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Summary 
 
On October 8th 2005 the villages surrounding Chinati bazaar in Bagh district of 
Pakistani-administered Kashmir (PaK) were hit by an earthquake measuring 7.6 on the 
Richter scale that affected the lives of more than 3.5 million people in PaK and Khyber 
Pukhtunkhwa. In this thesis I attempt to understand, through the stories and narratives 
of the people of Chinati bazaar, how they lived through, made sense of, and dealt with 
the earthquake and its aftermath. I use participant observation and conversations to tell 
the stories of those affected by the earthquake in their own voices as much as possible. 
The storytellers of the bazaar lived through two types of events: the earthquake itself 
and the post-earthquake rehabilitation and reconstruction process. The latter brought 
with it both positive and negative impacts: if, on the one hand, it brought progress and a 
new hope that life could be ‘Built Back Better’, on the other hand, it brought a different 
type of suffering – one that led to a loss of honour and dignity, resulted in social 
upheavals, and led to the exclusion and marginalization of certain groups. In this thesis I 
focus on both these ‘events’. 
Through these stories I build an argument about post-disaster discourses of change. I 
argue that while the narratives of the storytellers of Chinati bazaar posit the earthquake 
as a point of rupture in their confabulated stories, from which the collective memory of 
the bazaar dates its movement towards becoming modern and global, these changes 
have their origins instead in ‘bigger’ stories of modernisation and globalisation that pre-
date the earthquake and that highlight and emphasise more continuous processes of 
change that have been occurring over a longer period of time. In this thesis I analyse 
how these two competing discourses of rupture and dramatic change on the one hand, 
and slow, continuous change on the other, play out in the lives of the storytellers of 
Chinati Bazaar. 
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Chapter One 
The Earthquake and Discourses of Change in Pakistan-administered 
Kashmir: An Introduction 
Introduction 
It was November 2008 and I was driving carefully up the winding roads of Bagh district 
in Pakistani-administered Kashmir (PaK), the disputed territory that lies in the northeast 
of Pakistan and is administered by the centre as a special territory. It had rained that 
morning and driving my tiny rented Suzuki Mehran up steep wet roads was tricky work. 
I was heading to Chinati1 Bazaar, a small collection of buildings that sat atop one of 
Bagh district’s many hills and that was made up of greengrocers, a few general stores, 
restaurants and snack stands, a cobbler, a few tailors, two barber shops, two private 
schools and madrassahs, and an adda, or bus stand. This was my second trip in about a 
month. I had visited Chinati bazaar along with a few other parts of the district at the 
beginning of October when I had come here in search of a location for my doctoral 
research. The small bazaar along with the six villages that surrounded it, and which it 
served, seemed like the perfect setting for the questions I had in mind. I had spent a few 
days here talking to people then – some whom I had previously met when I conducted 
some fieldwork in these villages in the summer of 2006 – and was now heading back 
for a second, possibly longer, visit. 
It was just over three years to the day from the earthquake that had rocked this land on 
the morning of October the 8th 2005 and had wiped out large parts of it. The earthquake 
had measured 7.6 on the Richter scale, had taken more than 100,000 lives in the north of 
Pakistan, injured over 150,000 people, and caused immeasurable material losses in the 
affected regions in the form of lost homes, businesses, livestock and arable land. The 
earthquake had mainly affected PaK and Pakistan’s northern province, Khyber 
Pukhtunkhwa, but it had also caused damage all the way down in Islamabad, and had 
shaken me from my sleep in the centre of the country in Lahore. I had first come to 
PaK, to its Bagh district in particular, about a month after that day as part of a donor-
government effort to assess the extent of damage and loss caused by the earthquake, an 
evaluation that was to form the basis of a compensation programme. I visited the region 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Chinati is a pseudonym. To maintain confidentiality, the names of all the informants and villages 
discussed in this thesis are pseudonyms.	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many times over the following year, and the impression I left with each time was that of 
destruction, of immense loss, and of complete and total change that had been wrought 
on the people of this beautiful region within a few minutes on one cold October 
morning. The scenes I left behind after each visit consisted almost entirely of grey 
rubble and makeshift huts and tents that temporarily housed the residents of the many 
villages that dotted the green, thickly-wooded hills of Bagh district. 
When I had returned here a month ago, three years after the earthquake, the scene that 
had met my eyes was vastly different. As I drove down into the valley from Rawalakot 
city, I noticed that the green landscape around me was now dotted with colour – blue, 
red, emerald green, orange, yellow, purple and silver – the hillsides seemed to have 
come alive with every hue imaginable. It had taken me a while to realise that these 
brightly coloured spots were the rooftops of the new houses that had been constructed 
over the last few years. Where most houses had once had either brown thatched or grey 
cemented roofs before the earthquake, houses now had multicoloured roofs made of 
corrugated galvanised iron (CGI) sheets that had been a big part of the post-earthquake 
reconstruction efforts of both the state and non-state development agencies. Not only 
were they coloured but most were no longer the simple, gently sloped roofs that had 
always dotted these hills. Instead, these new roofs were intricately worked and 
decorated, some were shaped like Chinese pagodas, others were multi-layered, while 
some even had turrets on top. 
I had expected change in the region after the destruction wrought by the earthquake, but 
perhaps I had not imagined this. I was to find out later that these roofs were largely the 
result of changed and more stringent earthquake-resistant building laws that the 
government had instituted as pre-conditions to accessing compensation. As such, they 
represented a dramatic point of departure from the past. However, I was also to learn 
that these fancy roofs had also been made possible by older changes, such as the 
accumulation of wealth by the families of Bagh’s many migrants to the Gulf since the 
mid-1970s. While before the earthquake this accumulation had been expressed inside 
the house, mostly through a proliferation of electronic goods and other consumer items, 
the need to rebuild houses after the earthquake had given Bagh’s residents the 
opportunity to demonstrate their wealth and status, accumulated over an extended 
period of time, on the outside, observable by so many more people than before. In this 
the new roofs represented not just a point of dramatic departure, but also a more 
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continuous, less obvious, process of change that had been slowly occurring inside the 
house, unobserved by many until now. 
This leitmotif – of dramatic points of departure caused by the earthquake highlighting 
and emphasising more continuous processes of change that had been occurring over a 
longer period of time – was a constant that I was to come across again and again over 
the next few months. It was obvious even as I arrived in Chinati bazaar and was 
immediately pulled into the dense web of stories, myths, rumours and narratives that 
populated the bazaar through the day. Men from the surrounding six villages – that 
house most of the informants of this study – gather in the bazaar each day not just to 
exchange ‘things’ but to tell and exchange stories and to interpret the events that change 
their lives. It is in this bazaar that I will spend the rest of the year, listening to and 
recording these stories in order to understand how people interpret the catastrophe that 
hit their lives the morning of October the 8th 2005. 
As I drove up the steep, winding tar road into the bazaar, Hamza – my research assistant 
– and I headed for the top where the adda is and parked our car next to the commuter 
vans that leave for and arrive at regular intervals from Bagh city and the smaller 
Harighel town that lay en route to the city. From both urban centres passengers could 
change taxis and buses for other destinations like nearby Arja – the regional passport 
office for the district – Rawalakot and some major cities in Pakistan. We headed straight 
to Imtiaz’s shop that laid right in front of the adda, and that was a favourite gathering 
place for passengers waiting for their van to depart. I had met and been befriended by 
Imtiaz on my previous visit. He was a young shopkeeper from Sarian, one of the 
surrounding six villages, who had previously worked as a waiter in Lahore but had 
returned after the earthquake to help his family. His father had been a migrant worker in 
Kuwait and had built this shop with the money he had saved during that time. When his 
father passed away soon after the earthquake, Imtiaz decided not to return to Lahore and 
took over the shop instead. Over the next year we would spend a lot of time in this shop 
– not only was Imtiaz extremely entertaining and a great companion, but his shop was a 
good place to meet and have conversations with lots of other people through the day. 
Imtiaz had set up a bench outside his shop where people could wait for their van, and 
this bench stayed populated through the day. 
Today the bench had space for Hamza and me, and we soon got into a conversation with 
Imtiaz and his granduncle, also from Sarian, whose three sons were away working in 
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Saudi Arabia, and who spent his days chatting with Imtiaz at the shop. Within minutes 
Jafer saab,2 a Syed3 from Serabad, one of the six villages that lay just below the bazaar, 
passed by on his motorbike and stopped immediately to greet us. He was the principal 
of a public secondary school in Khorian, a village just slightly up the hill, and he had 
been one of my first contacts in the village because he was the brother-in-law of Ali 
Naqvi, an advocate in Bagh city, whom I had known since the days of the earthquake, 
my first gatekeeper in this area. Jafer saab greeted us and felt the need to introduce me 
again to Imtiaz’s granduncle as a ‘professor’ from Lahore who was here to write a book 
about the region and the earthquake. This introduction not only re-established Jafer 
saab’s central role within the ongoing activity but also categorised us as equals before 
the others, given our common teaching profession. 
At that moment, Omar, the local newspaper vendor, appeared at the shop. He had 
already completed his delivery rounds and stopped by now to check on our 
conversation. He had a reputation of being a jokester in the bazaar and spent much of 
his day moving from group to group, interjecting with funny yet incisive one-liners. At 
this moment his attention was focused on the fact that Imtiaz was spending more time 
playing with his mobile phone than in conversing with us, and said pointedly, “we 
didn’t have mobiles before and now look how common they are.” Omar was from the 
same middle-order biraderi as Imtiaz and his granduncle – they were all Mughals – but 
he was from a different village, Thial, that lay just north of Chinati. Imtiaz’s granduncle 
picked up on this comment and said to me, “A lot has changed since the earthquake. We 
shifted away from tradition; a lot of things that were gunnah [sinful] are now 
acceptable, like women working in NGOs and travelling alone.” Omar, now serious, 
added that before the earthquake only the ones that migrated had “access to tabdeeli 
(change)” but since the earthquake tabdeeli had come to the whole region. Jafer saab 
added that the earthquake and the post-earthquake aid had created a “huge shuffling of 
classes”, with people who used to be rich becoming poor and the poor becoming rich. 
Omar did not agree. According to him what had happened was that many people who 
had previously appeared to be poor because they lived in kaccha (non-cemented) 
houses, had actually just been “sitting on their money like snakes”,4 but after the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 A suffix added to the end of most names when referring to them to show respect. It is formally spelled 
as sahib in Urdu, but is pronounced as saab in most local dialects.	  
3 The uppermost biraderi/caste in the Pakistani Muslim social stratification system.	  
4 This is related to a local myth, where the king cobra sits on a pot of gold.	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earthquake they decided to make better pakka (cemented) houses with shôda 
(ostentatious) roofs. Imtiaz, raising his head for only a moment from his mobile, 
concurred by saying that there was nothing wrong with this; people wanted to become 
more developed, as “we are now becoming modern.” 
There, in Jafer saab and Omar’s disagreement, was my leitmotif – where Jafer saab saw 
a point of rupture, of a dramatic departure from the past caused by the earthquake, Omar 
saw a more continuous process of change that had only been made more visible by the 
earthquake. And there, in Imtiaz’s statement, lay the second leitmotif that I was to come 
across regularly over the next year – the earthquake as a point of rupture from which the 
collective memory of the bazaar dated its movement towards modernity. Through the 
web of stories, myths, narratives, and at times even rumours that are woven in this 
bazaar, I saw the change that the earthquake had brought about. But within these stories 
I also saw other stories of another type of more continuous change that was connected 
to the ‘bigger stories’ of modernisation and globalisation. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
In this section I explain the key concepts that guide my thesis. I start by situating the 
debate in disaster studies on change or continuity and offering a third view: that of 
continuity of change. I then look at ways we can frame people’s experiences through 
their narratives and storytelling, using particularly Veena Das’ (1995) work on ‘critical 
events’. Finally, these narratives were not only about the earthquake, but also about 
bigger stories of modernisation and globalisation. It is worth noting that this region has 
a long history of migration:5 before independence in 1947 it was an important recruiting 
ground for the Indian army, a breeding place for soldiers who fought in most fronts 
during World War II; from post-independence onwards the migration to urban Pakistan 
increased; and since the mid-1970s large numbers of men have been migrating to the 
Gulf. For this reason, I engage with the current literature on migration, modernisation 
and globalisation in the final part of this section. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 For further details, see Chapter Two.	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Disasters, Change and Continuity 
Despite a now sizeable literature on disasters and social change, the evidence of a 
relationship between them still remains weak (Hoffman, 1999; Stallings, 2006; Henry, 
2011). In the late 1970s Quarantelli and Dynes (1977: 34) noted that many researchers 
started adopting the principle of continuity, where “pre-disaster behaviour is probably 
the best indicator of trans- and post- disaster behaviour”. While there was “some 
evidence that disasters may, in some rare cases, contribute to change” (Nigg and 
Tierney, 1993: 2), many authors were of the opinion that, more than creating changes, 
disasters tended to accelerate or intensify pre-existing changes that were already 
underway. As several studies had shown, pre-disaster conditions influenced post-
disaster recovery, seen in people’s resilience and adaptive capacities (Bates and 
Peacock, 1987; Oliver-Smith, 1996; Morrow and Peacock, 1997, in Henry: 2011; 
Hoffman and Oliver-Smith, 1999). The aftermath of disasters is an arena for a struggle 
over redistribution of aid and power, often used by powerful groups to reinforce their 
power. As Hoffman (1999: 311) clearly states, “in response to challenges and 
contestation, disasters also often promote cultural preservation and resistance to 
change”, what Hoffman and Oliver-Smith (1999: 10) call ‘sociocultural persistence’. 
Overall, while acknowledging that there were some occasions where disasters generated 
social changes and groups could experience beneficial consequences from them, many 
researchers posited that “disasters contribute both to stability and to change, just as 
they generate both consensus and conflict” (Quarantelli and Dynes, 1977: 36). 
On the other side of the spectrum there is the prospect of disasters creating change: “not 
only are there significant alterations in society and culture after Atlas shrugs, but even 
after Atlas merely shudders” (Hoffman, 1999: 305). The propensity of disasters to affect 
societies’ ability to provide for the needs of their members paves the way for new 
arrangements to be formulated for those societies to continue to function (Oliver-Smith, 
1996). In Hoffman’s and Oliver-Smith’s (1999: 10) review of anthropological work on 
disasters they found clear evidence of disasters affecting the social, economic, cultural, 
religious spheres of people’s lives and they posit that “if not actual change, disasters 
certainly bring about the potential for change.” 
There is a third way of looking at the interaction between disasters, continuity, and 
change, to which I subscribe, that rather than getting stuck on a dualism of continuity or 
change, takes a different view and posits that disasters allow for a continuity of change. 
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For that though, one must first acknowledge that societies are not static, but constantly 
changing. Graeber (2001) states that this Heraclitan philosophy emphasising flux and 
change over stability could be seen in Bashkar’s critical realism. Bashkar (1998: 35) 
maintained that society was both “the ever-present condition (material cause) and the 
continually reproduced outcome of human agency.” According to him,  
“Society provides necessary conditions for intentional human action, and 
intentional action is a necessary condition for it. Society is only present in 
human action, but human action always expresses and utilises some or 
other social form. Neither can, however, be identified with, reduced to, 
explained in terms of, or reconstructed from the other.” (Bashkar, 1998: 37) 
He develops a ‘Transformational Model of Social Activity’ in which the emphasis on 
material continuity could sustain “a genuine concept of change, and hence of history” 
(Bashkar, 1998: 37). This concept of history is a Marxian one, in which “history is 
nothing but the succession of the separate generations, each of which exploits the 
materials, the capital funds, the productive forces handed down to it by all preceding 
generations, and thus, one the one hand, continues the traditional activity in completely 
changed circumstances and, on the other, modifies the old circumstances with a 
completely changed activity” (Marx and Engels, 1965, in: Bashkar, 1998: 73ft). 
Quarantelli (2005: 353) notes that of late several scholars saw disasters as “evolutionary 
manifestations of ever changing social systems.” As I mentioned previously, disasters 
and their aftermath are often arenas for contestation within societies and as such they 
are “great motivators of social action, and social action motivates change” (Hoffman, 
1999: 311). Recent anthropological research has confirmed the role of disasters in 
accelerating the processes of change that were already underway before a disaster 
(Oliver-Smith, 1996; Hoffman, 1999). 
There are other reasons for the continuity of this debate on disasters’ impact on change 
that need to be addressed. Since Prince’s (1920, in: Bates and Peacock, 1987) 
hypothesis that major catastrophes always create social change, in what was the first 
systematic study of disasters, research has both proved and refuted his stance. Firstly, 
while there are similarities in people’s experiences with disasters, there are several 
factors that differentiate them and need to be taken into account, including even the 
definition of disaster. Secondly, there are disciplinary differences within social 
scientists, not just methodological but also on what is the subject of study. Finally, there 
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is a timing issue, i.e., how far researchers go in the timeframe of the disaster and the 
affected populations, both historically (past) and within relief (immediate future), 
reconstruction and rehabilitation stages (future). I will further elaborate on these reasons 
in the following paragraphs. 
As Hoffman and Oliver-Smith (1999: 7-8) notice, there are some similarities in people’s 
experiences with reaction to and recovery from a disaster regardless of where it took 
place and of which kind of hazard: there are needs for shelter and sustenance; disaster 
victims tend to merge together into an ‘immediate unit’ which later on fragments; they 
interact with surrounding communities, aid agencies and governing forces; they search 
for meaning and explanation, bringing forth matters of religion and mortality; they 
express grief and mourning; relationships and allegiances change; and questions of 
resource sharing and inequality appear together with problems of self-interest versus 
community welfare. That said even the impact of a similar hazards, e.g. earthquakes of 
the same magnitude, can have different social effects, as often hazards are “not the most 
important elements in the disasters that occurred” (Quarantelli, 2005: 343). The reason 
for conflicting results often lies in an inconsistency surrounding the usage of the term 
‘disaster’ and a lack of specificity of the conditions in which social change can happen 
(Bates and Peacock, 1987). Following their research on the 1976 Guatemalan 
earthquake, Bates and Peacock (1987: 327) stated that “social change can reasonably 
be expected to result from disasters”, depending on “the disaster’s magnitude, the 
nature and quantity of external aid, and the duration of the restoration process.” Also 
intertwined with the magnitude of the disaster are the extent of the damage and the size 
of the population affected (Hoffman, 1999). Further factors play a role, including the 
sociocultural complexity and historical background of the community affected, and the 
extent of change one is looking for6 - major changes or small shifts, what Hoffman 
(1999: 308) calls “deep structure versus surface structure.” 
Within the social sciences the study of disasters has been largely dominated by 
sociologists who until the turn of the century posited that disasters cause little social 
change, although of late many started to consider them catalysts for social change. 
Somehow contradicting prior sociological thought anthropologists studying disasters 
approached human existence from a evolutionary point of view, spearheaded by Oliver-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 We also often overlook the positive aspects of disasters as Quarantelli (2005: 352) stated “in many 
cases, we do not find other than negative consequences because that is all we seek.”	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Smith’s usage of a political ecology approach, adding to it a level of historicity. More 
recently, the discussion has moved towards the relation of causality between pre-
existing socio-economic, political and institutional practices and disasters (Pelling, 
2003; Bankoff et al, 2004; Tierney, 2007), stemming from the work on risk, 
vulnerabilities and resilience by geographers such as Blaikie et al (1994). A key thought 
behind this perceived causality is the fact that social change often appears as both the 
agent of disaster as well as a solution to mitigate vulnerability, with the latter being 
“determined by social systems and power, not by natural forces” (Wisner et al, 2004: 
7). By bringing ‘vulnerability’ into the disaster equation7 “investigators began 
considerable assay into the long-term processes that lead to the imperilment of certain 
societies or segments of society” (Hoffman, 1999: 307). Today it is largely accepted that 
disasters are primarily the consequence of human action, that they are ‘social occasions’ 
(Quarantelli, 2005: 343). 
Finally, the timing of the research also has an impact on whether we see change or not, 
and if we do how much. A quarter of a century ago Bates and Peacock (1987) had 
already warned us that we needed to differentiate between temporary alterations in 
people’s behaviour caused by the disaster and its aftermath and more permanent ones 
post reconstruction. In the early days post-disaster changes seem major but over time 
they seem to lessen. As a result, victims and first-tier relief workers observe major 
changes as compared to more distant researchers, agents and non-affected citizens who 
often assume that little or no change has happened (Hoffman, 1999). Particularly within 
anthropology, Oliver-Smith (1996; and Hoffman, 2002) has been a proponent of 
disasters as potential factors in socio-economic and cultural change, especially during 
the reconstruction phase, as it is during this stage that much social and economic change 
occurs, with a convergence of (often foreign) people and goods which ultimately may 
even be “as great a source of stress and change as the disaster agent and destruction 
themselves” (Oliver-Smith, 1996: 313). In the case of large-scale disasters this 
reconstruction can last almost indefinitely, eventually linking disaster recovery to a 
larger ‘development’ project (Oliver-Smith, 1996; Quarantelli, 2005; Simpson, 2007). 
The first time I visited this region, a month after the earthquake, all I saw was 
destruction. Ten months later, when conducting a field survey on the impact of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Blaikie et al (1994) literally came up with an equation to evaluate disaster risk, whereby Risk = Hazard 
+ Vulnerability, later on revised to include resilience (Wisner et al, 2004) and therefore Risk = (Hazard x 
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earthquake on informal social protection mechanisms, I saw limited change. Three years 
after the earthquake, when I started my DPhil fieldwork, I saw continuity while most of 
my informants saw change. Six years later, while going through my fieldnotes and 
trying to make sense of the ‘bigger story’ I saw a continuity of change. After a disaster 
people recover and reconstruct, and while doing so they try to both recount and reinvent 
their cultural system (Hoffman and Oliver-Smith, 1999). As Oliver-Smith (1979: 96) 
says, “a disaster is a historical event - and the aftermath of disaster is process coming 
to grips with history.” For people in the villages surrounding Chinati bazaar the October 
2005 earthquake was an historical event, a critical event. But it was also an event 
through which other pre-existing events – part of the social, economic and cultural 
continuous change – were recounted and reinvented trying to form a whole. To examine 
how people’s experiences of such critical events are framed through narrative and 
storytelling I need to engage with the existing literature, particularly Das’ (1995) work, 
which I will do in the following section. 
 
Stories of the Earthquake: the narratives of critical events 
This research is based on stories of change that I was told or witnessed being told to 
others in the bazaar. Many of the stories were about the earthquake but many others 
were about other events, sometimes interconnected with stories of the earthquake. At 
times it seemed that some stories of the earthquake were in fact stories of other events. I 
contend that in a way, many stories of the earthquake were “particular stories which we 
might be able to use to connect to other bigger stories”, like Osella and Osella (2006: 
569) did while analysing how members of a ‘backward’ community in South India 
represented and made sense of their association with ‘modernity’ in the process of 
identity construction. White (2000: 5) in her work on vampire stories in Africa argues 
that the stories she was told with all their inaccuracies revealed the way Africans 
described colonial power and it was precisely these inaccuracies that gave us “a way to 
see the world the way storytellers did, as a world of vulnerability and unreasonable 
relationships.” Through narratives, myth-making and stories of change caused by the 
earthquake people in the bazaar described other changes. To understand how people in 
bazaar made use of these stories and how they connect to the ‘bigger stories’, I make 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Vulnerability) / Capacity.	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use of Veena Das’ (1995) seminal work Critical Events, as I infer that through these 
conversations, stories and narratives people in the bazaar recalled and retold not just the 
earthquake, but other critical events. Das (1995: 5) focuses on certain critical events of 
contemporary India to analyse various transformations which propelled people’s lives 
into “new and unpredicted terrains.” These critical events were recalled and retold not 
only by participants,8 but also by others – including the ‘community’, the state, and 
academia. After these events new modes of action came into being, redefining 
traditional categories as well as enabling a variety of political actors to acquire new 
forms. 
Jackson (2006: 33) asks what would happen to our capacity to tell stories when our 
lives were torn apart, for “while the need for stories is linked to the human need to be a 
part of some kindred community, this need is most deeply felt when the bonds of such 
belonging are violently sundered.” In her analysis, Das builds upon Loizos’ (1991, in: 
Das, 1995: 10) notion of ‘collective memories’ - which nation states ‘create, preserve, 
and recycle’ - by adding that such ideas are not only institutionalised by nation states, 
but at times also by communities which “in the process of their emergence as political 
actors, try to control and fix memory in much the same manner.” In trying to claim 
rights over its culture a community might try to ascertain “the right to institute memory 
in the form of the community’s history and the right to live by laws that regulate the 
personal life of its members” (Das, 1995: 13). I have found, throughout my 
conversations in the bazaars, similarities to her conclusion that, “as political actors, 
communities redefine themselves and are defined by others not by face-to-face relations 
but by (a) their right to define a collective past, a definition which homogenises the 
different kinds of memories preserved in different visions of the community;9 (b) the 
right to regulate the body and sexuality by the codification of custom;10 and (c) the 
consubstantiality between acts of violence and acts of moral solidarity”11 (Das, 1995: 
15). While doing so communities colonise the life-world of the individual just as the 
state colonises the life-world of communities. 
There is another important aspect of her work that I, try as I might, unfortunately could 
not cover which rendered this thesis incomplete. As it is obvious throughout this thesis 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Many of whom Das calls ‘victims’.	  
9 See Chapter Four’s narratives of a hierarchical past versus an egalitarian present, and Chapter Seven’s 
myth of self-sufficiency.	  
10 See Chapter Six on women’s mobility.	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the voices, stories, and narratives are mostly men’s, as the main site of my fieldwork 
was the bazaar, a male-dominated public sphere. Arendt (1958, in: Jackson, 2006: 18) 
argues that storytelling is a “strategy for transforming private into public meanings.” 
Das’ (1995) work shows that the concept of community hides an asymmetrical 
gendered worldview that divides the private and the public spheres, excluding women 
from the latter and therefore making the male voice the voice of the community. This is 
a reason why, throughout this thesis, we must not forget Jackson’s (2006: 11) assertion 
that “for every story that sees the light of day, untold others remain in the shadows, 
censored or suppressed.” 
Although incomplete, I still suggest that we take a look at people’s narratives for we 
might find pieces of the ‘bigger stories’ of continuous change that were recounted and 
reinvented at the bazaar. Bruner (1991: 4) says that “we organise our experience and 
our memory of human happenings mainly in the form of narrative – stories, excuses, 
myths, reasons for doing and not doing, and so on.” Narratives are accounts of 
particular events that occurred over time, vehicles rather than destinations, about people 
acting in a setting (Bruner, 1991). Mattingly (1998, in: Osella and Osella, 2006: 573) 
argues that sometimes life is actually like a story, where people live the story and make 
it move on, “trying to shape their story into a satisfying and positive one” turning 
events into ‘emplotted dramas.’ And we do not do this alone; we do it with others. 
Jackson (2006: 16) considers stories “a kind of theatre where we collaborate in 
reinventing ourselves and authorising notions, both individual and collective, of who we 
are.” We are both ‘who’ and ‘what’, actively participating in the making and unmaking 
of our world as well as suffering and being subjected to actions by others and 
circumstances that lie outside our control (Arendt, 1958, in: Jackson, 2006: 12). Like 
Mohammed Ahmed/Zahra’s story12 in Ben Jelloun’s The Sand Child (1985) Arendt 
(1958, in Jackson, 2006: 12) contends that the person who initiated and suffered the 
events recounted never remains the sole author of his/her own life story, as the story 
comes into being within an “already existing web of human relationships.” By 
constructing and sharing stories we are “affirming collective ideas in the face of 
disparate experiences” (Jackson, 2006: 18). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See Chapter Three on the earthquake and assistance.	  
12 The Sand Child is the story of Zahra, whose father, frustrated by not being able to have sons, decides to 
raise her as a boy, Mohammed Ahmed. The story is initially told at the bazaar by a wandering storyteller 
who claims to have access to Zahra’s diary. When the storyteller disappears, the listeners continue to 
meet and share their versions of how they think the story ends.	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We make sense of our lived experiences by trying to craft them into narrative forms 
(Osella and Osella, 2006), using stories to understand our social world (Carrithers, 
1995). Stories at times are counterfactual because they help us believe that “the world is 
within our grasp” (Jackson, 2006: 17). This does not mean that we deliberately tell false 
stories – as White (2000: 30) reminds us “true and false are historical and cultural 
constructions” – we tell stories that convey ideas and points. In her case (White, 2000: 
43), vampire stories revealed a way of talking about “the world of power and 
uncertainty which Africans have lived in this century” similar, to a certain extent, to 
Das’ (1995) stories which revealed how critical events shaped and transformed Indian 
contemporary society. When we are reconstituting events in a story we are actively 
reworking them (Jackson, 2006). Bruner (1991) argues that there is always some 
measure of agency present in narrative, which Jackson (2006) says is a vital human 
strategy in the face of disempowering circumstances. What these authors are saying is 
that “narrative is action and that action proceeds via narrative” (Osella and Osella, 
2006: 582). These narratives though, as I mentioned above, are not produced by 
individuals alone but while interacting with others; they are ‘confabulated’ and 
‘confabricated’ (Carrithers: 1995: 275). The stories that I heard at the bazaar were 
confabulations and confabrications of social life in the region. They were stories of and 
about the earthquake, woven together into a lihaaf (quilt cover), inside which was a 
razai (quilt) of other, bigger stories of and about modernisation and globalisation that 
covered their lives. 
 
The Bigger Stories: migration, modernisation and globalisation 
These bigger stories were about modernisation and globalisation. Or, to be precise, 
they were about ‘myths’ surrounding local people’s encounters with modernisation 
and globalisation projects. Ferguson (1999: 13) uses the term ‘myth’ to describe 
modernisation in two senses: myth as a belief based in an inaccurate account of 
events, which he says the modernisation theory always was; and myth as “a 
cosmological blueprint that lays down fundamental categories and meanings for 
the organisation and interpretation of experience”, which persists and continues to 
influence people’s experiences and interpretations of their lives. Several other 
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authors13 (Escobar, 1995; Rahnema and Bawtree, 1997) have shown how the 
narrative of modernisation, which with time morphed into ‘development’, was an 
illusion, a myth of the first kind. Flawed as they were, modernisation and 
development narratives had been accepted (at times with religious fervour) as 
‘truths’ until the last decade not only by academics and policy-makers, but by the 
general public as well. While most academics and some policy-makers now refute 
these narratives, as Osella and Osella (2006: 584) demonstrate “versions of the 
global narrative of modernisation [still] endure at the popular level.” Likewise, 
stories of change at the bazaar were punctuated by the myths of modernisation (of 
Ferguson’s second kind), with expressions such as ‘being modern’ and ‘becoming 
modern’ used to explain – and even justify – change. While hearing these stories I 
noticed that though some narrators talked about ‘becoming modern’ submissively – 
as an unavoidable yet unwanted destiny – others spoke of it teleologically. 
Although a generational gap contributed to these ways of talking about 
modernisation, there was another factor of differentiation, namely that those who 
directly profited from the expansion of global capitalism had a “clear attachment 
to values of modernity” (Osella and Osella, 2006: 578). 
In a region so desperately ignored by the state, historically always located at the 
periphery (Ballard, 2004), migration was seen as the key to engage with this 
modernisation project. The larger project of ‘becoming modern’, as I will show 
throughout this thesis, entailed claims of living in a modern (egalitarian and 
educated) society, having a modern (nuclear) family, and engaged in modern 
(tertiary) occupations. This larger mythical modernisation project was punctuated 
by a series of other myths, seen as key ingredients of the global recipe: the myth of 
equality, seen in claims about the decreasing importance of biraderi in networks 
and social arrangements of mutual support (Chapter Four); the myth of the end of 
the extended family, speared by the post-earthquake housing reconstruction 
(Chapter Five); the myth of the empowered women, seen in male discourses about 
the changing position of women in society (Chapter Six); the myth of the modern 
mobile individual, explained through the perceived increase of women’s physical 
mobility (Chapter Six) and men’s detachment from the land and decreasing 
importance of agriculture (Chapter Seven). This project though, was not to be done 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Often labeled as ‘post-development thinkers’.	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without suffering – and we can see painful reminders of this suffering in their 
mythical construction of loss: the loss of tradition (of foods, occupations, family 
values), of (agricultural) self-sufficiency, and ultimately – due to the earthquake – 
of lives. Cutting across these myths was the myth of the earthquake as the point of 
departure from the past towards a modern present. The earthquake, as I explain in 
Chapter Three, was not seen as a sole key event but two – it had a dual feature, at 
times representing itself as the ‘earthquake-event’ while other times becoming a 
metaphor for the (post-earthquake) ‘assistance-event’. 
While human history is filled with accounts of migration and change worldwide (Wolf, 
1982) until the 1960s anthropologists, like other social scientists, tended to see 
migration through the lenses of modernisation theory (Ferguson, 1999; Gardner, 2012). 
Often portrayed as a dualistic divide between urban-modern and rural-traditional, these 
‘myths’ dominated discussions of migration for many decades, reflecting dominant 
ideas of progress, modernisation and development (Lewis, 2005; Gardner, 2012). The 
developmentalist optimist of the 1950s and 1960s was counteracted by a more negative 
view in the 1970s and 1980s, when several authors brought forth the fact that in many 
instances migration undermined local economies: by ‘taking away’ their most valuable 
labour force; increasing their dependence on core regions (for accessing labour and 
commodities); and creating a culture of migration, where younger generations felt they 
only had a future if they became migrants (de Haas, 2010). Particularly important was a 
piece by Lipton (1980), in which he finds a negative impact of rural to urban migration 
on rural productivity and income distribution. In this article he states that often migrants 
are the main agricultural innovators (who have now left the region) and that remittances 
are highly fungible, inasmuch as they are mostly used to pay off debts, for everyday 
consumption, and to finance other family members’ migration, rather than used to invest 
– in other words, they are used more for capital transfer than capital creation. Many of 
these findings reverberate the situation existent in PaK, where there is a missing 
ingredient in the migration-development formula: that of the state. De Haas (2010) 
bring forth the crucial role the state has in shaping favourable conditions for 
development to occur – migration and remittances can only contribute for local 
development if states implement social and economic reforms, i.e., development is a 
prerequisite for migrant investment rather than a consequence of migration (de Haas, 
2010). 
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The 1990s and 2000s saw the appearance of a more nuanced optimistic view where 
migration is seen as part of a larger livelihood strategy to spread income risks and 
improve social and economic status, overcoming developmental constraints in the place 
of origin (de Haas, 2010). Gardner (2012: 7) argues that anthropologists have rejected 
modernisation theory and points out to recent ethnographies of migration which show 
“complex relationships among underlying economic structures and ideologies, which 
link movement to urban or industrial centres with modernity and upwards social 
mobility”, yet she warns us that much of what is written about migration is still haunted 
by its assumptions. I believe that this haunting stems, to a certain extent, from a 
complex relationship between anthropology and development, where anthropologists 
have taken and still take three intermingling positions in relation to development: that of 
‘antagonistic observers’, ‘reluctant participants’, and ‘engaged activists’ (Lewis, 2005). 
De Haas (2010: 240) reminds us that we need to contextualise migration, as “the 
heterogeneity of real-life migration-development interactions is too high to fit them into 
deterministic theoretical schemes predicting the development outcome of migration.” At 
the same time that ‘post-development’ came into being, social scientists started to focus 
on the “movement of people between places and the social processes which bind 
them together”, rather than studying migrant communities as fixed locations 
(Gardner, 2012: 11). It was the literary birth of the ‘transnational migrant’ (Levitt, 
2001; Vertovec, 2009; Gardner, 2012). Of late, migration is also being analysed through 
a new lens, that of globalisation. Opposite to transnationalism, which “calls attention to 
the cultural and political projects of nation-states”, globalisation processes are seen as 
more abstract, less institutionalised and less intentional, situated outside the sphere of 
nations (Kearney, 1995: 548). De Haas (2010) states that the shifts in the migration and 
development discourse of the past 50-odd years are part of more general paradigm shifts 
in social and development theory, and as such the latest discourse – on migration and 
globalisation – cannot be separated from a larger dominant neoliberal discourse. 
Neoliberalism is often used to refer to the recent capitalist globalisation, where 
individuals are free to participate in markets and markets are free to act unimpeded by 
the state (Kingfisher and Maskovsky, 2008). But as several authors note (Kingfisher and 
Maskovsky, 2008; Peck and Tickell, 2002), neoliberalism is not an end-state, a thing 
that acts in the world, but a process. Yet, many representations of neoliberalism and 
globalisation today still portray them as naturalised, external forces, linked to tendencies 
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towards homogenisation, convergence and levelling out a worldwide playing field, with 
unambiguous causal efficacy (Peck and Tickell, 2002). Central in this discourse is the 
role that ‘community’ plays – or, as some authors argue (Elyachar, 2003; Peck and 
Tickell, 2002), has been co-opted and appropriated to play – part of an entrepreneurial 
model where it replaces the state in the responsibility for welfare and distribution 
(Kingfisher and Maskovsky, 2008) and where migration and remittances exemplify the 
principle of self-help (de Haas, 2010). This situation is more extreme in many parts of 
South Asia, where many elements of neoliberalism existed before the event of 
neoliberalism itself. Chatterjee (2004, in: Cross, 2010: 367) claims that most Indians do 
not enjoy the inalienable rights, entitlements and status associated with citizenship as 
they are “first and foremost political subjects, who must struggle to achieve recognition 
as citizens by making claims on government”, which leads Cross (2010: 370) to say that 
“in India the de jure neoliberal exception is the de facto political and economic norm.” 
Still, there is somehow a legacy of a welfarist Neruvian state in India, which in 
Pakistan, apart from a brief moment in history during Bhutto’s regime, and in peripheral 
areas like PaK never existed – many of the broad economic changes and ideological and 
political practices of governance that characterise neoliberalism were already present. 
Accordingly, although discussions of globalisation might appear recent, Tsing (2000) 
argues that they are not and Ferguson (1999: 256) warns us that this ‘brave neoliberal 
future’ “bears an unsettling resemblance to the past.” In her seminal work on The 
Global Situation, Tsing (2000: 330) examines the allure of social science 
globalisms, by which she means the “endorsements of the importance of the 
global.” She argues that the multireferenciality of globalism – “part corporate 
hype and capitalist regulatory agenda, part cultural excitement, part social 
commentary and protest” – makes us assume that this ‘global’ is new (Tsing, 
2000: 332). But as seductive as global newness can be it creates distorted 
stereotypes of the past. Rather than looking for “world-wrapping evolutionary 
stages, logics, and epistemes”, she asks us instead to find and describe what she 
calls ‘projects’, “relatively coherent bundles of ideas and practices as realised in 
particular times and places” (Tsing, 2000: 347), just like Kingfisher and Maskovsky 
(2008: 118) ask us to “focus instead on concrete projects that account for specific 
peoples, institutions, and places.” Like many anthropologists today are able to 
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critically distance themselves from modernisation, we also need this critical 
distance while studying globalisation (Tsing, 2000: 351). 
In the new globalisms interconnection – created through circulation – is everything 
(Tsing, 2000: 336). Tsing (2000: 336) equates ‘circulation’ to the notions of 
capitalist penetration espoused in dependency theory and some kinds of world-
systems theory but with a glossy make-over, whereby policies of domination and 
discrimination are justified by “the equalities and opportunities of circulation and 
exchange.” By focusing on circulation we see the movement of people, things, 
ideas, and institutions, glossing over “how this movement depends on defining 
tracks and grounds or scales and units of agency” (Tsing, 2000: 337), for “what 
we have come to call globalisation is not simply a process that links together the 
world but also one that differentiates it” (Ferguson, 1999: 243). For instance, 
migrant ‘flows’ are movements “stimulated through [and contingent upon] 
political and economic channels” (Tsing, 2000: 338), and not free for all: 
“movement is controlled by states and global finance” (Gardner, 2012: 14). Similar 
to Osella and Osella (2008: 325) I also find Tsing’s work useful to see the 
production of narratives on ‘being modern’ at the bazaar not as “the product of a 
contradiction or a break or even an interaction between a ‘global force’ acting on 
a ‘local place’.” 
 
Argument – The Continuity of Change 
The 1755 earthquake and tsunami that hit Lisbon on All Saint’s Day was an important 
event discussed throughout Enlightened Europe. It made people like Voltaire, Kant and 
Rousseau question matters of the sublime, theodicy, and man’s relation with nature. It 
contributed to the beginning of modern seismology and earthquake engineering. A 
quarter of a millennium later the ‘collective memory’ of that earthquake is that it made 
Lisbon a ‘modern capital’ – just like the rest of Europe – with its crisscrossed 
downtown, commercial buildings, wide avenues and its Pombalin14 architecture. When 
we travel through Bagh district today, what we see are the new earthquake-resistant 
houses with their colourful roofs, the new hospitals and schools, the widened tarred 
roads, and the ever-growing bazaars. In both cases what we see of the earthquakes’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Named after the Marquis of Pombal, the prime minister of the kingdom in charge of the reconstruction.	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aftermath are indications of belonging to a modern, global project - of connection and 
circulation, of networks and exchange. 
After a disaster, such as the 2005 earthquake in PaK, people recover and reconstruct 
and, while doing so, they recount and reinvent their cultural system (Hoffman and 
Oliver-Smith, 1999). In the case of PaK, people’s stories and narratives of the 
earthquake appeared to use the rupture of the earthquake to break away from the past 
and reinvent the future. However, a closer look at their discourses often revealed that in 
their narratives the past was often reinvented. This reinvention was confabulated and 
confabricated into a ‘collective memory’ in order to reclassify people of PaK as modern 
and global, as well as ‘different’ – different from ‘the other Kashmir’, different from 
Pakistan. That is not to deny that changes occurred – the region now has new 
earthquake-resistant building codes, better means of telecommunication, an increased 
proportion of foreign labour force, and other aspects of progress and ‘modernity’. 
However, one of the toughest dilemmas that I had to face as an anthropologist was to 
navigate between stories and measurable change: were these stories about people’s 
perceptions or real change? What could I see in their stories, narratives, myths, 
discourses: change or continuity? At first glance what was immediately visible was 
change brought by the earthquake, but once we deconstruct their narratives about this 
change, what we start to see are more complex, more continuous changes inside that 
have been going on for a longer period of time – about migration, modernisation and 
globalisation. 
While the study of populations affected by a disaster needs to be historically grounded, 
in order to get a better picture of the impact of the disaster on the communities I suggest 
that we should go a step further and take a Heraclitan view of change – of continuity of 
change. In this region, changes occurred because of the earthquake but many other 
changes had happened before the earthquake, and these became entangled with the post-
earthquake changes in their stories. At times it seemed almost as though the earthquake 
was being used as a ‘authentication stamp’ for previous changes that had been occurring 
over a period of time preceding the disaster. By seeing the lives of individuals, as well 
as of communities, in flux, we get a better picture of how communities reinvent 
themselves following a disaster. The earthquake as a hazard brought a rupture, a halt 
into this continuous change allowing for a moment of reflection. Through stories of 
change people at the bazaar tried to make sense of events, tried to deal with trauma, and 
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tried to make political arguments. Like some of the communities studied by Das’ 
(1995), they tried to redefine – and reclassify – themselves through their right to define 
a collective past, one of a hierarchical and self-sufficient society, but also through their 
right to define a collective future where – through modernisation and globalisation – 
their society was becoming equal and transnational. They also tried to redefine 
themselves through “the right to regulate the body and sexuality by the codification of 
custom”, by bringing forth the high incidence of love marriages as accepted custom, as 
well as by trying to regulate women’s mobility. While doing so they colonised the life-
world of the individual. Nowhere is this more visible than in the interspersed female 
silences within the ‘bigger stories’, for the bazaar is a public space and as such a male-
dominated one. 
By positioning ourselves to see social and cultural life as a continuity of change we can 
understand how people at the bazaar authenticated previous changes through their 
stories of the earthquake. For people in the bazaar the earthquake was a critical event, 
but also one through which other critical events were constantly relived, recounted, and 
reinvented. By positioning ourselves to see social and cultural life in terms of a 
continuity of change we can also discern that the confabulated narratives on ‘being 
modern’ at the bazaar were not a product of contradictions or ruptures caused by global 
forces acting on local places. Instead, the bazaar was a place that was both ‘global’ and 
‘local’. For instance, the housing reconstruction that took place could have never 
happened if not for their transnational links to global capitalism. The amount of aid 
given by Pakistan’s ‘strategic allies’ would have been much smaller if not for a nearby 
‘war on terror’. The influx of international assistance though, might have been better 
coordinated, targeted, and distributed if not for this region’s historical seclusion and 
peripheral status. 
My main argument in this thesis, therefore, is summarised by the two leitmotifs present 
in the story with which I started. The earthquake is a point of rupture in the 
confabulated stories of my informants, from which the collective memory of the bazaar 
dates its movement towards becoming modern and global. At the same time, the events 
surrounding the earthquake also serve to highlight and emphasise more continuous 
processes of change that have been occurring over a longer period of time. Both 
leitmotifs are constants that I came across over and over in the stories told at the bazaar. 
They were also visible in the dynamics of social hierarchy, in the houses they built, in 
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intra-family relations, in the mobility of women, and in their livelihood strategies. I 
discuss each of these areas of change separately in the chapters of this thesis to show 
how the two competing dynamics of rupture and modernisation on the one hand and 
slow, continuous change on the other play out in the lives of the storytellers of Chinati 
Bazaar. 
Though not the main focus of my analysis, throughout this thesis I also pay special 
attention to elements of exclusion and inclusion to show variations in people’s 
experience of the earthquake and its aftermath, and to show that not everyone benefits 
equally from the project of ‘modernity’. In the study of a disaster it is not uncommon 
for the voices of the excluded not to be heard. Tsing (2000) alerts us to the fact that at 
times what we do not see – and often do not hear – are the ‘policies of domination and 
discrimination’ that control the connection, circulation and exchange. In the Portuguese 
‘collective memory’ we do not hear how important colonisation was to this project; in 
the bazaars of Bagh district the voices of those who do not get access to (Gulf) 
migration are at times silenced from the bigger ‘collective memory’. In this thesis, I 
remain aware of the fact that for every element of inclusion there is an element of 
exclusion. As Ferguson (1999: 238) reminds us “disconnection, like connection, implies 
a relation and not the absence of a relation.” As such the continuous creation and 
recreation of relationships before and after the earthquake is an important part of my 
analysis. The stories told at the bazaar show that migrant flows are contingent upon and 
stimulated through political and economic channels, as several authors argue (Tsing, 
2000; Gardner, 2012). Likewise, through these stories we can also see how post-disaster 
assistance flows were also stimulated through and contingent upon these same channels. 
This was evident in the way caste, kin, and family relationships were continuously 
important arenas of struggle to access different forms of capital before and after the 
earthquake. As we will see in the stories told at the bazaar this struggle was not new, but 
one to which the earthquake gave new significance. 
 
Methodology 
Despite the usefulness of questionnaires and surveys, “the actual process by which 
people and communities respond to risk, threat, vulnerability, impact, and recovery are 
best understood through on-site ethnographic research” (Oliver-Smith and Hoffman, 
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2002: 12). After surveying the region since the onset of the earthquake and the 
subsequent relief efforts, I felt that surveys and questionnaires only gave me a limited 
view of the impact of these events on people’s lives in Pakistan-administered 
Kashmir.15 That was one of the main reasons why I felt that my research following the 
events of October 2005 would be better handled through an anthropological perspective, 
and therefore I enrolled for a DPhil in Social Anthropology. Due to the dearth of 
research on PaK, both on the region and its people, I felt that I could contribute to start 
filling this knowledge gap by conducting ethnographic research on the region. At the 
same time, I felt that a nomothetic enquiry would contribute even more than an 
idiographic one. According to Radcliffe-Brown (in: Ingold, 2008: 70) “an idiographic 
inquiry aims to document the particular facts of past and present lives, whereas the aim 
of nomothetic inquiry is to arrive at general propositions or theoretical statements.” 
This was my second reason, as “anthropology is an inquiry into the conditions and 
possibilities of human life in the world; it is not (…) the study of how to write 
ethnography, or of the reflexive problematics of the shift from observation to 
description” (Ingold, 2008: 89). 
Anthropology is also “a practice of observation grounded in participatory dialogue” 
(Ingold, 2008: 87), for “any study of human beings must also be a study with them” 
(Ingold, 2008: 83). As such, the defining feature of my research was participant 
observation and within it I made use of unstructured interviews, direct observation, life 
stories, and, as much as I could, participating in ‘local life’. In Bagh district and 
throughout most Pakistan-administered Kashmir (PaK) life, particularly public life, in 
centred around the bazaar. In this district, characterised by high numbers of migrants to 
the Gulf, many of the rural bazaars are places that are both ‘global’ and ‘local’. Many 
shopkeepers are returned Gulf migrants who upon return often decide to invest their 
savings in opening a shop. Many other shopkeepers have never migrated before, or 
migrated ‘only’ to Pakistan, but even they at times benefit from the assistance of kin 
and relatives in the Gulf in opening up a shop. The presence of such an eclectic number 
of people with different worldviews – for these bazaars are a world of men who have 
been everywhere, places where people, things, and ideas pass through – gives to these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 This did not mean that throughout my fieldwork I did not make use of questionnaires. In the summer of 
2009 I trained and supervised a group of male students from LUMS to assist me in conducting a short 
survey on the impact of the earthquake in the urban and rural bazaars of Rawalakot, Bagh, Harighel, and 
Chinati.	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rural bazaars a feel of ‘being global’ in an otherwise highly secluded region. One of the 
many unwanted consequences of the territorial dispute between India and Pakistan over 
Kashmir is that PaK was, until the earthquake, a secluded and militarised region of 
which the world knew little about16.  
The main site of my fieldwork was one such rural bazaar located on the southern part of 
Bagh district, an area I had previously surveyed in August 2006. At approximately one-
hour drive from Bagh city to the north and one-hour drive to Rawalakot to the south, 
Chinati bazaar stood on the top of a hill surrounded by six villages. These villages were 
dispersed settlements (mohallahs) belonging to three different revenue villages 
(mauzas) and part of Bagh’s southernmost Tehsil. On average each settlement had more 
than 100 houses post-earthquake, of which a significant number was still being 
reconstructed at the time of my fieldwork. The tarred approach to Chinati from the main 
Bagh-Rawalakot road, through mostly pine forest sparsed by dispersed settlements, took 
approximately 15 to 30 minutes, depending on the type of car and weather conditions, 
with occasional small landslides slowing down the uphill drive during the rainy seasons. 
Composed of about 60 shops mostly running parallel to the main tarred road, Chinati 
bazaar was not more than a quarter of a century old. The vast majority of these shops 
were small groceries and general stores, with shopkeepers mostly involved in petty 
trade. The bazaar also had a mosque and a madrassah run by a local maulvi from a 
nearby village, where people from the surrounding villages congregated specially for 
Friday prayers. As such, the busiest days at the bazaar were Fridays and religious 
holidays. In Chinati most of the shopkeepers were returned migrants – either from the 
Gulf or from Pakistan. This made Chinati, like other rural bazaars in the district, both 
‘local’ and ‘global’. Conversations at the bazaar ranged from local discussions on the 
price of sugar or the lack of rain, to worldwide events such as the Dubai financial crisis 
or the Copenhagen Climate Conference of 2009. Often these topics were intertwined - 
for instance the impact of US industrialisation on climate change and the lack of rain - 
and hotly debated and contested, as they felt affected by both local and global events. 
Chinati bazaar was also a place of storytelling and confabulation. In fact, it was the 
place of storytelling and confabulation, where stories, myths, and narratives of the 
earthquake and other events were told and retold, created and recreated as part of a 
project of creating a ‘collective memory’. But the fact that Chinati was a public space 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Where foreigners were not generally allowed in unless they had a No Objection Certificate (NOC). 
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meant that it was a space denied to women, which, in a way, make my account of these 
stories, myths, and narratives incomplete. 
I conducted my fieldwork in Chinati bazaar and its surrounding villages from 
September 2008 until March 2010. Due to security concerns following the Mumbai 
attacks of November 2008, I relocated my field research to Lahore in December 2008 
where I started interviewing PaK migrants in the city. But, as by March 2009 the 
situation became ‘safe’ again, I returned to Chinati. Due to a lack of accommodation in 
the villages, as most houses were still being reconstructed and as a non-related male I 
could not live with families, I lived in hotels in Bagh and Rawalakot cities and drove 
daily to Chinati where I spent the day conversing with people. Living in Bagh and 
Rawalakot also allowed me to engage in conversations with some urban residents, 
namely the owners, managers, and workers of the hotels where I stayed, government 
bureaucrats, NGO workers, and some local influentials. This interaction gave my 
research a regional flare and contributed to my analysis by helping me situate the stories 
I heard in Chinati within the larger stories told in the region. Once a month I would 
move to Lahore for a week for family reasons, where I would work on my field notes 
and conduct secondary research having access to my university’s library. In Lahore I 
also discussed my field conversations and general life in Pakistan, as well as my 
‘theories’, with my colleagues at the university, to which I am eternally indebted. The 
unstructured interviews that I conducted during my fieldwork were, similar to Gudeman 
and Rivera (1990), conversations. The idea was not to have just interviews with 
different informants and observe their everyday activities (and try to participate in 
some), where often one is more concerned in making sure one is ‘getting it all’, but to 
engage in long, relaxed conversations. I noticed from my previous fieldwork in the 
region that it was relatively easy to engage in conversations, as many locals were eager 
simply to talk and discuss their experiences, views and thoughts on life before and after 
the earthquake. Unfortunately back then I was time-constrained, as I had to finish 
surveys and questionnaires and ‘head back’ to Pakistan. This time though, I stayed 
longer. 
During my fieldwork in PaK I was always accompanied by one research assistant, 
occasionally two, who helped me with translations and with whom I engaged in 
discussing the daily conversations we had at the bazaar. Throughout, I had in total five 
research assistants, four male and one – at the later stages as I tried to get access to 
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women’s stories – a female. These assistants were all my former students at the Lahore 
University of Management Sciences (LUMS), where I was a faculty member between 
2003 and 2007, and during which time I ran a series of post-earthquake surveys in the 
earthquake-affected regions. Three of these research assistants had in fact accompanied 
me in previous field trips to PaK. The reason for this high turnover of research 
assistants was that two of them were accepted at different universities abroad for a 
Masters programme and a third one, despite having a job in Lahore, simply liked this 
region and to be involved in this research and therefore would join me at every 
opportunity. Like Gudeman and Rivera (1990: 5) my research assistants and I created a 
‘conversational community’ in which our car “became not only our means of transport 
but a mode of inquiry17 and a marker of” this community. Particularly while driving 
back home to the hotel after field conversations, we would engage in discussions of 
what we thought had just heard and observed. Again, like Gudeman and Rivera (1990: 
6) “translation was only one of several tasks we undertook within our conversational 
community. More often that we would like to admit, each of us had missed something 
the other had heard, or heard the ‘same thing’ differently. This was disorienting and 
humiliating, because it meant that ‘facts’ were not external pillars of knowledge but 
partly constructed through our success in persuading one another, and our ability to 
listen too (…) so our continuous ‘review’ in the car and elsewhere had for us an 
‘interpretive’ as well as a ‘verification’ function, in some sense of those terms.” 
Another advantage of our conversational community was the fact that my research 
assistants knew ‘Pakistani culture’ - and more precisely ‘Punjabi culture’ - from 
growing up in it. Often this knowledge was voiced when I questioned the use of a word, 
expression, or practice which I did not fully understand, as a sizeable part of these 
conversations were around the meaning behind words, expressions, and practices and to 
reflect not just on their stories, but also in the words that they used to tell those stories. 
While unstructured interviews through conversations had the advantage of allowing 
informants the freedom to talk about what mattered to them (or what they felt we were 
interested in listening to), semi-structured interviews were quite useful when there were 
topics I wanted to discuss, without the constraint of having a structured questionnaire; 
informants often moved away from the topic (and brought up things I never thought of 
asking), but we could then slowly bring them back to the main topics I wanted to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 By conducting conversations while giving lifts.	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discuss. Quite a few of these semi-structured interviews – as it also happened with 
unstructured ones – became focus groups, as other informants joined the conversations 
with their views, opinions, and stories. I found family histories (Miller, 2007) and life 
event analyses (Whitehead, personal communication) were great exercises to look at 
which were the main moments of people’s lives. By asking “what were the key turning 
points in your life” gave me an idea of not only individual’s key moments in life, but 
also if they shared these moments with others, how were they perceived by different 
family members, why some were more important than others, and so on. Finally, 
another exercise which I conducted with selected informants was a ranking exercise, 
more precisely the ranking of biraderis. The aim of this exercise was to see how 
different people related their biraderis in regard to other biraderis that they were in 
contact with. I started by putting on a table (or floor) all the biraderis that I knew, with 
a biraderi name per card (in Urdu). I then asked the informant to indicate which 
biraderis he had heard of/interacted with (which stayed in the table) and ask if there 
were any missing ones. We then started ordering the biraderis according to his idea of 
how they were ranked, while asking questions about their location, origins, similarities, 
what was allowed to do across biraderis (e.g. marriage, loans), and why were they 
ranked this way. I would finish the exercise by asking why was there such a ranking. 
PaK is a politically-sensitive region. There were a few times when some people thought 
I was a ‘Pakistan agent’, that is, someone who would report back to Pakistani 
intelligence agencies what they were saying. The constraints of conducting research in 
such politically-sensitive region which also had recently suffered from a post-
earthquake survey-fatigue, as well as to try to make informants more ‘at ease’ and 
relaxed, made me devise what I call the ‘pelican method’ of note-taking. This entailed 
not having anything visible in our hands to record the conversations – no notebooks, 
papers, or tape recorders – and, like a pelican who fishes to eat later, carefully listening 
to what people were saying, quickly writing key notes on our mobiles either at lunch or 
while walking between houses or shops and then write them down back at the hotel. 
Usually during and after dinner we would discuss what we had heard and observed 
during the day, including what each of us had missed or heard differently as well as the 
meaning behind words, expressions, and practices. I would then write down these 
discussions and observations on my notebooks and/or computer. I found this method to 
work quite well as there were always at least two (sometimes three) listeners and 
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observers and, as fieldwork progressed, our memorising skills had improved 
considerably. 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is arranged in eight chapters, including the Introduction and the Conclusion. 
Following this Introduction, where I have set my argument within a larger framework, 
Chapter Two sets the scene by providing a historical overview of the region and its 
inhabitants. In this overview I provide some basic information about the bazaar and its 
surrounding villages. I focus mostly on the bazaar, a place that is both global and local, 
where things and people pass through, as this was the (public and male-dominated) 
place of storytelling and confabulation. In Chapter Three I narrate how people in PaK – 
starting in the capital and ending in the bazaar – lived through the earthquake of 
October 2005 and subsequent days, how they rationalised this event and its aftermath, 
and describe the discourses on post-earthquake change that I heard at the bazaar. I then 
examine the impact of the arrival of outside assistance and how this assistance was 
provided with all its problematics. I end the chapter explaining how people retold their 
suffering and relived the earthquake through their everyday lives. 
The following four chapters contain the bulk of my argument, and are presented as a 
series of stories about change in Chinati bazaar in the aftermath of the earthquake of 
October 2005. These stories constitute the main discourses on change that I was told or 
that I heard at the bazaar, and that I realised were the main vehicles through which its 
people framed and made sense of the events and trauma that they had recently lived 
through. I divide these narratives into four main areas that, according to the people of 
Chinati bazaar, had seen the most change post-earthquake. These are: (a) social 
stratification, (b) the house and family structure, (c) women’s mobility and work, and 
(d) agriculture and livelihoods. I sequence the narratives and chapters in this order so as 
to start with the largest social configuration – the system of social stratification – and 
then zoom in sequentially to first the family and household, and then to the women who 
live within these households, before finally looking at the impact of all this on the 
livelihood patterns of these households. 
Specifically, in Chapter Four I investigate how people negotiate between moralities of 
equality and the realities of hierarchy. I draw on the earthquake and the events that 
followed, namely access to relief and reconstruction aid, to analyse the extent of change 
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in social stratification within their society. Chapter Five deals with a series of discourses 
on change surrounding the house – both the physical structure and the home within it. I 
investigate the reasons for perceptions of a drastic increase in housing units following 
housing reconstruction, along with the myth of the breakdown of the joint family. As 
the earthquake allowed people to rebuild houses in different ways, I question if it also 
allowed people to rebuild relationships differently. The backdrop of Chapter Six are 
men’s stories at the bazaar of the way women’s lives changed after the earthquake. In 
this chapter I am not representing women’s experiences, but instead how men talked 
about women’s mobility and access to work outside the house to discuss change. Within 
a large spectrum of views there were two main discourses at the bazaar: one linking 
women’s mobility to immorality and social breakdown, and an opposite one linking 
women’s mobility to empowerment and ‘being modern’. I finish these series of stories 
in Chapter Seven by analysing another set of narratives about the demise of agriculture 
in this region. In this chapter I explore the ways people conceptualised and (dis)engaged 
with farming over time throughout a series of factors to show that the underlying theme 
was the shift from self-sufficiency to global interdependence. I conclude the thesis by 
revisiting the stories, myths, rumours, and narratives of change, in which the earthquake 
was used as a moment of rupture between a traditional past and a modern future, to 
restate my main argument that within these narratives of rupture lay more discrete 
currents of the continuity of change shaped by bigger stories of migration, 
modernisation and globalisation. 
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Chapter Two 
The Bazaar and its Storytellers: locating Chinati bazaar 
 
Introduction 
On my initial visits to Chinati, I used to like to park close to Ali Naqvi’s18 house in 
Serabad, one of the villages surrounding the bazaar, rather than in the bazaar itself. This 
gave me the opportunity to greet him on my way in or out, and also made Hamza19 and I 
less conspicuous in the bazaar, at least upon arrival. I would drive my rented Suzuki 
Mehran as far as I could up the steep southern road that lead to Chinati bazaar through 
Serabad, and park it close to the entrance path to Ali Naqvi’s house. The age of the car 
and its general condition gave us little faith in its brakes, so we would put four rocks 
behind each wheel – just in case. We would then proceed on foot to the bazaar. Despite 
the mild autumn temperature of my initial visits the effort of climbing what always felt 
like a 90-degree slope through goat paths would make us arrive at the bazaar drenched 
in sweat. We would head straight for Ali’s shop, at the very end of Chinati, because it 
always had the coldest cold drinks in the bazaar. Ali’s shop was also in front of the local 
adda, right next to Imtiaz’s. Over the year this was to prove to be a good place to meet 
people and have long conversations with them. However, in our first couple of visits we 
were not that fortunate. Our status as non-locals only attracted boys from the local 
schools who wanted to practice their English and an old man who shared with us his 
knowledge of the history of the sub-continent, but never talked about Chinati. When he 
did go into the region’s history he would say “but that’s another story and we don’t 
have time for it” and proceeded to explain to us the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, or 
how the first Mughal emperor, Babar, had conquered Hindustan. By this time we had 
already become frustrated with our original strategy of door-to-door interviews in 
Serabad, as either the men were away at work or up in the bazaar, and we could not chat 
with the women. We needed a different strategy but hanging out at the bazaar was not 
quite working either. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 My first gatekeeper, whom I first met during my post-earthquake research in the summer of 2006.	  
19 My first research assistance.	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Our luck changed one day when a clean-shaven middle-aged man driving an old blue 
jeep stopped at the adda. While switching on and off during a lesson on Pakistani 
foreign policy given to us by the old man, I overheard the jeep driver ask Imtiaz “yeh 
gora kaun hai?” (who is this foreigner [literally: white man]?). Imtiaz told him that we 
were from some university in Lahore and were studying the region. The jeep driver 
came towards me and in English said, “You are studying my region? That’s very good. I 
know a lot about this place. Today I’m busy but tomorrow you should come to my shop; 
it’s that one over there. Come tomorrow and I’ll tell you everything you need to know.” 
That was how I met Bashir, a returned Gulf migrant from the village of Sarian, who, 
like many returned migrants, used some of his savings to open up a small shop in the 
bazaar. He kept his promise and told me a lot of what I needed to know about ‘this 
place’. But more than that, through him I got to know many more shopkeepers, 
migrants, agents, workers, and schoolteachers. I got to know their stories and, through 
them, many others that snowballed into this bigger story of life in and around Chinati 
bazaar. 
In this chapter I place Chinati bazaar within the historic context of the Poonch region of 
Kashmir and look at some of the economic and social changes that have defined this 
region differently from the rest of Pakistan. For one, it has been more dependent on a 
remittance economy than the rest of Pakistan, and second, it has better education figures 
than the rest of the country. I describe both these trends and then move to look in detail 
at both the bazaar and its people. Given that the economy of the region is defined 
mainly by migration, I categorise the storytellers of Chinati Bazaar by their migration 
status: locals who were in the Gulf or had recently returned; locals who had migrated to 
other cities in Pakistan; those who worked in the region and had never migrated; and 
those who were migrants to this region from other parts of the country. This 
categorisation captures a major way that people think of and relate to one another in the 
bazaar. Even when they introduced themselves to me, or were introduced, their 
migratory status always immediately followed their residential one. So, a common 
introduction would go as follows: “This is Salim, he’s from Bagla and he works in 
Dubai”, or “Mr. Khalil is from Hothala. He’s a metre reader for WAPDA20 and his 
brother works in Jeddah.” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Water And Power Development Authority of the government of Pakistan.	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Historical Background 
Although known as Pakistan-administered Kashmir (also called Azad Jammu and 
Kashmir, Azad Kashmir, or AJK), about one third of this area had only been part of 
Kashmir for 11 years before 1947. The State of Poonch, situated west of the Kashmir 
valley, in the region known at the time as ‘the middle mountains’ (Drew, 1875), had 
been under Hindu rule until the first Afghan invasions in mid 12th century. Later on this 
region was ruled by the Mughals and the Afghan Durranis, becoming an autonomous 
state of Mughal India until the beginning of the 19th century, when it was captured by 
the Sikh armies of Maharaja Ranjit Singh and kept as part of the Khalsa Darbar of 
Lahore, making it effectively a district of Lahore (Huttenback, 2004). 
In 1846, after the defeat of the Sikhs by the British, Gulab Singh, a Hindu Dogra who 
had been made Raja of Jammu by Ranjit Singh and had switched sides during the Sikh 
Wars, signed the Treaty of Amritsar in which the British transferred to his power “all 
the hilly or mountainous country, with its dependencies, situated to the eastward of the 
river Indus, and westward of the river Ravi, including Chamba and excluding 
Lahore.”21 In other words, he became the ruler of the Hindu-majority Jammu, the 
Muslim-majority Kashmir valley, Mirpur and Muzaffarabad, and the Buddhist-majority 
Ladakh (Bates, 1873). After Gulab Singh’s death, his son Ranbir Singh added the 
emirates of Gilgit, Hunza and Nagar (all majority Shia Muslim) to the Princely State of 
Jammu and Kashmir. Gulab Singh’s nephew, Moti Singh, was allowed to set up Poonch 
as a separate principality, which eventually was recognised as a state by the British Raj 
in 1901 (Huttenback, 2004). 
While the north and south of today’s PaK were part of the Princely State of Jammu and 
Kashmir, Poonch remained a separate state until 1936, when it was reduced to a Jagir22 
by the Maharaja Hari Singh, Gulab Singh’s great-grandson. Wingate (1959: 108), the 
last Assistant Resident in Poonch in 1921, notes how Poonch society was closer to 
Punjab than Kashmir, writing in his memoirs the following: 
“The people of Poonch bore no relation at all to the inhabitants of the valley 
of Kashmir or indeed to their ruler. They were Punjabi Moslems of the hills, 
strong, independent, and good cultivators. During the whole period of 
Imperial rule, Poonch was one of the most important recruiting grounds for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Treaty of Amritsar, Article I.	  
22 A small territory granted for a short term, not exceeding the owner’s (jagidar) lifetime.	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the Indian Army. There was not a village in Poonch where there were not a 
dozen or more army pensioners, and the coming and going between Poonch 
and the Punjab of soldiers on leave and of recruiting parties made it far 
more a province of the Punjab in outlook and in culture than an appendage 
of Kashmir.” 
Since the beginning of the Sikh rule, the majority-Muslim population of Poonch was 
dominated not only by Sikh and Hindu landlords – as was the case of Jammu and 
Kashmir – but also by Muslim landlords. Ballard (1990) points out the fact that 
compared to directly ruled British India, Kashmiri subjects suffered from heavier taxes. 
From 1936 onwards, this heavier taxation was imposed in Poonch as well. “Things were 
a lot cheaper before Partition, but the taxes were much higher. You even had to pay a 
tax for having a stove in your house. It was very hard to survive back then” (Amjad, 
retired trader from Sarian). In 1937 the Maharaja promulgated the ‘Arms Act Bill’, 
which allowed the possession of unlicensed arms by the Hindu and Sikh population but 
declined the facility to the Muslim population. During the Second World War, of the 
70,000 Kashmiri soldiers who fought on the British side more than 50,000 were 
Muslims from Poonch, recruited as ‘Punjabi Mussulmans’ and not Dogra (Korbel, 
1954; Dawson, 1994). When they returned from the war, they were not allowed to join 
the Kashmiri army and instead were told to return to their villages and become 
sharecropping farmers (Dawson, 1994). This, together with heavy taxation and policies 
perceived as ‘anti-Muslim’ fuelled further resentment towards Dogra rule, as reported 
by Symonds, a British Quaker who worked with victims of communal strife during 
Partition (in Korbel, 1954: 68): 
“Poonch is a barren, rocky mountainous country, whose important export is 
military manpower. Sixty thousand Poonchis served in the Indian Army in 
World War II. They returned (they said) to find that during the war the Raja 
of Poonch, under whose mild, if unprogressive rule they had existed 
tolerably, had been dispossessed by a law suit and that the Maharaja of 
Kashmir’s direct rule had imposed all the tyrannous taxes of Kashmir and 
Jammu. There was a tax on every hearth and every window. Every cow, 
buffalo and sheep was taxed and even every wife. Finally the Zaildari tax 
was introduced to pay for the cost of taxation, and Dogra troops were 
billeted on the Poonchis to enforce collection.” 
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By 15th August 1947 Hari Singh had not made up his mind about adding Jammu and 
Kashmir to Pakistan or India, and was in fact pondering the possibility of remaining 
independent. The locals of Poonch, mainly retired Muslim army men now sharecroppers 
spurred by a few Muslim landlords, while calling for freedom (azadi) from Dogra rule 
during several public meeting and demonstrations started a rebellion, to which Hari 
Singh responded by sending his troops to crush the revolt (Huttenback, 2004). What 
started as an autonomous liberation struggle, coined the ‘Poonch Revolt23’, soon turned 
into a fully-fledged war, with Pukhtoon tribesmen (mostly Mehsoods and Afridis from 
Tirah and Waziristan) invading the region on the 22nd of October through Muree-
Muzzafarabad road, coming to the locals’ assistance,24 surreptitiously aided by 
individuals in the newly founded Pakistani government (Korbel, 1954; Dawson, 1994). 
The invading forces, aligned with mostly Poonchi irregulars and volunteers from 
neighbouring Pakistani Punjab, quickly swept through the region and reached 
Baramulla, a few miles north of Srinagar three days later. Hari Singh fled to Delhi 
where, on the 26th of October 1947, he signed the Instrument of Accession of Jammu 
and Kashmir State to India, making it officially a territory of India. What soon followed 
was the first Indo-Pakistani war, in 1947-1948. After a UN-negotiated ceasefire, 
Pakistan established its authority over the Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan) and the 
state of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (PaK), while India retained control over the Kashmir 
valley, the eastern portion of Poonch, Jammu and Ladakh. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Not to be confused with the older Poonch Revolt of 1836, when the Sudhans led by Shams Khan 
rebelled against Sikh rule and were defeated by Gulab Singh (Smyth, 1847).	  
24 Although leaving a trail of destruction while plundering villages and killing locals irrespective of 
religion.	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Figure 1 – Map of Pakistan-administered Kashmir 
 
Source: Kashmir Family Aid (http://www.kashmirfamily.org) 
Although the effects of Partition were not as violent as in other parts of British India, 
namely in Punjab and Bengal, there were some confrontations between Muslims, 
Hindus and Sikhs in this region, from which almost all the Sikh and Hindu families of 
Poonch migrated to India and many Muslim families from Indian-Administered 
Kashmir moved to Poonch. Before 1947, the Muslim population of Poonch was mostly 
involved in agriculture, with trade and services being run largely by Hindus and Sikhs. 
There was also a significant number of migrants in British India, serving either in the 
army or as domestic servants. “We either fought for them or we cooked for them” 
(Sardar Zulfiqar, retired artist from Rawalakot). In Poonch, while many Muslims owned 
land, a vast number worked as sharecroppers in larger landholdings growing rice, wheat 
and maize. “We used to work as sharecroppers, but we were strong pahari [mountain] 
men and always confronted the zamindars [landlords].” 
After the creation of PaK the sharecroppers in the new Poonch devised an autonomous 
land reform where the land once owned by Hindu and Sikh landlords was divided 
through the kinship groups (known as biraderi) who farmed this land in each village, or 
allocated by the new state to refugees coming from Indian-administered Kashmir. At 
household level though, land was (and still is) divided through a strict following of a 
local version of the Shari’ah inheritance law, where the land is supposedly equally 
	   35	  
divided by the number of offspring with females inheriting half of the males’ share, but 
in this case most often the women after marriage forfeiting this inheritance to their 
brothers.25 “Over time, with the population growth, large landholdings eventually just 
disappeared. It was more of a natural process. Here we do an even distribution of land 
among brothers. If it doesn’t happen, people would go to the courts and it would be 
evenly distributed” (Ali Azfar, ex-serviceman from Khorian). Because of the hilly 
terrain and erratic rainfall, agriculture was always done at a subsistence level and 
catering only to the needs of the family. “Farming here was seasonal, depending on 
rains. We made sure we left everything when the rains came and started ploughing. We 
made sure to utilise the land to the maximum. We were self-sufficient on maize, 
vegetables and wheat. Sometimes we had to go very far to get a small amount of water, 
but we would do it to use it in our lands” (Amjad, retired trader from Sarian). 
Since 1947 most of PaK showed low levels of economic development, with the 
population mainly depending on rain-fed (barani) agriculture. Ballard (2004) suggested 
the state’s lack of investment in the area as the main reason for this underdevelopment, 
when comparing the ‘development’ of Jalandhar (Indian Punjab) versus the 
‘underdevelopment’ of Mirpur (southern PaK), both areas known for a sizeable number 
of migrants in the UK. With landholdings becoming smaller, mainly due to rising 
population levels and the following of the local version of Islamic inheritance law, more 
and more households started sending at least one male relative to the army, police or to 
work in catering, to complement a weak subsistence agricultural system (Werbner, 
1990). This was not a new phenomenon, as Poonch had been known as a ‘breeding 
place’ for soldiers and cooks before independence, as the numbers of British Raj 
soldiers show (Wikeley, 1915; Omissi, 1994; Dawson, 1994). What was a novelty was 
the increased of numbers of migrants – and with them, more migrants started trying 
their luck in Pakistan’s major cities. Poonchis though, did not consider this movement 
rural-urban migration; for them, they were migrating abroad – to Pakistan. 
Following the events of the 1973 oil crisis, Middle Eastern OPEC countries found 
themselves with an enormous surplus of capital, while facing labour scarcity. 
Meanwhile, Pakistan was unable to repay its foreign debt, with its imports rising and its 
exports declining, especially since the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, when the 
East Pakistani market for West Pakistani goods disappeared (Lefebvre, 1999). In 1974, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 For more details see Chapter Five.	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at the 2nd Islamic Summit Conference in Lahore, Pakistan under the premiership of 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto struck a deal with the oil-producing countries in the Gulf under 
which the country would get subsidised oil in exchange for migrant labour. Bhutto’s 
government’s reforms in Pakistan had already started indirectly to impact people’s lives 
in PaK, particularly the pro-worker and pro-union labour policies which benefited PaK 
migrants in Pakistan through better working conditions and wages, translated into more 
remittances to send home. Bhutto’s government, unlike previous governments that had 
largely ignored PaK, was also keen on showing Pakistani-administered Kashmir as 
more ‘developed’ than Indian-administered Kashmir. His government created a series of 
measures in this direction, namely the allocation, for the first time, of a 2% quota for 
residents of PaK in government jobs and educational institutions in Pakistan, the 
introduction of direct elections on the basis of adult franchise, and easing the red tape 
for acquiring a Pakistani passport and visa to an oil-producing Gulf state, as well as 
making it cheaper.  
The army connection initially also played a role within the Gulf migration pattern, as 
seen by the geographical origin of the main migrant groups – Poonchis, northern 
Punjabis and Pukhtoon – the ‘martial’ groups. Like other Pakistani ex-army personnel, 
Poonchis initially went to the Gulf to work in security-related jobs, including police and 
army. With increased demand for construction-related manual labour many of these ex-
servicemen, sometimes also working as contractors and foremen, started to sponsor 
relatives and biraderi members to join them in the Gulf. Some did it informally while 
others made a profession out of it, becoming ‘Gulf agents’. With a fast growth of 
migrant labour came a demand for catering services, where Poonchis once more used 
their experience and reputation within Pakistan as good domestic servants to insert 
themselves within this industry as cooks and waiters. A third group of Poonchis to 
migrate were schoolteachers, who made use of their education to gain access to lower 
management positions within the construction and catering industries in the Gulf. 
Until the early 1970s Poonchi society, largely ignored by the Pakistani state, was 
primarily engaged with subsistence agriculture subsidised by urban migration, where 
temporary male migration to Pakistani urban areas and enlistment in the army and 
police played a significant role in sustaining rural households’ livelihoods. Most of the 
population was involved in a series of informal risk-sharing strategies through family, 
kinship and caste networks, a system of social protection embedded in local power 
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relations (Gardner and Ahmed, 2006), adapted to secure a minimum subsistence level 
for their members (Platteau, 1991). As this system of social protection submerged in the 
current world market economy, strategies such as the custom of hiring poorer 
households for seasonal agricultural labour by richer households in exchange for food, 
or the practice of gift exchange and with it the creation and maintenance of networks 
that made borrowing possible, rather than disappearing became (further) monetised, 
with remittances increasing the sphere of the existing gift economy. This phenomenon 
was not unique to this region and has been witnessed through the world. Yang (1994) 
mentions ‘gift-giving winds’ in China, recent social pressures to give more gifts and 
more expensive gifts. Piot (1999) referrers to the notion of ‘growing gifts, growing 
relationships’ in Togo, although here the importance was of the giver’s intention, not 
necessarily the size of the gift. In Pakistan and Pakistani Diaspora in the UK, Werbner 
(1990), Lefebvre (1999) and Lyon (2004) mention an upsurge in the size and quantity of 
gifts directly linked with overseas migration. Likewise, since the mid-1970s, with 
migration taking the leading role shaping this region’s economy and the demise of 
subsistence agriculture, many families started depending more and more on remittances, 
giving preference to preparing their young males to be sent abroad (Pakistan or the 
Gulf), rather than keeping them to farm their land. “We grow very few crops now; very 
little return with heavy work. People don’t work here because there’s always someone 
abroad” (Imtiaz, young shopkeeper). The impact of remittances was also visible in the 
decrease of household debt: in 1972 46% of all households in PaK (60% in Bagh) were 
under some form of indebtedness; by 2000 this figure had dropped to 9% for PaK and 
20% for Bagh District (GoAJK, 1975; GoAJK, 2000). 
The bounty of Gulf migration occurred at the same time that drastic political changes 
were taking place in the region. The opening of space for political parties, a partial 
devolution of power from the Pakistani-controlled Ministry of Kashmir Affairs to the 
new PaK parliament,26 and universal adult franchise (Mahmood, 2006), all contributed 
to a shift of decision-making from the hands of a powerful few, often selected by 
Pakistan, to the masses. Similar to Pakistan, where villagers voted not as individuals but 
in blocs (know as dharas) and there was a tendency to vote in response to targeted 
material inducements, so too in PaK voting occurred through clientelistic networks, as 
the state provided targeted and not universal services. Similar to the initial Gulf 
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migration strategies, these clientelistic networks were closely interlinked with kin and 
caste groups; as such politics required influence, groups which had large numbers 
within their constituencies formed unified vote blocs and supported candidates from 
within their group. The rationale was that once their candidate was in power they would 
have preferential access to services and jobs. This in effect made demographics a 
powerful force within PaK politics, allowing space for larger kin and caste groups – 
sometimes previously at a lower rank within the social hierarchy – to compete among 
themselves through biraderi-ism (clientelistic biraderi networks) for political 
dominance. For instance, while there was strong biraderi allegiance among Jats in 
Mirpur and Sudhans in Poonch (Evans, 2010) who constituted the majority within these 
districts, in Bagh – which became a district separated from Poonch district by 198727 – 
Raja, Narma and Mughal biraderis have competed for political dominance since the 
arrival of electoral politics. 
From the mid-1970s onwards, remittances and clientelistic politics were important 
factors in improving services throughout the region, albeit in a targeted manner. This 
was the time that many villages got access to electricity, tarred roads, health centres, 
and educational institutions. Education – until then more a privilege than a right – was 
in fact a great indicator of this change, as seen by the drastic increase in public school 
buildings, teacher hiring and student enrolment numbers (see Table 1). At the time of 
Partition, the education sector in what was now PaK was almost inexistent, with 254 
primary, 30 middle, and 6 high schools, totalling 291 educational institutions. In 2008, 
only in Bagh District there were 360 primary, 195 middle, and 95 high schools, along 
with 20 higher education institutes and 187 madrassahs, totalling 857 educational 
institutions – the number for the whole of PaK stood at 6,071. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 While keeping matters related to finance, defence and foreign affairs under the direct control of 
Pakistan.	  
27 The region which used to be the State of Poonch is now the Poonch Division in PaK (composed of 
Poonch, Sundnoti, Bagh and Haveli districts) and Poonch district in IaK.	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Table 1 – Public school enrolment, number of teachers and schools in PaK (primary and 
secondary) 
Year Enrolment Teachers Schools 
1974 192,509 4,091 1,526 
1989 585,238 20,474 5,757 
Increase 304% 500% 377% 
2008 556,217 28,615 5,945 
Increase -95% 140% 103% 
Source: P&D AJK, 1980; 1990; AEPAM/NEMIS, 2010. 
Remittances had a direct impact on education as it was seen by many as a form of 
investment, a way of making sure the next generations would have access to better 
employment opportunities as well as higher status. The role of the state was crucial in 
trying to universalise education. Today the gross enrolment rate at primary level in PaK 
is 95% for boys and 88% for girls (P&D AJK, 2008). With groups which were once 
denied access to political power by virtue of hierarchy becoming enfranchised, 
education became the number one priority in PaK, not only as a service, but also as a 
form of job creation. “The focus on education here started not only because it gave 
people an education, it also created jobs. The Department of Education is the biggest 
employer in the region” (Sardar Zulfiqar, retired artist from Rawalakot). Although with 
a certain gender bias favouring men, the increase of educational provision and 
enrolment happened for both the male and the female population, with women over 
time attaining higher levels of education and many becoming schoolteachers 
themselves. This can be seen today in the gender parity index (GPI) of the region as, by 
2007, Bagh district had a GPI of 1 or above for primary and secondary level, much 
higher than any province in Pakistan (AEPAM/NEMIS, 2010). The combination of 
increasing remittances and a demand for more and better education created a space for 
the appearance of private schooling since the 1990s. Many migrants started sending 
their children to private schools (a reason why public school enrolment decreased), an 
act which became connoted with wealth and status. “Private schools’ fees are twice as 
much as the government schools, so those who can afford such education send their 
children to private schools” (Bashir, shopkeeper in Chinati). By 2005 there were 2,295 
primary and secondary private schools in PaK, with 16,074 teachers (of which 54% 
were women) and 223,275 students (AEPAM/NEMIS, 2006). 
Together these factors had an impact both outside and inside the home. With larger 
numbers of males migrating, the demographics of PaK changed and soon women 
outnumbered men in every district, with a sex ratio below 100 for the population aged 
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between 15 and 50 (PCO, 1998). As able-bodied males, including often household 
heads, were away the responsibility to take care of the land and ‘protect’ the women fell 
upon those who did not migrate: the migrants’ brothers, fathers and sons. The 
rearrangement of responsibilities became rooted within a reciprocal expectation, 
whereby the migrant shared his remittances with the family in exchange for the 
father/brother keeping an eye on his household while he was away. “I’m proud of my 
sons, they made enough money and made sure there was plenty in my pocket as well. All 
of them became bare admi [big men].28 Two went to Saudi Arabia and took care of the 
ones left behind – the whole family! Not just their own households, even my brothers 
were taken care of” (Azfar Khan, retired cook from Sarian). PaK society was deeply 
embedded in a patriarchal and patrilocal system, where the status of women was 
measured through their seclusion “a function of a family’s worth, in an economic sense, 
but (…) [also] indicative of their social worth, or their honour” (Jeffery, 1979: 25). As 
such, women’s honour – and by extension – the family’s honour needed to be kept, a 
responsibility which non-migrant males took upon themselves to validate gaining access 
to remittances. This did not mean that inter- and intra-household power struggles did 
not exist. As I further explain in chapter five, the house was a domestic arena for 
competition where patriarchal bargains were constantly enacted and re-enacted, 
particularly between the mother and the wife of the migrant. Another factor that 
influenced women’s purdah system was the arrival of ‘foreigners’ post-1989. These 
were refugees from IaK that crossed the territory as the situation on the other side of the 
border worsened,29 as well as militant organisations which set training camps, freely 
propagated their views on ‘Political Islam’, and used PaK as a launch pad to cross to the 
other side and fight Indian forces30 (Human Rights Watch, 2006). Their views and 
presence,31 particularly in urban areas, made many women reinvent seclusion and 
observe more conservative veiling in public. “This [college women wearing hijab] is a 
new thing; it started in the 90s. Not so much in villages, but definitely in every town” 
(Sardar Zulfiqar, retired artist from Rawalakot). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Meaning successful.	  
29 This was the fourth wave of IaK refugees coming into PaK. Previously, refugees had come in 1947, 
1965, and 1971.	  
30 Mostly from anecdotal sources, the view was that there were very few locals in these organisations, 
with most of their people coming from Punjab and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, as well as IaK.	  
31 Together with some Gulf migrants who came back with similar notions of ‘Political Islam’.	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Despite the historical presence of men from this region in every continent of the world, 
due to the territorial dispute between India and Pakistan this was a secluded, militarised 
region of which the world knew little about. The 2005 earthquake opened, for the first 
time, the curtain into PaK. When humanitarian and development agencies (including 
Pakistani) wanted to know more about PaK to respond better to the crises, they soon 
found out that there was barely anything published on the region or its people. This was 
because “prior to the earthquake, [PaK] was one of the most closed territories in the 
world” (Human Rights Watch, 2006:6). This thesis will, hopefully, change some of that, 
at least for one part of the region. 
 
Chinati Bazaar 
Chinati bazaar stands on top of a hill surrounded clockwise by the settlements 
Basantkot (north), Thial (northwest), Khorian (west), Sarian (southwest), Serabad 
(south), and Bagla (east). On average there were more than 100 houses per settlement 
post-earthquake, ranging from 30 in Basantkot to 300 in Khorian, of which a sizeable 
number were still being reconstructed. Of these settlements Bagla and Basantkot are 
part of Nakkar mauza (revenue village), Khorian, Sarian and Thial part of Khorian 
mauza, and Serabad part of Hothala mauza. Nakkar and Hothala mauzas belong to 
Nakkar Union Council and Khorian mauza belong to Mughal Topi Union Council. 
Above Khorian stand the settlements belonging to Mughal Topi mauza and south of 
Khorian and east of Sarian the settlements belong to Moori Gali mauza. Further 
downhill, south of Hothala and Moori Gali the Mahl Nullah, a small stream, divides 
Bagh and Poonch Districts. Three roads lead to the bazaar: from the east the tarred road 
that links this area to the Bagh-Rawalakot road, to the south a partly tarred road that 
also links it to the Bagh-Rawalakot road, and to the west a gravelled road that ends up 
in Mughal Topi. 
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Figure 2 – Aerial view of Chinati bazaar and surrounding settlements 
 
Source: Google maps 
“In the beginning, there was a chinar32 forest where people used to gather to slaughter 
their animals in the shade. Chinati comes from a shortening of chinar and theri 
[gathering place]. Since there were no fridges at the time, the meat had to be quickly 
sold.” That was how Kashif, one of the many storytellers at the bazaar, told me of the 
birth of the bazaar. Chinati quickly became a gathering place not only for commerce, 
but also for prayer, as often the meat trade would happen on Fridays and there was 
enough flat space for people to congregate and pray together. The first shop was built in 
1984, a general store close to where the main mosque stands today, before the either the 
road or the mosque were made. Over time more people started to build shops on the 
southern side of the gravel road and the Syed family, who owned much of the land 
between the road and Serabad, donated a plot for the creation of a mosque. The Syed 
family’s role was also critical in the creation of the main road that crossed Chinati 
bazaar. Syed Ali Naqvi, at the time an influential member of the Muslim Conference, 
which he would later take advantage of to get the road tarred, was the acknowledged 
prime mover. As he said: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Oriental plane tree (Platanus orientalis).	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“I gathered the people around and told them that if a road was ever to be 
built, it had to be done by the people themselves. Most of the villagers were 
initially suspicious that it would be too much of an endeavour for them, but 
eventually people – mostly students – started working on the road, usually 
during the weekends. We started by forming committees in each settlement 
that the road would pass by and villagers started widening the main walking 
paths that connected the bazaar to the Bagh-Rawalakot road, breaking 
stones and using them to make the base of the road. It took us four years!” 
By 2009, Chinati bazaar had about 60 shops most of them running parallel to the main 
road, with four tailors, two barbers, one butcher, two telephone offices, one blacksmith, 
two dhaabas (roadside eatery) known as ‘hotels’, one shoemaker, one woodsman, and 
one bus stand at the top of the bazaar. Most of the shops belonged to Nakkar Union 
Council, except seven located further northwest, which belonged to Mughal Topi UC. 
The ‘border shops’ shared the same wall. The remaining shops were mostly groceries 
and a handful of small general stores, mostly selling vegetables and items for household 
consumption, with only two or three specialising in ready-made clothing. Chinati also 
had four educational institutions, namely a madrassah within the mosque compound, a 
vocational centre and two private schools. The mosque complex was a two-storey green 
building with 15 washrooms underneath, a small prayer hall connected to the 
madrassah part by a courtyard, and a tall white minaret surrounded by loudspeakers. It 
stood at the top of a mound on the eastern part of the bazaar, slightly above both private 
schools: the Syed-owned Al-Noor, on the southern side of the road, and the Jamaati-
Islami-funded READ, on the northern side of the road. Due to the high number of 
schoolchildren in the bazaar, most of the shops had sweets and snacks, which they sold 
for Rs. 1 to Rs 20. Opposite to what most bazaars did in this region, that is, to close on 
the last Sunday of the month, shopkeepers in Chinati had their shops open every day of 
the month, with the exceptions of the barbers, who came twice a week, and the butcher, 
who came mostly on Fridays. I ran a survey with 33 shopkeepers, roughly covering 
about half of the bazaar, to get a more accurate profile of Chinati and see the impact of 
the earthquake. 
Most shops in Chinati were cemented (pakka), with a sizeable number of kaccha shops. 
The average age of the shops was about 13 years old, ranging from one to 25 years. Still 
this average age can be misleading as about one third of the shops appeared after the 
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earthquake in 2006, i.e., they were at most three years old. Most of the shopkeepers in 
Chinati belonged to the Mughal biraderi, with a few Kiani, Sheikh, Alavi, Nai and 
Pukhtoon from KP also present. On average shopkeepers had attended school for eight 
years, with a small number having no or primary formal education, a few others having 
gone above Matriculation (10th grade), and about half having completed Matriculation. 
Most were migrants before becoming shopkeepers, either in Pakistan or in the Gulf, and 
one third had at least one other male family member abroad, mostly in the Gulf, sending 
remittances. About half of the shopkeepers had been working as shopkeepers in the 
bazaar before the earthquake. Of the 22 sampled shops that were present before the 
earthquake half were not affected by it, six were slightly affected, two were heavily 
affected, and three were completely destroyed. All the affected shops were being rebuilt 
by the shopkeepers themselves, with no government or NGO assistance, as throughout 
the earthquake-affected areas both the government and NGOs focused their livelihoods 
assistance mostly in agricultural projects or in cash grants to poorer families. By 2009 
only four out of the 11 affected had recovered from the impact of the earthquake. 
The vast majority of shopkeepers did not own their shops but rented them, paying on 
average Rs. 500 per month. Shops were run as family businesses, with most 
shopkeepers working alone or with relatives (often from within the family), with the 
exception of the dhaabas which hired based on skills, although even here biraderi 
played a role. About half of the shops restocked directly from the bigger bazaars in 
Harighel, Bagh or Rawalakot, while the remaining waited for distributors to come by. 
As a trend though, more and more distributors were coming to Chinati, especially after 
the earthquake. Only a small percentage of shopkeepers owned a bank account and most 
did not participate in saving committees.33 While 13 of the total interviewed said they 
experienced no seasonality, i.e., that there was no particular period of time when they 
sold more, 14 said it peaked during Eid-ul-Fitr and six mentioned summer, traditionally 
the wedding season. Most had regular customers, with a slim majority keeping tabs and 
allowing some customers (5 to 15%) to obtain products while paying later, and a third 
also lending money to some customers, but again not more than 5 to 15% of their 
customers. It is worth to mention that customers who had access to tabs and loans were 
often related to shopkeepers, or belonged to the same biraderi. For most shopkeepers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Of the 10 that did, most paid a monthly fee of Rs. 100. Committees ranged from four to 13 members, 
with membership mostly based on type of business.	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the average customer came weekly or fortnightly to their shops and spent about Rs. 10 
to Rs. 500, majority spending Rs. 100 or less. 
Immediately after the earthquake half of the shops reported fewer customers than usual. 
One year later 10 shopkeepers still had less customers while a similar number had the 
same number of customers as they did before the earthquake. Four years after the 
earthquake, the situation started to normalise with only a small number of shopkeepers 
having less customers. Yet, 14 shopkeepers (out of 22) stated that they now had less 
profits than before the earthquake. It is important to add that apart from the earthquake 
Pakistan and PaK had been affected by a severe rise of inflation since 2008, which 
played an important part on these figures. Almost all of their homes were affected by 
the earthquake. All of them received government compensation, ranging from Rs. 
100,000 to Rs. 175,000, with the majority receiving the full amount. While before the 
earthquake most lived in kaccha houses, due to the new building codes they had to 
ascribe to receive state compensation, they now owned pakka houses, although only a 
fourth had CGI roofs. 
There were two private schools in the bazaar, the oldest being Al-Noor established by 
the Syed family in the late 80s. The teachers were either Syed or Mughal, mostly 
women from the neighbouring villages. Many of them previously studied at Al-Noor 
themselves and had recently graduated or were now finishing their degrees mostly from 
the Open University. The male teachers were all Syed and related to each other, with 
degrees from AJK University or from Pakistan, including two with Masters. Although 
the teachers said the teaching was done in Urdu, often it was mixed with Pahari. In 
2002, the READ Foundation opened up a school in Chinati. Originally built in Sarian in 
1999, it moved three years later to Chinati because, according to the principal, it was 
more central, although some villagers from Sarian say the moved happened because of 
conflict between READ and some locals. READ had mostly Mughal and a few Kiani 
female teachers. As they were part of the READ Foundation, teachers regularly went to 
their regional headquarters in Bagh for further training. READ tried to portray itself as 
better than Al-Noor by focusing not only on teaching but also on extra-curricular 
activities. It also benefitted from being part of the READ Foundation which, after the 
earthquake, had access to a larger endowment fund. As such, differences started to 
appear, namely in salaries (Rs. 1,400 to Rs. 2,000 at Al-Noor compared to Rs. 2,400 to 
Rs. 4,000 at READ), teacher training, furniture, computers, and the previously 
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mentioned extra-curricular activities. By being linked to (and partially funded by) 
Jammati-Islami,34 READ also differed from Al-Noor by having a gender segregation 
policy in classes. This was one of the main reasons why some parents preferred Al-Noor 
to READ, while others preferred READ because of the extra-curricular activities. 
Most teachers, regardless of the school, took on average one hour to get from their 
homes to the school. Classes started at 8 a.m. and finished by 2 p.m., giving female 
teachers time to engage with their household chores. The biggest complaint teachers had 
was related to salaries. Salaries at government schools started at Rs. 6,000, much more 
than either school offered its teachers. During my fieldwork, many female teachers at 
Al-Noor were thinking of leaving if the salaries did not go up. But low salaries were not 
a reason on its own why female teachers left; most often it was because they got 
married and either their new family did not agree to them being away from the home in 
the initial stages of marriage, or because they did not agree with them being away for 
such a low salary. Often unmarried or divorced female teachers saved their salaries for 
further education, as in most cases they would like to go for further studies and did not 
have the means. Still, despite the low salaries, many more women wanted to become 
teachers. Being a teacher meant more than having access to a salary; it was one of the 
few occupations deemed morally and socially acceptable which allowed women to be 
outside their homes. As Razia, an economics teacher at Al-Noor, said “studying and 
becoming a teacher has helped me come out of my problems. Two years back a 
psychologist came to our place and treated many people who where very disturbed 
[because of the earthquake]. Teaching gives me a purpose.” An overwhelming majority 
of female teachers liked to teach. Rehana, a Kiani from Hothala who taught at READ, 
mentioned she wanted to teach in a government school not because of the higher 
salaries, but because “there is no proper education, children want to study and wish to 
study [in] public schools, but there is a lot of sifarish.35 I wanted to go to the public 
schools with READ syllabus and teach there.” 	  
The Storytellers 
In this thesis I decided to divide the storytellers of Chinati bazaar not according to caste 
or biraderi, important factors in stratification, but according to migratory status for two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 The Principal was also a JI member and poling agent.	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reasons. First of all, this categorisation captures one of the key ways people think of and 
relate to one another in the bazaar; even when they introduced themselves to me, or 
were introduced, their migratory status always immediately followed their residential 
one. Second, while caste is an extremely important dividing factor in this area it does 
not necessarily separate people by worldviews; migratory status – or lack of thereof – 
on the other hand seems to contribute greatly to create different worldviews and 
therefore different narratives on the earthquake and other events. As such, I have 
divided my storytellers into: (a) Gulf migrants; (b) Pakistan migrants; (c) Non-migrants, 
and; (d) In-migrants. 
 
Gulf Migrants 
My conversations at the bazaar really started once I accepted Bashir’s invitation and 
went to his shop the morning after we had met him in front of the adda. After the initial 
greetings he told us to sit inside his shop, called for the tea boy from the dhaaba across 
the street and ordered tea for all. “What do you want to know about my Kashmir? It’s 
very green isn’t it? And the bazaar is clean, no? I was the first [shopkeeper] to put a 
dustbin in front of my shop. Eventually people started putting their own. Some put their 
garbage in my dustbin, but it’s ok, better than garbage all over the street.” Bashir had 
worked in Dubai as a waiter in a four-star hotel for 15 years. He went with ‘no 
education’ (by which he meant 10th grade, the common of level of education for most 
Pakistani men) so he could not speak English. He bought a notebook and every night 
after work he would write words in Urdu and their translation in English. After 5-6 
months he could speak English. He retired in September 2005 and returned to his 
village Sarian just three days before the earthquake. After the earthquake he bought four 
shops in the bazaar with his savings. He rented three of these and in the fourth one he 
set up a general store, selling dry food items, toiletries, cleaning products, snacks and 
other household items. 
Like Bashir, a sizeable proportion of shopkeepers and customers in Chinati had 
previously migrated to the Gulf. Many upon return, if they had saved enough, opened 
up shops either in Bagh city, Harighel or Chinati depending on the quantity of savings, 
as the more money saved, the bigger the bazaar where they opened up a shop. Usually 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Here in the sense of corruption.	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though, before returning from the Gulf they would keep the ‘migration door’ open by 
bringing in a family member (preferably a son or a brother) to replace them in the Gulf. 
In a way, they were making a family business out of migration. Once back at home the 
preferred investment for their savings was to buy plots of land; either in bazaars which 
could then be rented out, or agricultural land within their villages, not necessarily to 
farm but as space for future housing needs. If they were still healthy most would try to 
become businessmen setting up a shop in a bazaar.  
The aim of becoming a businessman upon return was not guided by profit as much as it 
was by other factors. Many of my informants mentioned several reasons, namely that 
idleness was a sin so if one was still strong and healthy one had to work to live an 
‘honourable living’, by being active in the bazaar one was aware of (and involved in) 
the daily affairs of the region, as the bazaar was the main public forum36 central to 
social and political life, and it was also a way of gaining status, for many were before 
migration farmers and labourers, and now traders. Their knowledge of the world – 
through their first-hand experience as world travellers – was a catalyser for the constant 
displays of critical thinking and debate which shaped public life at the bazaar. This 
space was also used to lay claim of their exploits and knowledge of ‘abroad’, to tell of 
the innovations they brought home, and to share their worldview with the ones who 
stayed behind. In a way, to tell stories. 
“There’s a lot more to the hotel business than meets the eye; so many 
departments. Here people think it’s all the same as this hotel in front of us 
[the dhaaba]. There aren’t any good hotels in PaK that’s why people here 
have no clue what a hotel really is.” Ammar, retired head barman in Dubai 
“I introduced biryani and pulao at weddings. People enjoyed it so much that 
they started cooking with masalas.” Yasin, retired cook in Karachi and Abu 
Dhabi 
Bashir related to me (and others) how migration changed his worldview twice: the first 
time, when he was a young migrant working in construction in Bahrain and had to share 
accommodation with Hindus and Sikhs, he realised that everybody ate together, which 
went against what he was told at home, that people from different religions could never 
eat together. The second time was when he started working as a waiter at the four-star 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 In a way, the ‘agora’ of rural life.	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hotel in Dubai. One day he was supposed to serve food and beverages in the swimming 
pool area of the hotel and he noticed that there were naked men (with profusely hairy 
chests) and women around. He tried to juggle with the tray in one hand while using the 
other hand to cover his eyes, but this proved difficult. For a while he even thought of 
quitting the job. One Pakistani Punjabi waiter told him that if the guests felt ashamed, 
they would cover themselves, so he should not worry and serve and look. His point was 
that one should not judge people by the way they look: “we are all God’s creations at 
the end of the day – even the hairy ones!” 
When to return home was not always a migrant’s planned choice. Zulfiqar, who did the 
rounds with his donkey carrying products from the bazaar to people’s homes, was a 
gardener in Sharjah’s cricket ground for 15 years. Unfortunately, he developed a serious 
respiratory disease by inhaling chemicals used in the ground and a doctor told him that 
the only cure was to live in the hills, away from pollution. Zulfiqar came home, to the 
hills of Bagh, where he says he is a happier man, relaxed, doing lots of exercise and 
having no tension. Mohammad Sheikh, a middleman in the bazaar, was desperate to 
leave for the Gulf, where his two older brothers were, when he finally got the call in 
1996. He moved to Dubai where he happily worked for four years. The problem was 
that he was the youngest child and closest to his mother. “She used to call me and cry 
on the phone and would not stop crying, so out of guilt I came back.” Once back he got 
married and started a business in Harighel, but since he was used to the life in Dubai he 
could not take the slow life here. He took his mother and family and moved to 
Rawalpindi, where he opened a khokha (kiosk) similar to the one he had in Harighel. 
“Unlike here, there you make good money”. He made enough money even to lend to 
people from PaK in Rawalpindi, and he made many friends there. When the earthquake 
happened, he had to close down everything and come back, since many of his relatives 
were injured and much was destroyed. It took them a little while to get things in order, 
their house was slightly damaged, but they were well to-do and he had his brothers 
abroad, so they coped well. Since he had to close the shop in Rawalpindi quickly, he 
lost a lot of money. He tried to go back, but he could not afford the initial investment. 
Also, the people to whom he had lent money either had disappeared or were not in a 
position to pay him back. “I got fed up of the place, sold the shop and brought the 
money here. I then invested in this supply business. Now I’m happy around here – at the 
end of the day, there’s no place like home”. 
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Owning a shop in the bazaar was also at times a good investment if the next generation 
did not succeeded in the Gulf, as it happened with Parvez’s sons. Parvez was the owner 
of the biggest shop in Chinati. He had been a primary schoolteacher before migrating to 
Dubai in 1978. An agent friend of his had previously tried to lure him into working in 
the Gulf with the promise of much higher salaries, but money was not a temptation for 
him, as his father owned a lot of land and his brothers had a successful workshop in 
Harighel. What made him migrate was the loss of his mother, who died in 1977, and to 
whom he was close. He just took a one-year leave from his teaching job and thought of 
coming back, but months turned into years and he started getting good at his job, 
eventually starting to enjoy living there “I never drank, I never smoked and I never went 
after girls. You could do that there, but throughout my time I never did that”. Initially 
he was a supervisor at the four-star Dubai Metropolitan, then he was promoted to 
reception and in four years he made it into the management cadre.37 After some time he 
arranged for his elder son to join him, then another relative, then another, until he had 
sponsored 43 relatives plus 100 others. When he came back in 2006, because of the 
earthquake and his diabetes, his son stayed in Dubai for a while but eventually returned 
as he could not ‘survive’ on his own. 
“None of my children studied [not more than Matriculation] although I 
could afford for their studies. Since the father wasn’t there and their mother 
wasn’t educated, neither had the influence of the mother nor the strictness 
of the father to attend classes. I made a shop for my eldest son and he makes 
some money. For my younger son I even bought him a car to start a 
business, but he destroyed both. Now I have no choice, but to make him sit 
with me at my shop. One of the biggest regrets of my life is that I gave my 
children everything on a plate, I should have made them work hard for 
everything”. 
Parvez never charged money for sponsoring migrants, i.e. he never became an agent. “I 
never had greed about money, I just did it for the benefit of others. This was a poor 
region. I could have become an agent and I would have earned in crores and easily be 
one of the richest men here, but to become a bara aadmi [big man] never fascinated me. 
My ideal life was to lead a simple and uncomplicated life, which rich people never do”. 
There were others though, who after migration became agents. Mushtaq, who had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Which meant he even had a private room.	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previously worked in Dubai for five years, was one of them. As an associate of Sheikh 
Ashraf, a self-made bara aadmi, he was in charge of finding good workers in the area to 
send to the Gulf. He was also in charge of Sheikh Ashraf’s NGO, the Sheikh Neel Din 
Foundation, which offered free computer classes in the bazaar and was planning to 
build a hospital. Similar to other bara aadmi, who created NGOs after the earthquake 
and became involved in the reconstruction and rehabilitation stages bidding for 
development contracts, Sheikh Ashraf tried in the process to gain political clout and 
status.38 Sheikh Ashraf was the son of a Hindu who had worked for the Syed patriarch 
in Poonch city and moved to Serabad with him in 1947, converting and marrying a Raja 
from the settlement. Sheikh Ashraf had migrated to Kuwait and worked for 12 years for 
Kuwait airways after which he became an agent and sponsored people from the region, 
as well as from Nepal and India, to work in the Gulf. In 2006 he obtained a catering 
contract with the US army, making it the preferred option for many in the region. 
According to him, 
“People prefer jobs in Kuwait and Iraq because all is paid for; ticket, food, 
accommodation. They get their passports in Arja and then depending on the 
job, the agents takes care of the rest of the paperwork. In Dubai you get 
from 600 to 1,800 dirham, but you have to pay for food, flight, and live in 
poor conditions in containers with the AC off from October to March.” 
In Iraq the salaries were U$ 800 for a mechanic (minimum 3 months), U$ 700 for a 
cook (3 ½ months), U$ 500 for a barber or tailor (5 months), and U$ 400 for a labourer 
(6 months). Mushtaq often complained that it was hard to find technical people in the 
region. During my fieldwork they needed four male nurses in Iraq. Mushtaq found one 
at the hospital in Bagh and two others were working with ARC, with experience but no 
formal qualifications. He went to Bagh, got diplomas made on the computer (from some 
university in Sindh and Balochistan) and sent them. A few months later the employer 
called very happy with their work and asked for more male nurses. Usually the agents 
pay for everything and start receiving their commission (starting at Rs. 100,000) from 
the 3rd month onwards. Agents, like most Gulf migrants, complained about the lack of 
initiative of Pakistan’s and PaK’s governments towards migrants, as they felt they were 
not as active pursuing overseas contracts as were other governments. As Mushtaq once 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 The importance of the agent as bara aadmi reached its peak in 2009, when the PaK assembly elected as 
its prime minister a man whose rise to power was fuelled by his fame as a Gulf agent, having sponsored 
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told me, while we were having breakfast together on the roof of a new dhaaba in 
Harighel recently bought by the owners of the main dhaaba of Chinati, 
“Dubai is bad, nothing is happening right now. Kuwait and Qatar are better 
options. Iraq also, but there’s no government assistance. Indians and 
Bangladeshis are there with government support, but not our government. 
We’ve got two overseas ministers who haven’t even been overseas 
themselves. They don’t know people living outside the country. How can 
they facilitate migrants? About 80% of people here are migrants. No 
information about us in Pakistan.” 
Serabad-born Syed Ali Shah was another bara aadmi. Although a Syed he did not pay 
much attention to schooling and left at 16 to become a waiter in Rawalpindi and then 
Karachi. In 1971 he reached Dubai without a passport by dhow. Once PaKs were 
entitled passports his brother got him one (in Mirpur). Initially he cleaned houses and 
learnt Arabic at night.39 He then joined the UAE army for four years, where he picked 
up English with British officers. He later got a job with an Irish company and by 
befriending the foremen, many of whom were British ex-army officers, became an 
agent, bringing about 900 people from the area. Today, living in Islamabad, he owns 
property throughout Pakistan, a construction company, two hotels in Bagh and 
Muzaffarabad, and is the co-owner of the main private radio station in PaK. 
 
Pakistan Migrants 
Every time I would stop to chat at Bashir’s shop Kashif, his neighbour at the bazaar, 
would come and greet us. Kashif made and sold pakoras and jaleebis in the bazaar, 
enough to make ends meet. He had lived in Karachi for 30 years, initially working as a 
private driver for 25 years and then as a clerk in a Parsi-owned law firm. He was 
married three times: the first wife, with whom he had a son, died young; he divorced his 
second wife and a few years before the earthquake he remarried a distant younger 
cousin. After the earthquake his wife kept on asking him to return to Thial, as she was 
missing him, felt alone and their son was growing up without a father. He came back 
but since then could not find a decent job, like the ones he had in Karachi. Eventually he 	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took over the pakora shop as the old man who was in charge of it had a heart attack and 
could not work any more. Not only was his income much lower than the one he had in 
Karachi, this job was also dirtier. “You should have seen me in Karachi: starched white 
shalwar kameez, shiny black shoes, I was someone there, I looked like a bara aadmi”. In 
the bazaar his clothes were unkempt and dirty. Kashif compared his life to the one of a 
Sindhi man – a servant of a vedera (Sindhi feudal landlord) – he met in Karachi: his 
clothes were unkempt, his looks dishevelled, but he was happy to follow his master’s 
wishes. “He was a slave, just as I am a slave to this shop”. Kashif wanted to return to 
Karachi but his four brothers decided to make separate houses after the earthquake, so 
he had to stay to take care of his family. “It’s no longer a joint family. I have 
responsibilities here, so I’m stuck here”. 
Kashif was one of the many shopkeepers and customers in Chinati who had worked in 
Pakistan, mostly in the larger urban centres. Some migrated to Pakistan before the Gulf 
migration boom, while others migrated after. The ones migrating before the boom – if 
not in the army – mostly went to Karachi, where they worked as personal drivers, in 
construction and in factories. Despite being historically a big recruitment area, since the 
1980s numbers of PaK enlistments dwindled due to, according to my informants, better 
education and low army pay. Similar to the pattern of Gulf migration, once a migrant 
established himself he would sponsor other family members to join him, eventually 
sponsoring other biraderi members as well as friends. A group of them – mostly 
Mughals from Sarian and a few Raja from Serabad – worked in a pharmaceutical 
factory in Karachi, either in the assembly line or in the refectories. While they were 
migrants in Karachi, they could rarely save enough money to bring home, until the 
Bhutto reforms in the early 70s, when labour unions became more powerful and factory 
wages increased enough for them to start sending money home. 
From the mid-1970s onwards a bifurcated pattern of chain migration started to appear in 
several villages, where men migrated to Pakistan or the Gulf depending on the place 
where their initial family migrant went. Ashfaq, a male nurse working in Karachi but 
originally from Thial, told me that his family always migrated to Karachi. “When a boy 
is 16 and finishes Matriculation he’s sent to Karachi for further studies and 
employment. In Thial this is the migration pattern: if a boy has relatives in the Gulf, he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Many migrants proudly mentioned to me the fact they self-taught Arabic and English in the Gulf. That 
was also a reason why they wanted their children to learn ‘good’ English at school.	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goes to the Gulf; if he has relatives in Karachi, he goes to Karachi.” The pattern was 
not ubiquitous and there were several cases of Gulf migrants’ sons migrating to 
Pakistan and vice versa. There was a preference though for Gulf migration, as it not 
only paid much more than migrating to Pakistan but it was also seen as more prestigious 
to go overseas. Yet, it was much more expensive to send someone overseas – paying for 
a passport, travel and often commission – as compared to Pakistan, only a bus drive 
away. Often within families who had more than one son, the eldest would be given 
preference to be sent to the Gulf and the others to Pakistan. 
Families with a single son faced a higher risk though. Omar, who sold newspapers in 
Chinati and Khorian, used to work in construction in Karachi. Upon his return he had 
made enough money to own a house in Thial and provide his son with a good 
education. Unfortunately, his son chose not to study and became a waiter in Bagh. Omar 
then got a loan from his relatives so he could send his son to Dubai and, in his own 
words ‘earn a nice retirement’. Unfortunately his son spent all the money in Dubai, 
coming home empty-handed. He was now unemployed, living off his father, with a 
pregnant wife and two children. “We stupid people think that we can just make babies 
and God will provide – you’re so stupid to think that you can just sit on a rock and 
some angel comes with a plate of food”. Omar said that what he made was enough to 
live – he called it haway rozee (light earnings) – getting up to Rs. 40 a day for the 
newspapers and Rs. 400 per month distributing post from Harighel to Chinati, but 
because of his son he had extra mouths to feed. He still owed his relatives money that 
he used to send his son to Dubai, and despite them being kind enough not to mention 
the loan or wanting it back, he had to live with the mental burden of not being able to 
pay it back. “If ever they’ll ask for anything unfair – not that they’ll ever do – I can’t 
say no”. Recently, he found out that his old company in Karachi was giving pensions to 
retired personnel, but because he had a fake ID card (he tried to get a government job 
when he came back, so he changed his age) he could not get access to the Rs. 3,000 
monthly pension. “My ID can be ‘fixed’ in Muzaffarabad, but I don’t have the money or 
contacts to do it. My greed got me screwed”. 
Unlike the older generation, most of the young shopkeepers were in fact 
underemployed. They usually held a diploma or a degree and, either because they could 
not keep a job in Pakistan,40 or because they did not have the right connections in PaK, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Often not because of themselves, but due to family pressure to return, particularly after the earthquake.	  
	   55	  
they often were left with running the family’s store. The younger shopkeepers who had 
migrated before did so mostly to the main urban centres of Punjab and constantly 
thought of migrating again. Imtiaz, a Mughal from Sarian, owned the first shopping 
building to be made in Chinati, with three shops in the ground floor and four rooms on 
top. His father built the place with money he saved from working in Kuwait. Imtiaz 
used one shop as a general store and rented the others to a man from Thial who sold 
paints and to Ali, a retired Karachi migrant from Sarian who had worked at the same 
pharmaceutical factory, and always had the coldest cold drinks. He rented the rooms to 
the cobbler, the bank staff and to two drivers. Imtiaz used to work in Lahore as a waiter, 
where he picked up English by talking to tourists. His family has a court case in Bagh 
with the agent who sent his father to Kuwait, because during the First Gulf War he was 
evacuated and promised compensation, which he never got. It looked like his family 
was going to win the case and when (and if) they did, he was thinking of using the 
money to migrate to the Gulf or to open a business in Pakistan. Imtiaz, like most others 
in the bazaar, said that a business in PaK (or at least in Chinati) was never profitable 
and the only way to have a profitable business was to have one in Pakistan, away from 
his community. He mentioned that lending money with no proper return date – and with 
no lending rate (riba) – was a mistake businesswise, but it was what kept them together 
socially. 
“Hum kareeb rehta hai [we are close to each other]. If my shop was in Bagh 
I would deal with cash, but here people come once a week and buy a whole 
month’s ration. Here is weekly, while in the city it would be daily. Also, 
most of my business is on credit. If someone buys me four cans of oil, he will 
pay 40% now and give the rest later – this can take up to a month or even 
longer. It messes up my whole cycle –I don’t have enough cash to restock. 
No one gives ‘me’ credit!” 
Faraz from Khorian also wanted to one day open up his own restaurant in Lahore or 
Rawalpindi. He was part of a group of men who worked in catering in Lahore. First he 
worked as a waiter, then a cook and then went back to being a waiter because, despite 
being paid less and not a fixed amount, it was ‘less boring’. Of his monthly wage he 
spent Rs. 3,000 and sent the rest home. “It’s very hard spending so little in Lahore, but I 
need to send money home, otherwise there’s no point being away.” Like most Poonchis, 
he shared a rented room with friends near Sherpao bridge “mostly because it’s cheap 
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and easily accessible to most restaurants and hotels.”41 When asked why so many 
people from PaK were working in catering (in the Gulf or Pakistan) Mehmood from 
Basantkot, also a waiter despite having an FA (12th grade), said “It’s the easiest non-
skilled work you can get and the quickest that can get you on your feet. Now there’s 
more education but not during our parents’ and our parents’ parents’ time. They were 
the first ones to go out for catering; we just followed.”42 Some of the people working in 
Pakistan also profited from having a father or brother abroad to set up their businesses 
elsewhere. Fahad, living in Sarian but married to a Lahori, started a venture buying and 
selling food and sanitary items through fairs in Pakistan thanks to his eldest brother’s 
initial investment, himself a Gulf migrant. While he happily accepted his brother’s 
assistance, he was more reticent about receiving help from his in-laws. “My wife’s 
parents have offered me to start a business in Lahore. I like Lahore a lot, but I would 
like to settle on my own terms. It isn’t honourable to accept a deal like that.” 
Finally, there was the upper rank of returned Pakistan migrants, the white-collar 
workers who, for unforeseen reasons, had to return. Such was the case of Ali Naqvi, an 
advocate at Bagh city’s court. He migrated to Lahore for further studies and, after 
graduating with a law degree, started to practice in Lahore until his father died and he 
had to return to Serabad. The story of his life, according to him, was a love story. Just 
after he finished Matriculation the Syed patriarch of Serabad, an influential Syed in the 
region, had announced that he would marry his only daughter to the most educated man 
in the region. Ali Naqvi, who was in love with the daughter in question, decided then 
that to become the most educated man he should go to Lahore and study law. After he 
graduated and started working in a law firm in Lahore, he returned to Serabad to marry 
the Syed bara aadmi’s daughter. He lived and worked in Lahore for more than 15 years 
until his return to Serabad in the late 1980s. Upon his return he restarted his legal 
practice in Bagh city and entered politics by joining the Muslim Conference, eventually 
reaching the upper echelons of the party. As seen in the previous section, this 
connection proved to be a crucial element in the ‘modernisation’ of the bazaar with the 
tarring of the road. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Situated nearby in Mall road and M.M. Alam road.	  
42 According to some informants the reason why people from PaK worked in catering in the Gulf was 
because they were more hygienic and better educated than other Pakistanis.	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Non-migrants 
Syed Ali Raza, who lived in nearby Bagla, had never migrated outside PaK. With a BA 
degree in Economics from the AJK University’s Muzaffarabad campus he taught 
mathematics, English and economics at Al-Noor for the past four years. After the 
earthquake he also worked part-time for a government-funded NGO dealing with 
disabled people, having benefitted from a series of seminars and training sessions in 
Islamabad with “specialists from Pakistan and even abroad.” Working for this NGO 
also allowed him to rent a small room in the back of one of the bigger shops opposite to 
the mosque. He furnished it with a computer and printer and, having somehow access to 
internet, he thought of turning it into Chinati’s first cyber cafe. When I met him he was 
also planning to further his education and had recently applied for a Masters in 
Sociology back in Muzaffarabad. Until then, he would continue to teach at Al-Noor and 
work on his cyber cafe. 
The non-migrant population in the bazaar was so because either they were too young to 
migrate, too poor, or because they had a job that did not require them to migrate, 
although often they had a migrant father or brother(s). Taking into consideration that 
most of the young ones would, eventually, migrate or have some family member 
abroad, it appeared that there was only one factor that prevented anyone in Chinati from 
reaping the bounties of migration, namely poverty. This poverty did not only mean lack 
of economic capital but, as important if not more, social capital. Here I am referring to 
Bourdieu’s (1986: 248-9) definition of social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or 
potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less 
institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other 
words, membership in a group – which provides each of its members with the backing 
of the collectivity-owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the 
various senses of the word.” 
Of the people that worked in and around Chinati bazaar – and were not too young nor 
with access to remittances – the only ones who had never migrated were two deaf 
brothers (both of them tailors), one unmarried man who sold bakery items, and the two 
barbers belonging to the Nai biraderi who lived in a nearby settlement. The eldest of the 
barber brothers was a mason who part timed as a barber because, he said, his father was 
	   58	  
a barber43 so he decided to become one as well. This decision though, was also 
economic since his daily wage as a mason was about Rs. 300, while as a barber he 
earned from Rs. 700 to Rs. 1,400. His younger brother worked only as a barber, two 
days in Chinati and the rest of the week in neighbouring villages. Both brothers were 
known for being very pious and religious men44, in a way possibly compensating the 
lack of social capital through symbolic capital. The unmarried old baker got his bakery 
items from Harighel; whenever he needed bread they would send a van. His profit 
margin was minimal and he often used to run at a loss. “You got to do what you got to 
do, at least I’m making an honest living”. Recently though, he started selling more 
bread and running out of stock everyday. He said that after the earthquake people had 
become more “English”, having bread for breakfast. Until then people would have 
parathas and desi gee for breakfast, “but now even the poorer ones have a breakfast of 
eggs and toast”. 
An important occupation in which some men never migrated was that of the drivers. 
There were several types of drivers depending on the type of vehicle used. Jeep drivers 
mostly operated between the bazaar and the villages with no tarred roads, transporting 
goods and people, and between Harighel (and sometimes Bagh) and Chinati, 
transporting mainly goods. As roads were now being reconstructed, many of which 
were being upgraded from gravel to tarred, people started to prefer buses and taxis to 
jeeps as a mode of transportation. At the further eastern end of the bazaar stood the 
adda, the bus stop. This was the place where people took the buses to Harighel or Bagh, 
with four daily shuttles from Monday to Saturday (two in the morning and two in the 
afternoon) and twice on Sunday. Most of the drivers were locals, except for two who 
rented out a room in the bazaar. After the earthquake the number of drivers increased, 
due to the increase of construction and the need for construction materials, and an 
increase in the NGO presence (needing local drivers). Many saw the rise in demand for 
transportation as a good business opportunity and started using their savings to buy a 
vehicle.45 As of late though, there was an overflow of taxi drivers. This was particularly 
visible in the urban centres of Bagh and Rawalakot where taxi stands and addas were 
packed with taxis, most of them getting no work for days on end. Some drivers even 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Who even performed circumcisions (musalmani), an important marker of male Muslim identity, and a 
traditional component of the barber’s role.	  
44 Both sporting long beards and no moustache, with their heads always covered.	  
45 Some families even used the money they received for housing reconstruction to buy a car and start a 
taxi service.	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decided to quit the business, like Shoaib who now owned a ready-made clothes shop in 
Chinati. 
Abid was one of those who profited with post-earthquake transportation demand. 
Having worked first as a truck helper and then as a truck driver in Pakistan, in 1985 he 
bought a jeep which he operated until the earthquake. After the earthquake he was the 
first person in the region to buy a Mazda and start transporting construction material 
from warehouses in Bagh to all locations and projects: from roads, to bridges, to 
schools. Four years later he owned three Mazda and two jeeps, driving one Mazda 
himself, his son another and hiring drivers for the other vehicles. His son Wasay drove a 
lorry because despite having a diploma in mechanical engineering he could not find a 
job in the region. “There are about 10 to 15 people in the area with my diploma, but 
only three or four jobs in Bagh. There is little demand. I’m now trying to go abroad and 
already started getting in contact with agents.” 
 
In-migrants 
There were two types of people who migrated to Chinati: the ones employed in the 
formal economy and those in the informal economy, i.e., workers and labourers. The 
former tended to be educated and mostly from within PaK, while the latter were usually 
uneducated (or had primary schooling) Pukhtoon who came from KP. The first group 
consisted of teachers, who came early morning either from neighbouring villages or 
from Bagh, and the bank staff, who rented out rooms in the bazaar and lived there 
during the week. The bank manager, Ali, was from Bagh, a graduate in economics from 
AJK University who had been placed in Chinati since 2004. 
Of the Pukhtoon working in Chinati only one had a shop, the mochi (cobbler) who had 
been in the bazaar since before the earthquake with a young nephew as an apprentice. 
Originally from Mardan, they also rented a room in the same place as the bank staff. 
According to most people, the mochi had the most profitable business in the bazaar, as 
he was the only cobbler in a place where people got their shoes fixed rather than buying 
new ones. In fact, according to most shopkeepers the most profitable businesses were 
the ones done by outsiders, namely the cobbler, the barber, and the bank manager. Most 
Pukhtoon had worked somewhere else before coming to Chinati, some even before 
coming to PaK. One of them, Khan Saab, used to have a shop in Bagh, where he sold 
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shoes, garments, and toiletries. He used to go to Shaalmi bazaar in Lahore to buy his 
inventory and make quite a profit: “I would get a shoe for Rs. 300 and sell it here for 
Rs. 600. I had an ideal life”. Unfortunately, his shop was destroyed by the earthquake 
and because he was not a local he had no access to any type of compensation. Since 
then he joined the Pukhtoon labouring force working in post-earthquake reconstruction 
throughout the region. Like many other Pukhtoon he was critical of the way people 
worked in PaK. “The problem with people in Kashmir is that they just hate hard work, 
they rather sit down drinking tea than doing the hard work themselves. It’s a good thing 
for us [Pukhtoon] there’s a lot of work and value for us, since they don’t do the hard 
work”. Pride in manual labour pervaded throughout the discourse of most Pukhtoon 
labouring in PaK. Adam, a young uneducated Pukhtoon from Upper Dir proudly stated 
that Pukhtoon as a group were not famous for being intelligent and did not know 
anything apart from physical work: “Of course I’m dumb, that’s why I work here. If I 
was smart I’d be in England [where you are doing your studies]!46” Their surprising 
pride in not being considered intelligent comes from intelligence being linked with 
cunningness in the case of Punjabis who, according to them, cannot be trusted with 
money, while they themselves being straightforward to the extent of being considered 
‘dumb’ are therefore honest. 
Even Pukhtoon who succeed in life through hard work and ingenuity, often did not 
credit themselves with being smart. Gulzar, a Puktoon from Upper Dir, only made it to 
grade three. When he was nine he beat up another student and the headmaster called his 
parents. He got beaten up by both and in anger tore all his books and ran off to Lahore. 
There he first worked as a dishwasher (Rs. 10 a day), always paying attention to how 
food was made. He then became a cook (Rs. 12,000 a month) at a kebab shop in Model 
Town. When he turned 18 he moved to KSA where he worked as a driver for three 
years, until he got arrested for working outside his contract with a company, as he 
thought he could make more money on his own. He was in jail for four months and then 
deported. Back in Pakistan, he moved to Chitral and started working in a timber 
company. Eventually he started his own timber business and moved to Afghanistan, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 The stereotype of the ‘dumb Pukhtoon’ pervades throughout not only Pakistan but also within 
Pukhtoon of all classes and backgrounds - the idea being that they find education overrated because they 
are either landed and too rich to go to school, or too sturdy and martial not to be involved in physical 
work. The truth, of course, has more to do with the fact that KP was always a region with some of the 
worse standards of education, with an enormous divide between the haves and have-nots.	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where he was successful initially but lost it all because of the Taliban.47 He returned to 
Chitral where he was working in both timber and construction until the earthquake. He 
moved to Muzaffarabad, where he attended a vocational training workshop on 
construction and got into a road construction project. Initially he used to go to people to 
find jobs, but he developed a good reputation and since then people came to him to offer 
projects. He has done several jobs in this area, including five homes for Mushtaq and a 
school in Khorian. 
“Many people started reconstructing their houses and if they got quotations 
for 10 lacs I would do it for nine and I needed to do it for that much and 
well done, so I could build a reputation. It’s a fluctuating business, my 
monthly profit changes, but I can make up to Rs. 50,000. On average 
months I make Rs. 30,000. Mushtaq offered me a job in Iraq, but I told him 
that I’m not going to work for anybody. If he wants to get me a job, it has to 
be as a contractor.” 
Still, Gulzar did not consider himself smart. In his words, to be successful a person 
needed to be either very educated or have really good experience. According to him, he 
was not smart because he did not follow his studies and his experience was all due to 
hard work. When I said that he too was learned, as people learn through experience, that 
he had travelled a lot and could speak five languages, he insisted that “yes, you learn, 
but that does not make you smart or intelligent.” 
 
Conclusion 
Life in and around Chinati bazaar, like in most other rural bazaars in PaK, was 
continuously changing. Many of the defining elements that shaped social, economic, 
and cultural change were rooted in historical processes in which people from this region 
played a determining role, from the Poonch Revolt that sparked the Azadi movement in 
1947 – and consequently the Partition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir – to the 
increase and diversification of migratory patterns and education levels. In October 2005 
when the earthquake struck at the heart of PaK, according to many of my informants it 
ruptured not only the land but also all aspects of everyday life. While its physical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 He refused to pay them bribes.	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aftershocks were felt for weeks on end, its economic, social and cultural aftershocks 
lasted much longer. 
For most people the earthquake became a metaphor for rupture and change, the very 
moment from which they could date various transformations in their lives. However, as 
this chapter has made obvious, the lives of the people of Chinati bazaar have been 
subject to change for many decades now. While people have thought of this region as 
remote and closed of, its people have integrated and negotiated with global capitalism 
over a long period. Neither their economy nor the project of modernity can be dated 
from the earthquake. And yet, as the following chapters will show, it is indeed from the 
earthquake that changes emanate in the minds of most of my informants. 
In the following chapters I examine some of the main changes my informants believed 
had occurred in this region because of the earthquake. In each case I argue that while 
the rupture caused by the earthquake is rhetoricised in the everyday interactions of my 
informants, as seen in their stories, many of these changes in fact represent a more 
continuous process of change that has occurred over a long period of time. In other 
words, the earthquake did not so much create change as it crystallized, and at times 
intensified, pre-existing changes. However, before I can do that, I must first look in 
detail in the next chapter at this great point of rupture, the earthquake, itself, and at the 
day it shook Chinati bazaar. 
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Chapter Three 
The Day the Earth Shook: The October 8th Earthquake and its 
Aftermath 
 
Introduction 
Through my fieldwork in Chinati bazaar I was always acutely aware of the fact that the 
stories and narratives I was collecting from the many storytellers of this bazaar were 
deeply embedded in and contextualized within a trauma and a sense of loss that I could 
not entirely grasp. My experience of the earthquake, from which everything was dated 
in this bazaar, was to have been shaken from my sleep and to have slowly walked 
outside to wait out the tremors before going back to bed. For the people of this bazaar 
though, there had been no going back to bed. In that instant they had either lost 
everything, or had witnessed these enormous losses at close enough quarters to have 
been permanently scarred by them. I could listen to their narratives and look for 
common patterns that were indicative of an emerging discourse, but it took a very 
serious effort to truly understand the context within which these were told. In this 
chapter I go back to the day of the earthquake in an attempt to explain the extent of loss 
and suffering that my informants, the storytellers of Chinati bazaar, had lived through 
on that fateful day and in its aftermath. 
There were two types of suffering that my informants had lived through. The first was 
the earthquake itself. The 8th of October 2005 is a day that will forever be in the minds 
of all the inhabitants of PaK. The official government estimate of the death toll from the 
earthquake stood at 85,000 with more than 150,000 injured and most housing structures 
destroyed or damaged. Overall, the earthquake affected the lives of more than 3.5 
million people in PaK and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). The second was the relief, 
reconstruction, and rehabilitation process that started in the earthquake’s aftermath. This 
process brought to the scene –  through Pakistan’s special ‘open door policy’ instituted 
to deal with the emergency –  development agencies, private sector organisations and 
other actors – many for the first time. The arrival of these agencies had both positive 
and negative impact. On the one hand, it brought a new hope that life could be ‘Built 
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Back Better’.48 Through these agencies came new ideas and practices in housing, 
communication, health, sanitation, education, and livelihoods. They brought with them 
a reason for change. On the other hand, the post-earthquake assistance brought with it a 
different type of suffering – one that led to a loss of honour and dignity, compelled 
people to beg for assistance, and led to the exclusion and marginalisation of certain 
groups through the mistargeting of aid. As a shopkeeper from Bagh city put it, “God 
brought on us the earthquake and the devil the aid”. 
In this chapter I examine how people dealt, physically and emotionally, with both these 
sources of rupture, change and suffering. I also look at how both these events – the 
‘earthquake event’ and the post-earthquake ‘assistance event’ – were used by the people 
of Chinati bazaar to discuss and engage with cultural, social and economic changes, in 
the process creating discourses of change and suffering. I start the chapter by looking at 
how people in the region, from the urban centres of Muzaffarabad and Bagh to the 
villages north and south of Bagh, lived through the earthquake and the subsequent days. 
I follow this description by examining how people at the bazaar made sense of the 
earthquake and its legacy, and I elucidate the discourse on change that the ‘earthquake 
event’ created. After this I discuss in detail the arrival of the development agencies and 
other ‘outsiders’. I describe how these agencies appeared, how they provided assistance, 
and analyse the reasons for their successes and failures. Following this section, I look at 
the separate discourse and legacy of suffering and loss that this second ‘assistance 
event’ created. I conclude that as with the earthquake, people’s discourses of change 
because of the earthquake were also visible in their stories of everyday life and 
muddled up within these were other stories of pre-existing changes. 
 
The Day the Earth Shook 
On the morning of October the 8th 2005, more precisely at 8:52 a.m., the villages 
surrounding Chinati bazaar, along with the rest of PaK, were hit by an earthquake 
measuring 7.6 on the Richter scale that originated in the Balakot-Bagh fault, with its 
epicentre approximately 60 kilometres northwest of Bagh city (Hussein et al, 2009). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 This was the motto of the civilian organisation set up by the Government of Pakistan, the Earthquake 
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency (ERRA), to plan, coordinate, monitor and regulate the 
reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in the earthquake-affected areas of PaK and KP. It had also 
been used during the 2004 Tsunami and the 2010 Haiti earthquake.	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Throughout the day, a total of 232 aftershocks were registered after the initial quake, 
out of which one was classified as strong (6.4) and 26 as moderate (USGS, 2011). 
While more deaths and injuries occurred further north towards Muzaffarabad – the 
official death toll for Bagh district was approximately 8,500 deaths compared to 34,000 
deaths in Muzaffarabad district – physical destruction was more visible in Bagh 
District, with 92% of housing units49 and 80% of shops damaged, compared to 79% of 
housing units and 70% of shops in Muzaffarabad (ADB/WB, 2005). This section is 
about that day, how it was witnessed by the world and lived by the people in the urban 
centres of Bagh, the migrants who rushed back and the villagers living north and south 
of Bagh city. Keeping in mind Das’ (1995) work which shows that critical events are 
often recalled and retold more by ‘others’ than by the participants/victims themselves, I 
make use of their stories and, as much as possible, their voices to try to give the closest 
picture of what it was to live through the earthquake. 
 
Muzaffarabad, Ground Zero 
While Pakistanis and most South Asians felt a tremor in that early morning and 
seismographs around the world quickly detected its epicentre, it took some time until 
the world got the true picture of its impact. In the first few hours people watched on 
their TV sets the rescue operation in Islamabad where an apartment building had 
collapsed and news emerged of a hundred or more deaths in KP. Meanwhile, with the 
epicentre having been located only 19 kilometres northeast of Muzaffarabad, most 
people began to fear that the worst was still to come from PaK. Efforts to get news from 
the area were futile, with the roads blocked by landslides and telephone lines dead. 
After trying to reach Muzaffarabad by three different approaches and failing, a BBC 
reporter concluded that “it will be a while before we have a clear picture of the damage 
(…) From this end, the Pakistan-administered Kashmiri area is completely cut off from 
the rest of the country.”50 On the way, however, he and many other journalists 
encountered thousands of villagers that had come down from virtually destroyed 
villages, trying to take their injured to the city. This gave them and the world an initial 
idea of what to expect in terms of the damage caused in PaK. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 The disagregated figure was 56.7% destroyed and 35.6% damaged.	  
50 BBC reporter’s log, October 8.	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By the second day some people managed to cross the landslides but the roads were still 
blocked. Some reporters called Muzaffarabad the ground zero of the earthquake, an 
allusion to the main site of destruction in the 9/11 attacks in the USA. “I covered the 
tsunami and the Bam earthquake in Iran, and frankly I have not seen anything as bad as 
this.”51 Most of the buildings had collapsed and people were sleeping in the open, with 
nothing to protect them from the constant cold rain. Many of the buildings were 
educational institutions, with hundreds of children trapped inside. Due to the high levels 
of education in the region and Saturday being a school-day, a large number of people 
who died were schoolchildren. For this reason people often talked about the loss of a 
generation. The Pakistani government, through its armed forces, started a helicopter 
ferry service, bringing food and medical supplies in and carrying the injured to hospitals 
in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, but the numbers were overwhelming. “All that one hears 
is the constant clattering of military helicopters reverberating through the valley and 
the wailing of women. They say people buried underneath are still alive, and many are 
trying to move the concrete slabs with their bare hands. Anger against the government 
is growing by the minute. The mountains around look fragile and on one side of the city, 
the mountainside is still falling bit by bit.”52 
On the third day the first major road link was re-opened. “A lone bulldozer has made its 
way to Muzaffarabad's main bazaar and is trying to clear the road. The streets have a 
bad smell to them. Anger is mounting by the minute. Until yesterday, there were many 
who said they were certain the authorities would soon move in. Today, they have only 
hatred in their eyes. Many among them have started to wonder if they were, indeed, the 
lucky ones.”53 Eventually help started to arrive. By mid-morning the army finally 
entered the city with heavy hammers, pick-axes and shovels. The level of destruction 
and chaos was so great though, that “no one, it seems, knows where to begin.”54 While 
people were leaving the city in mass, by the end of the day there was also a steady 
stream of traffic heading towards Muzaffarabad and other affected areas, mostly 
composed of ordinary individuals arriving with loads of aid as well as relatives 
checking on their loved ones. The big relief operation was now finally underway. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 BBC reporter’s log, October 9.	  
52 BBC reporter’s log, October 9.	  
53 BBC reporter’s log, October 10.	  
54 BBC reporter’s log, October 10.	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Bagh City 
Figure 3 – Bagh bazaar one month after the earthquake 
 
 
The picture in Bagh city was not much different from that of Muzaffarabad. Despite 
being further away from the epicentre the physical destruction was similar, with roads 
blocked by landslides, many shops in the main bazaar razed to the ground, all the city’s 
hospitals and government buildings severely damaged, as were the telephone, water and 
electricity infrastructures. As it was Ramzan the bazaar was sparsely populated, with 
quite a few shops still closed and many shopkeepers sitting at the steps of their shops. 
Conversely it was a school day, which meant that all schools were open and packed 
with schoolchildren. As the first tremor hit Bagh most of these schools caved in, 
trapping an enormous number of schoolchildren inside. Several people found 
themselves also trapped when many of the city’s mosques collapsed. After the initial 
shock those who were alive poured into the streets and in disbelief realised that 
wherever they looked all they saw was rubble and clouds of dust. But the most 
gruesome picture was yet to come; as the dust settled down they started to see the 
bodies of those trapped inside the falling buildings. While some in shock and disbelief 
just stood by the roadside, either silent or crying, others desperately tried to rescue the 
ones trapped inside Bagh’s innumerable collapsed buildings. With thousands buried 
inside schools, mosques, shops, houses, and government buildings survivors now turned 
rescuers and used picks, shovels, pieces of metal, and bare hands desperately attempting 
to dig children, women and men out of the rubble. 
Khan Saab, whom I met often in Chinati bazaar, owned a small shop in Bagh where he 
sold shoes, garments and toiletries. Ramzan had started a few days ago and business 
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was slow, but as he had woken up early for sehri55 and was done with his morning 
prayers he decided to open up his shop anyway. He had just opened a few minutes 
before and was chatting with his neighbouring shopkeepers when his world came 
crashing down. His shop collapsed as did most in his street. In our conversations he 
always told me that reliving that day was too overwhelming. “I remember every 
moment, but I don’t want to talk about it – ever. I had an ideal life before. But I was not 
a local so I couldn’t get compensation. I lost it all, so I had no option but to leave and 
work in construction.” 
Close to the river, a few streets further down from where Khan Saab’s shop once was, 
the owner of a tea shop saw the river drying up for 20 minutes and then suddenly 
gushing black water. “I think it was black; maybe it was red.” There were so many dead 
bodies in the city that the owner of a bookstore nearby, along with other shopkeepers, 
buried 10 people in a single grave without wrapping anyone in a kafan (shroud). Along 
with the innumerable dead bodies filling the streets of Bagh, several shopkeepers told 
me of the horror of seeing severed bodies of their own relatives and acquaintances. The 
owner of a carpet shop said that the trauma of seeing headless children and amputated 
men and women made him go without food for two or three days. 
 
Migrants 
It was into this mayhem of gore and destruction that migrants rushing home from the 
nearby hills of Muree and the urban centres of Rawalpindi and Islamabad arrived. Riaz 
was working in Muree when he felt the earthquake. A waiter from Bagh District, like 
many waiters who worked in Muree, his village was a few kilometres north of Bagh 
city. He heard from fellow Kashmiris about the situation in PaK before any news 
appeared on TV.  He took off from work and tried to get a bus to Bagh, but there were 
none. The transport system had collapsed and none of the scheduled busses for the area 
were ready to go. He got together with a few others from Bagh and persuaded a bus 
driver to take them there. They had to pay a lot, much more than the normal fare, and 
the driver told them he would take them only to the closest point until where the cars 
could go. He drove them as far as he could; there were so many landslides that he 
eventually dropped them on the road a couple of kilometres after Arja. From there Riaz 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Morning meal before fasting.	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and the others proceeded on foot to Bagh. On the way they kept on seeing collapsed 
houses and people taking the injured on charpoys56 to the nearest hospital in Bagh. 
When they got to Bagh what they saw was destruction and chaos. Every shop had 
collapsed, buildings crumbled with twisted metal rods, rubble everywhere coming into 
the roads. It was there that they realised that the whole region was destroyed and the 
chances of their families being alive were very low. As night started to set in, 
accompanied with heavy rain, frenzy took over them and they felt an urge to get to their 
villages in the hills. With the sound of landslides rumbling in the hills and the 
probability of not making it home, some decided to wait while others, like Riaz, dared 
to keep on walking, crossing landslides in the dark, going home. 
When these migrants rushed back, most did not have enough money to support their 
families at such a time and could not even borrow major sums from anyone. But they 
had to go home. A migrant from Rawalpindi took five days to reach home and was 
relieved to see his entire family well and together. Many of his friends from work, he 
later found out, had lost many family members. Another migrant, also from Rawalpindi, 
reached home to find some of his family members still in the rubble. Some he saved 
himself and took to the nearest hospital camp. All migrants kept on stressing how 
grateful they were to their neighbours, for helping their families out of the rubble, for 
sharing the little they had. All villagers in fact kept on telling me tales of how people 
had helped each other. They felt a debt particularly towards the young men who had 
helped the most in getting people out of the rubble, walked endlessly again and again to 
the army camps to get relief for their families and for those who could not do it 
themselves – the widows and households whose men were not present. 
 
North of Bagh 
In the villages north of Bagh, where the destruction was ubiquitous and the number of 
deaths was high, people considered themselves survivors of war. Many people, having 
physically lived through wars fought between Pakistan and India, either by being 
shelled (destruction) or by having to relocate (displacement), equated the effects of the 
earthquake to the effects of war. They all had tales of death fresh in their memories. 
Nine months after the earthquake, in one of those villages a man told me the story of his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 A bed made up of a frame strung with tapes or light rope.	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three daughters. All three were in the nearby public primary school at the time of the 
earthquake. The eldest was a schoolteacher and the younger two were students. The 
youngest was misbehaving in class, so the teacher – her sister – sent her out of the 
classroom and told her to sit outside as a punishment. When the earthquake stuck, the 
school collapsed killing most of the children and teachers. Of his daughters, only the 
youngest survived. She was sitting quietly near her father, clinging to his kameez, while 
he was telling me his story. Another man in a nearby village was trying to get his 
brother out of the rubble when a stone slipped out of his hand and hit his brother. His 
brother died and now this man considered himself a murderer. 
The help that they did not get was also fresh in their memory. In their own words, they 
were made to beg for food, tents and money at a time when they had lost control over 
their lives. It took about three days for the first help to get to these villages, the ones 
easily reachable on foot. Villages further in the hills received assistance as late as two 
weeks after the earthquake. The first help they got were tents and scanty bedding from 
the army, the first official assistance provider from the state. The army had sent a 
message to the villagers saying that to obtain assistance they needed to go to a relief 
collection point, which they had set a few hours’ walk further up. The villagers went 
there for three consecutive days, only to be told that their collection point was actually 
further down in another village. Every time they would go there, though, they were 
refused assistance, as their village fell in another sector.57 Eventually the villagers got 
access to tents, some dry ration, and medicine but not without a fight. One night, the 
villagers saw the army subedar in charge of the collection point giving relief goods only 
to people with whom he had what they called a ‘special relationship’.58 A fight started 
and, with many more villagers arriving in a show of strength, the subedar59 eventually 
allowed them to access relief goods as well. This interaction with official assistance, 
though, happened because villagers went to the collection points. The first time the state 
agents went to their villages was a month after the earthquake, and that only with the 
purpose of surveying the area. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 While the civil administration divides PaK into constituencies forming Union Councils, the army 
divides PaK into mapped square sectors. Rarely do these two divisions match.	  
58 When probed further, the villagers told me that a few households were sending their women to collect 
relief goods, possibly in exchange for sexual favours.	  
59 I had a conversation with this same subedar a few months after the earthquake (before I was told this 
story), where he told me that “the people here are shameless, with no concept of honour”.	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South of Bagh – Chinati 
South of Bagh the picture was slightly different. While the destruction pattern was 
similar, with most housing structures destroyed or damaged, there were few landslides 
so roads were less affected and more importantly, there were less deaths. Still, that day 
remained fresh in people’s memories when I returned to Chinati in the Autumn of 2008. 
Having returned from Dubai just one week before the earthquake, Bashir was sitting 
outside his house thinking about going to the bazaar to see which plot to buy with his 
savings to build a shop. His terraced house stood on the southern slope of Sarian, 
southeast of Chinati bazaar, facing the Bagh-Rawalakot road and the Mahl Nullah. 
From his veranda he could see the other side of the valley, the Rawalakot side. 
“When the earthquake struck I was frozen. I didn’t talk, didn’t move, I was 
in shock. Then I heard the cries coming from all over the hills. I looked at 
my house and saw my family outside. They were all shouting something, but 
I couldn’t hear what. I kept on hearing the cries all around. Later my 
neighbours came – one of my nephews had broken his arm, so I go in the 
car to take him to Bagh hospital. I took a few others [injured] too. The 
scene in Bagh was crazy; so many people, so many injuries and deaths, 
hospitals and houses destroyed. There were lots of foreign doctors, they had 
a translator who couldn’t explain anything to them, so I started translating. 
They offered me a job to go with them to Muzaffarabad but I said no, I had 
to stay and take care of my family. [In the following days] there were so 
many NGOs around – most of us didn’t know what this NGO thing was – 
from all over Europe, Gulf, America, they came to help us. [In our village] 
we waited for help and on the third day we got food from a helicopter – I 
was very happy. In the first few days we slept in the street. Eventually I 
made a tent-like structure, because it kept on raining.” 
In Thial, on the northern side of Chinati bazaar, Babar, a waiter in Dubai, was back 
home for his annual leave. Sitting in the kitchen floor and sharing a late breakfast with 
his wife the first jolt knocked him to the ground. 
“Most of us managed to escape, except one young niece. While we were all 
outside I went back. One of the walls had already collapsed and she was 
frozen. I picked her up and brought her to safety. She is still affected by the 
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earthquake and so is one of my daughters. After the earthquake we were 
living in inhuman conditions, in tents and it was a cold winter. Living those 
moments was so horrible that I don’t even wish this to my worst enemies.” 
Further up in Khorian, where the forest is thickest, Sajida was playing with her son 
inside her house. Her house, like many others, was kaccha with wooded beams. She felt 
restless and distracted because for some days now she was fearing something bad was 
going to happen, but she kept on playing. With the initial tremor the beams fell on her 
and she got internal injuries and bruises. She was so badly hurt she could not take care 
of her son for days. Her neighbour’s houses were also destroyed. All the women 
remember that they were shoeless for two days and without kitchens or cooking utensils 
for 20 days. 
While there were no casualties at the bazaar, the scene was nonetheless a frightening 
one. Striking in the early hours of a quiet Saturday morning, when business was slow 
and some of the shopkeepers had not even arrived, most of the people at the bazaar were 
the schoolchildren and teachers at the two private schools. Following the initial tremor 
they all left their shops, some of which were starting to crumble and collapse, and ran 
home worried about their families. Rehana, a teacher at READ from Hothala, was in 
Chinati bazaar when the earthquake struck. 
“I was teaching that morning, giving an exam. I had a pen in my hand. At 
first I noticed something strange happening and when I realised it was an 
earthquake I really felt it was big. I looked outside and saw the wall of the 
dhaaba falling. My students were busy with the exam and I told them to stop 
and get out. And the pen was still in my hand. All the students followed me 
and we stood near a tree. READ is so disciplined that only my class had left. 
I called from the outside to the other classes to get out. I was calling 
everybody else. All the students came in proper lines with the teachers 
heading them. My cousin came to the bazaar, he found me there and I left 
with him – with the pen in my hand. I was worried about my cousins 
because I saw the road leading to their house with a big crack. I headed to 
my house and saw my mother trying to pull out our cow from the [collapsed] 
shed. There was so much earth on it that we left it there. I still had the pen 
in my hand. My neighbour’s roof fell. There were three ladies inside, but we 
could only save one. The three ladies were holding hands and shouting, but 
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there was so much noise that I couldn’t hear them. Their hands were set 
loose. I still remember [one of] the lady’s face, with wood and mud in her 
eyes, her face. It took me one year to recover and I can still see her face. 
Everyone was fearing their own houses. For three days we cooked food but 
didn’t eat. Everybody was staying in the gardens and then it started raining. 
We would go to our homes, but then would come out. The watercourses 
changed so we had no water. Nobody would go home, there were rumours 
that another earthquake would happen. I lived in my khala’s [mother’s 
sister] house for one year. All the boys came back from their jobs. Only after 
one year teaching resumed. READ came to the teachers’ houses and asked 
them to come back to teach.” 
 
Post-Earthquake Discourses of the Storytellers of Chinati Bazaar 
“And now? We bury the dead and take care of the living.”60 
The way in which people made sense of the earthquake had a strong influence on how 
they dealt with life after the earthquake, both physically and emotionally. For many the 
earthquake was not an event that happened in the past, but one that kept reoccurring in 
their minds through reminders all around them. Each time there was a mild tremor, each 
time there was a strange sound, each time they looked at their incomplete homes, the 
earthquake and its legacy made themselves visible through the sounds, images, and 
objects of their everyday lives. More importantly they were visible in people’s 
narratives and actions, and it is to this discourse that I turn next. 
 
Rationalising the Earthquake 
Three years later, in the stories I heard at the bazaar about that day I could see people’s 
reasoning for why the earthquake had happened through an array of justifications based 
on theodicies and science. In turn, the rationalisation of its occurrence had an influence 
on how people perceived its impact on society, with some telling stories glorifying a 
community spirit that emerged out of the rubble and others narrating the opposite, that it 
had made members of their society more individualistic and selfish. In this section I 
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analyse people’s perceptions of why the earthquake happened, its rationalisation, as 
well as its legacies. 
After being struck by an unannounced calamity where loved ones died or were injured, 
where houses and livelihoods were destroyed, people tried to make sense of the event. 
Two questions kept recurring in people’s minds, namely why did the earthquake happen 
and why did it happen to them? Most people used science and religion, or a mixture of 
both, to answer these questions. As Merli (2005: 106) notes, while historically we have 
changed the way we see disasters from “Acts of God” to “Acts of Nature” to recently 
“Acts of Men and Women”, these explanations are not mutually exclusive, but co-exist 
in the same social context. 
Regarding the first question, many people thought the earthquake happened because this 
region lies in the collision area between the Eurasian and the Indian tectonic plates. 
Using the scientific discourse of plate tectonics theory they concluded that as the Indian 
plate keeps moving inland towards Asia it creates earthquakes, such as the one of 
October the 8th. I found most proponents of this explanation among the more educated 
(schoolteachers, civil servants, professionals) and overseas migrants. Some not only 
believed in this theory, but wanted others to know it as well. A returned migrant from a 
village north of Bagh decided that especially schoolchildren should know this and took 
it upon himself to go from school to school teaching children (and teachers) plate 
tectonics. Among the people who used a scientific discourse to explain the earthquake 
there were some who thought that earthquakes happened because there were 
underground caves filled with gases, which upon the movement of tectonic plates would 
release these gases, causing the earth to shake.61 Many others used religion to explain 
the earthquake. They saw the earthquake – and the subsequent suffering – as an 
instrument of the purposes of God. Within these, some said the earthquake was a trial 
sent by God, while others said it was a punishment. All made use of Islamic theodicy to 
reach this conclusion. Throughout the Quran there are several suras which state that 
“God has power over every single thing”62 and that God is merciful and compassionate. 
According to Bowker (1975:112) by seeing suffering both as a punishment and as a trial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 The Marquis of Pombal, on being asked what was to be done after the Lisbon earthquake of 1755.	  
61 Kant (1756, in: Reinhardt and Oldroyd, 1983) developed a similar theory after the Lisbon earthquake.	  
62 ‘Ala kulli shayin Mushtaq.	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“the Quran attempts to reconcile the fact of suffering with a belief in God’s 
omnipotence and compassion”. 
As for why the earthquake happen to them, almost all (including the ones that reasoned 
its occurrence in science) stated that it was God’s will. Soon, a ‘religious reason’ 
(Simpson, 2011: 426) growing out of people’s experiences appeared to ‘explain and 
blame’. Many saw the earthquake as a preview of Qayamat (Judgement Day), as they 
drew comparisons between the Quranic description of Qayamat and the post-earthquake 
chaos, destruction and suffering. In fact, many people would refer to the earthquake as 
Qayamat. So if the earthquake was a punishment sent by God, what was God punishing 
them for? Tariq, a middle-aged unemployed Raja from Serabad said that “God [was] 
punishing us for our sins.” Which sins? There were mainly two explanations of what 
these sins were, both indirectly linked to migration and each created and recreated by a 
specific group. One explanation – given mostly by people who had no access to 
remittances – was that God was punishing them because their society was becoming 
more individualistic and materialistic. This had been happening since people started 
migrating to the Gulf and not sharing their wealth through the community. The other 
explanation, a male-dominated discourse, put the blame of their sins on women and 
their mobility. In their society seclusion and exclusion practices such as the purdah 
system were key tenets in the everyday life of men and women. Women, they said, 
should not be seen without their mehram – husbands and fathers – in public. If there 
were no mehram around, then they should be confided to the private sphere of the 
house. As many men migrated to Pakistan and the Gulf the female population, 
particularly between the ages of 15 and 50, was greater than the male population. This 
demographic group was also more mobile, with many young women enrolled in 
educational institutions and many adult and active women working outside the house. 
According to these voices the migratory and educational trends that had been in place 
since the 1970s allowed women to venture into the public space. Their presence in 
public meant, according to my informants, that they were in direct contact with non-
mehram men, through which many had become promiscuous and could be considered 
adulterers. It was for this that they had all been collectively punished. 
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The Impact on Morality 
The way people rationalised the occurrence of the earthquake had an influence on how 
they perceived its impact on society. Migrants, who were not present when the 
earthquake happened, would often praise the community spirit that the earthquake 
triggered in people’s minds and actions. Many were extremely thankful for their 
neighbours’ help with removing relatives from the rubble and sharing the little they had 
in the initial days. They particularly praised the youth for tirelessly walking to relief 
assistance points, often risking their lives crossing ‘live’ landslides, to fetch relief goods 
for those who could not go themselves. 
Context-bounded explanations on the state of morality of local communities post-
earthquake, with an aim to define social boundaries, were often embedded in 
“theological universalistic explanations of the existence of suffering and evil” through 
religious discourses (Merli, 2005: 104). Many who stated that the earthquake was sent 
by God as a trial also praised the ‘togetherness’ that evolved during the following 
months, implying that they had ‘passed’ God’s test. Some though, felt that they had 
failed God and would add their voices to the chorus of disenchanted people who 
believed God had sent the earthquake as a punishment. These people felt that the 
earthquake had brought selfishness and greed out of people. Even Gulf migrants such as 
Ahmed, one of Bashir’s relatives from Bagla whom I met while he was on leave from 
his catering job in Dubai, discussed this greed and selfishness. “People stopped caring 
after the earthquake. They became selfish and money-oriented.” Many shopkeepers in 
Bagh said that people had lost their moral values and singled out the local and non-local 
businessmen who artificially inflated prices of food and medicine soon after the 
earthquake. In reality, many felt that it was not the earthquake but the subsequent 
events, namely the aid that followed, which had destroyed the sense of community and 
made people individualistic and selfish. For some of these shopkeepers “God brought 
on us the earthquake and the devil the aid.” While this perception was mostly enacted 
by non-migrants who felt that they had received less aid than they deserved or were 
entitled to, with the passage of time some migrants too stated feeling that the sense of 
community was a thing of the past. Soon the discourse of ‘past-together’ versus 
‘present-separate’ started being internalised by many migrants, as they would return and 
see destroyed houses and – following housing reconstruction where many households 
decided to rebuilt separately – destroyed homes. 
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“Things got worse after the earthquake. People used to care about each 
other, family, neighbours. If you were in trouble, people would help you. 
Now people are materialistic. Money came in between people. Collectively 
lots of money came in, but individually it isn’t that much. It wasn’t worth all 
that individuality for little money.” Mushtaq, Gulf agent 
People who received little or no assistance, particularly those in households without 
migrants and who were not entitled to the full housing compensation, would phrase 
their disenchantment with the aid process through religion. Bashir, a retired migrant 
whose house was partially damaged63 and had no relatives abroad said that “before the 
earthquake we had the four characteristics needed for a society to function: mohabat 
[love], bhaichara [brotherhood], humdardi [compassion], and insanyiat [humanity]. 
After the earthquake all this has vanished. This is not a result of the earthquake, but of 
the situation people were in.” Out of his four characteristics, three – love, compassion 
and friendship/brotherhood – are usually mentioned as reasons to give sadqah, or 
voluntary charity. Like the villagers in some of the unreachable villages north of Bagh 
who – due to the initial lack of coordination in the relief effort – had to beg for relief, 
people who were unable to access the aid that poured into PaK felt a sense of 
deprivation and inferiority (ehsas-e-kumtari). Omar, the newspaper seller, explained to 
me how this sense of deprivation was exacerbated by post-earthquake assistance: “After 
the earthquake something has gone wrong ‘up here’. Rich people will talk to rich 
people and poor people will talk to poor people. People thought that they would all get 
aid, but since the influentials got aid and they didn’t, that made them feel deprived like 
never before.” Some, like Raza the young Syed science teacher at Al-Noor, felt that 
individualism, which they attributed to being modern, was something that was bound to 
happen as, even before the earthquake, they “were becoming modern”. Their interaction 
with development agencies accelerated it. Advocate Ali Naqvi posited that their society 
had become more individualistic because people were now (post-earthquake) more 
aware of opportunities available – and by opportunities he meant skills and employment 
gained through development agencies. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 And therefore was only entitled partial compensation.	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Discourses of Change 
In the early months of my fieldwork a common topic of discussion with people at the 
bazaar, particularly those who I knew from my previous fieldwork in this area, was the 
extent of change that happened through post-earthquake reconstruction. In one of our 
conversations I reminded Ali Naqvi, whom I had interviewed a year after the 
earthquake, that he had said it would take more than five years for things to get back to 
normal. I also told him that most people at the time had said the same and quite a few 
said things would never be normal again. He thought about it for a while and after 
having a sip of his tea replied that I had asked that question too early, too close to the 
earthquake. “After the earthquake we felt our lives moved 50 years back, but now we 
realise that we in fact have moved 60 years ahead. A lot of things have improved. We 
are becoming modern.” 
Ali Naqvi’s positive outlook on the legacy of the earthquake was reflected in my 
conversations with other informants as well. The motto of the Earthquake 
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency (ERRA)64 – ‘Building Back Better’ – went 
beyond physical reconstruction in most people’s minds. It was internalised in people’s 
narratives of post-earthquake life, with ‘better’ becoming the equivalent of ‘modern’: 
better planning, better houses, better jobs, better life.65 The earthquake and the outsiders 
it brought were seen as the main agents of modernisation, with PaK often portrayed in 
people’s discourse as a static, unchanging region before the earthquake that had been 
frozen in time since 1947.  
It is worth remembering at this point that ‘modernisation’ is not a neutral concept, but 
is, rather, value-laden. While for many being modern was something to aspire to, for 
many others it was an unwarranted and negative consequence of the earthquake. In PaK 
the latter group of people would claim that the exposure to the outside world had had an 
impact on morality: people (especially women and the youth) were becoming 
individualistic, materialistic, and less religious. This they saw as the destruction of 
(their) society’s moral fabric. Others though, were grateful that by opening PaK to the 
world the earthquake had accelerated their progress along the path to being modern. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 The civilian organisation set up by the Government of Pakistan to plan, coordinate, monitor and 
regulate the reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in the earthquake-affected areas of PaK and 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP).	  
65 The word most often used was pakka, literally meaning ‘solid’, but used colloquially to mean ‘formal’ 
or ‘better’.	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Despite decades of migration to Pakistan and the Gulf and interacting with ‘the world’ 
through consumption, most people in PaK felt that the region had been boxed in until 
the day the earthquake struck. As Raza, a teacher at one of the private schools in the 
bazaar who had never migrated said, “no one knew where PaK was. The earthquake 
opened up this place to the world. Most people in Pakistan thought there was only one 
Kashmir, on the other side [in India].” 
Part of this positive discourse on a traumatic event was based on the fact that before the 
earthquake, the direct interaction between people from PaK and the outside world was 
mostly unidirectional: men went from PaK to Pakistan, the Gulf and the rest of the 
world.66 The presence of foreigners was rare and even the number of Pakistanis coming 
to PaK was small, mostly consisting of a few traders, civil servants, the armed forces 
and, since the late 80s, militant groups. To the outside world – as most of my 
informants would say – there was only one Kashmir, the Indian one. After the 
earthquake, however, a stream of people and organisations stepped into PaK, many for 
the first time, in response to the humanitarian emergency. Some compared this flow of 
assistance to the Pukhtoon invasion and chaotic ‘assistance’ during the 1947 Poonch 
Revolt. Sardar Zulfiqar, a retired artist and son of a former prime-minster of PaK with 
whom I conversed regularly while in Rawalakot, was one of them. “People came from 
Pakistan to help just like in the Poonch Revolt, he said. “They came with aid, but didn’t 
know how to do it or who to help. There were no logistics.” However, to most of my 
other informants, these outsiders were largely a positive force that brought with them 
change. From this flowed a discourse of modernity.  
In people’s narratives the outsiders were roughly divided into two groups: the ‘formal 
outsiders’ who belonged to organisations, like NGOs (both national and international), 
donors and the Pakistani private sector, and the ‘informal outsiders’, mostly Pukhtoon 
labourers working in road and housing reconstruction. In Chinati bazaar, and throughout 
much of the region, the term ‘NGO’ was used to identify both local and international 
NGOs, as well as donor projects, and sometimes even projects that were implemented 
by the state. The sudden, large and unprecedented presence of NGOs and donors gave 
rise to a discourse that focused on people’s relationship with the state. The fact that 
these organisations were perceived to be more efficient and richer than the Pakistani 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Indirectly, however, the interaction occurred in both directions, after the migration boom of the 1970s, 
mostly through consumption.	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state allowed a neoliberal narrative on development to develop, whereby my informants 
envisioned a PaK where the state would be rolled back. “Soon the government is going 
to be completely phased out”, said Kashif, the pakora seller at the bazaar “It will be only 
NGOs and donors [providing services]. Since the earthquake this is happening; the 
government doesn’t have their capacity.” Many people in Chinati equated NGO 
presence with better living. They would talk about the improvements in health, 
education, and capacity building. Some, such as an informant at the Bank of Kashmir in 
Bagh city, also pointed out that NGOs had impacted the local economy through the 
infusion of money and the creation of jobs.  
Not all local narratives about NGOs were positive though. While some saw NGOs 
performing better than the state, others pointed out how they too had mistargeted 
assistance and were as riddled with nepotism, corruption and incompetence as the state. 
In some places, particularly in urban areas, a male-dominated discourse appeared 
blaming NGO presence for the destruction of the region’s morality. Several 
shopkeepers in Bagh’s main bazaar equated the arrival of the NGOs to an increase of 
“vulgarity” among locals. By this they were referring to the fact that in most NGOs 
women were working together with non-mehram67 men, which many (men) deemed un-
Islamic. Rumours abounded in the bazaars of rising incidents of the elopement of 
female and male NGO staff. People’s perceptions of the moral impact NGOs had in the 
region developed into a discourse where certain aspects of consumerism and taste68 
became branded as part and parcel of an ‘NGO culture’, where the physical world was 
more important than the spiritual. 
NGOs, donors and the ‘NGO culture’ were not the only new arrivals post-earthquake 
that gave rise to a new discourse. New ethnic groups also arrived as part of the massive 
reconstruction effort and created new dynamics. The largest of these groups were 
Pukhtoons from KP. Before the earthquake the Pukhtoon population in PaK was limited 
to a few traders and truck drivers living and working in the urban areas. During the 
reconstruction stage many more came, inflating their numbers in trading, transport and 
construction. In urban centres, the Pukhtoon population started to dominate the 
transportation sector69 and setting up new stores. The Pukhtoon though, were not a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Although the literal translation of mehram is ‘forbidden’, as it means a kin with whom a person cannot 
have sexual intercourse, in South Asia it is often used as ‘male guardian’.	  
68 In a Bourdieusian sense.	  
69 The Pukhtoon are known to dominate transportation throughout Pakistan.	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uniform group; while some were wealthy businessmen who had enough capital to trade, 
many came from poorer villages in KP, willing/having to work for lower salaries and 
becoming the main daily wage labourers working in road and housing reconstruction. 
Soon ethnically-segregated Pukhtoon neighbourhoods started to develop in urban areas, 
as they would live together sharing food, accommodation and language. One such 
neighbourhood was a new adda that appeared in the outskirts of Rawalakot post-
earthquake, uniquely Pukhtoon, which eventually became the main adda. In the eyes of 
the local population they were seen as a homogenous group, with their own culture and 
language. Local post-earthquake narratives painted the Pukhtoon as hardworking, 
business-minded individuals with a strong sense of community. These characteristics 
were seen as the opposite of what people in PaK had become following the earthquake. 
In fact some even hinted that one of the reasons why locals were now less hardworking 
and more individualistic was precisely the arrival of the Pukhtoon. “After the 
earthquake lots of outside labour came and people have changed, they help each other 
less.” With time, more negative views of the Pukhtoon developed, characterising them 
as uneducated, barbaric and materialistic. “They would sell their own daughters for the 
sake of business”, said a shopkeeper in Bagh city. Soon the Pukhtoon were seen as ‘the 
root of all evil’, blamed for introducing modern clothing and beauty products and even 
crime to the region. Khalil, the local metre-reader for WAPDA, the national electricity 
company, with whom I occasionally met while he did his monthly rounds in the bazaar 
and some of the neighbouring villages, was adamant that “before the earthquake there 
were no issues, but since then crime has increased, because people came from outside, 
especially from KP.” 
In people’s stories of change at the bazaar we can see the earthquake as a point of 
rupture from which the collective memory of the bazaar dates its movement towards 
‘becoming modern’. However, as I have already alluded, the earthquake was not the 
only event that disrupted their lives. The closely intertwined event that was the arrival 
of humanitarian and development assistance was to play a key role in their stories of the 
earthquake. This role was not always a positive one; as seen elsewhere (Oliver-Smith, 
1996) the arrival of people and goods can be as stressful as disasters themselves. In 
Bhuj after the 2001 Gujarat earthquake people referred to the disruption caused during 
the reconstruction stage as the ‘second earthquake’ (Simpson, 2007). In the following 
section I describe the arrival of these ‘actors’ on the post-earthquake ‘stage’ and the 
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impact that their ‘scripts’, often rehearsed for other theatres and other audiences, had on 
the storytellers of Chinati bazaar. 	  
The Rise of the NGO 
The initial response to the earthquake was visible in a time span of a few hours to a few 
weeks through an array of different actors. Chronologically, the main actors who came 
to provide assistance post-earthquake were first the locals themselves, then Pakistani 
citizens from various parts of the country, followed by local non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), the state, and the international community in the form of 
international NGOs (INGOs), donors and the UN. Most were new to the region, 
particularly in the case of PaK, where it was previously difficult and extremely 
bureaucratic for non-local organisations to enter. Indirectly, not only did the earthquake 
bring new development agencies into the region, it also increased the presence of 
existing ones. 
The term NGO was used rather loosely in the region – it applied to both local and 
international NGOs, donor projects, and even some projects that were implemented by 
the state. All development agencies advertised their input in a project with a banner or a 
sign with the name of the project and their logo, a form of announcing their active 
presence in the region, as proof of their contribution.70 For people in Chinati – and 
throughout PaK – if a project had a logo of an NGO, international organisation, or 
donor country, it was considered an ‘NGO project’. If the project only had a 
government or ERRA logo, then it was a government project. As many of the 
reconstruction and rehabilitation projects were implemented through the state but with 
donor funding or in partnerships with donors and/or NGOs, they displayed donor and 
NGO logos, and were thus identified by people as ‘NGO projects’. In this section I 
describe how these various actors that my informants described as ‘NGOs’ appeared 
and how they provided assistance. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 In-site publicity - an important task to prove to funders their activities in the field - is often a reason 
why many development agencies prefer funding physical structures to capacity building. As a retired 
development consultant told me “It’s always preferable to build a structure or buy a car rather than train 
people, because we can put our [development agency’s] sticker on things but not on people.”	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The Actors 
As news of the earthquake spread to Pakistan, citizens quickly started mobilising food 
and clothing and organising truck services of relief goods to the affected areas, often 
being the first to arrive. Unfortunately, due to lack of awareness of the field and lack of 
coordination, combined with many blocked roads, the public response created traffic 
jams which resulted in a slowing down of the initial relief effort (Strand and 
Borchgrevink, 2006). At the time there were 34 INGOs which had formed the Pakistan 
Humanitarian Forum (PHF) in 2001 (NDMA, 2007). They met in Islamabad on October 
the 8th to discuss the approach to take and divided the affected regions between them. 
Through their local partner organisations (local NGOs already in the field) PHF 
conducted rapid assessments within 24 hours and started search, rescue and relief 
operations, in some areas even before the state (Strand and Borchgrevink, 2006). 
On the 10th of October the president of Pakistan created the Federal Relief Commission, 
a military agency to coordinate relief work, through which the army distributed relief 
goods and medicines, and set up displaced and medical camps. On the 24th of October he 
established the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency (ERRA), the 
civilian offspring of FRC.71 With the government adopting an ‘open door policy’ – 
relaxing visa and landing permit requirements, customs regulations, and waiving duty 
on relief goods – many more relief agencies poured into the affected regions. Within a 
month, there were 140 international and national NGOs registered with FRC and many 
more smaller local level ones operating in the region (NDMA, 2007). The amount of 
INGO assistance can be seen in the quantity of relief goods arriving in Pakistan, which 
combined surpassed the quantity of relief goods sent by any individual donor country, 
including Pakistan’s strategic allies (see table 2). 
Table 2 – Relief Goods by Tonnage 
 Tonnage 
International NGOs 1,983.41 
China 1,827.31 
Saudi Arabia 1,074.58 
USA 1,018.57 
UAE 600.74 
Source: NDMA, 2007 
The United Nations (UN) decided to pilot test a ‘Cluster Approach’ for disaster 
coordination in Pakistan, where 11 clusters were divided among UNICEF (protection, 
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education and water/sanitation), WFP (nutrition, IT/communication and logistics), FAO 
(livelihoods), IOM (emergency shelter), UNHCR (camp management), UNDP (early 
recovery and reconstruction) and WHO (health), with OCHA in charge of overall 
coordination (Strand and Borchgrevink, 2006). As it was a new approach and both UN 
and NGO staff were unfamiliar with the concept, the high level of confusion created 
delays and ineffectiveness to the extent that it only became fully operational four weeks 
after the earthquake (ActionAid, 2006). With a military government ruling Pakistan72 
and managing relief efforts, the elected bodies which were severely affected by the 
earthquake were further sidelined from relief and reconstruction plans, for which the 
UN agencies contributed by often relying more on the army than local democratic 
structures73 (ActionAid, 2006; ICG, 2006). 
Overall these agencies were involved in rescue operations, clearing rubble, distributing 
relief goods, logistical support,74 providing medical assistance and constructing semi-
permanent shelters. The latter, through the provision of corrugated galvanised iron 
(CGI) sheets mostly by non-state agencies, was crucial for the relative success of 
minimising further casualties and avoiding mass migration out of the affected areas 
during the following winter.75 The government commended donors and INGOs for their 
operational flexibility and willingness to partner with local NGOs, which in turn created 
capacity-building for the latter (NDMA, 2007). Yet, most agencies, including state 
agencies, encountered serious logistical problems particularly with the storage, 
processing and accounting of relief goods, and an excessive convergence of operations 
in more accessible areas – to the detriment of far-off ones. Worse still, many 
communities received less assistance than needed not only during relief, but also 
throughout reconstruction and rehabilitation stages. 
Different development agencies operationalised their work differently according to a 
multitude of factors, such as expertise, capability, size, and networks. While some 
agencies – notably the state and UN organisations – tried to cover as much terrain as 
possible (breadth), others – often local and international NGOs – tried to reach the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Although the head was still an army brigadier and most of its officers were seconded from the armed 
forces. Seven years later, most of ERRA’s higher cadre was composed of retired army officers.	  
72 General Musharraf had come to power in a military coup in 1999.	  
73 A further example to the sidelining of democratic institutions was the fact that neither the creation of 
FRC nor ERRA was done through the Pakistani or the PaK parliament.	  
74 A crucial logistic was NGOs and donors’ provision of helicopters to reach far-off settlements in this 
mountainous terrain.	  
75 Fortunately the 2005 winter was a mild one.	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closest to the individual (depth). By making use of their networks in the field, many 
organisations outsourced relief distribution to the armed forces and local NGOs. Later 
on, during the reconstruction and rehabilitation stages, bilateral and multilateral donors 
continued this strategy of outsourcing by tendering projects to (international and local) 
NGOs as well as to the private/business sector. To fully understand the approaches that 
different development agencies took and their operationalisation, in other words their 
actions, these must be situated within a political and historical context. Development 
(and humanitarian) interventions are often politically shaped by the interests and 
priorities of development agencies and driven not by policy, but by the exigencies of 
these organisations (Mosse, 2005). Development agencies have particular discourses 
depending on where they come from. For instance, most development agencies are 
based in OECD countries, where a development industry tries to change the existing 
world in certain identifiable, predetermined ways, a way of thinking rooted in European 
Enlightenment thought “with it stress on humanity’s ability to understand and control 
the world” (Stirrat, 2000: 37). Not only some of these countries but also regional 
neighbours have a history of involvement and attempt to change the nature of this 
region. Stirrat (2000: 33) reminds us that many of these agencies can also be seen as 
metamorphosed versions of older institutions such as missionary organisations (turned 
into INGOs) and colonial civil services (turned into bilateral agencies). To this equation 
we must also add the geo-strategic influence of ‘friends of Pakistan’ – such as China, 
Saudi Arabia and USA – and the fact that the earthquake happened during a critical 
moment in the ‘war on terror’76. But zooming back into the ‘field’, even within similar 
development agencies there can be differences in approach and operationalisation, as 
Jasani (2008) discovered in her study of three religious organisations (Jamaats) 
operating after the 2002 riots in Gujarat, which had different modus operandi while 
providing and facilitating refugee resettlement. Moreover – and similar to the macro-
level – while largely cooperating among themselves, these Jamaats were also 
competing for establishing doctrinal hegemony. 
Out of all these different actors the only one that was already present in Chinati before 
the earthquake was the National Rural Support Programme (NRSP), one of Pakistan’s 
largest NGOs. NRSP was mostly engaged in ‘community-development’ projects, 
including assisting the formation of community-based organisations (CBOs) and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Where supporting a military dictatorship was crucial to defeat the ‘terrorists’, while trying not alienate 
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providing micro-credit. During the relief stages, besides the state through the armed 
forces, 10 different organisations provided assistance to the 17 mohallahs that 
composed the three mauzas surrounding Chinati (see Table 3). Out of these, villagers 
from the six mohallahs that surround Chinati bazaar and form part of my study received 
assistance from NRSP, GOAL, Save the Children, OXFAM, Islamic Relief, UNICEF, 
and the army. 
Table 3 – Organisations Providing Relief to three Mauzas (17 Mohallahs) Surrounding Chinati 
Bazaar 
Type of Organisation Name of organization and number of Mohallahs (in brackets) covered 
State Army (12) 
International NGOs 
GOAL (14) 
Save the Children (6) 
OXFAM (6) 
Islamic Relief (1) 
International Organisations UNICEF (4) WFP (1) 
National NGOs NRSP (15) Lok Sanjh (1) 
Religious Organisations Jamaat-ud-Dawa (1) Jamaat-e-Islami (1) 
 
Mistargeting Communities 
Despite a concerted effort to make post-earthquake assistance universal, most relief and 
reconstruction assistance was delivered in a targeted manner. Like in other humanitarian 
crises institutional issues within development agencies made them adopt a pragmatic 
decision to target aid. “Sometimes ‘targeting the vulnerable’ can just be a disingenuous 
way of identifying a number of people that corresponds to the amount of a relief item 
that happens to have been sent in, because of the unpredictable nature of relief 
pipelines, and is not an attempt to do more politically informed relief” (Harragin, 2004: 
318). For instance, in the 1984/85 Darfur famine in Sudan relief agencies used a relief 
model defined not by the situation, but by what relief workers could do about it (De 
Wall, 1989, in: Harragin, 2004). 
During the relief stages targeting was mostly determined by physical access. Two 
factors were determinant in receiving assistance, namely location and transport. 
Households living near urban centres and/or metalled roads received faster as well as 
often more assistance than households living further away. A report from RISEPAK 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the population. For the birth of development aid as counterinsurgency see McClintock (1992) chapter six.	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(2006) notes that particularly in the initial relief stages more than the extent of need, 
proximity to a major road had a positive association with the level of assistance 
received, with more remote villages being 25% less likely to be assisted than less 
remote ones. The same was true for households which had access to private 
transportation77 if road links had not been severely destroyed by the earthquake. For 
Tierney (2005: 113-114) social class position is “the most obvious contributor to 
disaster vulnerability”, as witnessed during the hurricane Katrina, where community 
evacuation plans were thought of disregarding lower classes’ lack of car ownership and 
reliance on (inexistent) public transportation. 
During reconstruction targeting was mostly determined by social access.78 The ability to 
create and/or use existing social networks based on kinship, caste, and clientelistic ties 
accelerated and increased assistance. As I mentioned before, the main actors providing 
assistance were the state (through ERRA, the local government and the army), NGOs 
(international, national and local), and to a minor extent political parties and religious 
organisations. Some actors, namely political parties and religious organisations, worked 
mainly in urban areas. Households connected with or able to connect with these actors 
making use of these networks benefited more than those that were not.79 
In tune with the current practice in the development industry, most agencies agreed on a 
community-based and community-driven approach for the road to recovery. Mansuri 
and Rao (2004) notice that regardless of becoming a key form of development 
assistance, such projects have largely missed the most vulnerable worldwide. A crucial 
factor for the poor performance of these projects is often the development agencies’ 
lack of awareness of the complex social organisation of rural communities. The 
literature maintains that, in rural settings characterised by social differentiation and 
patronage systems, community-based and community-driven development projects can 
become avenues for the rich and powerful to strengthen their control over the poor and 
powerless (Platteau, 2007). Unfortunately, “the ‘community’ in participatory 
approaches to development is often seen as a ‘natural’ social entity characterised by 
solidaristic relations” (Cleaver, 2001:44). In other words, many development agencies 
maintain the deep-rooted view that a community is simply a community, regardless of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Either by owning or being able to rent transportation.	  
78 I am not denying that relief targeting was sometimes determined by social access and reconstruction by 
physical access.	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the historical, political, or social environment of the region. Thus, communities have 
been idealised, homogenised, traditionalised, and made the object of interventions that 
upgrade, democratise, and modernise them to fit policy objectives. This makes them 
“good vehicles for development intervention because, on the one hand, they 
demonstrate society as ‘naturally’ self-regulating – an important premise of neoliberal 
political economy – and, on the other hand, they offer opportunities for improvement” 
(Li 2002, in: Mosse, 2006: 696). Improving communities though, requires them to be 
made technical, so that experts can proceed to what Li (2011: 76) calls “government 
through community”: “experts have constructed a technical field in which they are 
licensed and enabled to intervene in the minutiae of peoples’ lives.” 
Besides the notion of an ideal-type community – “idyllic ‘village democracies’ whose 
members interact in a free atmosphere of trustful cooperation” (Abraham and Platteau, 
2004: 218), where development agencies can utilise a one-size-fits-all approach – 
development agencies often equate ‘community’ with ‘village.’ One such example is a 
study by Dasgupta and Beard (2007), where the authors use the terms ‘community’, 
‘village,’ and ‘neighbourhood’ as being at the same political-administrative level while 
investigating the impact of elite capture in community-driven development in Indonesia. 
In South Asia, Stirrat (2000) states that development agencies’ persistence in using 
‘village community’ lies in their (colonial) dependency on ‘orientalist’ works such as 
Henry Maine’s Village-Communities in the East and West (1881) and Baden-Powell’s 
The Indian Village Community (1896) to understand South Asian society. Sinha (2008: 
62) elaborates that these authors’ recommendation to make ‘village communities’ the 
units of administration for the colonial state led to the creation and patronage of 
community institutions (controlled by large landowners and village headmen), making 
them “internal to [the colonial state’s] logic, encompassing dominant groups within 
them into its functions and local organisation, which in turn confirmed and enhanced 
their power.” 
For Cohen (1985: 118) communities are constructed symbolically, “making it a 
resource and repository of meaning, and a referent of their identity.” The common 
assumption within development agencies was that there was always one identifiable 
community in any one location, with the same natural, social, and administrative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Another actor was the migrant family member which, depending on his wealth, contributed with cash 
and in-kind assistance directly to households.	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boundaries (Cleaver, 2001). Yet, as often witnessed, these boundaries are not clear-cut, 
but blurred and porous. Communities are taken as “well-defined geographic entities, as 
opposed to geographically overlapping ethnic or religious entities”, with their 
geographic scale determined (or created) by the government (Conning and Kevane, 
2002: 381). But as Ferguson and Gupta (2002: 8) rightly warn us, “the presumption that 
spaces are autonomous has enabled the power of topography to conceal successfully 
the topography of power.” In other words, our insistence on the search for 
geographically delineated autonomous communities, or the notion that they are 
naturally self-regulating, leads us to ignore the underlining power structures within. 
This was apparent in both relief and reconstruction stages, where development agencies 
largely ignored caste and kinship networks, despite most of their work being 
community-based or community-driven. Taking ERRA as an example, in its official 
documents it stated that it would work at community level with community-based 
organisations (CBOs) engaged in community-based rehabilitation (CBR) through its 
devised Community Livelihood Rehabilitation Plan (CLRP). By ‘community,’ it meant 
‘village community’ (ERRA, 2006b; ERRA, 2006c; ERRA, 2007a; ERRA, 2007f; 
ERRA, 2008). Furthermore, ERRA’s documents reveal that it had little or no 
understanding of the social realities of these regions. This was especially evident in its 
District Profiles. For instance, the Bagh District Profile states “the major tribes of the 
district are Mughals, Rajputs, Gujars, Syeds, Abass Sudhans, Awans and Khawajas. 
They all live peacefully like brothers” (ERRA, 2007b: 3). The Muzaffarabad District 
Profile mentions that “many prominent tribes make the society of Muzaffarabad (…) 
each residing in specific/distinct locality in the district” (ERRA 2007c: 2). The 
Rawalakot District Profile says that “the mother tongue is a great cementing factor of 
the Pahari speaking people because they remain so closely associated with each other 
that cultural ethos transcend all that of distinct beliefs and faiths” (ERRA 2007d: 2). 
Nowhere, in any government document do the words quom, zat or biraderi appear80. 
This region was characterised by caste-based and kinship-based networks of patronage, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 This was also true for an overwhelming majority of government documents produced by any ministry 
related to communities or villages in Pakistan. The state ideology of Pakistan is deeply rooted in the two-
nation theory by which Muslims’ primary identity is their religion and there is a clear divide between ‘us’ 
(Pakistani/Muslim) and ‘them’ (Indian/Hindu). The terminology (and sometimes the social system) of 
quom, zat and biraderi is very similar to that of Hindu jatis and therefore problematises the state’s 
ideology.	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where hierarchy and difference played a role in stratification.81 By using neutral terms 
such as ‘tribe’ and stressing linguistic unity, development agencies overlooked the 
ground realities. 
There were three prominent yet interconnected reasons for why development agencies 
appeared to overlook networks of patronage. First, development agencies – particularly 
humanitarian ones – want quick results. Development agencies need to know, 
understand, acknowledge and internalise in their operations the complex social 
organisation of rural communities; they need a longer-term perspective and engagement 
when operating in lineage- or patronage-based societies (Platteau, 2007). Pressed for 
time as well as for results and often with a short mandate, these agencies often overlook 
local geographies of power. Second, as they are pressed to obtain quick results, 
development agencies tend to simplify the ‘field.’ Often they portray communities as 
static, simple, and identical, where the one-size-fits-all approach can be implemented. 
This phenomenon is visible above all in the activities of development agencies with no 
previous experience in a disaster-affected area such as PaK, a region which was vastly 
unknown for most development agencies and vice-versa. “A well-meaning outsider’s 
best intentions to provide aid will be futile if none of his or her priorities corresponds 
with those of the person being helped nor engage with his or her culture and political or 
economic institutions” (Harragin, 2004: 325). Third, most development agencies tend to 
see rural societies – as those visible in PaK – as ‘underdeveloped’ and ‘traditional,’ the 
opposite of ‘developed’ and ‘modern.’ For Chatterjee (1993, in Sinha, 2008: 59) 
‘community’ exists outside modernity because it signalled forms of solidarity arising 
out of bonds of kinship and not based on common interests. As Stirrat (2000: 40) states, 
“the work of contemporary historians, sociologists, anthropologists and political 
scientists is ignored in a picture of the world which juxtaposes ‘them’ and ‘us’, the past 
and the present, tradition and modernity, culture and rationality.” Development 
agencies rarely venture beyond this dichotomy, not just at the institutionalisation stage, 
but also during the actual operationalisation. 
Overlooking local social stratification and elevating the village as the ‘true community’, 
development agencies exacerbated exclusion, by allowing elite capture and misreading 
representation. If there is no clear understanding among development agencies of what 
constitutes a community, decision-making can be biased toward dominant groups who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 On hierarchy and difference see Chapter Four.	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claim to be the voice of the ‘community.’ This situation, known as ‘elite capture,’ 
involves individuals with higher access to social, political, and economic power 
dominating and manipulating interaction between the community and development 
agencies to suit their own needs (Conning and Kevane, 2002; Platteau, 2007). In most 
of rural PaK, where demographics plays a crucial role, dominant groups tended to 
belong to the majority biraderis (World Bank, 2001). In a previous study (Loureiro, 
unpublished) I asked 30 development agencies selected by ERRA to operate in the area 
what was their target community. As seen in Table 4, the vast majority of agencies 
(80%) defined ‘community’ as ‘revenue village’ and/or ‘settlement’, as opposed to 
biraderi. The other problem of adopting villages as target communities was one of 
representation. For instance, a revenue village was composed of several settlements, of 
which the main settlement gave the name to the revenue village. While an agency 
professed to be working with a revenue village, assuming it was reaching the whole 
village, it was most often working with the main settlement constituting that revenue 
village. In other words, the agency failed to reach the remaining settlements in that 
revenue village. The same happened within settlements: when an agency worked at 
settlement level, it assumed it was reaching the whole settlement while in fact it was 
only interacting with the dominant groups, often the majority biraderis. 
Table 4 – Target communities post-earthquake by local and international agencies 
 Union Council Revenue village Settlement Biraderi Household 
Agencies 2 14 10 2 2 
– International 2 10 4 2 2 
– Local – 4 6 – – 
Source: Loureiro, unpublished. 
The response to the earthquake saw an array of development agencies arriving in and 
interacting with a historically secluded region. For many this was the first time. Due to 
a series of physical and logistic factors the initial relief was slow to arrive and when it 
did it was targeted rather than universal. Central to relief, and later reconstruction and 
rehabilitation efforts, was the concept of ‘community’. Yet, in their hurry to obtain 
quick results and by simplifying ‘the field’, development agencies often failed to engage 
with local social, political and economic institutions. This failure was not only due to 
logistical issues, but also related to the interests and priorities of these agencies. By 
overlooking networks of patronage embedded in local social stratification development 
agencies’ actions contributed in many instances exacerbating the exclusion and 
marginalisation of certain groups. 
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Revisiting October the 8th: Post-earthquake Assistance and the Legacy 
of Suffering 
Some of the stories people told me about the earthquake were about suffering. Yet, all 
their stories about suffering related to the earthquake were not always about the 
earthquake itself. It only became possible for me to understand the meaning of their 
stories after placing these into the context of all that I had learned about their lives 
before, during and after the earthquake. As White (2000: 310) concludes in her work on 
rumours about vampires in colonial Africa “the ordinary (or the extraordinary) does not 
exist separate from the material and the political (…) stories and rumours are produced 
in the cultural conflicts of local life; they mark ways to talk about the conflicts and 
contradictions that gave them meaning and power.” We could be mistaken if we 
thought of the earthquake as the event, for there were two events interrelated and 
occurring almost simultaneously, both provoking suffering: the earthquake and the post-
earthquake assistance. 
In his study of blame narratives in the aftermath of the 2001 Gujarat earthquake, 
Simpson (2011: 434) asserts that people’s explanations for the earthquake were 
“commentaries on profane social trends, divisions and schisms that were well 
established before the earthquake”, as well as “attempts at coming to terms with rapid 
social change in the aftermath of the disaster”. People’s stories about the suffering they 
experienced in PaK were characterised by the dual feature of the earthquake, sometimes 
representing itself as the ‘earthquake-event’ while other times becoming a metaphor for 
the ‘assistance-event’. While the ‘earthquake-event’ had a ubiquitous negative impact 
throughout the region – largely cutting across class, caste, and sectarian groups – the 
‘assistance-event’ had an ambiguous impact, as it benefited the ones who had better 
physical and social access to aid, but excluded many others. Another important 
difference was the origin of these events, with the ‘earthquake-event’ having a non-
human origin, as opposed to the human roots of the ‘assistance-event’. When people 
talked about ‘living in inhuman conditions’ post-earthquake, these conditions were not 
always caused by the ‘earthquake-event’, but by the ‘assistance-event’. In these cases 
the inhumanity was not aleatory, but perpetrated by a human ‘someone’ – often an 
outsider. 
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People’s stories of the earthquake as ‘assistance-event’ were often like allegories where 
the (human) outsider, the ‘other’, was the villain. These stories though, were as much 
about the ‘other’ as they were about themselves. For instance the story of villagers using 
their womenfolk to gain access to relief goods was not only about the evil army 
subedar, but also about their powerlessness. In a region where women’s honour reflects 
the family’s honour, one of the most valued ideals in patriarchal societies such as this 
one, there were families who had to forgo of this honour in order to survive. In my 
informants’ storytelling the earthquake as ‘earthquake-event’ made them lose the power 
they once held over their lives, but it was the earthquake as ‘assistance-event’ that 
transformed them from heroes into antiheroes. Arendt (1958) says that storytelling 
transformed private experience into public meaning. Yet, narratives are shaped as much 
by individual experience as by the demands of communal identity (Donnan and 
Simpson, 2007: 5). In a way, there is a dialectic relationship between private and public, 
where “private events are translated into public stories and, reciprocally publicised 
events penetrate our private lives and shape our unconscious imaginings” (Jackson, 
2006: 292). In the subedar story, my informants were not only telling me about what 
the earthquake did to some families’ honour, they were telling me about their own 
honour. The earthquake as ‘assistance-event’ turned their world upside-down. Used to 
working for a living in any corner of the world, my informants were now dependent on 
charity, something beggars did for a livelihood. Worse still, as relief efforts were not 
universal but targeted – and often mistargeted – they were ‘made to beg’ for assistance. 
They felt, as Omar said, “deprived like never before”. 
People’s rationalisations of the ‘earthquake-event’ influenced how they dealt with life 
(and death) after the earthquake, both physically and emotionally. While interviewing a 
group of survivors around Bagh city two months after the earthquake, Ansari and Ørner 
(2008) observed ‘social cohesion’ and ‘narrative coherence’ as the two recurring themes 
emerging from their narratives of coping and adjustment. Their informants stated that 
sharing loss, suffering and the need to feel safe was the driving force behind 
coordinated responses to the event. For them, as well as for the people living around 
Chinati bazaar, “suffering [was] a social experience” (Kleinman, Das and Lock, 1997: 
ix) and enacting it socially helped them to cope with the aftermath of the earthquake. 
The “unprecedented destruction in living memory provoked significant challenges to 
previously held spiritual beliefs, personal values and psychological attitudes” (Ansari 
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and Ørner, 2008: 99), which made people look for ways of reinterpreting their beliefs, 
engendering a sense of meaning and purpose. For most the earthquake strengthened 
their belief in God, especially the ones who saw the earthquake as a trial. They 
externalised this confidence in God through their displays (and non-displays) of 
suffering. 
North of Bagh, a young couple lost both their children in the earthquake. The husband 
was working as an assistant shopkeeper in Bagh city while the wife was in the fields 
and had left their young daughter in charge of her baby brother at home. During the 
earthquake their house collapsed killing both children. While both husband and wife 
talked about their loss to others, they never uttered a word about it to each other. “How 
can I talk [to her] about it” – the husband said – “if it only brings despair into her 
heart?” Bowker (1975: 112) states that in Islam “the effects of suffering are important: 
faithfully accepted, suffering helps to produce an equal and balanced character – and 
conversely fear of suffering is a mark of inadequate trust. Despair is blasphemy.” While 
publicly performing their social role and displaying their suffering to and with their 
community, in the inner depths of their marriage neither spouse shared this suffering 
with the other, as each saw this action as detrimental to the other’s wellbeing. For 
Daniel (1996: 123) “the highest form of sharing – human sharing – also entails caring.” 
In this case it appears that this would be true for the public sphere, but not the private. 
In an event like the earthquake, where all were affected and suffered, sharing their 
suffering in public appeared to work as a rite of social acceptance as well as a token of 
caring and empathy. Yet, within the private sometimes it could be the opposite, where 
not sharing involves caring. 
Several people used silence as a display of suffering. Many authors have pointed out 
how stories of people in crises are often punctuated by silences (Das, 1995; Daniel, 
1996; Jackson, 2006; Donnan and Simpson, 2007). In Sarian, a woman lost all her four 
daughters in the earthquake when the roof of their house collapsed. She was outside 
when it happened. Her daughters yelled and cried but she could not do anything. 
Eventually they all died. I was told this story three years after by her relatives while she 
was in the room. She just sat quietly with a blank stare, not crying, just there. In The 
Human Condition, Arendt (1958: 50) says “the most intense feeling we know of (…) the 
experience of great pain, is at the same time the most private and least communicable of 
all (…) perhaps the only experience which we are unable to transform into a shape fit 
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for public appearance.”82 So publicly, we suffer in silence – as a deliberate choice – as 
it is sometimes “the only way we can honour the ineffability and privacy of certain 
experiences” (Jackson, 2005: 155). Silence can mean a withdrawal from society, but it 
can also be “converted to speech as long as it provides ‘witness’ to truth” (Das, 1997, 
in: Donnan and Simpson, 2007:17), as was the case with this woman. 
Finally, another way in which people displayed social suffering – somewhat in a similar 
way to silence – was by participating in everyday events through non-participation. 
Many people cooked food but did not eat it in the first few days after the earthquake, 
like the owner of the carpet shop in Bagh and the schoolteacher from Hothala. This had 
a special religious meaning to it as it was Ramzan, the Islamic month of fasting. One of 
the five pillars of Islam,83 fasting during daylight in Ramzan (saum), is seen as a 
sacrifice to learn self-restrain. During the first few days many people would prepare 
food for sehri (morning meal) and iftar (evening meal) as a way of trying to keep the 
normalcy of their lives and yet would not eat. Through non-eating many felt they were 
making a bigger sacrifice – and therefore pleasing God, or passing God’s trial – as well 
as suffering together with the ones that could not eat. In a way, their abstinence could be 
seen as a form of silence. 
 
Post-Earthquake Everyday Lives 
Along with pain and suffering, the earthquake left people in the region with a mixture of 
other emotions, many of which they did not know how to deal with. In series of studies 
on the psychological effects of the earthquake Niaz (2006) reports high levels of Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PSTD), depression and morbidity in most survivors. In a 
survey that I conducted nine months after the earthquake with 86 household heads (of 
which 14 were women) in a village north of Bagh, most informants stated that they 
often had recurring thoughts of death, felt lonely and sad, lacked energy and felt easily 
irritated, restless and worried for no reason. In Bagh city, many shopkeepers said that 
apart from missing their (dead) relatives, they worried too much about the future and 
would constantly think of death. In the villages around Chinati, despite fewer casualties 
many people exhibited similar emotional symptoms, namely a sense of high insecurity. 
Fatima, a Syed housewife from Serabad, said that “after the earthquake people became 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Arendt is talking about bodily pain.	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very disturbed. There is a sense of somebody snatching some thing from you.” The 
sense of insecurity was exacerbated by mistargeting throughout post-earthquake relief 
and reconstruction, as many felt that some families were benefiting from assistance that 
others deserved and did not get. “One family would take what was needed and deserved 
from another” (Abida, Fieldnotes, February 2010). 
Even a few years later, the memory of that day played with their senses. The sounds of 
rumbling or heavy rainfall would remind them of the earthquake. “The earthquake 
sound is hallucinating still. Every time I hear something strange I relate it to the 
earthquake”84 (Rehana, Fieldnotes, February 2010). The sights of cracked roads, visible 
faults in hills, ruins of houses, abandoned winter tents and the ‘qabristan barae zalzala 
zadgaan’ (cemetery for the earthquake victims), all made them think of (and relive) that 
day. Some even mentioned that the smell of medicine would transport them to that 
period of their lives. Consciously and unconsciously though, some people displayed 
memory loss. Jameela, a housewife from Sarian, said that after the earthquake her in-
laws became very distraught, irritable (chir chara pan) and forgetful - not of daily life, 
but of life before the earthquake. Some parents whose children died in the earthquake 
took upon themselves to make sure the memory of their children would not die. In 
Bagh, the owner of a general store renamed his shop after his son who died on that day. 
In Serabad a woman whose son died in Muzaffarabad framed several pictures of him 
and distributed them through her family. After the earthquake most married males in her 
family started making individual houses, so she went to every house and placed his 
picture in each main living room. 
Wilkinson (2011: 467) identifies the experience of suffering “as a decisive element 
within the formation of individual personalities and within the overall character of 
societies.” Babar, a waiter in Dubai, expressed the same opinion while explaining to me 
the effect of the earthquake on children. 
“When you come from outside you might think people have moved on. 80% 
we have but we still have 20% of thoughts, fears and anxieties every now 
and then. It’s even worse with children. It might be that with them it’s 20% 
fine and 80% of thoughts and fears. When you are a child it’s the time you 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 The others are testimony (shahadah), prayer (salah), pilgrimage (hajj), and alms-giving (zakat).	  
84 Razia, schoolteacher from Hothala.	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are moulded into a man.85 The earthquake is what will stay with them and 
mould them as grownups. It’s the same with our houses. We’re all slowly 
rebuilding our houses, going from one structure to another. This means we 
slowly relive the earthquake with every brick, every room, every part of the 
house. It indirectly affects us daily; we relive the earthquake daily.” 
In his discussion on the social suffering of Holocaust survivors, Langer (1997: 55) 
observes that for survivors of atrocities “time is durational as well as chronological, 
and that durational time is experienced continuously, not sequentially as a memory 
from which one can be liberated.” For many people living around Chinati the 
earthquake was not a thing of the past, but an event which kept reoccurring. Like 
Langer’s Holocaust survivors, they too lived simultaneously in the chronological time 
of everyday life experience and the durational time of October the 8th. That day – and its 
legacy – was visible in people’s memories, discourses and actions, and was triggered 
repeatedly through the sights, sounds and smells and objects of their everyday lives. 
 
Conclusion 
The 2005 earthquake left not only a physical scar but also an emotional one in the lives 
of the people of PaK. For many, the earthquake was not an event of the past but one that 
kept reoccurring in their minds, and was constantly evident in their narratives and 
actions. In this chapter I looked at the day the earthquake occurred, the events of its 
immediate aftermath, and analysed people’s perceptions of why the earthquake 
happened, its emotional legacy of suffering and loss, and how they dealt with it, or in 
other words, how they relived the earthquake in their everyday lives. 
While the day is remembered as a day of loss and suffering, its legacy is more 
ambiguous. The earthquake brought with it destruction as well as transformation. Over 
the course of the reconstruction and rehabilitation stages people in PaK developed 
various discourses and narratives on change in which the earthquake and the presence of 
development agencies was used to explain cultural, social and economic changes. The 
primacy of the earthquake in these narratives was such that it ‘hijacked’ the role and 
importance of other agents of change, and of previous social and economic changes that 
had been going on for a period of time since before the traumatic events of 8th October 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Or woman.	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2005. The earthquake was drawn upon both as an event and as an idea. It made people 
think about change, and they used it as a point of departure with which to organise their 
ideas about what was happening around them. In a way, the ‘earthquake event’ became 
an avenue to justify previous changes, especially the ones that questioned prevalent 
moral discourses. 
Yet, much of the social and economic change that people said had happened after (or 
because of) the earthquake had in fact started happening before the earthquake. In the 
following chapters I argue that rather than being a trigger of change, the earthquake, 
both as an event and as a metaphor for post-earthquake assistance, had a magnifying 
effect on change that had been occurring over the past decades in this region. In 
people’s stories of change at the bazaar we see the earthquake as a point of rupture from 
which the collective memory of the bazaar is now dated. However, I argue that muddled 
up within these stories are other stories of pre-existing changes. Therefore, in most 
cases what people were talking about was not change, but rather, the continuity of 
change, where the earthquake and its aftermath magnified or intensified pre-existing 
social and economic conditions. In the following chapters I further analyse some of 
these narratives to test this theory.
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Chapter Four 
Liberty, Equality, Fraternity: The Social Construction of Biraderi and 
Egalitarianism in Azad Kashmir 
 
Introduction 
In September 2009 after Hamza, my first research assistant, left to go abroad for his 
Masters degree I brought with me to the bazaar Umer, my new research assistant. He 
had previously worked as a surveyor in PaK for one of LUMS’ studies on the 
earthquake and, after graduating, had worked as a research assistant for a team of 
Pakistani economists on a donor-funded study on economic prospects for the region. I 
was introducing him to the several shopkeepers in the bazaar when, as we were passing 
in front of the main dhaaba, Bashir called us in. While I was introducing Umer to him, 
Kashif appeared with a plate of fresh pakoras and Bashir ordered tea. He then 
questioned Umer about his background, to which Umer responded that he was a Lahori 
but his family had originally migrated from northern Punjab and therefore he could 
speak Pahari, like everyone in PaK. To that Bashir said, “[Pakistan-administered] 
Kashmir is different from Pakistan. Here we’re all equals; we don’t have hierarchy. 
We’re close, united communities. The goras are like this as well. We are educated like 
them, that’s why there’s equality. Just like Islam tells us.” Kashif, standing at the 
entrance of the shop, nodded in support. He had worked for 30 years in Karachi and had 
interacted with people from all over Pakistan, and based on what he had seen there, he 
too believed that no other place was as equal as PaK. 
When describing their society people in the bazaar and its surrounding villages would 
often proudly state that theirs was an egalitarian society. They would do this by 
comparing themselves to not only the society of their forefathers but also to the social 
structure of the rest of Pakistan. According to them, Pakistani society was a highly 
hierarchical one with stark class and caste-like divisions. They pointed out that their 
society too had been similarly stratified in the past but since the 1970s the divisions had 
become weaker and more symbolic. In fact, they believed that in the future social 
stratification would become meaningless. 
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However, many conversations, such as the one Bashir had with Umer, also contained a 
sub-text, often quite explicit, of a continuing differentiation between people. The crucial 
element for stratification in this region was the biraderi, a caste-like and/or kinship 
corporate entity which was “the primary factor amongst the primordial loyalties which 
govern[ed] social organisation” (Alavi, 1972: 27). The notion and concept of biraderi 
and biraderi-based differentiation was a constant part of people’s narratives, of their 
introductions of one another, and also often of how they related to one another. At the 
surface of many conversations lay equality, but just underneath lurked repeated 
references to the importance of biraderi. In this chapter I deconstruct people’s claims of 
equality vis-à-vis the continuing importance of biraderi-ism. As I deepened my research 
in the area I realized that it was indeed through biraderi-ism that most people had 
attempted to gain access to power and resources both before and after the earthquake. 
And biraderi-ism and biraderi membership, by definition, define social inclusion and 
exclusion. My main aim, therefore, is to analyse how the storytellers of Chinati bazaar 
negotiate between the moralities of equality and the realities of hierarchy that continue 
to exist around them. 
In this chapter I draw on the earthquake and the events that followed, namely the relief 
and reconstruction stages, to analyse the change in social stratification within PaK’s 
society that was contained in the narratives I heard in the bazaar. In section two I start 
by defining the biraderi and situating it within the debate on hierarchy and social 
stratification in Pakistan. Biraderi is a complex and often fluid concept that must be 
localised and contextualised before any attempt can be made to understand how social 
stratification is lived in this region. In section three I analyse how local notions of 
hierarchy and social stratification have evolved over time in Chinati, identifying the 
actions involved in creating, recreating and maintaining stratification, and the factors 
that have contributed to this evolution. In section four I look at the relief and 
reconstruction stages that followed the earthquake to show that the networks people in 
Chinati used to recover from its impact, as well as in local politics, continued to be 
embedded primarily within biraderi-ism. I conclude by stating that PaK’s society still 
remains stratified, with pockets of social and economic exclusion visible in both 
minority and lower biraderis. 
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Social Stratification in Pakistan and PaK 
“At the end of the day, it’s all about caste.” Zeeshan, Syed businessman in 
Bagh city. 
The literature on social stratification within South Asian Muslim societies is often 
centred on the question of how closely these societies are related to a caste system 
(Ahmad, 1973; Bhatty, 1996; Fanselow, 1996). Even though there is a general 
consensus in the literature on the fact that caste in India is a colonial construct 
(Mayaram, 1997; Dirks, 2001; Samarendra, 2011), social stratification based on caste-
like features is deeply embedded not just within Hindu society but even within South 
Asia’s Muslim communities. There is, however, great variation across these 
communities in South Asia. Therefore, the debates about the existence of caste and 
social hierarchy in South Asian Muslim societies must be localised and contextualised. 
As Vatuk (1996: 229) puts it, we need to “try to come to a better understanding of how 
South Asian Muslims themselves think about identity and difference, equality and 
inequality”. 
Like several authors86 who identify social stratification in South Asian Muslim societies 
as “the product of a dynamic interplay between Islamic ideology and the socio-
economic and historical forces”, where the latter played a more influential role than the 
former (Bhatty, 1996: 247), I analyse PaK’s social stratification as a hierarchy of status 
groups. According to Bhatty (1996), recent socio-economic and political changes in 
India have continually had an impact on these societies’ social stratifications, not by 
bringing more egalitarian structures, but by making these stratifications more fluid. The 
quest for this fluidity – and not equality – has been recently examined by several 
authors when studying the political struggle of Indian lower caste Muslims, generally 
known as Muslim Dalits, versus Muslim upper castes, known as ashraf,87 in 
Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar (Ali, 2010; Ahmad, 2003). Likewise, in PaK the 
socio-economic and political changes, particularly the ones originated in the 1970s, did 
not flatten social stratification but made it more fluid and characterised by an 
undercurrent of ambiguity. Due to a dearth of literature on social stratification in PaK I 
will first describe how social stratification is lived in Pakistani Punjab, as its social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 See Ahmad (1973) and Bhatty (1996).	  
87 Plural of sharif, meaning noble or highborn, used by South Asian Muslims who claim Arab, Persian, or 
Central Asian descent.	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structure – and the terms used – is the most similar to PaK and, according to my 
informants, it is how their social structure existed until the 1970s. 
 
Quom, Zat and Biraderi in Pakistan 
Most students of Pakistan’s social stratification either have the view that – without 
ruling caste out – the “system of social stratification and political power [is] based on 
class” (Ahmed, 1977: 70), or – without ruling class out – recognise that there is 
something ‘caste-like’ that “embodies the primordial loyalties which structure (…) 
social organisation” (Alavi, 1972: 1). Most authors use for ‘caste-like’ the kinship 
system as the main social unit in Pakistani Muslim communities (Alavi, 1972; Alavi 
2001; Alvi, 2007; Mohmand and Gazdar, 2007; Shaw, 2000a; Werbner, 1989; Werbner, 
1990), which, in Punjab and PaK is often referred to as quom, zat or biraderi.88 These 
networks assume a corporate structure that performs political and economic functions 
(Mohmand and Gazdar, 2007), with “notions such as blood purity also playing a 
tremendous role in defining the boundaries of the group” (Alavi, 2001: 46). 
There are two reasons why quoms, zats and biraderis can be perceived as ‘caste-like’. 
Firstly, most of them use the names that are traditionally associated with Hindu jatis 
(Shaw, 2000b). Secondly, they share principles of endogamy, hierarchy and sometimes 
even pollution. Some authors (Ahmad, 1977; Alavi, 2001) state their difference in the 
fact that biraderis are endogamous and less ritualistic (no notions of ritual pollution) 
while (Hindu) subcastes are exogamous. Yet, Mayer (1970, in: Klass, 1993) and Klass 
(1993) actually say that (Hindu) subcastes are endogamous and it is within the subcastes 
that exogamy happens,89 while Mohmand and Gazdar (2007: 21) witness “a significant 
notion of ritual pollution built into the relationship between the [the lower caste] 
Musalli and other castes” in rural Punjab. Because these terms are often used 
interchangeably (Nazir, 1993) there is little agreement in the literature of what 
constitutes (or what separates) quom, zat, and biraderi, with most authors preferring the 
use of the latter as an encapsulating term for the whole. Werbner (1989: 294) points that 
by doing so, biraderi “disguises the immanence of caste behind a facade of fraternal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Quom can be translated as “nation”, zat as “being” and biraderi as “brotherhood”. According to Alavi 
(1972), the latter term comes from the Persian biradar, “brother”, although brether is a Proto Indo-
European word. For instance, a similar word (phratry) was used in Ancient Greece for a cluster of several 
clans allied into a single category.	  
89 In what Klass (1993) calls the ‘marriage-cycles’.	  
	   103	  
kinship”. This is also related to the root of the words, with quom and biraderi seen as 
more ‘neutral’ – possibly even implying equality – “while the use of the notion of zat 
implies ranking as well as non-kinship” (Werbner, 1989: 298), which would go against 
the egalitarian principle of Islam. This interchangeably is not unique to Pakistan though. 
In Kangra Parry (1979: 131) discovered that “the term jat may be used to designate a 
varna, a ‘caste’ or a clan, and it is only the general context which indicates the sort of 
unit under discussion.” 
While both Ahmad (1977) and Shaw (2000a) mention three hierarchical categories in 
terms of production and organisation, they were different inasmuch as Shaw divides 
them into ashraf (noble), zamindar (landowning) and kammi (artisan), while Ahmad 
divides them into landlords, peasants and servants.90 Alavi (1972) on the other hand, 
mentions four categories, namely, landlords, independent small landowners, poor 
peasants, and village servants. This was a simplified classification as there was often 
overlapping between the first three categories, and “there are biraderis which include 
some households which belong to one economic category and other households which 
belong to a different category” (Alavi, 1972: 20). He further explains which categories 
had stronger biraderi organisation (namely, independent small landowners), but the 
interesting aspect in his categorisation was that, like Ahmad and Shaw, he misses one 
important group: the musallis, or Muslim Sheikhs.91 These are the untouchables in 
Pakistan’s Punjabi rural areas, who do not fit into any category mentioned above. They 
are responsible for domestic and agricultural labour, but should not be confused with 
kammis, as the latter are also menial workers but artisans. And it is with the Muslim 
Sheikhs that traits of ritual pollution appear in Punjab – most ‘higher’ biraderis will not 
touch food or drink (nor the cutlery or crockery used) that has been prepared by Muslim 
Sheikhs. More recent work started to acknowledge the existence of this group as 
independent from the kammi group, as seen in Mohmand’s (2011) thesis where she 
divides Punjabi villagers into three ‘nations’ (quoms), namely zamindar, kammi, and 
musalli. 
Biraderi itself can be contentious, as Shaw (2000a) noticed with her informants having 
different definitions (including the same informants) and adding or removing 
households from a particular biraderi. Alavi (1972) realised this problem when he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 It is worth bearing in mind that Ahmad uses class as the main system of stratification.	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mentions that there are two constituent principles of biraderi: horizontal fraternal ties 
(contemporaries) and vertical lines of descent (ancestral). He further divides biraderis 
into three broad categories: a more general meaning as a descent group; a more 
restrained descent group with mutual knowledge of and empirically determinable 
descent (biraderi of recognition – taken from Mayer’s “kindred of recognition”); and a 
biraderi of recognition that participated in gift rituals (biraderi of participation).92 
Werbner (1989: 295) though mentions that, like Eglar (1960) and Ahmad (1977), Alavi 
(1972) emphasises that the biraderi was a patrilineage, defined by a patrilineal descent 
from a single apical ancestor, but none of them gave any examples “of such a 
patrilineage except as it exists in a single village”. According to her this principle only 
operates in defining the biraderi at village level and at the “wider, inter-village level the 
biraderi is a recognised marriage cycle composed of members of a single caste and 
named section who live in a relatively large number of villages within a locality, and 
who traditionally intermarry with one another” (Werbner, 1989: 295). This distinction 
of biraderi as village kin group and as a marriage cycle is important because at inter-
village level “the principle of inclusion or exclusion in a biraderi is based on affinity or 
prior affinity rather than descent” (Werbner, 1989: 295). So for instance, if a man is a 
Sheikh, he identifies himself with all the Sheikhs in South Asia as part of his quom; all 
the Sheikhs that he can identify as related to him through patrilineage or affinity are part 
of his zat; and within these, all the Sheikhs that participate in gift rituals with his family 
are part of his biraderi of participation. When Shaw (2000b: 96) states that “kinship is 
the predominant principle of social organisation at village level in rural Pakistan”, she 
was actually talking about one category: the biraderi of participation. The same happens 
with Mohmand and Gazdar’s (2007) research in rural Punjab, when exploring the 
determinants of social exclusion in rural Pakistan. It is at the level of the biraderi of 
participation that most social protection mechanisms occurred according to these 
authors, as witnessed by Eglar (1960), Wakil (1970) and Alavi (1972) when looking at 
the main gift exchange ritual called vartan bhanji (in Punjabi ‘buying sweets’).93 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Alavi does not entirely miss this group; rather he groups them with kammis as one category – village 
servants.	  
92 Wakil (1970) too divides biraderi into three similar categories: Zat or quom; biraderi at large; and 
effective biraderi.	  
93 The name comes from the fact that this gift exchange is done at auspicious moments, during 
celebrations, which often entail distributing sweets.	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The principal mechanism that maintains the biraderi structure is endogamy, i.e., 
marriage within the biraderi (Shaw, 2000b), with preferential patrilineal parallel cousin 
marriage (Wakil, 1970). The first preference is for a man to marry his father’s brother’s 
daughter and if demographically impossible, then his father’s father’s brother’s son’s 
daughter. There are several justifications for this practice, a complex mixture of cultural 
(Shaw, 2000a), religious (Alavi, 1972; Shaw, 2000a) and economic (Mohmand and 
Gazdar, 2007) reasons. Families in Pakistan like to stay as close as possible. In Islam, a 
man cannot have sexual relationships with his mother, daughter, sister, paternal aunt, or 
maternal aunt; so the closest a man can be within the family is by marrying his cousin. 
Following local interpretations of Islamic law, most of the inheritance passes largely to 
the sons, therefore the best way to keep the wealth in the family is for a man to marry 
his father’s brother’s daughter. Another advantage is for the married daughter to stay 
closer to her parents’ family. Finally, this practice makes sure that siblings are kept 
together through their offspring. Alavi (1972: 6-7) notes that “control over marriages is 
a major factor in maintaining the cohesion of biraderis” and its degree “appears to vary 
directly with the degree of strictness in enforcing endogamy and regulating marriages 
within the biraderi”. The important factor here is to keep the women of the family 
within the family, with men’s amount of control over women in terms of marriage being 
the basis of the structured kinship (Alavi, 2001). 
Still, as families tend to have a high number of offspring there will have a mixture of 
different strategies for marriage. One such strategy is the exchange between two men 
marrying each other’s sisters, known as watta-satta  (Darling, 1925; Eglar, 1960; Wakil, 
1991; Alvi, 2007). In such cases, it is also usual for the parents of the brides and grooms 
to be siblings; in other words it entails a sister giving her son and daughter in marriage 
to the daughter and son of her brother. Darling (1925: 62) states that this was often an 
arrangement preferred by the poor, a “marriage on the cheap”, while others (Barth, 
1965; Wakil, 1991) also reasoned caste endogamy and keeping property within the 
family. This practice is still common today in rural Pakistan, with Jacoby and Mansuri 
(2010) observing an incidence of 36%. The rationale for watta-satta goes beyond the 
notion of keeping the biraderi tight, to making sure that a woman who has left her natal 
household following marriage – and therefore has moved from being seen as ‘own’ 
(apna) to ‘other’ (paraya) – can return to being part of the household she left through 
her daughter (Alvi, 2007). It is not surprising then that women are the ones making such 
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arrangements. Since women do not generally have a symmetrical number of children, 
some matches will only be completed in the following generation, leading to an open-
ended marriage indebtedness (Alvi, 2007). These marriage strategies are also helpful in 
transmitting a strong feeling of solidarity towards near and distant relatives into the 
younger generation (Lefebvre, 1999) and creating some sort of protection from inter-
biraderi conflicts. 
Coming back to the biraderi of participation, according to Mohmand and Gazdar (2007: 
5) the leaders of this group use their traditional power to make decisions on marriage, 
exclusion and to “mediate access to social services and livelihood opportunities”. 
Membership into this group is also maintained by vartan bhanji, which Shaw (2000a) 
called lena-dena (take-and-give). The principle is simple: gifts in cash or kind are given 
to a household during certain ceremonial occasions (e.g., weddings and births), by 
members of their biraderi of participation and, to a certain extend, by close friends 
(rishtedars). The essential feature is that it is not the gift per se, but the obligation to 
reciprocate on a subsequent occasion (Wakil, 1970; Alavi, 1972; Shaw, 2000a). Next 
time though, the receiver has to give an amount slightly higher than received, so the 
debtor becomes a creditor.94 This keeps the vartan bhanji alive and with it the link 
between the biraderi members. In Punjab, Alavi (1972) further notes that there are two 
types of vartan bhanji: one where even members outside the biraderi of participation 
participate (rishtedars), called katchi vartan and another, more important, only for the 
members of the biraderi of participation, pakki vartan. Both types of gifting were 
managed by women, as they were “the guardians of vartan bhanji, who know to whom 
and when and how much a family is to give as well as from whom and when and how 
much it should receive” (Eglar, 1960: 138). 
It is important, though, not to see these strategies of gift exchange as a positive force 
only. As Wakil (1970: 702-703) notes, “the most peculiar feature of the biraderi, 
however, is the melange of a very fierce kind of competition and noble cooperation. In 
an extremely class and status conscious society like the Punjab the gift exchange 
acquires a most vicious character and is not usually as loveable an activity as some 
students of the Punjabi society believe”. This competition and cooperation operate at 
both levels of interaction, namely inter-biraderi and intra-biraderi. Looking at the 
former, it is true that inter-kin relations are very complex and seldom amiable in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 These amounts are fixed by custom.	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Pakistan. Several studies (Ahmed, 1990; Mohmand and Gazdar, 2007) have shown that 
villages often represent arenas for contest among kin. Even abroad, as Ballard (1990) 
notes looking at the Diaspora in Britain, settlers construct their networks of social 
solidarity and mutual support through regional, linguistic, religious, caste and class 
origins, reinforced by the tightly parochial loyalties of kinship. As for the latter, intra-
biraderi competition and cooperation is visible in everyday practice and strongly 
embedded in consanguinity established by pakka bhanji, e.g., we support our ‘own’ 
(apna) people in conflicts between households or descent groups (Alvi, 2007). And 
while there is an invidious competition within the biraderi (mainly witnessed through 
gift exchanges), where the aim is not to ‘keep up with the Joneses’ (nor to ‘leave the 
Joneses behind’), but to ‘keep the Joneses down’ (Wakil, 1970), there is always also a 
minimum of cooperation, as biraderis have numerous integrative functions (Wakil, 
1970; Alavi, 1972; Werbner, 1990; Shaw, 2000a). Lefebvre (1999) states that one of the 
major reasons for this cooperation lies on notions of risk and security; in a society 
where the State does not provide any kind of social security (to which I would add 
universality of services as well) people trust more their own biraderi members than 
strangers, as the interdependence of these kinship networks mean security (and access to 
services). 
 
Quom, Zat and Biraderi in Pakistan-administered Kashmir 
“Today biraderi is only visible in marriages. Before it used to be really strict 
– even a rich kammi [artisan] would be below a poor Mughal. He would sit 
on the ground and eat separately at weddings.” – Ali Naqvi, elder Syed 
“The biraderi system is almost gone, but not in people’s minds. Sheikh 
Ashraf is a big rich man, but people still mention that his mother was a Raja 
[a lower ranked biraderi].” – Bashir, middle-aged Mughal 
“A Mochi [shoemaker, artisan caste] can own 20 kanals, have a majority in 
the village, be rich and educated and change his name to Sudhan, but he 
will always be a Mochi.” – Imtiaz, young Mughal 
These three quotes give us a broad view of how people in this region talked about social 
stratification and its evolution. I have chosen these for two reasons: first, to show that 
despite what many informants said about the diminishing importance of hierarchy it was 
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still visible in everyday life and in people’s minds. Secondly, it brings forth a difference 
in generational discourse. When talking about the importance of stratification older 
people would often compare the ‘past’ – their lived experience of a highly hierarchical 
society they witnessed when young – to the ‘present’ – a less hierarchical society. 
Younger people would only relate to the ‘present’ and saw stratification as it was lived 
today. For a lack of literature on social structures and stratification in PaK in this 
section I mostly use their oral histories supported, to a certain extent, by the larger 
literature on social structures in Pakistani Punjab and its Diaspora. 
In Bagh district the largest biraderis are Mughal, Narma and Raja, although there are 
differences within each mauza and each settlement. In most mauzas and settlements 
around Chinati bazaar Mughals are often the largest biraderi, though Syed and Kiani 
are a majority in a few. As seen in Tables 5 and 6, Mughals are not only the majority in 
Nakkar and Khorian mauzas but also in the five settlements out of these mauzas that 
surround Chinati bazaar – Bagla, Basantkot, Thial, Khorian and Sarian. In Hothala 
mauza the Kianis and Syeds are the demographic majority, but in the one settlement that 
was served by Chinati bazaar – Serabad – the Syeds are the main biraderi. Though their 
society was heavily stratified, the stratification itself was loosely defined and much 
contested, which, surprisingly, made this area much more equal and horizontal in its 
social composition than Punjab, for example, where biraderi stratification and hierarchy 
seemed to have relatively clearer definitions. 
Table 5 – Biraderi/Quom Composition of Mauzas Surrounding Chinati bazaar 
Mauza Nakkar Khorian Hothala 
Biraderis 
Awan 
Bhatti 
Lohar 
Khwaja 
Kiani 
Mughal 
Pathan 
Qureshi 
Raja 
Syed 
Alavi 
Awan 
Lohar 
Kiani 
Malik 
Mirza 
Mochi 
Mughal 
Nai 
Pathan 
Qasab 
Qureshi 
Raja 
Satti 
Sheikh 
Sudhan 
Syed 
Kiani 
Mughal 
Narma 
Raja 
Sudhan 
Syed 
Note: Largest biraderis in bold. 
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Table 6 – Biraderi/Quom Composition of Settlements Surrounding Chinati bazaar 
Mauza Nakkar Khorian Hothala 
Mohallah Bagla Basantkot Thial Khorian Sarian Serabad 
Biraderis Mughal Raja 
Khwaja 
Mughal Mughal 
Kiani 
Mughal 
Raja 
Sheikh 
Mughal 
Raja 
Sheikh 
Mughal 
Raja 
Syed 
Note: Largest biraderis in bold. 
Throughout the region there was no apparent clear definition of the terms quom, zat and 
biraderi. Most people would use geographical markers and size to differentiate the 
three. All agreed that biraderi was smaller and quom larger, and locate biraderi within 
the limits of a village or neighbourhood. Zat was more ambiguous, with some people 
stating it was the same as biraderi, while others saying it was the same as quom. All 
would translate quom into ‘nation’, zat as either ‘caste’ or ‘tribe’ and biraderi as either 
‘tribe’ or ‘kinship’. Similar to what Parry (1979) saw in Kangra with the term jat used 
to mean varna, caste or clan, in this region biraderi was used as the all-encompassing 
term for quom, zat and biraderi, depending on the context it was used. Despite most 
talking generally about the biraderi system, they would often acknowledge that this 
created erroneous generalisations. Mohammad Azfar, a Mughal ex-serviceman from 
Bagla brought out this point when I asked him what were these groups that called 
themselves Mughals, Syeds, Awans, Rajas, Mochis, Mirasis, and so on. “Quom means 
nation, zat is a caste in a particular area and biraderi is a community with common 
interests. We actually use the wrong word, i.e., we use biraderi while we should be using 
zat.” There was also a gender difference when using these terms to describe social 
stratification. Men mostly used biraderi while women used quom. For women the latter 
was what they identified as caste or tribe, while biraderi was a lineage-oriented house. 
Possibly the reason for this differentiation lied in the fact that for women biraderi was 
closer to the family, while quom included strangers to whom they were connected but 
were not part of their domestic cycle. In this chapter I use Alavi’s (1972: 3) and Wakil’s 
(1970: 701) division of biraderi into three groups to classify local social stratification: I 
use quom as the general descent group; zat for what Alavi called the ‘biraderi of 
recognition’ and Wakil the ‘biraderi at large’ while taking into consideration Werbner’s 
(1989) point that this recognition can be through patrilineage or affinity; and biraderi 
for the ‘biraderi of participation’, or ‘effective biraderi’. 
Quom, zat and biraderi differentiation happened because of nasal (breed) and 
occupation. To be more specific this differentiation happened sometimes because of 
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nasal, in the case of higher groups such as the Syed or Kiani, and sometimes because of 
occupation, in the case of lower groups such as the Lohar or Nai. Most people said that 
this differentiation came from caste divisions based on ritual pedigree (Arab decent, or 
being related to the house of Muhammad) and historical power (former rulers), and 
from historical class divisions – Bashir said that “the rich castes had people working for 
them, so these workers would be the lower castes.” All agreed that the present social 
stratification was rooted in historical factors, where social mobility was inexistent. 
Quoms were roughly categorised in three broad hierarchical yet porous groups, 
according to their status and power. In a status-conscious and socially stratified society 
such as this one, the origins of each quom, zat or biraderi were heavily contested, as 
was their ‘rank’ within the social hierarchy. Table 7 is the result of a ranking exercise I 
conducted individually with several informants from different status groups.95 During 
the exercise I would ask the informant which criteria was he using to rank their 
importance. While all informants used ‘status’ to signify importance, their definitions of 
the former differed. For instance while the Syed stressed descent as the marker of status, 
the Mughal and Raja informants used economic and political power, without necessarily 
disregarding descent. All informants also stressed education as an important marker. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 See the Methodology section in Chapter One for more details.	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Table 7 – Ranking of Biraderis/Quoms According to Three Informants 
Respondent Syed Mughal Raja 
Group I 
Syed 
Abbasi 
Kiani 
Alavi 
Awan 
Qureshi 
Mughal 
Syed – Narma – Sudhan 
Syed 
Abbasi 
Raja 
Sudhan 
Narma – Mughal – Kiani 
Group II 
Sudhan 
Mughal 
Raja – Rajput – Janjua 
Narma 
Khwaja 
Gujjar 
Pathan – Durani 
Sheikh 
Satti 
Khokar 
Bhatti 
Abbasi – Kiani 
Raja – Gujjar – Khwaja 
Khwaja 
Lohar / Awan 
Khokar 
Gujjar 
Rajput 
Julaha 
Group III 
All at the same level: 
Mirasi – Kumhar – 
Mochi – Julaha – 
Lohar – Nai – Qasab 
– Kalal 
Rajput – Durani – Sheikh 
Kumhar – Awan – Pathan 
Lohar – Khokar – Satti 
Julaha – Bhatti – Qasab 
Mirasi – Kalal – Mochi – Nai 
Nai 
Mochi 
Mirasi 
Kumhar or Kalal 
Qasab 
Note: In bold: menial quoms; Underlined: Ashraf quoms. 
The higher group generally consisted of quoms which were considered ashraf and often 
quoms which claimed descent from conquering castes.96 In the lower group informants 
would include quoms which traditionally were involved with menial occupations and/or 
in contact with polluting substances. Finally, the middle group was more ambiguous, as 
it was composed of quoms which were neither higher nor lower, i.e., neither ashraf nor 
kammis. In fact, the ambiguity of the middle group could be seen even in the way 
people referred to these groups, as they had a name for the higher and lower groups 
(oonchi zat and neechi zat, respectively),97 but not for the middle one. This hierarchy 
was similar to Werbner’s (1989: 290) description of Punjabi Muslim zats which were 
“ranked hierarchically in a system with persons of high ritual pedigree located at the 
top of the hierarchy, followed by ‘conquerors’ of Muslim and Hindu origin, followed by 
categories of agricultural cultivators and artisan castes, with service castes and those 
coming into contact with polluting substances located at the bottom of the scale.” 
Within each group quoms were also placed hierarchically, but if there was limited 
agreement among informants on which quoms belonged where in each group, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Note that according to the Syed informant ashraf quoms were all of proclaimed Arab or Persian 
descent, and Afghan and Central Asian ‘conquerors’ were not considered ashraf.	  
97 Similar to what Bhatty (1996) found in Uttar Pradesh.	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elsewhere (Ahmad, 1973) their ranking within the groups was even more debatable. 
There were exceptions to this disagreement, namely in the case of the Syed, always 
placed in the higher group, and most service castes, placed at the bottom. It is worth 
mentioning that, like Werbner (1989) witnessed in Pakistani migrants in Manchester, 
here too informants would often place their own quom at a higher level. Higher-ranked 
quoms would have more intricate knowledge about rankings than lower ones, possibly 
because the former had historically always been more literate98 and in a position of 
power.99 
The strict hierarchy that defined this region in the past created and was itself a product 
of social and economic exclusion defined along quom lines, with the higher groups 
using their born-status within the hierarchy to gain access to power and resources, often 
at the expense of the lower ones. As Hameed, a Mughal mason from Sarian, put it, back 
then “there was a feeling of superiority within each level towards the lower level.” One 
of the crucial factors that excluded individuals was linked to notions of blood purity. As 
status and power were closely linked with hierarchy, the only way for someone to move 
up in the hierarchy would be to marry above his/her status. However this was extremely 
rare as taking a husband or even a wife from a lower level meant ‘polluting’ the 
group.100 
This separation between quoms was also visible through ritual purity. “Separation used 
to happen because of hasab-nasab [meaning progeny, genealogy, family background].” 
At particular events where all quoms would congregate, e.g., at weddings and panchayat 
meetings, the seating arrangements were done in a way of showing hierarchy, with 
lower quoms always seating on the ground below the higher quoms. At these events, if 
food was distributed it would be prepared and served separately according to hierarchy. 
Even during prayers higher quoms would sit in front and lower quoms in the back. 
Commensality between higher and lower quoms in public was discouraged and frowned 
upon. Qasim, a Kiani political agent from Hothala still remembers what happened to 
him when he tried to cross this boundary. “When I was in school I used to buy and eat 
bhundi [local sweet] with a Nai [barber quom] classmate. Once I went to a wedding and 
saw him eating alone in a corner. I went there and started eating with him and all my 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 The Syeds in particular have lineage records to prove their ‘pedigree’.	  
99 Possibly these were the ones from whom the colonial census officers recorded most information on 
castes.	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friends and relatives made fun of me, calling me a Nai.” The reason for this separation 
lay in the fact that, for all purposes, lower quoms were dirty (ganda) and sharing food or 
sitting together meant allowing oneself to be polluted. 
The importance and the character of this biraderi-based stratification, though, had 
changed over time. Particularly influential in this process of change were a series of 
events that started to occur in the 1970s, namely, the introduction of electoral politics, 
mass migration to the Gulf countries and increasing levels of universal education. In the 
following section I analyse how notions and practices of hierarchy and social 
stratification evolved over this period, identifying the factors that made this change 
possible, as well as the ones that continued to enforce it. 
 
Changes in PaK’s Social Stratification: from ‘hierarchy’ to 
‘difference’ 
Most people in the villages surrounding Chinati bazaar stated that the strict hierarchy 
that once characterised their society was a thing of the past. There was now more 
equality among quoms and the distinction between these groups was based on 
‘difference’ rather than hierarchy. In other words, social stratification had changed from 
a vertical to a horizontal system, from hierarchy to difference. Hierarchy is only one 
kind of stratification, one where the layers are arranged vertically and, therefore, 
ranked. Dumont (1970: 66) defines hierarchy as “the principle by which the elements of 
a whole are ranked in relation to the whole”, placing it in a continuous scale. While 
some societies are hierarchically organised, notions of difference are dominant in other 
stratificatory systems, where layers are organised horizontally or separately, rather than 
vertically or hierarchically, like in the case of language, religion or nationality (Gupta, 
1991). In these cases “there are incommensurable entities or units, that constitute 
different systems of stratification”, where instead of being in a continuous scale they are 
placed in discrete categories (Gupta, 1991: 8). 
It is useful to go back to Werbner’s (1989) assertion that Punjabi Muslims used the term 
biraderi (and quom) to imply equality – and therefore a social structure more Islamic – 
instead of zat, which entailed ranking. The same can be said for this region and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 In principle taking a wife from a lower group should not have been a problem as descent was 
patrilineal. Still, it rarely occurred.	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preference for using the terms biraderi – ‘brotherhood’ – and quom – ‘nation’ – terms 
which imply that their social stratification is based on difference, as opposed to zat – 
‘caste’ – which is hierarchical and potentially un-Islamic. Yet, this shift in the nature of 
local social stratification was not an exercise simply based on semantics, it was 
something that they witnessed in their everyday lives. Something had changed to make 
them perceive their society as more equal and less hierarchical. To be precise, there 
were four interconnected factors that made this shift in social stratification possible, 
namely land ownership, electoral politics, migration patterns, and education. The vast 
majority of my informants though, would often name education as the main factor. 
 
Land Ownership 
Since the time of the Mughal rule land ownership has been seen as a privilege more 
than a right, being identified with belonging to a higher class (Ahmad, 1977; Habib, 
1999). In Punjab, the colonial rule further exacerbated this through its Punjab 
Alienation of Land Act 1900,101 which divided the region into agricultural (or 
zamindar) and non-agricultural tribes.102 As no such legislation was ever made in PaK 
(or previously in the State of Jammu and Kashmir) anyone could own land, so long as 
they could afford it. Following the creation of PaK in 1947 large tracts of land 
previously owned by Hindu and Sikh landlords were soon taken over by the local 
population (as well as by refugees from Indian-administered Kashmir), allowing for 
even non-zamindari landless lower castes to own land. 
With new job opportunities being created in the mid-1970s by the mass migration to the 
Gulf countries – and with land ownership still being so closely linked with status – 
everyone, including lower castes, would buy land as soon as they could, even when 
agriculture was not profitable. The aim was not to become a farmer (kissan) but a 
landowner (zamindar) and thus trying to move up in the rank. Today, PaK is 
characterised by land being widely distributed, with 86% of private property ownership 
(P&D AJK, 2008) compared to 37% in rural Pakistan (Agricultural Census, 2000), but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 While officially the aim was to avoid increasing levels of debt and land being bought by urban, non-
agrarian people, the main purpose of this Act was to cultivate certain landowning classes which were 
patronised by the colonial rulers. For that “The Board of Revenue shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, 
determine what bodies of persons in any district or group of districts are to be deemed to be agricultural tribes or 
groups of agricultural tribes for the purposes of this Act.”	  
102 By tribes colonial rulers meant quoms or zats.	  
	   115	  
with landholdings smaller than two hectares. This in turn made land ownership stop 
being a factor of social stratification and exclusion, opposite to what happens in 
neighbouring Punjab where it was (Ahmad, 1977; Alavi, 1972) and still is (Mohmand 
and Gazdar, 2007; Shaw, 2000a) a determinant factor defining hierarchy. 
 
Electoral Politics 
Despite being azadi from Dogra rule in 1947, universal franchise only appeared in the 
political spectrum of PaK in the 1970s. In the initial years PaK was ruled by the 
supreme head of the Muslim Conference (MC) and indirectly by Pakistan through the 
Ministry of Kashmir Affairs (MKA). Since 1947 Pakistan has de facto ruled PaK. The 
President of Pakistan is the head of the AJK Council, which controls aspects of finance, 
defence and foreign affairs and appoints the Chief Secretary, the Inspector General of 
Police and the Finance Secretary. In 1958 General Ayub, the military dictator in 
Pakistan, banned all political parties in PaK. Soon after he extended his “basic 
democracy” to the region through the 1960 Basic Democracies Act, where a carefully 
selected number of “basic democrats” would elect a president.103 Following Ayub’s 
demise in Pakistan, General Yahya Khan dissolved the one-unit system and appointed a 
new minister for the MKA who allowed the main party leaders of PaK to draft a new 
constitution and hold elections on the basis of universal suffrage (Mahmud, 2006). As 
Pakistan introduced a new constitution in 1973 based on a parliamentary system, so too 
it encouraged PaK to re-draft its constitution. The result was the Azad Jammu and 
Kashmir Interim Constitution of 1974, where 42 members of the legislative assembly 
(MLA) were elected directly on the basis of adult franchise for a five-year term 
(Mahmud, 2006). This created a volte-face in the politics of PaK, as for the first time in 
its history political power was decided by demographics rather than status. Many quoms 
with large numbers within their constituencies started forming vote blocs and 
supporting candidates from within the quom. In a region where the state provides 
targeted rather than universal services and is the major employer, the rationale was that 
once their candidate was in power they would have preferential access to services and 
jobs. Similar to other parts of South Asia104 a ‘patronage democracy’ soon developed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Among the criteria for selection were education and income level, basically barring the vast majority 
of the population from franchise.	  
104 See Ali (2010); Price and Ruud (eds) (2010).	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where democratic practices were seen as “direct or indirect ways of getting a share of 
state resources and as ways to obtain or maximise power” (Chandra, 2004 in: 
Michelutti, 2010). Party politics soon became muddled up with biraderi-ism and even 
today “party leaders seek out candidates with the largest clans and the deepest roots 
inside their communities” (Ghauri, 2011). Larger quoms that were until then at lower 
levels within the social hierarchy became elevated through the creation of ‘biraderi 
politics’, effectively increasing the fluidity of the social stratification. 
 
Migration 
Following Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s deal in 1974 with the oil-producing countries in the 
Gulf, under which Pakistan would get subsidised oil in exchange for migrant labour, 
this region witnessed a significant level of migration. According to Shaffer (2005) 40% 
of households in PaK today have at least one member working overseas. Partly because 
of the newly-founded AJK Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) Chapter in the region and as a 
way of gaining political leverage, Bhutto’s administration eased the red tape and 
reduced the price for acquiring a Pakistani passport, as well as facilitating the access to 
Gulf states’ visas. The initial migrants found jobs within the police and armed forces of 
these Gulf countries, many were ex-servicemen from the Pakistani army, while others 
worked in construction workers and catering. The first ones to migrate would sponsor 
relatives and members of their biraderi, but as the migration flow increased 
exponentially agents started hiring beyond their social networks. This meant that men 
from all quoms migrated, including men from the lower ones, as long as they could 
afford Gulf migration. As remittances started to flow into this region, migrants’ 
households would use them to improve their living standards, invest in land acquisitions 
and/or in educating their children, and eventually showing some level of superfluous 
consumption. Gulf migrants, on their part, would often return with a different mindset – 
and money in their pocket – having a knowledge of the world beyond PaK and Pakistan 
and would challenge the existing social stratification.105 
Gulf migration also contributed to the crumbling of another boundary within social 
stratification in PaK, namely the one of occupational specialisation. Lower quoms – 
whose identity was linked to menial professions – and small peasants became migrants 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Many would also come with a different view of Islam, a more egalitarian one.	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and mazdoors, and, upon return, shopkeepers and zamindars. Their children (through 
education) could become teachers, engineers and businesspeople – just like everybody 
else, irrespective of caste. Similar to what happened in other regions in South Asia 
(Gardner and Osella, 2004; Osella and Osella, 2000) Gulf migration allowed for social 
mobility of not just individuals, but of whole groups. 
 
Education 
Until the 1970s education levels were relatively small and despite an increase in the 
previous decades in primary education enrolment, access to education (especially above 
primary level) was still within the domain of higher quoms. During the mid 1970s a 
drastic increase in the creation of public middle schools, high schools and degree 
colleges changed this situation, with enrolment rates doubling, octupling and 
quadrupling, respectively. The role of the state was crucial in trying to universalise 
education: today the gross enrolment rate at primary level in PaK is 95% for boys and 
88% for girls (P&D AJK, 2008). With a change of the power basis and groups that were 
once denied access to political power by virtue of hierarchy now being enfranchised, 
education became the number one priority in PaK. This shift could be seen not only in 
the increase of public schools, but also in public sector employment where, by 1980, 
42% was in education (P&D AJK, 1980).106 Since then literacy figures for most of PaK 
became substantially higher than those of Pakistan (Shaffer, 2005). The quasi-
universality of education meant that every child would be together in school: learning 
together, sitting together and sharing food together. While there was still some 
discrimination and exclusion within groups regarding children of lower quoms, the daily 
interaction often made these children question social hierarchy, as Qasim stated in the 
previous example. 
Migration (and remittances) also had a direct impact on education. Like migration, the 
event of education was not a novelty, although its increase had, to a certain extent, 
replicated the increase in migration patterns. Education was seen by many as a form of 
investment, a way of making sure the next generations would have access to better 
employment opportunities. As elsewhere (see Ciotti, 2006), by attaining formal 
education many middle- and lower-status groups were in effect also trying to attain 
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higher status. Since education became almost universal and with remittances flowing in, 
people from all quoms stared to enrol their children in schools and of late putting them 
in private schools, to show how serious they were about education. Education became a 
benchmark of modernity and status, not necessarily what one knows, but that one 
(formally) knows. 
Mehmood, a waiter from Basantkot who worked in Lahore put the interconnectedness 
of these four factors succinctly: 
“The biggest problem in Pakistan is that the rich people don’t allow the 
poorer classes to get educated and get into a better financial position. These 
people are the ones in government, making policies that only benefit them. A 
poorer child can be more intelligent but a richer one will have tuitions, 
access to private schooling and then a good job and that’s how the cycle 
goes on. The sad fact is that the poor don’t even know their rights and how 
this is affecting them. Punjabis have their chaudhrys, Pukhtoon their khans, 
Sindhis their vederas, and the Balochis their sardars. Here we’re all 
zamindars.” 
 
Endogamy 
While these changes all contributed to a levelling of local social stratification, one 
crucial factor – endogamy – remained the same. As I mentioned before, the two main 
factors for the old differentiation and hierarchy were nasal and occupation. While 
occupation disappeared, nasal remained. People were constantly being reminded of that. 
When Yasir, a young Mughal shopkeeper proudly boasted that they (the Mughals) ruled 
over the bazaar – because they were the majority – someone quickly added, “Yes, but 
don’t forget the Syeds will always be on top of you…” More often than before, 
marriages did occur between quoms of similar rank, mostly within the middle group. 
But these were a small minority of cases, as most people still married within their quom, 
and within it their biraderi107. Similar to Punjab (Alavi, 1972; Donnan, 1988; Eglar, 
1960; Wakil, 1970) there was a stated preference for first cousin marriages, although 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 As a comparison, after education the two highest public sector jobs were in the police (12%) and in 
health (8%).	  
107 Out of all the marriages mentioned to me during my fieldwork (about 70-odd) only three were inter-
quom: A Sheikh took a Raja wife, a Sudhan a Mughal wife, and a Mughal a Pukhtoon wife from Lahore.	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with a slight difference inasmuch as the common rhetoric being the preference for 
matrilateral cross cousin marriage, i.e. for a man to marry his mother’s brother’s 
daughter, rather than patrilineal parallel cousin marriage. Yet, as Das (1973) warns us, 
using generic terms like ‘cross-cousin marriage’ and ‘parallel cousin marriage’ and 
assuming that each is a distinct sociological type can be misleading. 
In this region it was common for men to refer to their father’s brother’s daughter and 
father’s sister’s daughter – i.e. father’s siblings’ daughters – as behen (sister), and for 
women to call their father’s brother’s son and mother’s brother’s son – i.e. parents’ 
brothers’ sons – bhai (brother).108 This did not mean that, within the extended family 
(khandan), a man was only allowed to marry his mother’s siblings’ daughters and a 
woman her parents’ sisters’ sons. Considerations of relatedness were important both 
inside and outside the khandan but as elsewhere (Das, 1973; Donnan, 1985; Shaw, 
2001) marriage choices were made with a number of pragmatic considerations based 
not only on cultural rules or preferences, but also on political, economic, and social 
factors (Shaw, 2001). While studying marriage practices among the Dhund in 
neighbouring Murree, Donnan (1985: 194) notices that “kinship and ideas about proper 
behaviour between kin provide the bases of the rules and the rhetoric for these 
marriage strategies” but other considerations not related to kinship also come into 
play109. Within the Pakistani (mostly Punjabi) Diaspora in Oxford, Shaw (2001: 326) 
also notes that “obligation to kin is important but it is not the only factor taken into 
consideration” while choosing whom to marry. In fact, Donnan (1985) advises us to 
move away from looking at rules and preferences and look instead at strategies. 
Matrilateral cross-cousin marriage can be seen as both an exchange between families 
and a strategy to keep them connected. In this region, as a woman leaves her ancestral 
home and moves into another family’s – although most often within the same village – 
she potentially not only loses her connection with her siblings and parents but she also 
gets deprived of her due share of land inheritance as, despite being entitled to a share, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 In Urdu there is no single word for cousin; it is connoted by referring to the specific type of 
relationship, e.g. the male paternal parallel cousin for a man is called chacha zad bhai (my brother from 
my father’s brother), his male maternal cross cousin is called mamu zad bhai (my brother from my 
mother’s brother), and so on. In effect, they would use the English word ‘cousin’ for the cousins who 
were not considered siblings.	  
109 Some of the storytellers in Chinati themselves referred to Donnan’s work, saying they knew of a book 
written about the Dhunds of Murree.	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was the local custom that parting brides forfeited their inheritance to their brothers.110 In 
the next generation though, this woman will try to reconnect with her family by 
marrying her son to her brother’s daughter. If this marriage strategy is looked at across 
generations one notices that, to a certain extent, there is an exchange of women for 
entitled land/inheritance between the two families. As Parveen, a Mughal housewife 
explained to Areej, my female research assistant, “the first preference [for a woman] is 
to marry the puppo ka beta [father’s sister’s son]. If it doesn’t happen, then you marry 
the other side.” What Parveen meant for ‘the other side’ was the mother’s sister’s son, 
rarely the mother’s brother’s son, as in the latter the mother would lose both the entitled 
inheritance and a woman (daughter) as well. The non-preference for a man marrying his 
father’s brother’s daughter was not because of a potential rivalry for control of the 
property of their common ancestor like in the case of tarburwali111 with the Pukhtoon in 
KP (Lindholm, 1996), but because of patrilocality as brothers’ offspring, particularly in 
their first years, are reared as siblings. Again, the non-preference though, did not mean 
avoidance, as considerations of relatedness were important but not the only factor. 
Also similar to Punjab watta-satta still occurred within some families in this region, 
although it was being increasingly challenged by the grooms to be. It happened with 
Mira and Miryam, two young cousins from a Mughal family: 
“My father and chacha [father’s brother] planned watta-satta for us. I would 
marry my uncle’s son and Miryam would marry my brother. We didn’t like 
the idea, but we would always marry whomever our parents chose for us. 
But both boys backed out as they had other interests. The boys liked two 
girls from the same quom but of different biraderi and from another village. 
Negotiations are now going on between the families. Meanwhile my puppo 
has asked for my hand and my khala [mother’s sister] has asked for 
Miryam’s.” 
In Mira and Miryam’s case the first marriage choice was actually patrilineal parallel 
cousin and only after the ‘grooms’ opposed the match did the families decided on 
matrilateral cross-cousin marriage. Their example is one of many where people used 
different strategies beyond the professed first preference of matrilateral cross cousin 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 The (local) rationale being that women were moving into another home where they would access their 
husbands’ land.	  
111 Rivalry between patrilineal cousins.	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marriage. What really mattered though, and what I witnessed during my fieldwork in 
the region, was that more than within the khandan, the vast majority of marriages 
happened within biraderi or quom. Like in the nearby Murree Hills (Donnan, 1985), 
even marriages within quoms of similar rank were still frowned upon. The importance 
of quom and biraderi endogamy is not unique to PaK: back in the early 1970s, Qazi 
(1973, in: Wakil, 1991) finds ‘caste’ to be the number one reason for choosing whom to 
marry in rural Faisalabad; in his exhaustive study among the Dhunds in Murree, 
Donnan (1988) finds that of all marriages 52% were within kin and 92% were within 
quom; in her sample of Oxford Pakistani Diaspora, Shaw (2000a) accounts for 87% of 
marriages happening within the biraderi; and in Bristol, Charsley (2005) finds no 
evidence of preference for patrilateral marriages – instead the clear distinction was 
between marrying out of or within the biraderi. Two facts come out of these cases: first, 
figures are extremely high for marriages within biraderi or quom; and second, there is 
no clear border between what constitutes biraderi and quom – and it is Shaw (2000a) 
that rightly identifies the central importance of the flexible notion of biraderi for the 
reasons between pragmatic and theoretical marriage choices. This flexibility can be 
witnessed not only in marriage choices, but also if we look at who participates (and 
how) in the main rituals involving the contract of marriage, i.e., the wedding. The 
following paragraph is an account of a ‘typical’ wedding taken from my fieldnotes, 
based on my experience as a ‘participant’ and Chinati’s storytellers’ accounts: 
“A wedding in this region usually happens in three days. The first day (at 
night) is the mendhi, where the people invited are members of the groom’s 
and bride’s family, extended family, and biraderi members from the groom’s 
village and sometimes nearby ones. The mendhi is a joyous occasion, with 
music played by members of the Mirasi (musician) or sometimes Nai 
(barber) quom. The groom’s family provides the dinner. The barat happens 
on the second day, where the groom’s family members and people 
belonging to the biraderi will go to the girl’s house (sometimes in another 
settlement) to sign the nikahnama (marriage contract) and bring her to the 
groom’s home. Both the groom’s and the girl’s families will have with them 
musicians, making it a more joyous event than what is witnessed in 
Pakistani Punjab. There is food at the groom’s house for his family and his 
biraderi members. The walima is on the third day (evening), when the 
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groom’s family organises a reception for his and her families, biraderi 
members and neighbouring villagers from other biraderis and quoms. This 
is a sober event (no music) where again the groom’s family provides food. 
Biraderi membership plays a part in weddings in both receiving and giving 
aspects: only biraderi members are invited to all the functions (receiving), 
and only biraderi members are expected to offer a gift (giving), usually in 
the form of money. This gift exchange ritual – similar to vartan bhanji or 
lena-dena – is called niendra, meaning “list”, i.e., both the giver and the 
receiver will have a list of which presents were given (or received), by (or 
from) whom and on which occasion. Non-biraderi members can also give 
niendra, but they are not obliged to do so – except if they have a niendra 
relationship with the groom’s family112.” 
Similar to what Wakil (1991: 48) notices in northern Punjab, “since the gift-exchange 
cannot be carried out within the entire biraderi (…) families usually find themselves in 
a gift-exchange relationship with a manageable number of families”, which he 
identifies as the ‘effective biraderi’ and Alavi (1972) as the ‘biraderi of participation’. 
So despite talking about general biraderi participation at weddings, there are in fact 
different types of biraderis participating at different moments. Several authors (Das, 
1973; Shaw, 2001; Wakil, 1991) posit that in the future the importance of marrying 
inside the family might diminish, but arranged marriages within biraderi(s) will 
continue. In line with these predictions, many informants in Chinati also brought up the 
point that many marriages were now happening outside the khandan. Ijaz, a Syed ex-
serviceman said, “initially we only married within the khandan. Because of health 
problems we’ve stopped marrying first cousins, but we still marry within our quom.” 
More importantly, like in Sylhet (Gardner, 1995: 192) “rather than only being a 
transaction between households, marriage [had become] increasingly to do with 
partnership”, as seen by the importance given to love marriages in peoples’ marital 
choices. 
As they used education to justify changes in the structure of social stratification, it too – 
as seen elsewhere (Donner, 2002; Grover, 2011) – was used to potentially affect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 This creates bonds cutting across biraderis. Apparently this is becoming a trend especially among 
families with migrants in the Gulf (more access to money to engage in across-biraderi niendra).	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endogamy, particularly through love marriages.113 “Science has proved that mixed 
marriages generate more intelligent children, but still people here marry mainly in their 
own quom. It’s changing, especially with boys and girls going to college together”, Ali 
Naqvi told me. Most informants though, stated that only small minority of love 
marriages were due to co-education. Mostly they happened because families would 
meet and visit each other, and boys and girls would interact. The idea that education 
was changing marriage practices, although not to the extent of challenging marriage 
outside the quom, was seen because the younger generation was becoming more vocal 
on choice. Hameed said “boys and girls have more say in weddings than before. They 
are realising that they are individuals, living their own life and have a right to decide 
for themselves.” Some informants said that girls too were also asked for their marriage 
preferences. Abida, a Mughal teacher at READ stated that “now we ask our daughters 
whom they want to marry. Girls here are very shameful, they only convey through 
others. However sons tell their parents.” Many girls felt that this was not entirely true. 
Zainab, a young Raja student rhetorically asked Areej “what’s the point in loving 
[mohabat] someone or being in a lustful [ishq] relationship if my father is very strict?” 
In Mira and Miryam’s case, they felt disappointed because their fathers never asked 
them whom did they want to marry; as Mira said resignedly “we have to marry whoever 
our parents chose.” The problematisation of love marriages though, was not necessarily 
because people wanted to marry outside the family or the biraderi. Sometimes it was 
problematic to marry within the family, as Bashir’s case when he tried to marry the 
‘wrong’ cousin: 
“First my father proposed to one family for me. The girl had four brothers 
who could always help my family with agricultural work. I put up a fight; I 
told my parents I was getting married not them, so I should choose when 
and to whom I should get married. My father said he knew what was better 
for me and beat me up with a stick. I persuaded my chacha and puppo to 
talk my father out of the idea and left for Pindi. My father eventually agreed 
and asked me to come back. When I came back I fell in love with my cousin 
[father’s sister’s daughter]; I would go to her house to be with her brother 
and she was there, all handsome although one year older to me. One day I 
asked her and her brother to come to my place. There I cornered her and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 I use Donner’s (2002: 83) definition of love marriage where the crucial marker is “the agency of the 
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asked her if she would have a problem if we would get married. She lost it 
and told me off for being so bold and how could I speak to her – a single 
woman – like that. Then she left and after cooling down a little she 
contacted me and said that if I really wanted to get married I should ask her 
brother – her father was dead – and not her. So I went to my chacha again 
and asked him to talk with my father. My father went crazy again, 
threatened to kill me, because she was my puppo’s daughter. I told my 
father that if he wanted me to get married this was the only one I wanted. 
Eventually my father agreed and we’ve been married ever since. I was a 
trend-setter.” 
Today many marriages started with the boy telling his parents he wanted to marry a 
particular girl. In most cases he would already be in a relationship with this girl. Aasim, 
a young Mughal electrician explained to me the ‘hidden’ rule: “You can date whoever 
you want. But when you’re falling in love, then go for a girl of your [own] quom.” 
The earthquake also impacted dating and courtship, or more precisely the means of 
communication used to date and court. While before the earthquake courtship happened 
mostly through the exchange of letters, following the post-earthquake arrival of mobile 
phones these were substituted by text messaging. Some boys, jokingly, told me that 
Chinati bazaar sold more phonecards than Bagh. The initial contact though, still 
happened the same way, with a boy dropping a chit of paper with his mobile number 
near a girl and, if the girl accepted his courtship, her texting him from her mobile. As 
most young people owned mobiles post-earthquake, many people started saying that 
dating had increased after the earthquake, as well as the number of love marriages. In 
reality, as many of my (young) informants told me, the arrival of mobile phones made 
dating easier, while not necessarily increasing dating. For dating to happen, as Aasim 
reminded me, “either a letter or a text message, the girl still has to reply!” When 
describing dating in this region my young informants also mentioned that it was easier 
for it to happen in rural areas as opposed to urban centres as the rural forested landscape 
was more propitious and with many settlements being inhabited by the same quom 
purdah was more relaxed, so women could move about more freely. 
Most of my young informants stated that while dating cut across quom lines (as well as 
wealth and education), when it came to marriage the choice had to be for a girl from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
partners in initiating a pre-marital relationship”.	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their own quom, as mixed-quom marriages were still frowned upon (although not 
impossible). When the relationship became ‘serious’ and they were from the same 
quom, then the boy would ask his parents to go to the girl’s family and propose. One 
afternoon at Imtiaz’s shop, Hameed explained to me how love marriages proceeded: 
“You can’t have public affairs, but once it’s out or the couple decide to get serious, the 
boy’s side goes to the girl’s side and during the proposal they would mention that ‘our 
children are in love’.” In urban Calcutta Donner (2002: 84) witnessed parental concern 
of affairs becoming publicly known, because both the girl’s honour and the boy’s 
reputation would be at stake as “pre-marital relationships limit[ed] the prospects to find 
a good match.” In this area though, once ‘it was out’ the idea was of damage control 
and most often than not, the marriage proposal was accepted, as long as the boy had 
means to provide for the girl. The notion of the “providing husband”, which Grover 
(2011: 37) stated being of great importance in arranged marriages, was here as 
important in parents’ approval of love marriages. “If the boy is a charsi [drug addict] or 
doesn’t have a job, no matter how much love, parents won’t allow it. Minimum he 
should provide two meals a day”, said Hameed. Although most people professed that 
the option of choosing a marriage partner was still allowed only within quoms, 
sometimes love marriages also occurred outside quoms. In extreme cases, when an 
unmarried girl would get pregnant, the problem appeared to be dealt with differently 
depending on whether the couple belonged to the same quom or not. “If a girl gets 
pregnant and he’s from the same quom, we’ll force them to get married. If he’s from 
another quom, we ask him to leave the region and never come back; in the old days we 
would hunt them down and kill them. We do nothing to the girls, because usually in 
these cases girls are naïve, their brains are in their ankles [aurat di akal, unde giteau 
waich hundi he].” Yet, even if they were not from the same quom but of similarly 
ranked ones, the marriage would proceed, as it did when a couple from different but 
similar ranked quoms were caught in a compromising position in a village further north 
of Chinati and got married the day after. 
As a result of this allowed choice, many marriages in this region are a mix of love and 
arranged marriages. Still, these love marriages mostly happened within quoms, or 
sometimes with quoms ranked similarly, but never with lower quoms. According to 
Imtiaz, “Mughals will never marry a Nai even if he’s the Prime Minister, rich with a 
PhD. They would marry Sudhans because they are of equal quom.” Similar to Grover’s 
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(2011: 207) findings in urban Delhi, where caste was more important than education, 
employment, and class mobility, here too “prejudice against certain inter-caste (…) 
unions remained intense.” The reason that people from quoms belonging to the higher 
and middle groups used to justify not marrying lower quoms was one of ritual purity, 
which they would equate to honour. Hameed told me “lower quoms are ganda [dirty], 
that’s why we don’t marry them. Not because they’re poor, but because they have no 
honour.” According to some of my informants the perception of lack of honour in lower 
quoms was linked to women’s honour (“if their women are groped they won’t do 
anything”)114. But, as Béteille (1993, in: Grover, 2011) notes when analysing Indian 
middle class professionals, they added that with the passage of time and education they 
had become more honourable. Qasim, the Kiani political agent, linked this education 
with equality: “Nowadays all are treated with the same respect. There is shahoor 
[consciousness] and education. In the next 25 years the whole biraderi system will 
disappear.” Until then, though, lower quoms were still excluded from marrying above 
and, therefore, accessing the other quoms. 
The nature of social stratification in PaK, which was once characterised by a 
hierarchical order enforced by strict endogamy, occupational specialisation and ritual 
pollution, had changed over time. It appeared that there was now more equality among 
quoms and the distinction between groups was based on ‘difference’ rather than 
hierarchy. Four interconnected factors contributed to this change, namely land 
ownership, electoral politics, migration patterns, and education. While these changes all 
contributed to a perceived horizontalisation of social stratification, one crucial factor, 
endogamy, remained the same. As access to power and resources was often channelled 
through quom and biraderi ties, the inability of lower quoms to marry above could be 
translated into powerlessness. However, as stratification slowly became more 
horizontal, demographics started to play a more major role. In the perceived shift from 
‘hierarchy’ to ‘difference’, social exclusion reappeared, based this time not on a ranking 
but on the dominance of numbers. Larger biraderis were now more dominant, and used 
their large networks to get preferential access to jobs and other resources. Since society 
was still stratified by biraderis, numerically smaller biraderis now faced exclusion. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 While having this discussion, a curious conversation happened when Imtiaz was talking about Mirasis. 
“The problem with Mirasis is that they sing and play for money. We do it for fun at weddings, that’s 
alright because it’s not for money.” When I asked him if famous musicians, who sang for money, were 
also dirty and had no honour, he replied “big musicians are fine because they are international artists, it’s 
like waiters at big restaurants getting tips.”	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shift from ‘hierarchy’ to ‘difference’, therefore, added a new dimension to social 
exclusion and inequality continued to exist, though in a slightly altered form. If, on the 
one hand, there were still elements of hierarchy that continued to reinforce pockets of 
social exclusion based on status among its lower biraderis, on the other hand, the new 
realities of demographics created new pockets of exclusion among its minority 
biraderis. More worryingly, sometimes these biraderis were one and the same. 
Nowhere was this form of exclusion and inequality more obvious than in the aftermath 
of the earthquake, when it was magnified and highlighted by the process of 
reconstruction and rehabilitation. 
 
The Politics of the Earthquake 
One day at the bazaar, while moving from shop to shop, Ali Naqvi called across to me 
from Mehfooz’s shop – one of the oldest in the bazaar and which sold grain – and 
invited me for a quick chat and a cup of tea. Mehfooz, an older Mughal from Bagla, 
cleaned an old wooden bench and told me to sit down, amusedly saying, “All day long 
you go from shop to shop and never sit down. You’ve started looking like Omar [the old 
newspaper seller].” During our cup of tea I asked both Mehfooz and Ali Naqvi how 
were people mobilising themselves in post-earthquake community-based projects. Ali 
Naqvi said that things were getting better. “We’re becoming more efficient in utilising 
networks. Because of awareness and exposure, people started forming all these 
committees [organised by the NGOs after the earthquake], so networks got improved 
with other villages as well.” Mehfooz added that after the earthquake people had 
become more opportunistic. “People use their contacts and milk them as much as 
possible to get as much as they can.” Both agreed that after the earthquake people 
mobilised themselves more through ‘common needs’ than biraderi. “Biraderi is still 
important, but less than before”, said Ali Naqvi. 
Due to the earthquake, this region received an unprecedented attention from both the 
Pakistani state and the development industry, with national and international NGOs 
flooding PaK. During relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation stages these agencies 
were involved in a series of community-based and community-driven projects designed 
to assist the locals (particularly the more vulnerable) in recovering from the impact of 
the earthquake. Often perceived as originators of ‘neutral’ networks – based on common 
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goals and needs – these projects became reflections of or magnifying lenses for the 
existing social stratification and exclusion. In this section I use the post-earthquake 
relief and reconstruction stages to show that the networks people used to recover from 
the earthquake’s impact, as well as the networks used in local politics, continued to be 
embedded primarily within the biraderi,115 creating (or exacerbating) social and 
economic exclusion. 
 
The Earthquake and the Politics of Biraderi-ism 
As seen in chapter three, most development agencies’ targeted assistance overlooked 
the existent networks of patronage embedded in local social stratification. By allowing 
‘elite capture’ and misreading representation their actions contributed in many instances 
to exacerbate exclusion. The problem of elite capture and representation was visible in 
the way biraderi politics affected reconstruction. Even pre-existing autonomous 
community-based organisations (CBOs) suffered from biraderi politics, as was the case 
of the Khorian Social Welfare Association in the villages surrounding Chinati bazaar. 
Founded autonomously in 1993 by locals of all biraderis belonging to five nearby 
settlements, this CBO was engaged in giving loans without interest and food-for-work 
to poorer people in the region. Its committee collected funds from within these villages 
(including fitrana and zakat donations) and identified potential beneficiaries. Following 
the earthquake it worked as a go-between with relief NGOs until it lost out due to 
political pressure. Aslam, a Mughal from Khorian and the treasurer of this association, 
narrated to me how this CBO was affected by biraderi-ism: 
“After the earthquake our Association was still working. We would go to 
different NGOs, show our [membership] cards and get stuff to distribute. 
Later the funds started to get passed on through MLAs and they would give 
preference to [their] family and biraderi. This caused fights within the 
Association and it died, victim of biraderi politics.” 
As the relief stage progressed towards reconstruction, development agencies began to 
formalise assistance and channelled it through either the different state agencies (with 
ERRA being the main coordinator) or by subcontracting local NGOs, many of whom 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 In this section I use the word biraderi for both biraderi and quom, as this was the word used when 
discussing politics.	  
	   129	  
were recently formed. While the main agencies publicised this channelling as a way of 
making assistance more efficient, transparent and equitable, the lack of awareness of 
power hierarchies within the region did not prevent these channels of being highjacked 
by the more powerful elements. Mohammad Sheikh stated, like many of my other 
informants, that “some staff at ERRA and NGOs were nepotists and would help mainly 
their biraderis, or were corrupt and made money through aid.” Mistargeting was 
detrimental to the whole relief and reconstruction stages not only because many of the 
more vulnerable were excluded, but also because sometimes it channelled assistance to 
better-off groups, drastically increasing the gap between the haves and the have-nots. 
Zaidi et al (2010: 396) when assessing the targeting of the World Bank-funded 
livelihood cash grant discovered that “nearly one-half of deserving families (…) were 
excluded. Moreover, one in two families that did not deserve the benefit because they 
were ineligible according to the ERRA–WB criteria were selected and awarded the 
dividend.” Similarly a report by the Auditor General of Pakistan showed that during 
2006-07 ERRA paid Rs. 94 million in housing cash grants to 1,255 ineligible claimants, 
Rs. 410 million to claimants which required confirmation of eligibility, plus several 
cases of beneficiaries being paid twice (Khan, 2008). In most cases, both exclusion and 
inclusion were attributed to biraderi-ism playing a role in determining who would get 
access or not. 
As with the case of the Khorian Social Welfare Association politicians, government 
officials and NGO staff would often channel resources and funds to the people who 
helped them attain these positions and to whom they owned primordial loyalties116 – 
their biraderis. According to locals, people in PaK felt trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma: 
they all identified a relation between biraderi-ism and nepotism, but no one was willing 
to be the first one to step out of it, as others would continue to use their biraderi 
contacts. According to Kashif, “nepotism is not a problem with politicians, it’s a 
Kashmiri thing. We’re always used to the biraderi connection. It goes beyond 
government jobs – even in NGOs and private business people would ask you who was 
your reference.” Biraderi-ism was embedded in all levels of power leading to nepotism, 
which they recognised as corruption. Corruption though, was ambiguous and seldom 
purely wrong as it was a special case of wider practices of mutuality and dependence. It 
was, in the wider context of social life, “only one among many outcomes of habitual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Using Alavi’s (1972) terminology.	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practices [involving] habitual networking, negotiation and manipulative application of 
ideas and moral arguments – it just happen[ed] to involve a holder of a public position” 
(Ruud: 2000: 271). But the pervasiveness of the need for a reference to get access to 
jobs had even created self-doubts in many people about their qualifications. Raza was 
one of those: “After the earthquake I applied for a data entry job with NRSP. I had a BA 
in Economics from AJKU and a 6-month diploma in MSOffice. I didn’t have contacts. 
The guy that got the job didn’t know how to use a mouse. For [this NGO] I passed two 
interviews and was put on top of the list. I seriously think that if it wasn’t for a relative 
inside the NGO I wouldn’t have got the job.” 
‘Interview’ was the word commonly used for exploiting the biraderi connection when 
applying for a job.117 It meant using a contact during the application process, someone 
from your biraderi who could put in a word for you. “If you try to get a job in the 
government you need the biraderi connection. Friendship doesn’t work”, told me 
Abbas, the Mughal owner of the adda at the bazaar. Being able to get an interview is 
vital in this region, as 25% to 50% of the economically active population is unemployed 
(Shaffer, 2005) and, one would assume, levels of underemployment are also very high. 
Umar, a young local with a technical engineering diploma who worked in a grocery 
shop was applying for a job in AJKPTV because someone from his biraderi was a 
Minister and had arranged an interview for him.118 With demographics playing a major 
role in biraderi dynamics – and majority biraderis becoming dominant due to their size 
– the lack of interviews plagued especially minority biraderis, including higher ranked 
ones that used to be more powerful such as the Syeds. Ali Naqvi was quite vocal about 
this: “Politicians use biraderis, so Syeds lose out. A Narma minister will choose a 
Narma with an FSc over a Syed with an MSc. My sister’s daughter had an MA in 
Botany and my daughter a BEd but they couldn’t get an interview. If Europe was like 
us, nothing would happen;119 that is why the West is ahead of us.” 
That biraderi affected politics was evident in the election results for this constituency. 
Evans (2010: 18) found strong biraderi allegiance among the Jats in Mirpur and 
Sudhans in Rawalakot, stating that “in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 In a similar way as the word sifarish (reference or recommendation) is commonly used in Pakistan, 
except in this region sifarish always had the element of money added to it.	  
118 The higher the contact, the better chances people had of getting an interview within any ministry. As a 
Raja informant told me, “[Politician X] was construction minister but if someone from his biraderi 
needed a job in education he would talk to the education department.”	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organisation among biraderis remains as influential as political parties”. The same 
applied to Bagh District, where for the past 40-odd years Narma,120 Mughal and Raja 
candidates have been battling for power using a mixture of clientelism and biraderi-ism. 
These candidates acted like ‘bosses’ (Price and Ruud, 2010:xxiv) redistributing 
“resources in relatively small-scale domains (…) with a first (amoral) imperative of 
maintaining the dominance of the leader and his establishment”, often practicing the 
role of the local middlemen – the ‘fixers’, known here as political agents – between vote 
blocs121 and the state machinery. As a Kiani influential told me one day at the bazaar, 
when we were alone, “Mughals and Narma dominate Bagh District. Narmas are big in 
Bagh city and around. Mughals are illiterate but well organised. They listen to their 
leaders and vote in bloc.” Mohmand (2011) makes the same point for rural Punjab, 
showing clientelism and biraderi-ism as the two main forces that organise the vote. 
During my fieldwork, the MLA for this constituency was a Narma. A recurrent 
comment in the bazaar was the fact that since there were very few Narmas in these 
villages, they received very little attention from the government, as the villages 
surrounding Chinati bazaar belonged to a larger constituency within the Bagh District 
which also included villages where Narmas and Rajas were the majority biraderi. 
“The current MLA is a Narma so he doesn’t come much here. He only cares about his 
own people.” In this constituency the 2011 elections were contested by a Mughal (PPP), 
a Raja (MC), and two Narmas, one campaigning for Jammat-e-Islami (JI) and the other 
– the previous MLA – running as an independent candidate.122 All four candidates had 
previously won in this constituency, sometimes representing different political parties 
(the Mughal candidate in 90-91 as independent and 96-01 in another constituency with 
PPP; the Raja in 75-77 with PPP and then 91-96 and 2001-06 with MC; one Narma in 
96-01 with JI; and the other in 2006-11 with MC). The PPP/Mughal candidate won with 
almost twice the number of votes of the nearest candidate, the Narma running as 
independent who was the incumbent MLA, while the MC/Raja and the JI/Narma 
candidates finished third and fourth, respectively. While a sizeable population voted 
according to political allegiances, the majority voted once more around biraderi lines. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Interestingly, biraderi politics was also prevalent in the British Diaspora (Akhtar, 2003; Dale, 2008). 
In a recent report Wilks-Heeg (2008) even mentions bloc voting across biraderi lines.	  
120 Both Narma and Raja considered themselves Rajput. While some stated that their quom was Rajput 
and zat Narma and Raja, others said that Narma and Raja was both their quom and zat.	  
121 Known in Punjab as dhara (Cheema and Mohmand, 2006).	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Imtiaz told me that “the Mughal candidate uses the Mughal connection. It’s not because 
people believe in him as a politician that they vote for him. It’s because they know he 
will help them once he’s in power.” This explained the division of MC votes among the 
Raja candidate and the independent Narma (who used to be MC), as well as the division 
of Narma votes among the JI candidate and the independent one. 
An important actor in the electoral process was that of the fixer – using Price and 
Ruud’s (2010) terminology – or political agent. Often not associated with a political 
party (nor pledging allegiance to the same candidate throughout elections), political 
agents acted as middlemen between vote blocs and candidates, promising votes to the 
latter and jobs to the former for a small fee. One such agent was a man from Khorian 
who called himself “Sher-e-Khorian” (The Lion of Khorian). He claimed to know all 
the people in government, especially the ones appointed by Pakistan (Chief Secretary, 
IG Police and the Finance Secretary), carrying with him clippings of local newspapers 
where we was seen shaking hands with ministers. Some people would pay Rs. 10,000 to 
Rs. 20,000 for him to arrange government interviews. Qasim, a Kiani from Hothala, a 
village where Kianis were the vast majority, was also a political agent. In his words, the 
problem of nepotism and biraderi-ism lay with political agents, not politicians. 
“For years I did nothing but later I became a political agent and joined 
PPP. In the early 90s, when Khaled Ibrahim established Jammu and 
Kashmir People’s Party (JKPP) I joined it. Just before the earthquake there 
was a plan for a 5-mile road to my village. The MC government through the 
MLA of the area talked to my older brother and asked us to join MC so that 
the road would go ahead. We did and now we have a road. JKPP is mainly 
about merit while MC is about contacts and biraderi-ism. I get votes for MC 
during elections and in between elections I get jobs to the voters, regardless 
of merit. The blame of corruption should not be on the leaders, but on 
political workers like me who destroy meritocracy.” 
Corbridge et al. (2005: 191) assert that in India the minimal presence of the state in 
rural areas and therefore rural citizens’ interaction with the state being sectional – 
framed by kin and caste and mediated by those with power at the local level – made 
local political society “often constructively engaged in providing links between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Which, a month before the elections, pledged his allegiance to Pakistan Muslim League-Noon (PML-
N).	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‘government’ and ‘the public’, as well as brokering deals and forming patterns of 
authority that hold these deals in place.” Recently, Mohmand (2011:170) discovered 
that in rural Punjab voters’ political preferences were shaped by local vote blocs and 
their leaders, where most voters were members of vote blocs either because of “a 
negotiated relationship that enable[d] them to access public services and other material 
benefits, or as a form of collective action in which they [could] act together with other 
members of their family or kin group to improve their material circumstances. Any 
given vote bloc [could] be both a vertical network of patrons and clients, or a horizontal 
network of social solidarity and collective action.” In PaK electoral politics were 
heavily affected by political organisation through vertical clientelistic networks and 
horizontal biraderi lines. With the introduction of majority rule in the early 1970s 
majority biraderis became often the dominant biraderis, using their networks to access 
power and resources in a society where the state did not provide universal services nor 
social security. Post-earthquake assistance was also not universal but targeted. Despite 
efforts to reach the more vulnerable, often this assistance was highjacked by the ones 
closer to power, namely the elites within the majority biraderis, who proceeded to 
distribute this assistance by incorporating it in their clientelistic networks. 
 
Within the Biraderi: inter- or intra- politics? 
As seen so far, biraderi demographics played a crucial role in accessing assistance 
during both relief and reconstruction, just as it did in accessing services and 
employment before the earthquake. But what happened when villages where the 
majority (and dominant) biraderi was the same tried to access services? Similar to rural 
Punjab, where “the main ethic of the biraderi is not ‘to keep up with the Joneses’ but ‘to 
keep the Joneses down’ (…) to impede any process that might raise either absolutely or 
relatively the social or economic level of the member of one’s biraderi” (Wakil, 1970: 
703), intra-biraderi competition appeared to stall several reconstruction projects. An 
example of this fierce competition was seen during the negotiations for a Basic Health 
Unit (BHU) among villages where there was – according to my informants – the same 
majority biraderi. Yet, this ‘same biraderi’ needs to be contextualised otherwise we 
might fall in the fallacy of seeing biraderi as the all-encompassing unit which is not. 
	   134	  
In the summer of 2009, the then Health Minister, the Mughal belonging to PPP who 
was elected in this constituency in 2011, approached a group of villages from two 
different Union Councils with a majority Mughal123 population and asked them to 
choose a location for an upcoming BHU. For Kashif, like for many others, this was 
purely a political move. “He wants to do something in this region because all that has 
been done so far was done by the MC. But he warned us that if there was no agreement 
on the location, the BHU would go somewhere else.” After a first round of negotiations 
these villages organised themselves into two groups, one composed of villages at 
middle altitude which preferred the BHU to be made close to Chinati bazaar and the 
other a group of villages at a higher altitude which preferred the BHU to be further up 
from the bazaar. The first group justified their preference with the fact that they all 
belonged to Nakkar UC, which had no BHU and had to go to Hari Ghel, while the 
others belonged to Mughal Topi UC which already had a BHU. The second group stated 
that there was not enough space to build a BHU near the bazaar and their proposed 
space even had a water source, essential for a BHU. For the following months both 
groups met several times without reaching a decision to the despair of many. Imtiaz put 
forth this despair one day when I asked him, many months after the initial consultation, 
what was the news on the BHU: 
“These [expletive] just like to talk. Everybody likes to have his piece of 
mind, but at the end nothing happens, nothing will happen. These people 
just like to show-off their apparent influence and power. They don’t deserve 
a right of opinion – the government should have just got here, grabbed land 
and built the damned thing. Then they complain that the government doesn’t 
take their point of view in decisions – this is why the government doesn’t do 
it! They [locals] make a mess of it. They’ll only notice the mistake when 
someone from here will die on the way to the hospital in Bagh. Two groups 
who cannot compromise on 10 minutes’ distance. They’d rather both loose 
than one win a bit and the other win a lot.” 
As witnessed by Wakil (1970) in rural Punjab, so too in these villages intra-biraderi 
competition revolved around impeding members of their own biraderi from gaining an 
advantage within the group. If not able to achieve a win-lose situation, members would 
often prefer to reach a lose-lose rather than a win-win situation, even if it was at the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Some villages where Mughals were a minority or did not exist where never part of the consultation.	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expense of accessing needed services. But if we probe this example deeper, we see not 
intra-biraderi competition, but intra-zat competition. As I mentioned previously, the 
ambiguity of the term biraderi allows it to be used as quom (descent), zat (recognition) 
or biraderi (participation). In this case, while all parties considered themselves as part 
of the same biraderi-quom of the Health Minister, they differed from him in their 
biraderi-zat and, more importantly, were differentiated among themselves into two 
groups composed of several biraderis of participation. 
As before the earthquake, the politics of biraderi seeped into all spheres of relief and 
reconstruction. “Many companies that initially came here after the earthquake were 
outsiders so they would hire on merit. Eventually MLAs would advise them on who to 
hire or their contracts would finish” said Mohammad Sheikh, the trader.  Having the 
right contact to access assistance entailed being a member of the ‘right group’. This 
membership though could only be attained by birth or in some cases by marriage, 
virtually denying access to the ones that were born in the ‘wrong biraderi’. Biraderi 
though, was not a universal category, as it was – depending on the context – used as 
caste or as kinship, triggering in some instances a more detailed targeting and 
exacerbating exclusion, while at other moments widening this targeting and enabling a 
larger number of people to be included. The ambiguity of the terms used to define and 
rank different groups within the local social structure and its fluidity was, to a large 
extent, intensified by the impact of recent socio-economic and political changes 
witnessed in PaK as elsewhere, and particularly visible during the post-earthquake 
relief, reconstruction, and rehabilitation stages. 
 
Conclusion 
There was a general perception among the people of the bazaar that their society was 
egalitarian. In saying so they referred to the fact that over time, given a number of 
events – such as entitlements to land ownership, the introduction of electoral politics 
through universal suffrage, mass migration to the Gulf countries and an almost 
universalisation of education – social stratification in their region had evolved from 
being based on ‘hierarchy’ to being defined by ‘difference’. 
However, despite these changes, historical cleavages based on caste and kinship 
continued to exist. Although notions of hierarchy and social stratification had evolved 
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over time, the social position of individuals, and social and economic exclusion, were 
still defined by birth, through membership in a biraderi, an all-encompassing term for 
caste and kinship social structures. This was particularly true for individuals from lower 
biraderis, for whom the strict rules of endogamy rendered their eligibility to become a 
member of a higher biraderi nearly impossible. Despite all the changes, it was still 
through biraderi-ism that most people attempted to gain access to power and resources, 
both before and after the earthquake.  
While most claimed that this differentiation was now based on ‘difference’ rather than 
‘hierarchy’, inequality continued to exist through the unequal power of majority and 
minority biraderis. Since society was still stratified by biraderis, numerically smaller 
biraderis now faced exclusion. If, on the one hand, there were still elements of 
hierarchy that continued to reinforce pockets of social exclusion based on status among 
its lower biraderis, on the other hand, the new demographic realities created new 
pockets of exclusion among its minority biraderis. Often these biraderis were one and 
the same. Therefore, while the stories and narratives of the people of Chinati bazaar 
spoke explicitly of change and equality, and of the slow death of biraderi-ism, the 
details of their conversations about social organisation and how society functioned 
revealed instead continuing differences and exclusion, that had been changing and 
evolving in form over a long period of time. Once again, their stories of change had a 
sub-text of continuity. In the next chapter I take a step deeper into societal dynamics by 
going from the biraderi group to the family unit, and analyse how the two competing 
dynamics of rupture and modernisation on the one hand and slow, continuous change on 
the other play out even in intra-family relationships. 
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Chapter Five 
Upside Down and Inside Out: The Continuity of Change in the House, 
Home and Family 
Introduction 
Figure 4 – Written on the bumper: “tum kiya wafa ki baat kartey ho; wafa tau un dinno thi, jab makaan 
kacchey aur log pakkey hua kartey the” (What do you know of loyalty; loyalty existed when houses were 
kaccha and people were pakka) 
 
It was past noon and, as on every other weekday, a rush of schoolchildren from the two 
private schools flooded the bazaar, ‘invading’ every shop that sold sweets, as well as 
Kashif’s pakora shop. Despite his pakoras being quite tasty, which I happily devoured 
twice a day, the schoolchildren only had an eye for the other delicacies that Kashif 
served: jaleebis124 and chips. I waited for the rush of schoolchildren to subside and then 
sat at the entrance of his shop for my daily dose of pakoras and gup shup (informal 
chat). Raza, having just finished teaching, joined me from the other side of the road, 
carrying tea. Kashif was complaining that he needed a new roof for his house but did 
not have the money for it. Before the earthquake he lived in a joint family with his 
brothers within the same house, but after the earthquake they had decided to build 
separate houses. As the eldest he kept the old house, but it was in a bad shape so he 
decided to build a new one. Raza said this was a problem for everybody after the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 A sweetmeal made of sugar, oil and saffron in circular shapes and soaked in syrup.	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earthquake. “Because you had to show that you were rebuilding your house to access 
government compensation, people went ahead and started building multiple individual 
houses to get more compensation. This initiated the end of the joint family system. There 
are many more houses now than before the earthquake. Joint families had many 
advantages, but it was a normal thing [to end] as we are becoming modern.” Like Raza, 
many people associated the recent increase in the number of houses with post-
earthquake reconstruction, and this reconstruction with changing patterns of residence, 
namely, the shift from a joint family system to a nuclear family. Their rationale for 
these associations was based on the fact that the number of houses had increased of late, 
as had different types of arrangements in family living. 
This chapter is about the discrepancy that existed in people’s perception of change in 
housing and the extent of actual change that occurred after the earthquake. My 
argument centres on the fact that residents in the villages surrounding Chinati bazaar 
said they had witnessed changes in housing following the earthquake, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. According to them, there was not only an 
unprecedented increase in housing units, but also an increase in ostentatious houses, 
creating a wider rift between wealthier and poorer families. Along with this increase in 
housing, residents pointed out that there had also been a change in the spatial 
organisation of families, with younger households moving towards more independent 
living away from the family. This in turn had created a change within family relations. 
They explained this by pointing out that since most people needed to rebuild their 
houses following the earthquake, it gave wealthier families the excuse to use the new 
building codes to display their status, and younger households the opportunity to build 
separate houses. In this chapter I use census data and their narratives of everyday life 
(as opposed to their narratives of change) to show that neither the increase in housing 
units nor the use of the house as a status symbol was new, nor was there a breakdown 
per se of the classical patriarchy. The earthquake and post-earthquake reconstruction 
intensified and crystallised pre-existing social conditions, including the continuity of 
power relations and social inequalities both inside and outside the house and the home. I 
reach this conclusion by looking at how households continued to create, negotiate and 
reinforce family ties in their everyday lives as ways to increase their social and 
symbolic capital, as well as to access informal social protection. 
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In the following sections I analyse the real and perceived changes in housing 
arrangements that took place in the villages around Chinati bazaar post-earthquake, and 
their real and perceived impact on the domestic arenas. In section two I explain the 
perceived increase in housing reconstruction following the earthquake and analyse the 
reasons why people may have come to perceive this change. In section three I move 
inside the house and similarly establish that changes in the domestic organisation, 
perceived to have been caused by the refashioning of the houses, were simply a 
continuation of pre-existing patterns linked primarily to migration. In section four I 
analyse how despite perceived notions of household independence, the earthquake did 
not change the fact that the family continued to be the main source of informal social 
protection. I conclude by stating that there was a continuity of pre-existing social 
relations and that the earthquake did not create change, but rather, crystallised a process 
of change that was already underway. 
 
Change and Continuity in the New House 
In people’s narratives at the bazaar the earthquake was the main reason why people had 
started building not just new houses, but new types of relationships within the family. 
However, as I had more and more conversations about this in the bazaar, a second 
reason appeared within these narratives. This had to do with the fact that they were 
‘becoming modern’ and as such they were shifting from a joint family system to a 
nuclear family. In India, where there is a larger literature on what Cohen (1998: 89) 
calls the “taken-for-granted decline of the joint family”, this literature bases the decline 
on Westernisation, modernisation, industrialisation, and urbanisation. Similarly, in 
Pakistan several recent studies (Ali and Kiani, 2003; Itrat et al, 2007) also identify 
modernisation, industrialisation, and urbanisation as the reasons for this decline. 
However, what these studies all have in common is the lack of baseline or longitudinal 
data with which to support this assertion (Lamb, 2000). Those that have used 
longitudinal studies in their work (Cohen, 1998: 103; Lamb, 2000: 93; Uberoi, 2005: 
371) point out that “multiple studies exist that suggest the joint family system has not 
declined in any simple sense” (Cohen, 1998: 103) as the “proportion of joint over 
nuclear households does not appear to be decreasing” (Uberoi, 2005: 371). 
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The situation in Pakistan is not very different. While a 1998 survey-based study claims 
that “about one half of the households in Pakistan are now nuclear” (Sathar and 
Casterline, 1998), other studies that date back to the 1960s and 1970s argue that the 
dominant or supposedly universal pattern of patrilocal extended family of the past is 
essentially a myth. Wakil (1991) points out that according to the Pakistan Housing 
Census of 1960 only 54% of people in rural areas lived in some type of joint family. A 
survey by Khan et al (1979: in Wakil, 1991) in rural Sindh shows that about one of 
every two families was a nuclear family with only the parents and their unmarried 
children living together. The tendency to conduct studies without using longitudinal 
data has contributed to the perception that the joint family is in decline, whereas there is 
literature on South Asia that indicates that there has been little change in residential 
patterns, and that both joint and nuclear families have been part of these patterns over 
many decades now, in some cases, in almost equal proportion. Cohen (1998: 104-105) 
sees the myth of the declining joint family system as a narrative where ‘Western 
modernity’ is the villain who abducts the self together with its idealised joint family. In 
her study of (Indian) Punjabi families Das (1979: in Uberoi, 2005) identified the joint 
family as an ‘ideology’ and a ‘code of conduct’ where household relations were 
subordinate to a larger collective identity. I advance that Uberoi’s (2005: 362) assertion 
about the ideal Indian joint family, which she says “has long been an important 
ingredient in the national self-imaging as the social institution that uniquely expresses 
and represents the valued aspects of Indian culture and tradition”, is also true of the 
ideal Pakistani joint family, including in PaK. In our case, the stories told at the bazaar 
were also filled with an idyllic ‘past-joint’ versus a ‘present-nuclear’ discourse where 
the earthquake was viewed as the key moment in this rupture. Before looking at the 
changes inside the house though, in this section I describe and analyse the various 
reasons why people had come to perceive a drastic growth in the number of houses and 
explain how this may have helped to confabulate the myth of the decline of the joint 
family. 
 
How Many Houses? 
Despite the fact that an increase in housing is neither new nor recent, most of my 
informants seemed to believe it was. Yet, the extent of growth in the housing sector 
appears to not be simply linked to post-earthquake reconstruction, as it was visible in 
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the preceding years to the earthquake. For instance, while in the 1998 Census the 
number of houses for Bagh District was 53,275 (of which 38% were considered 
pakka),125 the housing survey conducted by ERRA in early 2006, to ascertain the 
number of houses eligible for reconstruction compensation, accounted for 94,752 
houses. In other words, according to ERRA there was an increase of about 56% in 
housing structures in the preceding seven years to the earthquake. Although this figure 
might have been inflated, there had been an increase in housing, which was directly 
linked to an increase in remittances. Building a house is considered a preferred way of 
using remittances especially, as many of my informants often stated, in a region where 
there are very few opportunities to invest. According to the World Bank (2012) dataset 
on workers remittances for Pakistan, remittances received in the country were of the 
order of US$ 2-2.5 billion annually from 1980 until 1990 (peaking at US$ 3 billion in 
1983), decreased to a range of US$ 1 billion to US$ 2 billion annually from 1990 to 
2001, then increased to US$ 4 billion for the 2002-05 period, and have been increasing 
at the rate of US$ 1 billion per year ever since. A reasonable number of houses 
destroyed in the earthquake were in fact fairly new and some were even unfinished. 
Nevertheless many locals believed that this increase was recent for a series of reasons, 
which I will now elaborate on. Firstly, it seems that the slower increase of housing 
construction before the earthquake might have passed unnoticed or, at best, was not as 
visible as compared to a drastic shock like the earthquake, after which houses had to be 
built. While previously people built their houses throughout the years, after the 
earthquake they built them almost simultaneously, thus giving the feeling of a rapid 
increase in housing. 
Secondly, many informants used a perception of population growth and population 
pressure to justify what they saw as an increase in housing and a potential shift from 
joint family systems to nuclear. Increasing family numbers was a strong reason for 
building new houses, preferably with extra divisions for future generations. These new 
houses were costly to build, even for many migrant-sending families, as remittances 
were spent over time in daily household consumption, children’s education, and social 
events such as weddings and funerals. Before the earthquake people would often just 
build extensions to the existing houses. Post-earthquake, many felt that government 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Pakka means cooked, ripe. In housing it is used for houses that are solid, usually made of concrete, 
bricks and/or stone. The opposite term is kaccha (raw, unripe), for houses made of adobe or mud.	  
	   142	  
compensation and the need for reconstruction gave them an incentive to build separate 
houses, to ‘steam off’ population pressure. This population pressure, though, might not 
have been as high as people perceived. Growth rates in Bagh District are relatively 
lower compared to PaK as a whole. As seen in Figure 5, while there was a steady yet 
fast increase in population in PaK, in Bagh the increase had been more subdued. Still, as 
families had augmented and living space was becoming smaller, they said, many opted 
for building more houses, rather than create attachments to the older houses. “Earlier 
everyone used to live in one house but now they live nearby [in separate houses]”, said 
Jameela Bibi, a resident of Serabad. Often these new houses were built in the same plot 
where before the earthquake there was a single house, thereby creating a cluster of 
buildings, a compound, due to the limited availability of land and as a way of 
maintaining patrilocal residence. In effect, these new houses became extensions of what 
rooms used to be, i.e., where before a joint family in a larger house would allocate 
rooms to households, today these rooms have been detached and given their own roofs. 
Where before the roof was the unifying element of the joint family, in a reversal of 
space – from above to below – it now appears that the courtyard has taken this role.126 
This trend though, was not the only one adopted in the region post-earthquake; in many 
families married brothers decided to pool in their resources and build a single larger 
house, others built a simple three-bedroom house and rebuilt the older house as their 
winter house-cum-kitchen, and others even built something like semi-detached houses, 
with a nuclear family per floor. Many, especially the poorer ones and the ones who did 
not get access to compensation, built what they could, which often meant the same 
house spatially, but with a tin roof. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Besides roofs, in the next section I further explain what households shared and not shared before and 
after the earthquake.	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Figure 5 – Population Growth in Pakistan-administered Kashmir 
 
Source: P&D AJK, 1980; 1990; 2008 
Thirdly, a misunderstanding regarding entitlement to government compensation became 
an incentive to build more houses. The total compensation given by the government to 
rebuild a house in the earthquake-affected areas varied from Rs. 25,000 (minimal 
damages) to Rs. 175,000 (complete reconstruction). Housing compensation was given 
in four tranches for destroyed houses: an initial Rs. 25,000 to cover immediate shelter 
needs, Rs. 75,000 for mobilisation, Rs. 25,000 upon completion to plinth level (base), 
and Rs. 50,000 upon completion of the walls. For partially destroyed houses, after the 
initial Rs. 25,000, people were entitled to one single instalment of Rs. 50,000. As a 
large number of the population was entitled to (and received) the first tranche, at this 
point a misunderstanding developed on who was entitled to compensation and how 
much. According to news reports, soon after the earthquake Musharraf promised that 
the “Federal government will construct and provide a new house in place of [a] razed 
house in NWFP and AJK” (PakTribune, 2005). While the vast majority of the 
population in PaK understood “compensation” as total compensation, the Federal 
government, despite what its leaders said to the press, meant ‘partial subsidy’. Also, as 
the initial instalment was given to households – identified by stoves – and not houses – 
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identified by roofs – most assumed that the rest of the instalments would continue this 
way. The government, on the other hand, had other plans: 
“If more than one family are residing under one roof and during the initial 
damage assessment Rs. 25,000 were given on the basis of stoves, second 
tranche will only be given to one who is the owner of the house and 
undertaking will be obtained from other residents that they have no 
objection on subsidy given to one person who will build the house on behalf 
of all.” ERRA (2006a) 
As Raza said, “you had to show [the government] that you were rebuilding your house” 
according to the new directives in order to get compensation. This obligation to rebuild, 
together with the perceived promise of funding, especially for those who received the 
initial instalment, became an incentive to build more houses. 
Building a house, especially a pakka one using new materials, became an endeavour far 
more expensive than many predicted, including the locals and the government. In their 
initial assessment the ADB and the World Bank stated that a “typical home in the 
affected areas houses 6-7 persons, is 400 sq. ft. and consists of one or two main rooms, 
a veranda and a bath and kitchen which may not be attached” (2005). This depiction of 
an average house in the earthquake-affected areas of both PaK and KP, became the one 
adopted by the government to the detriment of places like the villages surrounding 
Chinati bazaar, where it fell short of the real picture of a house. In this area a typical 
home housed more than seven persons, was 500 sq. ft. and consisted of three or four 
main rooms, a veranda, and a bath and kitchen often not attached. On top of that, 
“material quantities and construction costs were estimated (…) as they existed prior to 
the earthquake” (ADB/WB, 2005). One of the immediate effects of the earthquake was 
an inflationary increase of the cost of construction materials and labour. Rebuilding a 
simple three-bedroom house with a simple tin roof would initially cost from Rs. 
400,000 to Rs. 800,000. As total compensation was of Rs. 175,000, people had to make 
up the difference by using their savings, by borrowing, or by increasing their income. 
As time passed, despite a feeble attempt by the government to regulate costs, 
construction expenditures increased, linked to increased inflation levels in Pakistan. 
Hameed, a mason from Sarian, explained to me how costly it was to make even his 
house. “I’ve put around 12 lacs and [my house] is 90% complete. Maybe three more 
lacs to complete it. The major problem in making a house is the availability of wood. I 
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get the wood from Hari Ghel and have to let the guy know by three to five months in 
advance.” The construction of the new earthquake-resistant houses with tin roofs 
required extra amounts of wood. Due to a successful combined reforestation effort in 
the 80s by the government and its citizens, there was a tight control of logging in the 
region, meaning that local wood was hard to find. Often it came from outside PaK, 
further adding to the costs. 
Fourthly, many migrants who had savings did not automatically spend those savings on 
improving their houses before the earthquake, living instead in kaccha houses or 
building simple pakka houses, with stones rather than brick and cement. Similar to the 
1998 Census figures for Bagh District, in the villages I studied only about 37% of the 
houses were pakka before the earthquake. The earthquake and the potential government 
compensation gave them an incentive to improve their houses. As Omar the newspaper 
seller said in my initial story, many people who had previously appeared to be poor 
because they lived in kaccha (non-cemented) houses, had actually just been “sitting on 
their money like snakes”, but after the earthquake they decided to make better pakka 
(cemented) houses; the earthquake gave them the motivation to build pakka houses. 
ERRA’s motto, to ‘Build Back Better’ was largely adopted, if not in reality at least in 
aspiration, by most of the population post-earthquake. As Raja Yasin, a returned 
migrant from Serabad, said “the earthquake was a good thing because (…) everybody 
now has pakka houses, there is better living”. The earthquake gave them a new aim: to 
rebuild their houses in a ‘proper’ way, meaning using modern materials such as cement 
and paint, preparing for future earthquakes by using tin roofs, and creating more 
housing units for future family expansion. 
Finally, one particular material used in the new houses might have also contributed to a 
perceived increase in housing numbers – the tin roof. Before the earthquake, most 
houses were kaccha, meaning they were made of mud walls, a large wooden beam 
crossing the roof and covered with pine (or grass) thatch. Pakka houses were made in 
stone masonry, with the mortar being a mix of gravel, mud and sand, and a flat slab roof 
or, sometimes, a tin roof. These roofs had higher status linked to them and were 
generally rare in the region. In one of our first conversations Sardar Zulfiqar pointed out 
that “before the Gulf migration, there were only three tin roofs in Rawalakot: the 
mosque, my father’s house and another Sardar. Since the 80s, the numbers started 
increasing and after the earthquake, you can see for yourself.” Government 
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compensation for housing reconstruction came with specific guidelines, of which the 
most visible one was the obligatory erection of tin roofs. Compared with other 
materials, e.g., wood, thatch or cement, tin sheets are more noticeable as they reflect the 
sun (see Figure 6). This heightened the sense that many more houses were being built 
after the earthquake, as tin roofs were rare before and became the norm after. 
Figure 6 – Sun-reflecting Tin Roofs in Bagh District (morning and afternoon shot) 
 
Due to this series of factors, namely simultaneous construction, perceived population 
pressure, a misunderstanding on eligibility for government compensation, a 
refashioning of houses from kaccha to pakka, and a proliferation of (more visible) tin 
roofs, people felt the earthquake caused a recent increase in housing, whereas much of 
this was because of processes already underway that were exacerbated by the 
earthquake. 
 
Showing-off Through Roofs 
People not only identified the earthquake as the main cause for the perceived recent 
increase in housing, but also perceived post-earthquake housing reconstruction as the 
reason for an increase in inequality among families. Reconstruction, though, did not 
increase inequality inasmuch as it made pre-existing inequality visible. 
To build the new earthquake-resistant houses people needed other sources of capital 
besides limited government compensation. Families who had members working abroad 
had access to remittances and therefore access to more capital. It not only paid to have 
family members working abroad, but it made sense for these members to stay abroad 
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longer, as they would make more money. Receiving remittances not only meant a 
higher chance of building their house faster, it also increased the possibility of building 
a more elaborate house, or even several housing units for each household within the 
family instead of one house as before. Noticeably, the higher the remittances received, 
the more expensive housing reconstruction became. Abdullah, an unemployed Mughal 
from Thial who owned a joint house with three brothers who worked in Kuwait, showed 
me his house during one Eid. As he proudly stated, “I have a kaccha winter house and a 
pakka summer house. I’ve spent Rs. 4,000,000 so far in this [summer] house. The paint 
came from Saudi Arabia and the roof is like the Malaysian ones.” Soon a gulf appeared 
between families with migrants in Pakistan and families with migrants in the Gulf,127 as 
the latter’s salaries (and remittances) were much higher than the former. Kashif had told 
me in one of our first encounters that “there is a jealousy between the Gulf migrants and 
the Pakistani migrants; if Pakistani migrants earn 300, Gulf migrants earn 30,000. 
When people got money, they started building big houses to show-off. This is not 
helpful, it only causes more jealousy in the area.” 
This propensity to show-off, known locally as being shôda, took to new realms with 
housing reconstruction and was most visible in the elaborate CGI roofs – locally called 
‘tin roofs’ – which had always been a symbol of status. A particular aspect of the 
housing reconstruction process in this region was the amount of labour, money, and 
attention spent on the construction of roofs. While some people started rebuilding their 
houses with a simple wooden frame and plain tin roof, others went for something more 
elaborate; they started creating kitschy pieces of art with their new roofs (see Figure 7). 
A correlation quickly developed between place of emigration and roof style; the bigger 
and flashier the roof was, the higher the probability that the house belonged to someone 
who was a migrant in the Gulf, Europe or North America. Hasnain, a teacher from 
Serabad put it succinctly when he said, “most remittances are spent on showing off.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 And a wider gulf between families with access to remittances and families without.	  
	   148	  
Figure 7 – Various types of new roofs 
 
Tin roofs, as I mentioned previously, were not a novelty in Poonch per se, but they were 
rare and of simple construction. Throughout the relief stage many development agencies 
provided CGI sheets to build semi-permanent shelters, which contributed to a 
proliferation of tin roofs. Unlike the simple, colourless slanted tin roof that appeared in 
the 80s, many of the new roofs were colourful, elaborately constructed and could 
harbour one or two storeys inside. Bashir was a very proud owner of an orange new 
roof: “In the 80s, people started making roofs like this because you don’t have to clean 
the snow – it just falls. After the earthquake we got colour. The technology came from 
Australia and now these [CGI sheets] are made in Karachi.” There was some dispute 
on the origin of these types of designs; many informants stated they were created by 
carpenters from Muzaffarabad (where there was more snow), while others said that the 
idea came from the south, from Mirpur, where there was no snow, but houses were 
known to be very ostentatious. 
It appears that this was what migrants were waiting for to show off their livelihood. 
Some returned migrants mentioned that when remittances started coming (late 1970s 
onwards), they never thought of building a new (flashy) house, as they already had a 
house. Instead, they ‘packed’ their houses with appliances –fridges, satellite dishes, 
microwave ovens, and so on. Bashir’s house was one of those: “I had a brilliant house, 
with fridge, the best furniture, the best house.” Now, since they had to rebuild their 
houses, why not make something that could show access to gulf remittances on the 
outside? Because of the hilly terrain, houses were not always visible (at least not the 
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whole house), but roofs were. This, it appears, was a reason why most of the (migrant) 
houses had these ‘arty’ roofs, which were often complete before the rest of the house 
was finished. Sardar Zulfiqar was not so sure that this ostentation was beautiful. “Why 
are houses and roofs brightly painted? There’s a guy who honks every time he passes 
by this road. He does it to tell people it’s him passing by.” More important, in a socially 
stratified society such as this one, many migrants from middle- and lower-ranked 
biraderis started to propagate the use of ostentatious houses and roofs as markers of 
wealth and status and, in a way, challenging the prevailing social hierarchy. That not 
everybody, particularly people from higher status groups, agreed with ostentatious 
houses and roofs as markers of wealth and status was visible in the way people talked 
about these houses and roofs, with owners and kin calling them izzatwala (respectable) 
and others calling them shôda. 
Houses and roofs subsequently became a yardstick for defining ostentation and became 
a measure by which other things were compared. For instance, a young schoolteacher 
from Khorian while describing why, in his opinion, education was not valued in this 
region equated it to ostentation: “Education is not a means to a goal, rather it’s an end 
in itself. People get their children educated because it becomes a status issue – so 
everybody gets educated. But if they have to choose between funding their children for 
higher education and making a big flashy house, 90% would go for the latter. 
Education is not a long-term investment; it’s a shôda item.” Ballard (2004) describes 
houses as ostentatious symbols of migratory success when analysing the case of the 
Mirpuri Diaspora. When comparing houses built by migrants to Europe and to the Gulf 
he states: 
“Far from being machines for living in, they are best understood as vehicles 
which very publicly express the extent of their builder’s achievements, most 
especially in comparison with those of their immediate neighbours. Hence 
the competitively driven urge to add extra storeys and ever more flashy 
decoration (…). But although such buildings are very effective symbols of 
‘modernity’ and ‘progress’, they are not of much use for anything else. (…) 
In this respect I noticed a striking contrast between the building styles 
favoured by returnees from the UK and elsewhere in Europe, and those 
from the Gulf, who had no prospect of taking up permanent residence 
overseas. Gulf returnees displayed little interest in building ‘skyscrapers’. 
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Instead they preferred the secluded courtyard style, which is much more in 
keeping with the demands of everyday domestic life.” (Roger Ballard, 
2004:46) 
Ballard’s reasoning for the distinction between European and Gulf migrants is that the 
latter preferred practicality and comfort because they had to return, as opposed to 
European migrants who did not live in these houses and used them as status symbols. 
After the earthquake, housing reconstruction in other parts of PaK managed to combine 
practicality, comfort and shôdapan. 
Making a new house became an imperative in the earthquake-affected areas of PaK, but 
it became linked, more than before, with status and honour. Even people who did not 
need to rebuild their houses wished they had to. Imtiaz’s granduncle was one of them. 
“Almost all my sons and nephews have completed their houses; this is new. Most of our 
houses were destroyed in the earthquake. I wished mine would have been destroyed, so 
I could have built a nice-looking, izzatwala like the others.” Kashif, the retired migrant 
from Karachi who made pakoras in the bazaar, had such a dilemma. His problem was 
not the lack of money to live, but the lack of a new roof for his new house. It was not 
that he did not have a liveable house, just that he did not have a new house. He 
perceived his lack of a new house as a lost opportunity to be respected, i.e., his status in 
the bazaar was lower than it would have been had he owned a new house. He had 
reached a state where he had to be mindful whether to accept being invited to other 
people’s houses, because he would be expected to reciprocate the invitation to his 
simple, old house. However, if he refused, he would be left out of the reciprocity chain 
and hence would have less access to informal social protection. 
As the spatial organisation of the house was turned upside down, with the courtyard 
replacing the roof as the unifying element of the domestic group, so too was ostentation 
turned inside out, with the explosion of colourful new houses and new roofs in the 
landscape of Bagh as symbols of wealth and status. 
 
Inside the House: the domestic sphere 
As seen in the previous section, a direct impact of post-earthquake reconstruction was 
the refashioning of housing structures in the earthquake-affected areas of PaK with a 
preference for, although not ubiquitous, single housing units. Did this refashioning have 
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any impact on domestic structures, that is, did post-earthquake housing reconstruction 
change the home as much as it changed the house? In this section I step inside the house 
to establish that the perceived post-earthquake changes within domestic organisation 
were also a continuation of pre-existing patterns and what the earthquake did was, to a 
large extent, to reset the developmental stage of the domestic cycle. 
 
The Gharana 
In the cluster of villages surrounding Chinati bazaar, as throughout PaK, a house could 
mean the physical structure (makan), or more often, the place where people lived, i.e., 
home (ghar). It is important to differentiate home from house because the former could 
exist in one house or in several, in the same plot of land, either adjacent or in storeys, 
or, as it was common in high altitude villages, in two plots at different altitudes: a 
summer house (high altitude) and a winter house (low altitude). 
The most elementary composition of a household or gharana (literally “belonging to the 
home”) in PaK was a husband, wife and their unmarried children. This though, was 
only a norm as household composition was constantly changing over time according to 
its development cycle, “whereby nuclear households expand, become extended, and 
then, at the death of the household head, split once more into nuclear units” (Gardner, 
1995: 102). Uberoi (2005) points out that in India, despite a predominance of nuclear 
households, most people experienced living in several different types of households 
throughout their life. Often in the same ghar several married couples could (and did) 
coexist, depending on the developmental stage of the domestic cycle.128 At its 
maximum number, a male-headed domestic group129 would be composed of the head of 
the family, his spouse, his brothers, their spouses and their children, his (unmarried) 
sisters, his children and their spouses, and his parents (if being supported). As for 
female-headed domestic groups, and following Handa’s (1994) reasoning that we 
should not treat them as a homogeneous group, there were roughly three main types: the 
de facto female-headed one, where the male head had died and his spouse had taken 
control of the family until one of her sons became the head (and she became a supported 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Using Fortes’ (1958) terminology.	  
129 I use the word ‘domestic’ and not ‘household’ or ‘family’ for the social structures inside the home for 
“at the core of most conceptions of ‘domestic’ are two sets of functional activities: those pertaining to 
food production and consumption and those pertaining to social reproduction, including child-bearing 
and child-rearing” (Yanagisako, 1979: 166).	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parent); the absent male-headed domestic group, where the male head was away 
(usually migrated) and his spouse became the head during those periods; and a third 
type similar to the previous one, except the decision-making role of the head was 
delegated (often not her choice) to her father-in-law or one of her brothers-in-law. 
The most common domestic development cycle in the villages around Chinati bazaar, if 
we take a man as the ego, would start with him marrying and starting his conjugal life in 
the house of his parents. Initially his wife would cook together with his mother and 
unmarried sisters for the whole household, depending on the mother’s decision. As his 
own family expanded his wife might start to cook separately, although still living in the 
same house and often still sharing the same resources. Eventually he would build an 
extension to his parents’ house or, if he could afford it, a separate house within the same 
compound, therefore creating a new household within the immediate family (tabbar). If 
he had brothers with time they too would marry and bring to the house their wives, 
eventually forming more households within the same house. As per tradition in this 
area, the sharing of the inheritance was often done while the parents were alive, 
particularly the division of land as it allowed the sons to own the plot where they could 
build a future house. When the patriarch of the house died, the eldest brother would 
become the new head if they lived in the same house, otherwise, if they lived in separate 
houses and the eldest had his own house, the next elder brother would inherit the main 
house. 
Within the home the key identifier of the number of households present was the number 
of cooking stoves (chula); whoever ate meals prepared on a particular chula belonged to 
that household. Yet, there was a multiplicity of ways by which different households 
made use of these chulas that defied this definition: often households would eat 
breakfast in separate chulas and dine from a unifying one; at times different households 
would have breakfast from the matriarchal’s chula and dine in separate chulas; some 
households whose women worked outside the home would rotate among them the 
responsibility for a unified breakfast, but separate at other meals; and there were homes 
where the younger housewife would prepare meals for her household in her chula and 
then move to her in-laws’ chula to prepare their meals. As several authors have pointed 
out, (Sharma, 1980; Gardner, 1995) ‘common hearth’ is but one of many criteria 
including co-residence, economic cooperation, mutual finances and joint property. 
Identifying the number of households within the tabbar was not a simple exercise. As 
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they aged and contributed less to the economy130 of the house the older patriarchs’ 
power in decision-making was reduced over time. To the extent that, though a 
household themselves, they stopped being counted as one when it mattered. For 
instance, in a house where a tabbar lived together – composed of an older married 
couple (patriarchs), their three married sons (plus wives and children), one unmarried 
son and an unmarried daughter – when discussing power relations within the house the 
daughters-in-law said, “we are three households in this house and maintaining 
relationships becomes difficult”. When asked as to how many households lived in the 
house they mentioned four. 
People who lived in the same house did not necessarily belong to the same tabbar and 
sometimes did not even belong to the same extended family (khandan). Like in other 
cases (Yanagisako, 1979), in this region too there was sometimes a distinction between 
household and family, with the former being related to proximity and the latter to 
kinship. During Partition, there were several instances of (mostly Sikh) children who 
stayed behind and were ‘adopted’ by Muslim families, eventually converting and taking 
the name Sheikh as their ‘new’ biraderi and, in effect, becoming part of the household 
but not the family. This distinction appears to have intensified particularly after the 
earthquake, with an increase of houses taking in new members – from outside the 
tabbar and even the khandan – whose livelihoods got severely affected as a result of the 
death or disability of the household heads. 
The impact of the earthquake (and post-earthquake reconstruction) inflated some 
domestic groups and deflated others. The increase in size was witnessed in a multitude 
of combinations, either by pooling in resources – with married brothers or even married 
cousins rebuilding one or several houses together with one or several chulas – or by 
adopting members from outside the pre-earthquake domestic group. While the pooling 
in of resources was primarily an economic decision – and there were other 
considerations, such as keeping the women together in one home (making it easier to 
‘protect’ them), or dividing household chores – the adoption of new members from 
outside the family was often a moral choice, incurring an increase of expenses. In 
Sarian, one family neighbouring Bashir’s took upon them to take care of two young 
boys from another village and different biraderi. Safina, the matriarch told us the story: 
“There’s a family in Mughal Topi whose father has epilepsy and the mother doesn’t 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Literally “household management”.	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work, so they stopped educating their children. After the earthquake their two younger 
sons came to live with us, so we can get them educated. We are sharing our budget with 
this family.” The decrease in the size of domestic groups happened because of two 
reasons, both linked to the earthquake and migration: either due to an absence of 
members – because they either died during the earthquake or were migrants – or due to 
the creation of new smaller domestic units – through post-earthquake housing 
reconstruction and through remittances that sponsored the creation of such units. These 
smaller units were referred to as ‘single families’ and while conceptually similar to 
nuclear families the terminology could be used to express the opposite, for many people 
in the region used the word ‘nuclear’ for joint families. 
Jameela, a young wife from Sarian, complained since their household had a low income 
they could not make their own independent house and have what she called a ‘single 
unit’. “The preference is to have single units, but due to constraints we have a nuclear 
family.” When she stated that there was a preference for single units, she did not 
necessarily mean that this was a preference for single families; there was a difference, in 
their discourse, between residing separately and living separately. As elsewhere, 
(Gardner, 1995: 121) the domestic group was seen as a set of relationships and 
transactions beyond co-residence and “simply because households [were] physically 
separated [did] not mean that they stop[ed] being households.” Particularly with the 
post-earthquake reconstruction there had been an increase of single unit houses, often 
built together in the same (or adjacent) plot where previously one larger house existed. 
This created the feeling of separate residence, as they were separate houses, while the 
day-to-day domestic activities, in many cases including cooking together, remained the 
same as before. Yet, not everybody liked the idea of single units. Many criticised the 
fact that by building single units people were potentially accelerating the destruction of 
the joint family system and with it, destroying the social fabric. Hasnain, a Syed 
schoolteacher at Al-Noor lamented this destruction. “There used to be more love. 
People in the old days used to get guidance from parents on living together, 
cooperation. Now parents are abroad, so these kids only see money coming in, better 
houses and new clothes – they become selfish and greedy.” 
Single family units, though, were not new. In fact, similar to Schild’s (2011) findings 
while studying the representations of ‘home’ in post-earthquake Muzaffarabad, people 
used the earthquake to justify separation, holding a nostalgic view of joint families as 
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ideal patrilocality, a sort of together-past and separate-present. While for some living 
separately was something not approved of – “Separation is not considered good in 
[Pakistan-administered] Kashmir” – for others it was desired – “It is a prestige and 
relief if a son can afford to live by himself”. This prestige associated by some with 
living separately in a single family was talked about across wealth groups, which went 
against Nadvi’s observations of northern Punjab, where “for the wealthier and better 
endowed the extended family reflects status and provides economic benefits” (Nadvi, 
1999: 153). 
Generally, young migrant households were for the creation of single families, while 
older or non-migrant households were against it. The former drew upon an increase of 
privacy and autonomy in decision-making as advantageous reasons for single families, 
while the latter brought forth the access to support systems and protection of the women 
of the house as reasons why joint families should be maintained. Like in many other 
classical patriarchal societies (Kandiyoti, 1988), women’s honour was a reflection of the 
honour of the family, and as prized valuables they must be protected (and controlled) at 
all times. Bashir, like many other migrants, preferred the joint family system because of 
protection. “We don’t leave our women alone so the joint family helps in keeping at 
least one man at home to protect the women.” Proponents of single families associated 
them with having more privacy and more freedom in decision-making, especially in 
managing expenditures and in deciding how much to save. While with male household 
heads being away many women exercised considerable control over resources (Sharma, 
1980), this increased responsibility did not mean that these women thought of it as 
“giving them ‘autonomy’ and ‘freedom’” (Rashid, 2008: 220). Rather, the household as 
a unit was more autonomous and free from the family. Opponents stated that this 
freedom carried with it an added responsibility that, in the case of single families where 
the male was a migrant, women could not cope with. Parveen, herself the wife of a 
migrant, complained about the fact that, for migrants’ fathers and brothers “women are 
considered dumb and irresponsible or not reliable enough to manage a household. 
Even [migrant] single families feel that they too are controlled externally by fathers-in-
law and scorned upon for their expenses. Freedom is equated with irresponsibility.” 
The post-earthquake housing reconstruction created a chance for younger migrant 
households to break away from their progenitors. With an increase in single housing 
units, many felt that there had been an increase in the number of single families. In 
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reality, while the house (makan) – the physical structure – might have changed, the 
home (ghar) – the domestic arena for competition – remained the same. As the main 
dwellers of the home,131 much of this competition was between the women of the 
house(s), specifically between the mothers and the wives of the working males – the 
saas (mother-in-law) and the bahu (daughter-in-law) – and their ability to exert control 
over them. While mothers used the moral obligation sons have for the labour expended 
in their upbringing (White, 1994), symbolised by breast milk and known as “milk debt” 
(doodh ka qarz), wives tried to counteract by “keeping their husbands in hand” 
(husband ko hath mei rakhna). 
 
Keeping the Husband in Hand 
The house is a hierarchical world and the everyday activities that happen there are not 
as neutral as we perceive them to be, but embedded in social meaning and involved in 
the reproduction of meaning (Bourdieu, 1990). If we ignore the production and re-
enactment of gender subordination in the house, something easily done if we analyse 
houses as isolated units, “without reference either to wider social or economic 
structures, or to the nature of relationships within the unit” (Harris, 1981: 140), we are 
giving men (as family heads) the misguided opportunity to represent and speak on 
women’s behalf, confining them to the domestic sphere. As seen in this section, the 
house was not only internally differentiated, but was also a political arena with each 
individual bargaining, contesting and manipulating allocations (Whitehead, 1981; Hart, 
1992; Moore, 1992). The saas-bahu dyad was one of many relationships within the 
house where we could witness this bargaining, contestation and manipulation. I have 
chosen it above others not only because it tended to be the most visible, but also 
because it was often the one through which others were expressed (Sharma, 1980; 
Gardner, 1995). As seen throughout this section, the earthquake and post-earthquake 
housing reconstruction did not change domestic organisation, it only crystallised pre-
existing trends of competition within the home. 
Similar to what happened within biraderis (Wakil, 1970), family relations too were 
regulated by a mixture of cooperation and competition. As I mentioned previously, this 
cooperation and competition was more visible in women’s everyday lives. In the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 By ‘main dwellers’ I mean individuals who spend the longest time in the house.	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economy of the house, while men were usually the main earners, women were often 
seen as the main managers, similar to Pahl’s (1980, in: Whitehead, 1981: 104) 
‘allowance system’, where “the husband hands over a portion of his wage as 
housekeeping to his wife and keeps the remainder”, and the wife has ample control over 
what is purchased. Khalid, a returned Gulf migrant and trainer at the bazaar’s vocational 
training centre, echoed this view of women as managers. “The basic tool behind saving 
are the women in the family; it’s their worry. Especially with remittances: it’s the 
woman’s choice how much to spend and how much to save.” Conflicts and competition 
often arose between the women who had the closest relation to income-earning males, 
namely the mothers and wives. 
Women as mothers were recognised not only for their child bearing but equally 
important, for child rearing, being in charge of both biological and social reproduction 
(Harris and Young, 1981). This was especially the case in families where the active 
males had migrated, entrusting their wives with the children’s upbringing. The close 
daily relation between mothers and sons, where the mother ends up being the most 
important person in her sons’ lives (until marriage), should not be seen as an altruistic 
gesture alone, but also as a relation embedded in reciprocity, as the mother expects later 
on in life to be taken care of by her sons. Her sons are indebted to her through the “milk 
debt”, the moral obligation to provide old-age social protection to their mothers. The 
situation is slightly different with daughters as they will move to another family after 
marriage, and therefore shift from being seen as “own” (apna) to “other” (paraya).132 
Close ties between mothers and sons were visible in the number of anecdotes of 
migrants not being able to migrate until their mothers had passed away, or of having to 
come back earlier than expected because they were being missed (by their mothers). As 
Kandiyoti (1988: 279) states, “since sons are a woman's most critical resource, 
ensuring their life-long loyalty is an enduring preoccupation. Older women have a 
vested interest in the suppression of romantic love between youngsters to keep the 
conjugal bond secondary and to claim sons' primary allegiance. Young women have an 
interest in circumventing and possibly evading their mother-in-law's control.” 
Women as wives, from the beginning of wifehood, must then compete with their 
mothers-in-law for the attention and care of their husbands. As Sajida, a migrant’s wife 
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from Khorian, said: “When households live together, the most important thing for the 
wife is to keep the husband in hand, to make sure she is top priority for him within the 
family, more important than her mother-in-law.” Wives used both physical and mental 
attributes, such as looks and intelligence, to impress their husbands. The aim is to make 
sure he is attracted to her and thinks she is clever – clever and reliable enough to 
manage a household by herself. Fahad, who sold household items in fairs throughout 
Pakistan, was married to Jameela, a Lahori-born woman from a different biraderi whom 
he met when her family was on holidays in this area before the earthquake. Despite 
living in Sarian for the past seven years, Jameela still had some difficulties adapting 
from an urban life to a village setting. She used this ‘maladjustment’ to keep him in 
hand through love. “I get scorned by my wife because she’s having difficulties getting 
used to being here. She gives me a hard time emotionally, but I do love her, she has to 
understand my situation. She use to have dahi bhallas133 every day, but there are none 
here. So I go to Rawalakot and buy a stack of them and freeze them. At the end of the 
day she has to understand she has to adjust. I did the same when I went abroad.” By 
keeping her husband in hand, Jameela managed to be induced to village life very 
slowly: for the first year she did not carry water, as her husband persuaded one of his 
sisters to carry it for her.134 
Yet, in joint families daughters-in-law not only had to please their husbands but their in-
laws as well. Their reputation as good, caring and modest daughters-in-law, was “an 
important form of cultural capital (…) to accrue support from their husbands as well as 
gain better status within the family” (Rashid, 2008: 227). For instance, “out of deference 
to her elders, a young wife will not claim greater freedom than her mother-in-law” 
(Sharma, 1980: 46). Living in a joint family tended to create more conflicts than in a 
single family, as Parvez, the owner of one of the biggest shops in the bazaar, said “the 
more people [living together] the more problems and fights”. These conflicts revolved 
around the sharing of resources, both physical (kitchens, bathrooms) and monetary. 
Many daughters-in-law would publicly profess that by deferring all decisions to their 
mothers-in-law such conflicts were often avoided. Hameed’s sister, who married into 
another family but of the same biraderi and in the same village said that in her new 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 In fact, for many families in northern South Asia daughters are paraya since birth. A common saying 
in Punjab says beti paray ghar ki amanat hoti he – ‘my daughter has been entrusted to me [by another 
family]’, i.e., she was never ours from the start.	  
133 Deep fried balls of lentils spiced, soaked and served in yogurt, common throughout Pakistan.	  
134 “It’s like having a live fish in on your head”, Jameela said.	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family “we all live together, but we don’t fight. If there is any issue, the eldest [women] 
would solve it. They’re here to solve problems.” While Grover (2011: 69) identifies 
“conflicts of interest between the conjugal home and the natal home” as a “constant 
source of friction between women, their husbands, and their in-laws”, in Chinati this 
was more subdued, as not only marriage contracts were endogamous and mostly within 
the family, but also in many instances the mother-in-law was the daughter-in-law’s 
puppo [father’s sister]. Yet, as Vera-Sanso (1999: 582) discovered in South India, “even 
close-kin endogamous marriage does not ensure good mother-in-law/daughter-in-law 
relations nor effective natal support for brides”, as their economic interests may still 
conflict and “because families have multiple social and economic ties, natal families 
can be less willing to support their daughters/sisters for fear of jeopardising kin 
relations.” 
Usually, in a joint family the daughter-in-law gradually took on most of the household 
chores previously done by the mother-in-law, as “household chores [were] often 
distributed by the elderly women leaving the younger women to perform their assigned 
roles” (Rashid, 2008: 222). This passing on of household responsibilities was also a 
strategy by the mother-in-law to keep her daughter-in-law so busy as to not pay enough 
attention to her husband. Hamida, a young housewife who lived with her in-laws in 
Bagla while her husband was away in Iraq, talked about this pressure: “In a joint family 
there is so much work and pressure that often the husband is ignored [by the wife]. 
Then he tends to side with the family in terms of trust and expenditures and he is 
constantly forced to think about how to keep the joint family together.” Similar to 
White’s (1994) case in Turkey, this ‘patriarchal bargaining’135 was generally accepted 
by the daughters-in-law, as they knew that in the future, when their sons marry and 
bring new daughters-in-law to the house, it would be their time to be in power: “the 
hardships that younger women endure are eventually superseded by the control and 
authority they exert over their own daughters-in-law. The cyclical nature of power 
through the life cycle encourages women to internalise patriarchal values” (White, 
1994: 44). The internalisation was visible even with unmarried girls’ preference for TV 
dramas. “We don’t watch Indian dramas because our parents don’t let us and we don’t 
like them. Watching Indian dramas might make you run away. The difference between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Using Kandiyoti’s (1988) terminology.	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PTV and Indian channels is that PTV actors don’t dress up and don’t do politics; the 
saas and bahu don’t fight”, said Mira and Miryam. 
Another feature of domestic cooperation and conflict could be witnessed within the life 
and activities of the units of production within and across households and homes. In this 
region, as throughout rural South Asia, women were responsible for child rearing as well 
as for the set of activities associated with daily family maintenance (Beneria, 1979). There 
was a clear gendered division of domestic labour within the home, where women were in 
charge of the vast majority of household chores. This gendered segregation of domestic 
labour started at a young age, with young daughters assisting their mothers in most of these 
activities, while sons’ contribution to household chores being limited to small errands, 
mostly purchasing last minute groceries at the bazaar and serving male guests when the 
patriarch was entertaining them. Within the hierarchical world of the home younger 
women were under the control of the matriarch and younger men under the control of the 
patriarch. These networks of control were extended within families and across households, 
where family patriarchs and matriarchs used their status and power to co-opt male and 
female family labour force, respectively. As such, not only daughters assisted mothers and 
sons assisted fathers, but also even other members of the tabbar assisted the matriarchs and 
patriarchs. This was particularly visible with bahus not only being responsible for the daily 
maintenance of their households but at times having to assist their saas in their households’ 
maintenance as well. 
This contribution to the in-laws’ unit of production was not limited to household chores, as 
seen in the family’s agricultural activities. Throughout the region, men are in charge of 
preparing the fields, sowing and harvesting staple foods and women responsible for the 
rearing of such crops as well as the family’s livestock and vegetable gardens. At the 
household level the women belonging to those households rear their vegetable gardens 
independently, although at times women from different households but of the same tabbar 
do operate together if living within the same compound. Traditionally, sons helped their 
fathers and daughters their mothers – for instance, girls were often the ones in charge of 
putting out the household’s livestock to pasture. Offspring’s input in agrarian production 
though, has diminished over time as often they are away in school, particularly when such 
activities are done in the morning. While the reduction of the family male labour force – 
due to migration and the pursuit of education – can be substituted by hiring casual labour, 
as it often happens mostly within families with access to remittances, in this region there 
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was barely any concept of hiring female labour to assist women in their activities. As such, 
mothers-in-law – especially in families whose livelihoods still depended heavily on 
agriculture – often regarded their daughters-in-law as part and parcel of their unit of 
production and expected them to contribute to their (mothers-in-law) household agrarian 
production. Despite feeling an obligation to assist their mothers-in-law in their agricultural 
activities, in many instances bahus felt this to be another example of their saas’ attempts to 
keep them busy and away from their responsibilities towards their own households. 
By persuading their husbands to build single housing units younger women were 
separating, as much as they could, their husbands from their mothers. This only 
happened though when their husbands could afford to build a separate house, as was the 
case in quite a few households where the husbands were Gulf migrants. Similar to 
Gardner’s (1995: 100) findings, where migration fed into, was influenced by, and 
influenced local households, “and the ways in which people perceive[d] them”, there 
was no breakdown of the classical patriarchy, which, according to Kandiyoti (1988: 
282) “results in the earlier emancipation of younger men from their fathers and their 
earlier separation from the paternal household”. While the new houses were often built 
separately, i.e., not sharing a roof, many were built within the same compound, and 
therefore shared the same floor (though not necessarily the same kitchen). Older males 
within domestic groups could consequently use ‘protection’ to validate the need for 
migrants’ wives to live close by, warranting them the authority to collect and distribute 
remittances. 
Keeping their husbands in hand was especially important for younger wives’ access to 
remittances within domestic groups. While in most cases remittances moved through 
the migrant’s father or, if he was absent, through a brother, there were women who, by 
successfully keeping their husbands in hand, were able to make sure their household 
received remittances almost directly. Receiving remittances directly was very rare, for 
regardless of utilising formal (banks) or informal (hundi) transaction methods women 
still faced mobility problems, as local notions of purdah limit women’s access to the 
bazaar. Even when husbands sent remittances to their wives, rather than their brothers 
or fathers, there would always be a male mediating the transaction. This created tension 
between families, with wives being stigmatised as being ‘too powerful’ over their 
husbands and migrants being criticised for not performing their moral duty and 
responsibilities towards their parents (Rashid, 2008: 226). 
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For men, not having access to their sons’ or brothers’ remittances was a cause for 
conflict, for families felt entitled to a migrant’s remittances, as they were often the ones 
who had sponsored the migration in the first place. Sending a male to work abroad was 
a family strategy to increase the income of the domestic group. That was Hameed’s 
reasoning for why his brothers should assist him monetarily. “I earn Rs 200 a day. I 
can’t survive [with this income], so we send family abroad. I have two brothers abroad. 
They help me [with remittances] and I help their families.” This expectation was 
particularly visible with returned migrants, who before coming back helped their sons or 
brothers migrate, often to take over their jobs abroad. Apparently, sending remittances 
directly to wives rather than the family happened in the initial stages of mass migration 
to the Gulf. Imtiaz’s granduncle said that “in the beginning migrants would send their 
money directly to their wives; they would spend it in their houses without taking into 
consideration the head of the family and did not help the family head’s brothers – then 
they started sending it to the head and brothers.” The resentment of bypassing the 
family fuelled the myth of the “irresponsible fat wives and spoiled children”, as Jafer 
Saab put it, as migrants’ households started to exhibit the materialistic symptoms of 
social mobility, creating islands of increased superfluous consumption and perceived 
idleness.136 Although this resentment was generally universal within the family, it was 
often vocalised by the migrants’ mothers. 
Following the earthquake, wives gained access to a new ‘weapon’ for their struggle to 
keep their husbands in hand – the mobile phone. Communicating with a migrant before 
the earthquake was a difficult endeavour, as it would be done by letters (made harder if 
one was illiterate), or by telephone, a rare item in rural areas. For instance, before the 
earthquake there were no more than a handful of private telephones in each village and 
one or two public ones in Chinati bazaar. Migrants would often receive only snippets of 
everyday life at home, being exposed to it only when on holidays. Many informants, 
like Ahmed from Bagla who worked in Dubai, commented that although they would be 
homesick and missed everyday home life when they were away, they sometimes 
regretted staying too long, as they would get ‘too much’ everyday life: “This one is sick, 
that one needs new clothes, everybody’s fighting… I can’t wait to go back!” With all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 The negative perception of women’s idleness (and generally the quantity of work they do) can be 
witnessed in the following anecdote. Asked how did their household start the day, a husband told me: “I 
wake up at 5.30 for morning prayers, then my wife wakes up, followed by my daughters, and then the 
other men of the house.” His wife’s tale was different: “I wake up at 5, clean the place, make breakfast, 
fix clothes, then at 6 my husband and the children wake up.”	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private mobile companies based in Pakistan allowed to enter the PaK market post-
earthquake, within months almost every corner of the region was under mobile 
coverage. This explosion of private mobile companies made communicating abroad 
easy,137 with many people in the region buying mobile phones. Raza remembered the 
first weeks post-earthquake when so many people bought mobile phones. “The first 
tranche [of housing compensation] went into good mobile phones. It even became a 
joke. Everybody had to buy one, because it was a new, modern thing.” 
With mobiles, wives were able to talk to their husbands whenever they needed to, not 
just about daily life, but also about matters of the heart (hum dil ki baatein kartey hain – 
we talk about our love). In fact, some women said that they would try not to talk much 
about household matters not to worry their husbands. Sajida, while talking about her 
phone conversations with her husband, told my female research assistant that “we only 
kiss on the phone [hum pappi kartey hain], he doesn’t know how we are going through 
life.” Yet, eventually many conversations would end up dealing with household matters, 
like my assistant overheard her calling her husband the next day and complaining: “I 
got up unwell this morning, your brother’s wife is complaining that I do nothing and 
your brother is refusing to take me to the doctor.” With the help of mobile phones, 
wives could now come into the migrants’ everyday life. Notwithstanding the fact that 
mothers also started using this new technology, they did so at a much lower rate than 
wives, as they were averse to using modern gadgets and would often delegate this ‘task’ 
to the men of the house. 
A direct impact of post-earthquake reconstruction was the simultaneous refashioning of 
many housing structures, with a preference for single housing units. This refashioning, a 
sort of a collective dispersion phase within the domestic cycle, was visible almost 
exclusively within families where the husbands were Gulf migrants. Yet, as these 
housing units were often built within the same compound, there was no breakdown per 
se of the classical patriarchy and the competition between mothers and wives remained 
much alive. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 See Vertovec (2004) for the changes in communication between migrants and kin due to the recent 
advancement in telephone technology.	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Outside the House: the extended family 
The house, though, should not be seen as a bounded unit, as its boundaries are highly 
permeable, but rather as a nodal point in a system of redistribution, and it is this system 
“which links the household to the kinship system, to village organisation, to regional 
political and economic structures, to the state, and to the wider international context” 
(Moore, 1992: 131). I infer that this permeability of the boundaries of the house is most 
visible when we analyse the layer between house and kinship – the extended family, or 
khandan. In this section I analyse how despite perceived notions of household 
independence, the earthquake did not change the fact that the family continued to be the 
main source of informal social protection. I use the khandan, the permeable boundary 
between the household and the kinship system, to reach this conclusion. 
 
The Khandan 
Despite changes in family forms, throughout South Asia traditional values and 
structures have largely been retained (Lamb, 2000; Parry, 1979; Uberoi, 2005; Vatuk, 
1972). Gardner (1995: 99) advances the idea that “rather than fixed institutions, 
[household arrangements] appear as strategies, moulded by circumstance.” Like in 
Sylhet, local people in Chinati did not think or operated in narrow sociological 
categories, with boundaries around domestic groups being blurred and constantly 
defying easy classification. As Das (1973: 40) states in her work on marriages in 
popular Urdu fiction in Pakistan, “it is extremely difficult to define the khandan in terms 
of the accepted classifications of kinship groups.” I assume this is one of the reasons 
why different authors have translated it into English as “family” (Shaw, 2000a), 
“lineage” (Cohn, 1959) or “extended family” (Vatuk, 1972). While other terms for 
family are relatively easier to identify – e.g., gharana as the household, tabbar as the 
immediate family with its node being a common paternal grandfather, and kumbah as 
lineage with its node a common ancestor – people in PaK often use the term khandan 
liberally. Here I use khandan to define what locals call the extended family: a group of 
people related by blood or marriage, whose relations are a level above the gharana with 
or without propinquity. This can be problematic as, according to my definitions, the 
tabbar is the immediate family and the khandan is the extended family, but at times the 
khandan encompasses the tabbar. Similar to biraderi, where the ambiguity of the term 
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was also used as a strategy to include people in or exclude people out of larger networks 
of power, I infer that the vagueness of the term was not accidental, as its ambiguity 
facilitated all parties to gain more access to informal social protection. 
In Pakistan, and by default in PaK, informal social protection is more prevalent than 
state-mediated or formal arrangements, with these confined to the formal economy and 
a small percentage of urban working class, often failing to reach the poorer segments of 
the population (Beall, 1995; Sayeed, 2004; Kabeer et al, 2010). It comes as no surprise 
then that “strong social networks are an important source of social protection in 
Pakistan” (Sayeed, 2004: 16). In rural PaK, as in Alavi’s (1971: 114) rural Punjab, “the 
pivotal institution in the “traditional” social structure (…) is (…) the kinship system”. It 
is through this language of kinship that a great deal of informal social protection is 
mediated, with families being the “safety nets of first resort” (Kabeer et al, 2010: 5). It 
is then safe to argue that in rural areas the crux of informal social protection is 
embedded in the social meaning of ‘family’. In villages where most people belong to 
the same biraderi (like the case of most villages in this study) or where each biraderi is 
very large, the expression “we help our own” can lose its significance, as most people 
are considered ‘ours’ (apna). In these situations belonging to the khandan can work as a 
multiplier effect – not only you belong (and have access) to your immediate family, but 
also to other families – and therefore it is best to keep its meaning ambiguous, in order 
to belong (and have access) to a wider number of immediate families. In other words, 
the aim is to create and maintain relations closer to other homes. This might be a reason, 
for instance, why cousins were referred to as brothers (bhai) and sisters (behen), and 
close friends as relatives (rishtedar).138 
In August 2006 I conducted a study on vulnerabilities, resilience and coping 
mechanisms in a set of earthquake-affected villages in PaK and KP, with a team of 
students from LUMS. Out of these, the results shown in Figure 8 are for 17 settlements 
in and around Chinati bazaar, based on two gender-segregated focus groups interviews 
per settlement (one male and one female). In these focus groups we asked informants to 
quantify the proportion of households per settlement that had access to different 
informal social protection mechanisms pre- and post-earthquake, through a series of 
actors, from the gharana, to neighbours, biraderi, NGOs, and the state. In Figure 8 I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 There are, obviously, other reasons, such as altruism and love. I am merely pointing out another 
possible reason for this use of relationship terms.	  
	   166	  
have charted the four most important informal social protection mechanisms that people 
had access to pre- and post-earthquake through the gharana and the biraderi. 
Figure 8 – Impact of the Earthquake on the Proportion of People Accessing Informal Social Protection 
Mechanisms Through the Gharana and the Biraderi (percentage) 
 
As seen in Figure 8, in these villages the main informal social protection mechanisms 
people mentioned having access to were, in decreasing order, loans, remittances, gifts 
and seasonal work. In line with Kabeer et al’s (2010) statement, more people had access 
to these through the gharana than the biraderi. This was especially the case for 
remittances, which were rarely shared within the biraderi. Belonging to the khandan 
gave households better chances to access other households’ remittances, along with 
more loans and more seasonal work than through the biraderi. More than biraderi, the 
language of khandan was used to ask for assistance in times of need (such as recovering 
from the impact of the earthquake), to start a new venture (including migration),139 and 
to be taken care of in old age. This was particularly visible following the 2005 
earthquake and, more recently, the rampant inflation that had hit Pakistan and PaK since 
2009. The following two dialogues are my rendition of real conversations I overheard in 
the bazaar between shopkeepers (both owning small general stores) and their relatives. 
They exemplify how the language of khandan was used to create bonds of assistance. 
Dialogue 1: Bashir’s shop. Bashir’s nephew (sister’s son) walked into his shop and 
struck up a conversation about the current food inflation. Bashir quickly picked up his 
mobile and started chatting with someone, at which his nephew complained he was not 
paying attention to him. Bashir took his sweet time on the phone. Eventually the 
nephew told him that his mother (Bashir’s sister) had asked him to get two chickens, a 
kilo of tomatoes, two packs of milk and some crisps for his younger brother. 
Bashir – Are you kidding? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 When helping others to migrate, migrants sponsor first household members, followed by other 
relatives and then members of their biraderi.	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Nephew – About what? 
Bashir – I don’t have these things. 
Nephew – You don’t have crisps? 
Bashir – I can’t do it. 
Nephew – Do what? 
Bashir – You do realise that I’m not a millionaire, that I have problems of my own. 
Times are hard for all of us, the money I make is barely enough for all of us, I can’t 
provide for the whole village. 
Nephew – I’m not asking you to provide for every person in the village, but we’re 
family [khandan]. 
Bashir – It’s fine for a few times, but it amounts to Rs. 6-7,000 per month, and 
sometimes even Rs. 12,000. It has even gone up to Rs. 20,000 once. What do you expect 
me to do? Why don’t you start helping  your family more and apply yourself harder? 
Nephew – I’m doing everything that I can! How much more do you expect from me? 
Bashir – (quiet for a while) Listen, I have these crisps and milk, but chicken and 
tomatoes I don’t even sell them, how do you expect me to help you there? 
Nephew – Ok, fine; talk to my mother yourself. 
Bashir – (talking with his sister on the phone) Ok, I can send you the stuff I sell in my 
shop, but that’s it. And your bill is pilling up, at least pay me some of it. 
Bashir gave his nephew whatever he had (crisps and milk) and wrote it down in his 
book. 
 
Dialogue 2: Ibrahim’s shop. Ibrahim is chatting with his maternal cousin Imtiaz when 
their maternal great uncle walks in to buy a packet of cigarettes. Ibrahim gives him the 
packet and asks for the money. 
Great uncle – How can you ask me for money? I am your elder! 
Ibrahim – It’s only Rs. 20 for a packet, what’s the big deal? 
Great uncle – It’s not about the money, it’s about showing respect for the elders. It 
shows you have respect for us. 
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Ibrahim – It’s not about the money for you, but it is for me; I have to make a living. If 
everybody here said the same, as most are my relatives [rishtedar], I wouldn’t have the 
money to live. Each and every day is about survival for us now. We barely make it for 
our expenses. 
 
Keeping the Khandan in Hand 
In their analysis of social structures in rural Pakistan, Mohmand and Gazdar (2007:4) 
state that, “while the rules governing membership within a kin group are often 
determined by factors such as marriage or descent, kin networks also incorporate a 
wide range of cultural practices, most commonly observed in the various rituals and 
ceremonies that serve to reinforce kin solidarity.” While entering the khandan occurred 
automatically through marriage or blood ties, staying in the khandan required active 
participation in rituals and ceremonies. Because of the fluidity of khandan the 
participation in these rituals and ceremonies must not be taken for granted, as 
relationships were constantly being negotiated. People, then, needed to keep the 
khandan in hand. 
The enactment of family bonds through the khandan was most visible during the 
creation and the reinforcement of these bonds, of which two good examples were, 
respectively, marriage and visits. While in the former the roles and responsibilities of 
different actors within the khandan were clearly recognisable during particular moments 
of the domestic cycle, i.e., the wedding and its set of rituals and ceremonies, in the latter 
they could take subtle forms which might make them almost invisible in everyday life 
to the observer. Migration, particularly to the Gulf, affected the way these visits to 
relatives occurred, inasmuch as it often created or reinforced power relations within the 
khandan and made the subtle obvious. 
As sisters married and moved out of the house to another family, there was usually a 
concerted effort by both brothers and sisters to keep the sibling bond intact. The 
importance of the bond between brothers and sisters has been comprehensibly studied 
throughout South Asia (Jeffery, 1979; Sharma, 1980; Agarwal, 1995; Rashid, 2008; 
Grover, 2011). Despite being entitled to inherit property from her natal home, women 
often relinquish this entitlement to their brothers. As Bashir said, “Here [in PaK] 
inheritance is equally divided even with girls. But most of the time 90% girls say they 
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don’t need inheritance, they’ll get it from the new house.” Often seen as an investment 
(Agarwal, 1995), women play the role of the ‘good sister’ (Sharma, 1980) by not 
claiming their inheritance preferring to cultivate the goodwill of their brothers. There is 
also an element of practicality, as women lived in their conjugal home and therefore 
could not control natal property (Rashid, 2008). By considering their brothers’ needs, 
women gained access to their gifts and protection in case of divorce (Jeffery, 1979). As 
the brother of one of Grover’s (2011) informants said, as long as he was alive he had a 
duty towards his sisters. Their brothers’ lifelong support was a form of accessing social 
capital which they often preferred to material capital (Rashid, 2008), “for a woman to 
press for her inheritance rights would be tantamount to loosing her brother’s favour” 
(Kandiyoti, 1988: 279). 
As seen in the previous chapter, many informants mentioned the preference for men to 
marry their mother’s brother’s daughters (mamu ki bhetti). This preference was 
cultivated while sisters visited their brothers. These family visits demonstrated the 
closeness and strength of post-marital bonds with the natal kin, which happened not 
only during ritual times, but also in casual visits (Grover, 2011). When brothers came 
from the Gulf, carrying with them the bounties of migration, married sisters moved in to 
their brothers’ house. Bashir’s wife, despite herself being a migrant’s wife, did the same 
every time her brother came from the Gulf. “My brother went to Bahrain and took his 
family with him. They come and take good care of us; they bring a lot of material goods 
beyond our needs. We [married women] have a tradition of going back to our brother’s 
house and staying there for days. I go to his place when he comes and I stay there. He 
brings me things, so it’s my duty to go to him.” 
More than remittances, gift-giving was “a sign of status and power, as well as 
reproducing social relationships” (Gardner, 1995: 124). Migration and its related 
wealth had, in many cases, turned these visits into an obligation, creating a feeling of 
vassalage that sisters owed to (better-off) brothers. Staying at the brother’s house was a 
way for married women to gain access to foreign goods, as well as sometimes loans and 
even sponsorships for their husbands or sons to migrate. Gardner (1995: 123) postulates 
that in Bangladesh “close kin in divided households [did] not normally expect any 
regular support, although again, in times of special need they might be sent money.” As 
seen in Figure 8, access to remittances – in the form of gift or loan – happened largely 
through the gharana. By cultivating closer ties to households which received 
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remittances, other households within the khandan aimed at getting more access to these 
remittances. The earthquake and the need for post-earthquake reconstruction 
exacerbated this obligation, as beyond seeking help from their brothers, men (especially 
non-migrant ones) sought help from their (migrant) brothers-in-law through their wives. 
Visits during Eid were a particularly crucial way of keeping the khandan in hand. Eid-
ul-fitr was known in the area as “big Eid” and deemed more important that Eid-ul-azha 
unlike in Pakistan where it was known as “little Eid” for being less important than Eid-
ul-azha.140 The rationale for this importance lay in the fact that during Eid-ul-fitr a 
person was obliged to visit every family member and possibly every biraderi member 
with whom one had a niendra relationship141, therefore making it essential in 
reinforcing social networks. Most of my informants said that with so many relatives and 
biraderi members it was now getting to a stage that they could not visit everybody. As 
people started narrowing down the number of homes they could (and had an obligation 
to) visit, the priority was to keep alive the linkages with the closest ones and the ones 
with which they had (or intended to have) a debt relation – those who could (or did) 
help them access migration or its rewards and, more recently, with their recovery from 
the earthquake. As reciprocity was a crucial element of these visits, i.e., one visits and is 
visited, following the post-earthquake reconstruction these visits increased their 
standing as avenues for reclaiming status, with the wealthier showing off their new 
houses, as well as becoming honour traps, as seen in Kashif’s conundrum. 
To sum up, just as they did before the earthquake, households continued to create, 
negotiate and reinforce family ties in their everyday lives as ways to increase their 
social and symbolic capital as well as to access informal social protection. In a region 
where families are the main safety nets and social protection is mediated through the 
language of kinship, their aim continued to be to maintain relationships closer to other 
homes, especially better-off ones. While better-off households aspired to more 
independence from the family, they too did not wish to sever ties with the family at 
large, as not only did these linkages offer them ways to increase their social and 
symbolic capital, but they also kept them within the reciprocity chain. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Many informants said that in recent years maulvis had been trying to persuade people to consider Eid-
ul-azha the “big Eid”, but for them visiting family was more important than distributing meat.	  
141 The main gift exchange ritual, similar to vartan bhanji and lena-dena (see Chapter Four).	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Conclusion 
The earthquake that struck Pakistan-administered Kashmir in October 2005 brought 
with it obvious destruction and perceived change. According to those affected by it in 
Chinati bazaar, it transformed their houses, homes and family structures in several 
ways. They said they had witnessed an increase in the number of houses and associated 
this increase with post-earthquake reconstruction, and this reconstruction with changing 
patterns of residence, namely the shift from joint to single unit families. The earthquake 
had indeed caused some significant changes in the spatial organisation of the house, 
which had not only been turned upside down – with the courtyard replacing the roof as 
the unifying element of the domestic group – it had also been turned inside out, with 
ostentation now visible on the outside through the explosion of colourful new houses 
and roofs. However, I argued in this chapter that since most new housing units were 
often built within the same compound, there was no breakdown per se of the classical 
patriarchy, and intra-family relations, and competition between members of the joint 
family over common resources, remained alive and unchanged. The changes that had 
occurred in these relationships were related more to the earlier process of migration than 
to the earthquake. 
Similarly, I argued that for a host of reasons – such as simultaneous construction, 
perceived population pressure, a misunderstanding on eligibility for government 
compensation, a refashioning of houses from kaccha to pakka, and a proliferation of 
(more visible) tin roofs – people felt the earthquake caused a recent increase in housing, 
whereas much of this was because of processes already underway that were exacerbated 
by the earthquake. Even in terms of the extended family, though people talked of the 
weakening of links and the growing independence of individual households, I argued 
that the earthquake did not change the fact that the family continued to be the main 
source of informal social protection. In this chapter I, therefore, conclude that rather 
than creating change, both the earthquake and post-earthquake housing reconstruction 
intensified and crystallised pre-existing processes of social change at the level of the 
house and the home that were already underway. In the next chapter I take an even 
closer look within the household through men’s stories about women in particular, in 
order to analyse discourses of change regarding women’s mobility and access to work 
outside the home that had proliferated in the aftermath of the earthquake. 
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Chapter Six 
Through the Prism of the ‘Other’: Stories of Women’s Work, Mobility 
and Morality by the Men of Chinati Bazaar 
 
Introduction 
In September 2009 I encountered Khalid, a trainer at the vocational training centre in 
the bazaar. We had met a few times over the year in the bazaar but we had never had a 
chance to sit down for a proper chat before. One day while I was in Imtiaz’s shop, 
Khalid came across to have his gas cylinders filled. While he waited we started talking 
– in English. As was usual with most people I met at the bazaar, Khalid started by 
asking me what I thought of PaK and, if I had travelled through Pakistan, how different 
did I think this region was from Pakistan. I had developed a standard response by now, 
mostly because I had had to repeat it so many times. And like everyone else I met in the 
bazaar, he too informed me that many changes had happened around Chinati after the 
earthquake, one of the biggest being an increase in women’s empowerment. This he 
attributed largely to the presence of NGOs. “After the earthquake many women came 
outside [the home] to work and most found jobs in NGOs” he explained. 
I had heard this from many others as well. The post-earthquake exponential increase in 
the presence of NGOs, together with that of the state through ERRA, in close proximity 
to Chinati had helped create new forms of employment. Throughout the reconstruction 
and rehabilitation stages they contributed directly and indirectly to job creation by 
hiring local staff, imparting new skills, and providing credit to new ventures or 
rehabilitating existing ones. According to most development agencies and locals, both 
men and women benefited from this. Most also inferred that this interaction with 
development agencies had had an impact on increasing women’s physical mobility and 
access to employment opportunities as a group. 
Traditionally, it is not considered respectable for women in PaK to work outside the 
house, as by doing so they have to engage with male-dominated public spaces. Even 
now many people expressed their reservations about this. The notion of women working 
outside the house clashed with prevalent seclusion and exclusion practices enacted and 
re-enacted through the purdah system (Jeffery, 1979). The prevalence of these practices 
did not mean that they existed uncontested; there was a constant struggle by an array of 
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actors to challenge and recreate them. In this chapter I argue that this struggle could be 
best witnessed in men’s narratives on labour and work, and how these applied to 
women. In line with the theme of my previous chapters, I extend the argument that this 
struggle pre-dated the earthquake, but that the earthquake made it more visible. At the 
same time, I demonstrate that the increase of female work outside the house was, in 
fact, minimal and that people at the bazaar used the perception of the increase to explain 
– through stories, myths and rumours – how they engaged with ‘becoming modern’. 
In this chapter I analyse post-earthquake narratives about women’s mobility and work. 
Because I do not have enough data directly from women, I am not trying to represent 
women’s experiences. Instead, this chapter is about men’s stories at the bazaar about 
women’s work and mobility and how, in men’s stories, women’s lives changed after the 
earthquake mostly due to the presence of development agencies. Men’s stories though, 
were not uniform. In their narratives I could see both discourses of acceptance and 
challenge of the ‘official’ patriarchy, similar to Kadiyoti’s (1994: 211) assertion that 
“behind the enduring facade of male privilege lie profound ambiguities which may give 
rise to both defensive masculinist discourse and a genuine desire for contestation and 
change.” 
In section two I set the scene by exploring local notions of work and labour and their 
association with honour and status, while at the same time positioning women as a 
group within these notions. Both proponents and opponents of increasing women’s 
employment opportunities – the two extremes of a wide spectrum of opinions on this 
issue – identified the earthquake and the greater presence of development agencies in its 
aftermath as the main catalysts for the perceived increase both in women’s work outside 
the house, and in their physical and social mobility. In section three I analyse how these 
narratives evolved in the aftermath of the earthquake. Despite professing similar 
narratives, inasmuch as both proponents and opponents of women’s access to work 
outside the home said that it had increased, each group interpreted the impact of the 
same event differently. While proponents used the earthquake to justify and enhance the 
increase, through a discourse built around ‘awareness’ and ‘risk’, opponents used it to 
curtail mobility by questioning the morality of women’s presence in public spaces. In 
section four I investigate how different actors used these similar narratives differently. I 
conclude with a proposition that beyond access to work, the underlying struggle that the 
men in the bazaar spoke of was also for women’s access to public spaces and action. 
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Again, despite this struggle being attributed to the aftermath of the earthquake, in the 
sub-texts of the narratives I heard I was able to witness a more continuous process of 
change that revealed that the struggle had gone on for a much longer period of time and, 
in fact, predated the earthquake. 
 
Men Work, Women Labour 
In the months and years that followed the earthquake there was a common perception 
that there had been an increase in both women’s presence in public spaces and in their 
employment outside the home. Most people with whom I spoke in the bazaar pointed 
out that this increase was an indirect consequence of the earthquake. In the various 
narratives that people developed on this increase, notions of labour and work were 
frequently present. Before delving into people’s post-earthquake narratives on the 
increase in women’s presence and work in the public sphere, I first explore the role of 
women as women within the larger debate on women, Islam and patriarchy in South 
Asia, and then situate the women of PaK as a group within local discourses on labour 
and work. 
 
Seclusion: women, Islam, and patriarchy 
A visible trait of PaK society before and after the earthquake was the importance placed 
on seclusion and exclusion practices such as the purdah system in everyday life of men 
and women. “Purdah entails much more than the physical separation of men and 
women. There are multitudes of complex social arrangements which maintain social 
and not just physical distance between the sexes” (Jeffery, 1979: 4). As Kirmani (2009: 
54) noticed while interviewing Muslim women in Delhi, women’s definitions of and 
opinions about purdah revealed “a flexibility and creativity amongst women in the 
appropriation and application of such discourses in their own lives.” Differences in 
class and income, residence, education level, occupation, religious affiliation, group 
membership, and individual circumstances all contribute to a wide array of types of 
purdah observance, where its crucial characteristic remains the limitation of male and 
female interaction (Papanek, 1982). 
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While the general rules of seclusion in South Asian Muslim societies are based on a 
series of Quranic prescriptions, as several authors point out (Jeffery, 1979; Papanek, 
1982; Kandiyoti, 1991) one must look beyond religion (and its different interpretations) 
and probe the workings of social organisation and local patriarchal systems to get a 
better picture of how seclusion exists, how it is interpreted and how it is enacted and re-
enacted in these societies.142 In her groundbreaking work on gender and land rights in 
South Asia, Agarwal (1995: 377) demonstrates “the strength of cultural commonalities 
over religious differences”, where the patterns of northwestern Indian Hindus are closer 
to Pakistani Muslims than to south Indian and Sri Lankan Hindus, and Sri Lankan 
communities show greater similarity across religious affiliation as compared to their 
respective religious brethren further north. Similarly, in a cross-regional study of five 
socio-cultural setting and groups distinguished by region (Pakistani Punjab, Uttar 
Pradesh, and Tamil Nadu) and religion (Muslim and Hindu), Jejeebhoy and Sathar 
(2001:708) discover a wide variation in levels and determinants of women’s autonomy, 
with what they call the “social institutions of gender” within each community shaping 
women’s autonomy. According to them, the influence of social system is stronger than 
religion or nationality, with women’s autonomy in the highly gender-stratified Punjab 
and Uttar Pradesh shaped by traditional factors such as family structure and coresidence 
with mother-in-law, and size of dowry. In Pakistan, several studies in both rural and 
urban areas on women’s participation in the labour force143 identify the socio-economic 
status of the family (Shah, 1986, in: Naqvi and Shahnaz, 2002), observance of purdah 
(Ibraz, 1993, in: Naqvi and Shahnaz, 2002), the presence of adult male members, 
remittances (Rashed et al, 1989, in: Naqvi and Shahnaz, 2002; Kozel and Alderman, 
1990, in: Naqvi and Shahnaz, 2002), and patriarchal prohibition of working outside the 
house (Naqvi and Shahnaz, 2002) as having a negative impact on participation. 
For Kandiyoti (1991) this region is defined by classical patriarchy, reproduced through 
the patrilocally extended household with women’s access to resources mediated through 
the family. Women adopt interpersonal strategies of subservience and manipulation that 
do not structurally change this system, but allow them to maximise their life chances. 
The hierarchical stratification imposed by class and biraderi add further complexities to 
this system, with seclusion and exclusion practices such as purdah observance and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Muslim women themselves state that it is men’s patriarchal misinterpretations of religion that oppress 
them and not Islam (see Kirmani, 2009).	  
143 Pakistan has one of the world’s lowest female labour force participation rates.	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female non-work also signalling status. Women’s seclusion and honour is an important 
aspect of male control, a measure of their protectors’ status (Papanek, 1982: 193). 
According to Kandiyoti (1991: 35) “the material bases of classic patriarchy crumble 
under the impact of new market forces, capital penetration in rural areas, and 
processes of economic marginalisation and immiseration”, with men’s economic 
protection of women challenged by the necessity of every household member to 
contribute to survival, especially among the propertyless and the dispossessed. 
Yet, the collapsing of the material bases of classical patriarchy does not mean the 
collapse of classical patriarchy itself. Several authors note that market forces can 
produce more seclusion (Gardner, 1995) and gender roles can be renegotiated (Kabeer, 
2000). Both women and men use ‘patriarchal bargains’144 to challenge women’s 
positioning within their society within classical patriarchy. These patriarchal bargains 
“exert a powerful influence on the shaping of women’s gendered subjectivity and 
determine the nature of gender ideology in different contexts”, “influence both the 
potential for and the actual forms of women’s active or passive resistance”, and “are 
not timeless or immutable entities, but are susceptible to historical transformations that 
open up new areas of struggle or renegotiation of the relations between genders” 
(Kandiyoti, 1991: 27). Harris and Young (1981: 130) argue that in places where gender 
differentiation is highly stressed “the sexual division of labour will often allocate men 
and women to categorically different forms of work, with the result that the tasks and 
the amount of work carried out by each sex will be rendered strictly non-comparable. 
One major consequence of this is that what women do is assigned a completely different 
status in analysis and is frequently not counted as work at all.” Gender though, as 
Moore (1999) and Green (1999) argue using Judith Butler’s work, is not only culturally 
constructed but has to be performed. Gender discourses, regardless of being male or 
female, “act as a reflection on the capacities of the genders and their interactions” 
(Moore, 1999: 28). Idealised gender models then, “need to be seen not as fixed 
descriptions of what people are, but as ways of describing and judging what they do” 
(Cornwall, 1998: 51). 
Male stories at the bazaar were precisely this; ways of describing and judging what 
people did, in this case what women did after the earthquake and after the arrival of the 
development agencies. But, more than opening a new area of struggle, I suggest that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Using Kandiyoti’s own terms.	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2005 earthquake as an event widened a pre-existing area of struggle and was used by 
both men and women to renegotiate the relations between genders. The area of struggle 
that I am referring to was women’s increased physical and socio-economic mobility, a 
struggle not only for access to work but also for access to public spaces and action. 
 
What People Do: active life in PaK 
In my conversations at the bazaar I noticed that people had two different words for 
agricultural work differentiated by land ownership: mazdoori if working in someone 
else’s land and kaam if working in one’s own land.145 Most often the former was 
translated into English as ‘labour’ and latter as ‘work’. The difference between 
mazdoori and kaam though, was deeper and more complex than ownership of resources 
(or means of production).  Mazdoori, whose roots come from muzd (remuneration), was 
translated by Platts (1884: 1028) as “bodily labour, to work for hire, to toil and labour 
for a living”. In this definition we can see in mazdoori a notion of labour characterised 
by non-freedom, as well as an element of repetitiveness and hardness. The term was 
also used in PaK for heavier, harder activities – people do ‘hard labour’ (mehenat 
mazdoori), not ‘hard work’. If mazdoori was, on the one hand, used to identify activities 
related to the primary sector of the economy, kaam, on the other hand, was used to 
identify activities related to the manufacturing or secondary sector and the service or 
tertiary sector. Although only one word was usually used to describe work – kaam146 – 
there was in fact another word that formed the root of work-related words – kaar (Platts, 
1884: 804 and 799, respectively). In both these words there was an element of 
instrumentality, as both were employed for ‘use’ or lack of; e.g., nekaama, a person of 
no use and bekaar, a useless person or object. In both words there was the sense of 
artificial fabrication and of this activity being under human control, with kaam also 
meaning handiwork and an artisan being called a kaarigar. While both words can also 
mean action, it is especially kaar that gives its power to this activity. So for instance, 
the word commonly used for ‘action’ was kaarwai, an activist (such as an NGO 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 In Chapter Seven I discuss further the changing character of agricultural work/labour.	  
146 While kaam in Urdu means work, in Old Persian it means desire. The multivalence of this word was 
often used by Mir and Ghalib in their ghazals (see Pritchett, on-line).	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activist) was a kaarkun,147 a social worker was a samaji148 kaarkun, and a political 
activist (or political worker) was a siyaasi kaarkun. 
The way people at the bazaar contextualised notions of ‘mazdoori’, ‘kaam’, and ‘kaar’ 
are reminiscent of Arendt’s (1958) categorisation of human activity, or vita activa, in 
her book “The Human Condition.” She divides human activity hierarchically into 
labour, work, and action – the three basic conditions under which humans live – with 
the latter being the most important for being human. 
“Labour assures not only individual survival, but the life of the species. 
Work and its product, the human artefact, bestow a measure of permanence 
and durability upon the futility of mortal life and the fleeting character of 
human time. Action, in so far as it engages in founding and preserving 
political bodies, creates the condition for remembrance, that is, for history.” 
(Arendt, 1958: 8) 
Labour, a repetitive, never-ending pursuit yielding nothing permanent, represents the 
biological necessities of human life necessary to maintain human existence, and is 
characterised by non-freedom. In fact, the recognition of labour as involuntary is a 
distinctly human quality. Work, under human control, is all that is constructed in the 
human existence, the artificial fabrication of surroundings and building both physical 
and cultural structures and borders. It is characterised by instrumental necessity, while 
there is also an element of freedom. It is public and between individual human beings. 
Action represents the initiatives that form the system of social and cultural negotiation 
manifested in societies, communities and cultures. It is unpredictable and it can only be 
judged and given meaning by its public reception, and therefore always a public 
activity. It is not bound by instrumentality (like work), but characterised by its quality 
of not being subordinate to anything else. In other words, it corresponds with full 
freedom of human activity: human beings are free to initiate action and are free to do so 
as long as they act. 
It is in kaarwai and related words that we can encounter the publicness and freedom 
associated to Arendtian action, representative of the initiatives forming the system of 
social and cultural negotiation within the community. And it is this that makes me 
believe that there was a gendered struggle not only for work – kaam – but also for work 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Or a sargaram (literally ‘hotheaded’) kaarkun.	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and action – kaar. Although it might appear that I am portraying these factors as 
providing clear-cut divisions, they did not. There was a fuzziness about these three 
conditions of human activity in the villages surrounding Chinati bazaar and people did 
not clearly divided their activities into ‘labour’, ‘work’, and ‘action’. Furthermore, 
narratives on these three types of human activity differed from person to person and 
from case to case, enough for not existing a clear consensus. Yet, within this fuzziness it 
was still possible to witness a gender bias – with women playing a role of lesser 
‘citizens’149 – where the value attributed to women’s activities within the 
labour/work/action distinction closely mirroring the work of several authors on the 
reproductive/productive divide (Beneria, 1979; Beneria and Sen, 1981; Harris and 
Young, 1981), who state that women’s subordination and the little or no value attributed 
to their activities is a result of the gendered division of labour, their assigned role in 
biological and social reproduction, and the nature of their participation in production. 
As I previously mentioned, ownership of the means of production is a factor that can 
help us differentiate human activity between labour and work in this region. Not only in 
agriculture, but in many other activities owning (or renting) the tools used in production 
and/or distribution can set apart a labourer and a worker. As an Algerian informant told 
Bourdieu (2000:22) on the emergence of the full-time shopkeeper in the 1960s: 
“Everything’s a métier150 now: one puts three boxes of sugar and two 
packets of coffee in a shelf and calls himself a grocer. One who can nail 
four planks together calls himself a joiner. Everywhere there are drivers, 
even if there are no cars: all you need is a licence in your pocket.” 
This point also touches upon two other factors: one, of the linkage between activity and 
status, whereby one’s status increases by moving up in the hierarchy of human activity, 
and two, of the importance of location in one’s activity, as seen in this case where the 
shopkeeper becomes detached from the land and the shop detached from home. In the 
latter, it is as if there is a public-private divide among human activity, with many 
labour-related activities being done in private spaces, such as the house and the adjacent 
fields, many work-related activities done in public, such as the bazaar or abroad, and all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 From samaj, community.	  
149 For Aristotle (Politics, book 3) a citizen is someone who had a share in the “privileges of rule.” In 
Ancient Greece women, children, foreign residents, some labourers and slaves were not citizens, and 
therefore excluded from these “privileges of rule”.	  
150 Job, trade, profession.	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action-related activities done in public, in – again – the bazaar and abroad, but also 
mosques and even in the privately-public spaces of the house, such as the veranda and 
the guest-accessible living room. Several other factors influenced a distinction between 
labour, work, and action in this region, namely autonomy – working for oneself or 
labouring for others – the type of remuneration – being paid or not and when – and the 
nature of the actors themselves. Who performed ‘what’ also contributed to distinguish 
what ‘what’ was. Here determinants of hierarchies of power, such as gender as well as 
class and biraderi, played an important role. For instance, most of women’s activities 
were considered labour, sometimes work, and seldom action. On the other side of the 
spectrum higher class and/or biraderi males rarely laboured, often worked and acted. 
Finally, the placing of these activities within Arendt’s three conditions, akin to 
Kandiyoti’s patriarchal bargains, is also susceptible to historical transformations. In this 
case, access to Gulf migration and increase in levels of education, which accelerated the 
social mobility of not just individuals but of whole groups as seen elsewhere in South 
Asia (see Gardner and Osella, 2004; Osella and Osella, 2000), opened up new areas of 
struggle and renegotiation for the classification, promotion and demotion of different 
human activities. Particularly in the case of labour and work, jobs are not permanently 
confined to one or another activity. For instance farming, which used to be mainly 
classified as work, had been ‘demoted’ to labour over time, due to access to new 
livelihood opportunities, the unprofitability of the occupation, and the shift in actors – 
from owning males to females and hired labour. 
This demotion was visible in the way Manshaat, a migrant in Dubai whom I met at the 
bazaar while he was on his biennial leave, described people’s engagement with 
agriculture in the past and today: “Compared to us, our forefathers used to wake up 
early in the morning, they would work hard. Now everybody has fields but no one works 
[kaam] in the fields. They feel they’re too big to labour [mazdoori] in the land, they just 
want office work. Agriculture is below our status.” Teaching was another noteworthy 
case, where the reasons for the ‘demotion’ of farming from work to labour seemed to be 
somehow similar, namely, access to better livelihood opportunities, unprofitability of 
the profession, and a shift in actors, with more and more women becoming 
schoolteachers. It appeared that a renegotiation of teaching as work was taking place in 
this region. “Most teachers are women because salaries are very low. This is pocket 
money, so only women can afford to do this”, told me the (male) principal of READ. As 
	   181	  
in north India “the definition of women as primarily domestic workers enabled their 
work outside the home to be undervalued and hence underpaid” (Sharma, 1980: 7) and 
therefore their salaries being seen (by men) as ‘pocket money’. 
 
Women’s Vita Activa 
So how was women’s vita activa lived in PaK? A clear distinction of women’s activities 
was delineated by space, i.e. between private and public, with activities in the realm of 
the former classified as labour and in the latter as work. Within the private sphere 
women laboured both in the home and in the fields as, throughout northern South Asia 
(Sharma, 1980: 43), household land was considered an extension of the home and 
therefore “women [could] move about in their own fields with confidence in their right 
to be seen there.”151 Outside the home, women overwhelmingly engaged with teaching 
as work. As witnessed in rural Malaysia (Stivens, 1996: 83) the shifts in female 
occupation through the decades mirrored to some extent the growth in education, with 
rising levels of female teachers correlating with educational expansion (Table 8). 
Table 8 – Number of teachers in Bagh district 
Public (2008) Private (2005)  Number % Number % 
Male 2254 56 604 41 
Female 1736 44 871 59 
Total 3990 100 1475 100 
Source: AEPAM/NEMIS, 2006; P&D AJK, 2009. 
The division of labour within the home followed strict age hierarchies, with older 
women responsible for the cooking and younger women in charge of cleaning and 
fetching water. Mira, a young teenager from Sarian said that “we [daughters] do the 
safai [cleaning] and mother sits on the chula [stove].” The sharing of household chores 
among the women of the house created at times conflicts,152 as well as bonds of ‘mutual 
reliance’ (Grover, 2011: 71), depending on the dyad. Mothers and daughters routinely 
depended on each other, with daughters taking on chores when mothers were ill or 
absent and mothers ‘training’ their daughters in ‘housework’ from an early age to 
become ‘good wives’. Mira’s cousin Myriam said that in her family the daughters made 
rotis when the mother was away. “I can’t remember when I started making them.” The 
mother-daughter bond was nurtured (through visits) beyond the time the daughter 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 In Chinati the fields were adjacent to the house.	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married and moved away. In Delhi, Grover (2011) notices that a married daughter’s 
ability to do chores is more valued than unmarried daughters or daughters-in-law as she 
is considered more experienced and familiarised within the natal home. 
The value of being a ‘good housewife’ who did household chores was reverberated 
across gender lines and ages. Zubaida, a housewife from Thial said that “clothes, 
decorations for the house and a clean house; those are the wishes of a woman.” Raja 
Yasin, who had previously worked as a cook for an English couple in Dubai, mentioned 
that one characteristic that struck him at the time was that the couple shared chores. 
“Here women do all the housework [ghar ka kaam].” Despite using the word kaam, the 
meaning attached to it was that of ‘labour’. Equally, when Papanek (1982: 198) 
describes the defining interdependence and division of labour among gender where 
“men generally do not do things which are defined as being ‘women’s work’ but are 
dependant on women to do them [and] outside the home, women are equally dependent 
on men”, this gendered division of labour can be seen as an interdependent male-work-
public and female-labour-private dichotomy. 
The fact that men did not do household chores meant that women who worked outside 
the home were left with a conundrum. On the one hand they were responsible for 
‘houselabour’ and, on the other hand, they wanted (or needed)153 to work outside. 
Overwhelmingly these women fell under what Beneria and Sen (1981) call ‘the burden 
of the double day’: they engaged with productive activities outside the home while at 
the same time being responsible for the bulk of reproductive tasks within the home. As 
Saadia, a married schoolteacher at READ said, “women working is fine as long as your 
house and your children are not affected.154 Teaching is not a good thing, because when 
you’re trying to divide yourself in two places, your health gets affected.” This was 
particularly problematic for married women with young children who did not have other 
women in the house capable of taking over their share of ‘houselabour’. In fact, as 
Rashed et al’s (1989, in: Naqvi and Shahnaz, 2002) study show, the likelihood of 
women being employed increased with the presence of other women in the house. The 
refusal to renegotiate ‘houselabour’ might had to do with men’s reluctance on “any 
encroachment on their leisure time” (Kabeer, 2000: 124), although, as Harrison (2001) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 See Chapter Five on the saas-bahu dyad.	  
153 In Bangladesh’s garment industry women more often entered the labour market more by need than 
choice (Kabeer, 2000).	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shows in rural Zambia, rather than being idle, men are often occupied in creating, 
maintaining and improving social networks and contacts, in the hope of gaining access 
to better economic opportunities. Also important in these negotiations was men’s image 
as breadwinners outside the house (see Grover, 2011). Women working outside (and 
men inside) “not only destroys husband’s image as a ‘provider’, but also the status of 
the family” (Rashid, 2008: 233), and can be taken as a public statement of men’s ability 
to fulfil the roles of provider and protector (Kabeer, 2000). 
The decision for women to work outside – overwhelmingly as teachers – had therefore 
to be done in consultation with their families. In these consultations, a form of 
renegotiating the patriarchal bargain, women treaded “a balance between their basic 
needs and social expectations of gender norms” (Rashid, 2008: 235), as often they were 
“valued as producers of heirs rather than as producers of food” (Sharma, 1980: 14). 
Working women renegotiated the patriarchal bargain not only by proving to be capable 
of working outside the house and yet still play the role of the ‘good daughter’ or ‘good 
mother/wife’, but also by having to prove that their work was morally and socially 
acceptable. An important factor in these renegotiations was their relative power in 
relation to the other household members, which also determined the effective 
possession of the resources she produced or earned (Whitehead, 1981). For instance, a 
‘good daughter’ or a ‘good wife’ always shared her income with the household head out 
of her goodwill. Zainab, Ali Naqvi’s unmarried daughter said: “I keep the money 
[salary] for me and spend it on food and clothes, but I also contributed to rebuilding the 
house. My father never asks me for money, I give it myself.” From the mid-1970s 
onwards, due to a drastic increase in male migration, women found a type of work 
which, despite being public, was morally and socially acceptable – teaching. 
The multiple effects male migration has on gender relations in South Asian Muslim 
communities has been described by several authors (Gardner, 1995; Gardner and Osella, 
1994; Rashid, 2008): it can increase the independence of migrants’ wives, allow women 
to enter (some) public male spaces, yet it can also increase female seclusion and 
women’s workload. In this region male migration to the Gulf also affected women’s 
access to work by, on the one hand, increasing a demand for education – for both men 
and women – and, on the other hand, motivating many male teachers to migrate, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 The ideology of maternal altruism, where a mother and wife always put the family and children first 
(Whitehead, 1981: 107).	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therefore creating a vacuum to be filled by women. Still women needed to negotiate, 
both within and outside the home, the fact that teaching was considered a public 
activity. As Kabeer (2000: 329) states, “intra-familial relationships (…) reflected the 
family’s insertion into larger social hierarchies”; consequently the family’s class and 
caste position and “the extent to which it valued, or could afford to value, dominant 
norms about the division of labour among family members” also influenced this 
negotiation. The underlying elements in this negotiation were that of status and honour. 
As Rashid (2008: 211) states, “mere money does not bring status and prestige for 
women and their families, especially not if the money is earned in a process which is 
not socially acceptable (…) women earn their status by being a good mother, wife, and 
daughter-in-law.” Throughout northern South Asia not having women working (outside 
the house) is often a sign of high status, as Gardner (1995: 209) identified in many 
studies of gender in the region, “which focus on two intersecting phenomena: the sexual 
division of labour, and ideologies of female modesty and shame.” 
“Women in South Asia bear a special responsibility for family honour; 
insofar as a woman conforms to certain standards of modest feminine 
conduct her family’s status is maintained or even improved, whist 
unwomanly conduct is a blot not just on her personal reputation but on the 
reputation of the whole family.” (Sharma, 1980: 3) 
While still having to prove that employment outside the home was morally and socially 
acceptable for women to perform, in this region they had the advantage that teaching 
itself was an occupation which was morally and socially acceptable: it involved 
minimal interaction with men and more with children; it was easily assimilated into 
traditional feminine role concepts; there was a need for more teachers; in most cases the 
physical distance between the house and the school was minimal; and education was a 
status marker, traditionally linked with the Syed biraderi. Yet, due to the physical 
mobility aspect of teaching, women also had to renegotiate the concept of purdah, 
which they did physically by using veiling as a strategy to legitimise working outside 
(Rashid, 2008), and intellectually by attempting to reinterpret purdah based on a 
practical morality, akin to Kabeer’s (2000: 91) “purdah of the mind” and Kirmani’s 
(2009: 55) “purdah of the heart.”155 Finally, as Gardner (1995) discovered in rural 
Bangladesh, veiling and other external indicators of purdah also created female status 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 In fact some of my female informants used the latter expression.	  
	   185	  
and added to their personal power,156 as seen in this region with some female 
schoolteachers engaging in the organisation of Quranic readings and Milaads157 for 
other women. 
As in other South Asian Muslim societies, in PaK too the gendered division of labour 
rooted in local ideologies of honour and status limited women’s engagement with public 
activities. Due to the prevalent seclusion and exclusion practices, women mostly 
‘laboured’, only sometimes ‘worked’, and seldom ‘acted’. The drastic increase in male 
migration to the Gulf and its spillover effect of an increment in the demand for more 
education opened up a space for women to engage with work outside the home, 
signalling a shift from private-labour to public-work. Many women successfully 
renegotiated gender roles, allowing them to become schoolteachers. Yet they first had to 
prove that their work was morally and socially acceptable. The question remains as to 
how the earthquake as an event further affected, if at all, men’s narratives and actions 
regarding women’s activity. In the next sections I analyse these narratives – as well as 
how they were used differently by different actors – in order to examine if the 
earthquake was indeed a catalyst for an increase in women’s mobility and work outside 
the home, and what this entailed. 
 
Narratives of Post-Earthquake Mobility and Work 
The place of women in society was a hotly debated topic at the bazaar, with narratives 
centred on women’s mobility – physical, social and economic. There was a wide 
spectrum of views on women’s mobility and access to work that ranged from a more 
conservative view – which created a discourse based on religion and ‘local values and 
culture’, whereby women’s seclusion was imperative for a good society – to a more 
progressive view – which saw local expressions of women’s seclusion as excessive and 
preventing their society from keeping up with the rest of the world and becoming 
‘modern’. Regardless of the discourse, however, almost all the men I talked to about 
this in the bazaar associated the perceived increase in women’s mobility and work in 
public spaces with the arrival of development agencies, particularly NGOs, and, to a 
lesser extent, new traders in the urban bazaars. In an Arendtian sense, I argue that that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 Let us not also forget that purdah-related behaviour is more than just about status as it is ”central to 
women’s inner spirituality, helping them grow closer to Allah” (Gardner, 1995: 219).	  
157 Celebrations of Milaad-un-nabi (birthday of the prophet).	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through the changes revealed in the stories, women were trying to shift their activities 
from ‘labour’ to ‘work’.  In this section I analyse these narratives and examine how they 
were created and recreated, by whom and for what purpose. 
 
The Earthquake and NGOs 
The impact of development agencies’ relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts 
was perceived by most in Chinati as largely positive. Within these agencies NGOs 
received most of the praise for the work done. In fact, most people regardless of gender, 
age, status group or wealth equated the NGO presence with better living conditions. 
Throughout their stories about post-earthquake change they would talk about the 
improvements in health, education, and ‘capacity building’ that happened in the region 
due to the arrival of these NGOs. For instance, Ali Naqvi, commenting about OXFAM 
and Save the Children’s work in the area said that “NGOs helped us think of hygiene 
and health, people learnt and are now living better.” Mushtaq, the Gulf agent from 
Sarian, argued that despite this region having both public and private schooling, 
education benefitted from the arrival of the NGOs: “We had lots of schools but after the 
earthquake NGOs built better ones. They teach a better curriculum with English at an 
earlier age, like the schools in Rawalakot.” Mohammad Sheikh, a trader at the bazaar, 
mentioned that schoolchildren were not the only ones who learnt new things, as “people 
learnt new skills due to the NGOs. Because of that many have started their own 
businesses.” 
This narrative though, was not ubiquitous. Some people pointed out how NGOs mis-
targeted assistance and were as riddled with nepotism, corruption and incompetence as 
the state. Especially people in Bagh city, who witnessed a flurry of NGO activity, were 
very suspicious of their performance. “All the earthquake money is going to workshops 
and jeeps. Nothing really happens.  When it does, it’s extremely late. They [NGOs] keep 
on having workshops, meetings and seminars. It’s just talk, talk, talk.” Some people in 
some places developed a discourse blaming NGO presence for the destruction of the 
region’s morality.158 The voices of discontent directly linked this loss of morality to a 
loosening of women’s honour, which they could observe in the increase of women’s 
mobility, both physical and social. This increase, they said, was a causal effect of the 
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NGO presence. The creation and recreation of this discourse was not haphazard – there 
was a visible trend in who said it and where. It was largely a male-dominated discourse, 
as exemplified by a shopkeeper in Rawalakot who complained to one of my (male) 
research assistants that “the NGO’s promotion of women workers [samaji kaarkun] 
[had] influenced the [patriarchal] social fabric of the region” and therefore challenged 
“our local values and culture.” 
What at first glance appeared to be a disapproval of women engaging with work-kaam 
was in fact also a disapproval of women entering the more public space for Arendtian 
action through work-kaar: through the arrival of NGOs women were now getting jobs 
as samaji kaarkun. Mostly men stated that women’s public exposure was against 
religious and cultural practices and that as a shopkeeper in Bagh said –  “women [were] 
now forgetting their rightful place in society”. These voices were also older, with many 
people from the older generations who viewed themselves as guardians of these values 
and culture, such as an old dhaaba owner in Bagh, blaming “the ‘NGO culture’ that 
developed [in PaK] through which people became fashion-conscious and less 
religious”. Religion was used to justify the righteousness of this discourse, with purdah 
as the centre tenet. Despite Jeffery (1979: 17) rightly pointing out that “Islamic 
doctrines can, at best, provide only a partial explanation for the seclusion of women” 
these were the ones that were vocalised when justifying the need to curtail women’s 
mobility. It is of no surprise then that an influential group propagating this discourse 
were the religious clerics, or maulvis, who regardless of sect saw an increase in 
women’s mobility – and NGOs as instigators of this mobility – as fitna.159 Jummah 
prayers, one of the most important male public congregations, proved itself the right 
place for maulvis to spread their message on purdah. At the mosque in Chinati bazaar, 
the local maulvi often warned the faithful that “this is one of the most important parts of 
Islam. This community thinks it’s modernising and they think that keeping purdah is 
backward. I want to tell those people that they are stupid [bewakoof]!” Linked with 
observing purdah, at times he would also warn of the dangers of women working with 
men: “Women mingling with non-mehram men is becoming too normal now, too 
common. I cannot stress enough how God really hates this.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 The words often used were beghairat (without honour) and beyhaya (shameless), meant as ‘involved 
in immoral behaviour’.	  
159 In the sense of ‘sedition’.	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Another group of men who moulded their discontented voices to this discourse were 
those who had less access to these NGOs and to relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation 
funds, and particularly those who saw the bounty of development aid arriving in the 
region – to which they felt entitled – only to see it be distributed to others.160 Their 
resentment was often directed at women, as they saw women stepping on their turf – the 
public turf. 
Overall, this discourse was public, more urban than rural, and grew louder the further 
we moved from the epicentre of the earthquake. NGO offices were based in urban 
centres, often in the male-dominated public bazaars, where both male and female 
workers would interact and were seen by all entering and leaving these offices. For 
many, who had limited or no dealings with these NGOs, what happened inside these 
offices was a mystery, as the walls were a curtain161 between the outside and the inside 
of the NGO. The owner of a general store in Bagh’s main bazaar said that vulgarity had 
increased because of the NGOs, as they not only allowed but incentivised men and 
women to work together, which he deemed un-Islamic. Close to the UN containers 
which served as offices for the Bagh District bureaucracy, an old lawyer friends with 
Ali Naqvi told me that since the arrival of the NGOs there had been an increase of court 
cases. According to him, the reason for this increase was that unmarried women 
working in NGOs started eloping with their male counterparts. The women’s parents, 
on the basis of Pakistan’s Islamic personal laws, initiated these cases and he had 
counted more than 60 cases in Bagh district just in the first three months of 2009. 
In rural areas people dealt not with NGOs, but with NGO workers and in the 
overwhelming majority of cases these contacts were gender segregated, with female 
NGO workers interacting with rural women and male NGO workers with rural men. As 
such, the curtain was drawn between sexes and not between NGO outsiders and 
insiders. Finally, distance from the epicentre was also a factor in how people viewed 
NGO presence. A recent study by Andrabi and Das (2010) shows that people living 
closer to the fault-line had a more positive attitude towards foreigners (including 
Europeans and Americans), mirroring the higher provision of foreign aid and foreign 
presence in these areas. In 2009, together with a group of students from LUMS, I 
conducted a short survey on the impact of the earthquake in rural and urban bazaars of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 See Chapter Three on targeting assistance.	  
161 In Persian, purdah.	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Rawalakot and Bagh, where I also observed that shopkeepers in Rawalakot bazaar, 
which was less affected, were more vocal about the ‘NGO culture’162 than shopkeepers 
in Bagh city. 
On the other side of the spectrum, proponents of increasing women’s mobility and 
access to work outside the home also concurred with opponents that an increase had 
happened and that too because of the NGOs. Mobeen, a district secretary and member 
of JKLF163 from Thial, said that “the earthquake changed our area a lot, women’s 
horizons were broadened. This was because of international NGOs; people coming 
from outside taught them about a better lifestyle.” This group consisted of younger men, 
NGO workers, active migrants (particularly Gulf migrants) and younger women – 
students, workers and young housewives. They talked about the lack of investment on 
women’s futures – like Khalid, the vocational trainer, who complained that “we have 
both men and women, but there’s no training for women. We don’t care for about 50% 
of our population, they just stay at home” – while praising the NGOs for their role in 
emancipating women’s lives. They criticised the patriarchal values which linked a 
family’s honour to women’s seclusion – like the vice-principal of one of the private 
schools at the bazaar who said that “women are still suppressed in education and 
choices in life. Women do work in NGOs and banks, but it is not considered 
honourable. Teaching is the only honourable profession [for women].” – and 
appreciated how the presence of NGOs helped them challenge this view. More 
importantly, they created a discourse based on risk, as seen in Sajida’s comments where 
“the earthquake changed our lives, there is more awareness[agaahi]. Nobody used to 
educate their women, now people do it because they realised that they have less 
securities in life. Women are expected to do jobs.” – to justify their entering the male-
dominated public working space. 
Their narratives were permeated by ‘buzzwords and fuzzwords’ (Cornwall, 2007) 
similar to the ones used in the development industry’s discourses, such as ‘gender 
equality’, ‘empowerment’, and ‘awareness’, which were associated with ‘building back 
better’. These buzzwords were not created in a void, but often by interacting with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Curiously, unlike in Bangladesh where there was a widely view “that women who worked in the 
garment industry were of loose moral character (…) that even the epithet of ‘garment girls’ had come to 
assume a pejorative meaning within local discourse” (Kabeer, 2000: 83), here the ‘lack of morality’ was 
blamed on NGOs and not on the women working for them.	  
163 Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front, the main political organisation seeking independence of PaK and 
IaK from both India and Pakistan.	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development industry through the NGOs and the state. For instance, regarding ‘gender 
equality’ and ‘empowerment’, the state’s ‘Gender Policy for Earthquake Affected 
Areas’ (ERRA, 2007e: iii), proclaimes that “gender equality must be considered as an 
integral part of all ERRA policies, programmes and projects” where “women’s social 
and economic empowerment is central to achieving [this] gender equality.” In a way, 
these buzzwords infiltrated these narratives through the use of the word ‘better’, which 
was what Jauhola (2010) discovered in the post-tsunami reconstruction in the 
Indonesian province of Aceh. She argues that the ‘better’ in the ‘build Aceh back better’ 
slogan adopted by many development agencies involved in post-tsunami reconstruction 
was not understood to be just about technical reconstruction with better quality, but also 
about reconstructing ideas, ideals, and norms, in which “bodies [became] sites for 
deployment of ethical and political values” (Jauhola, 2010: 189). 
There were, of course, other views in the middle of this spectrum. Many informants told 
me that they approved of women working as social workers, as long as they worked 
relatively close to their homes so they could reach them before dark. Ali Naqvi laid 
down ‘the rules’ while explaining to me which types of occupations women could do: 
“Teaching is considered the most respectful [occupation] for women. They also work in 
hospitals or become social workers with NGOs. But we make it clear to them: females 
shouldn’t work very far from home. They should work at a place which is accessible 
through a pakka road and they should come back home in the evening.” The problem 
for them was not that women working questioned men’s role as ‘provider’ but as 
‘protector’ – men, after all, ‘allowed’ their women to work with these NGOs initially. 
Bashir’s description of how this event turned out was as following: “Many NGOs164 
came after the earthquake and some women from our village started working with them, 
mostly doing surveys. After seeing women travelling to far-off places and coming home 
at night our people in the village opposed that. Soon, women stopped working for these 
NGOs.” By arriving late at home women were not fulfilling their part of the patriarchal 
bargain as good housekeepers and, more importantly, women, particularly young 
women, were seen as vulnerable and therefore should not be left alone nor far from 
home. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 By NGOs he was referring to UNICEF, ERRA, NRSP, and Lok Sanjh, i.e. an international 
organisation, the state, a national and a local NGO.	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Economically, the impact of these NGOs was felt not only through the quantity of 
money they brought in,165 but also through job creation. Many people within the region 
sought employment with development agencies, especially with international NGOs as 
they provided very competitive salaries. Raza said that before the earthquake “people’s 
priority job used to be teaching [in government schools] but since the earthquake it was 
NGO job. Not so much now, as international NGOs have left and local NGOs pay local 
salaries.” Despite most international NGOs wrapping up their programmes one or two 
years after the earthquake, as many of them were relief-oriented, many local NGOs 
continued to hire staff throughout the reconstruction and rehabilitation stages. For 
instance, the number of staff in the National Rural Support Programme (NRSP), 
Pakistan and PaK’s largest NGO, increased from 86 before the earthquake to an average 
of 500 to 600 in the relief and reconstruction stages, and stabilised at 200 plus in the 
rehabilitation stage (see table 9). 
Table 9 – Number of NRSP offices and staff in PaK before and after the earthquake 
 March 2005 March 2006 March 2011 
Main offices 4 8 8 
Sub-offices 6 48 6 
Total offices 10 56 14 
Total Staff 86 485 236 
Source: NRSP employee records 
The increase of employment opportunities had not only an economic impact but, 
perhaps more importantly, a social one.166 It impacted particularly in the perception that 
the gender composition of the local work force had begun to shift towards there being 
more women workers. Most of the ‘proof’ that proponents and opponents of enhancing 
women’s access to work outside the home could draw on concerned the increase, 
following the earthquake, in the number of women working for NGOs. Although the 
absolute number of women working in NGOs had increased, the relative proportion of 
women to men remained numerically insignificant167 – but the increase was morally 
significant. Taking NRSP again as an example, while the number of female workers had 
increased post-earthquake, so had the overall number of employees, but the proportion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 An officer at the Bank of Kashmir told me that their turnover before the earthquake was around seven 
million rupees per month. With the arrival of NGOs and the government housing compensation scheme a 
year after it was thirty million.	  
166 It also had a political impact, as NGO jobs were often contested through existing patronage networks 
(see Chapter Four).	  
167 The same applied to International Organisations. For instance, of a total of 78 World Food Programme 
employees working in PaK until December 2011 only nine were women, a total of 11.5% of their 
workforce (Source: WFP employee records).	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of women to men had in fact slightly decreased (see table 10). When probing deeper the 
perception of the increase in women’s NGO employment, through conversations with 
NGOs’ staff and school principals (the presumable employers), I was told that many of 
these NGO jobs were in fact teaching positions in privately-funded or NGO-funded 
schools, where a sizeable proportion of the new positions were filled by women who 
had lost their previous teaching jobs following the destruction of their old schools – a 
redeployment of unemployed women. 
Table 10 – Gender-wise distribution of NRSP staff in PaK before and after the earthquake 
 March 2005 March 2006 March 2011 
Total Staff 86 485 236 
Women 14 64 32 
Women (%) 16.3 13.2 13.6 
Source: NRSP employee records 
Likewise in private businesses, the increase in women’s employment was no more than 
a perception. A good example was that of private telecommunication companies, which 
did not exist before the earthquake and mushroomed all over PaK. These companies 
mostly hired young male adults or redeployed the same male adults who used to work 
in PCOs. The fact that people heard a female automated voice (regardless of 
telecommunication company) made many think that there was a sizeable number of 
women working in these companies. 
Finally, the ‘proof’ that people used to show the increase in women’s mobility was the 
number of women in public spaces, i.e., it concerned women’s physical mobility. The 
perceived increase in the number of women in public spaces was directly and indirectly 
linked to NGOs: directly as providing working places, seen in Ali Naqvi’s assertion that 
“before [the earthquake] you would see one woman – usually with a sick child – in a 
bus; now you see up to 40% women going to jobs”; and indirectly as the salaries 
obtained from working in NGOs were – according to people who opposed women 
working outside the home – used to consume luxury items. As Bashir complained: 
“Women are becoming more materialistic. They waste their [earned] money in make-up 
and new clothes.” 
During my fieldwork and travels in PaK, mostly in rural and urban bazaars, I observed 
not more than a few women in these public spaces. Even in the offices of NGOs, the 
number of female staff could be counted on one hand. Yet both proponents and 
opponents of increasing women’s access to work outside the home hyped these 
numerically insignificant figures and made them morally significant. Both groups 
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developed a series of similar narratives whereby the earthquake and the arrival of 
development agencies, namely NGOs, were the origin of a perceived increase in 
women’s mobility. While doing so, both groups were stating that, because of the 
earthquake and its aftermath, there was a shift of women’s activities from ‘labour’ to 
‘work-kaam’ and ‘work-kaar’. However, comparing pre- and post-earthquake 
employment figures reveals that the pre-existing gender relations in the region’s 
workforce remained largely unchanged after the earthquake. Furthermore, despite 
voicing similar narratives each group created different discourses for different aims, 
with proponents trying to increase women’s access to work outside the home and 
opponents trying to curtail it. In the following section I analyse how the same events – 
the earthquake and the arrival of development agencies – were used differently 
according to the agendas of different actors. 
 
Using the Earthquake to… 
Most people in the region voiced similar narratives on the earthquake as an event that 
had increased women’s access to work outside the home. Yet, there existed a polarity in 
their explanations of the meaning of this increase. People’s interpretation of the same 
event differed according to their predisposition and actions towards women’s 
emancipation. On one side of the spectrum proponents of increasing women’s access to 
work outside the home used the earthquake to develop a discourse that sought to 
continue this increase; on the other side, opponents developed one that aimed to curtail 
women’s mobility. The stories on both sides revealed that this struggle for an increase 
in women’s physical and socio-economic mobility – a struggle for access to ‘work’ and 
‘action’ – was not new. Accounts of active life before the earthquake showed that it had 
also existed before the earthquake. However, the earthquake gave it a new impetus. 
 
…Curtail Mobility 
In April 2009, when the night temperature is still cold in the hills of PaK, my research 
assistant and I arrived once more at what was my initial ‘base camp’ in the region: 
Rawalakot. After an eight-hour drive from Lahore, we initiated our ‘ceremonial’ 
routine. We stopped first at the brightly lit Gulf Departmental Store, the newest 
supermarket in town built after the earthquake, stretched our legs and amused ourselves 
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by blowing steam out of our mouths in April (in Lahore the temperatures were already 
above 30˚C). After a quick salaam to the clerks, we went in to buy American chocolate 
cookies, Pringle crisps, Ceres juice, Nutella spread and all other ‘essential’ items for 
breakfast and late night snacks. From there we drove through the dimly lit Pukhtoon 
adda to the PDA Guesthouse; again more salaams, this time with hugs as we were 
starting to be considered rishtedars (“our brothers from Lahore”), a short discussion on 
what to eat for dinner (the options always being chicken karahi or daal), and we finally 
entered the eternally cold rooms in which we always stayed. I threw down my bags, 
switched on the TV, went in for a quick wash and,… there was nothing on TV! I flicked 
through the channels and nothing, except PTV. When Aziz, the cook-cum-waiter-cum-
everything came in with our meal we asked if the cable was operational and he said that 
cable TV was now banned. “Why?”, I enquired. “Pornography”, he said. “The cable 
operator had a channel showing local girls naked, so the police stopped transmission 
and the guy ran away. The police is now looking for him to arrest him.” Having to make 
do with the rest of what promised to be a quiet night, I got into bed with Eric Wolf’s 
Europe and the People Without History and made a mental note to probe the next 
morning what this hullabaloo was all about. 
“They’re all crazy, all of them. The maulvis, the police, even the local government!” 
Sardar Zulfiqar was not pleased with the latest events in Rawalakot. While sipping hot 
tea early morning in the garden at the back of his house he told us the whole story: 
“A few days ago some maulvis got together and complained to the AC that 
the cable TV was showing pornographic films in one of its channels. They 
told him that these films were made with local girls. Some said by sons of 
influential people, others by NGO workers filming their female colleagues 
naked. They had used these new mobile phones with cameras. Now they 
were asking the government to do something about it. In a knee-jerk 
reaction, the government decided to ban cable TV, ban the youth from 
carrying mobiles, and ban women from walking alone in the bazaar. They 
even banned cassette players in public transport!” 
“What about the cable operator?”, I asked, “Why did he run away?” Sardar Zulfiqar 
gave me a dirty look. “He didn’t run anywhere; when all this happened I called him to 
ask what was going on. He had no clue of what was happening. By coincidence he was 
away in Islamabad buying more hardware for his business and he was in shock when I 
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told him the whole story. Right now he’s still there, waiting for things to calm down, but 
he already called the AC and told him that these are all lies. Even if he had access to 
porn, why would he put it on cable for everybody to see?” 
After tea we drove by the bazaar to see the impact of the latest bans. While the (already 
small) number of women had dwindled, the number of police had swollen. We later 
found out that the increase in police numbers was to make sure that women were not 
seen walking alone, that young men were not carrying mobile phones, and that buses 
and taxis were not playing music.168 
Despite the ban being only two days old, it was the main topic of discussion in Chinati 
bazaar. As I entered Imtiaz’s shop he immediately told me of the rumour that “the 
government in Rawalakot has imposed a ban on girls walking alone in the bazaar and a 
ban on cassette players in buses. It was because some NGOs started making 
pornographic films with local girls.” 
This story is a good example of the kinds of activities some people took to curtail the 
perceived post-earthquake increase in women’s mobility, by linking it to what most 
believed was its originator: the NGOs. Analogous to the case of women employed in 
the garment industry in Bangladesh (Kabeer, 2000: 84), the general disapproval of 
women working for NGOs “was constantly fuelled by rumours about ‘incidents’ of a 
sexual nature relating to [these working women], spread by word-of-mouth or reported 
in newspaper articles, and often assuming a very exaggerated form.” As White (2000: 
310) states, “stories and rumours are produced in the cultural conflicts of local life; 
they mark ways to talk about the conflicts and contradictions that gave them meaning 
and power.” Likewise, people who opposed women’s access to work outside the home 
in post-earthquake PaK created and recreated rumours such as this one to talk about the 
contradictions of enabling women to work. As in this example, opponents of increasing 
women’s access to work outside the home used three kinds of action in their endeavour: 
they developed a discourse linking post-earthquake women’s presence in the public 
sphere to a loosening of the region’s morality; tried (and often succeeded) to reinforce 
physical segregation in public spaces; and – as a measure of last resort – protested 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 This did not mean that the population took the bans lightly: an older woman who was stopped by the 
police for being alone in the bazaar publicly shamed the police’s mothers so loudly that they gave up on 
her; boys started a game of ‘take a picture of the police’ with their mobiles; and drivers would switch on 
their radios as soon as they would leave Rawalakot.	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(sometimes using violence) with the government to ban agencies or things that the 
earthquake brought, which challenged the ‘moral values’ of their society. 
The common public space used to spread this discourse was the mosque, mostly during 
the obligatory169 Jummah prayers. The theme of the discourse was purdah, where the 
community was reminded of the need to keep women secluded, particularly in the 
changing post-earthquake scenario. The discourse was not religious per se, but was 
claimed to be based on religion, or to be more precise, based on an (often distorted) 
interpretation of religion. And it was for all to hear – despite women not attending 
Jummah prayers, maulvis would sometimes directly addressed the female population in 
their speeches. The following are some snippets told by the local maulvi during his 
sermons at Jummah prayers in the bazaar: “Fatima was the best woman ever, as she 
kept purdah all her life. When she was dying, angel Azrael came to collect her soul, but 
she didn’t want it, as he was a man. So God collected her soul. Mothers, sisters and 
daughters, if you hold Fatima as your mother, start observing purdah!”. The aim of the 
discourse was to restrict women’s mobility – physical and social. Physically, the aim 
was to curtail women’s movements (thereby preventing them from working outside the 
house) and, in a region where often their husbands are away, to even question the 
sanctity of other males of the house. “Someone came to Azrat Mohammad and asked 
him if a brother-in-law could sit together with his bhabi. He said no. You people 
actually think that families getting together and mingling is ok, but let me tell you that 
brothers-in-law are the evil of society. Brothers-in-law are fitna. Women should even be 
careful when going on a journey [alone] with their fathers-in-law!” Socially, the aim 
was to remind people of women’s ‘rightful place in society’: to complement men’s 
activities, not to compete with men to perform men’s activities.170 “In Islam women can 
wear perfume which is colourful, but of no smell. Otherwise they shall feel God’s wrath. 
They can wear it with smell only for husbands and at home. Men can use perfume. But 
if women start imitating men, it’s the beginning of the end. It starts with perfume, then 
starts a chain reaction and it ends in rape. This is what leads to the destruction of 
society. Umar saw a woman wearing perfume and he whipped her with 10 lashes.” 
As before the earthquake, post-earthquake gender-based physical segregation occurred 
in both rural and urban public spaces, although it was more pronounced in urban areas. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 Due to peer pressure this obligation was as much social as religious.	  
170 The kind of ‘sexual apartheid’ Jeffery refers to (1979: 21).	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This segregation was many times more subtle, with a rearrangement of male and female 
public spaces conductive to ‘separate development’. For instance in Rawalakot, with the 
sprawling of the bazaar following the reconstruction stage, a new market appeared close 
to the women’s degree college.171 This was a custom-built market catering to young 
women’s needs, with shops selling women’s clothing, cosmetics, food, books and 
stationary, and therefore young women did not need to go to the (male) main bazaar. In 
a region where most private and, due to a lack of girls schools, even some government 
middle and higher schools are co-educational, some religiously-oriented (and funded) 
private schools started segregating their classes. As Ayub, the principal of READ, 
proudly conveyed to me at his office one day, “ours is the only school that isn’t co-ed. 
Although so far only the 9th grade is segregated, we are planning to segregate middle 
classes soon as well.” 
Physical segregation was not only applied to women. Sometimes efforts were made to 
deter men from idly congregating in large numbers in public places close to female 
areas. In Chinati bazaar there used to be two karamboard rooms where men of all ages 
would spend their time playing the game. These rooms were located nearby the private 
schools, where female teachers were the majority. The local maulvi used the mosque’s 
loudspeakers to complain that this activity was unIslamic. His reasoning was based on 
the fact that gambling was illegal, it created idleness, and idle men would stare at 
women. “He said men would tend to gather around and when there are men gathered 
around it is very difficult for women to pass, as men would stare at them.” The maulvi 
also said that random people would start coming to their bazaar and thefts would 
happen. After much persuasion, the karamboard rooms were closed until five years 
after the earthquake, when another room was ‘secretly’ opened.172 
Finally, a third type of action people used to curtail women’s work outside the home 
was by protesting and demonstrating against the those who provided them with work, 
the NGO agencies. These protests were mostly organised and spearheaded by the 
maulvis who, similarly to Kabeer’s (2000: 82) Islamic economists in Bangladesh, 
professed that women’s employment not only took work away from men, “the natural 
breadwinner of the family, but it represented a threat to the very fabric of the moral 
order.” The situation turned violent in August 2006, after a group of maulvis in Bagh 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Itself on the outskirts of Rawalakot.	  
172 A few steps down the mosque and in between the two private schools.	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city threatened violent protests if aid agencies would not dismiss all their female 
employees. 
“We have told the administration that we will not allow NGOs to exploit our 
women and asked them to give a date suitable to them for removal of all 
female workers. If our demand is not met then we will take direct action and 
extreme steps. There will be demonstrations and damage may be caused to 
public property and a law and order situation would be created in the area. 
They [NGOs] hire beautiful girls and take them to Islamabad for enjoyment. 
They keep women in offices as decoration pieces because we know that 
women have no work and there is no such work that men cannot do.” Syed 
Atta Ullah Shah, maulvi of Bagh’s central mosque (AFP, 2006) 
Despite negotiations moderated by the government between aid agencies and the 
maulvis, the latter mobilised sizeable crowds a few times after Jummah prayers to 
protest. A small number of these turned violent, with mobs breaking into NGO offices 
and burning their vehicles. When all aid agencies stopped their operations for a short 
while, the unhappy population (and government officials) pressured the maulvis to stop 
the protests, which they did. A few years later, I met some of the protesters in Bagh city, 
including a fruit vendor who still blamed NGOs for the post-earthquake ‘modernism’ in 
the area. He proudly told me that he was part of the group that protested against them 
and attacked their offices “but the NGOs had managed to stay with government’s help.” 
 
…Increase Mobility 
On the other side of the spectrum, proponents of further enhancing women’s access to 
work interpreted the impact of the earthquake differently. While concurring with 
opponents of women’s access to work outside the home that – following the earthquake 
and the arrival of development agencies – this access had increased, proponents used 
the earthquake to advocate a continuation of this increase. They created a counter 
discourse based on risk where the increase of post-earthquake women’s work outside 
the home was essential for a return to normality. This counter discourse also challenged 
the idea that an increase of women’s mobility would made women less honourable by 
pointing out that honourable women belonging to high-status biraderis also worked 
outside the home. Finally, there was another clear difference within these discourses, 
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inasmuch as the opponents backed their stance using a new element – the arrival of 
development agencies – whereas proponents used an existing one – education. By 
linking the need for more women’s education to minimising future risks, proponents 
were in fact ‘proving’ that there was a need for an increase in and diversification of 
women’s work. 
For a vast number of families the level of housing reconstruction needed after the 
earthquake was, even after receiving government compensation, beyond their financial 
means. Not only did the houses have to be rebuilt, but most of their household 
possessions had to be re-bought, having been damaged or destroyed during the collapse 
of the houses. Especially during the first few months, household bills increased with 
rising prices of goods and the added burden of medical bills for those who had been 
injured during the earthquake. Many people’s livelihoods were affected by the 
earthquake – from shopkeepers whose shops got destroyed, to schoolteachers who had 
no schools in which to teach, to farmers who lost all their cattle and whose access to 
water vanished with the changes in watercourses and drying up of chasmas. More than 
just remaking houses, many families had to remake their lives, a long, painstaking 
endeavour to which the more members of the house could contribute, the less insecure 
their futures would be. 
Ali Naqvi’s khandan, a relatively better-off Syed family, was one of those. Before the 
earthquake they owned a considerable amount of land, a couple of buffaloes and all the 
working-age males were employed, most in white-collar jobs in the region. Although 
the women within the family were highly educated,173 their affluence allowed them not 
to work outside the house. The earthquake changed all this; most of their houses were 
damaged, many possessions were lost, and their cattle died when the sheds collapsed. 
Even more crucial was the impact the earthquake had on their livelihoods, as most of 
their workplaces were affected and for some months they did not have access to income, 
at a time when their savings and incomes were essential to recover. That forced them to 
adopt some unwanted measures such as selling parts of their land – which Dadijee, Ali 
Naqvi’s mother-in-law, lamented by saying that “we used to be very affluent. We used 
to have lots of land but the earthquake shook us” – and borrowing from relatives, and 
rethinking livelihood strategies, namely increasing the number of working family 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Most having degrees.	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members. In the case of Ali Naqvi’s household, that meant his wife and his elder 
daughter becoming schoolteachers. 
The fact that, following the earthquake, more women from higher biraderis, such as the 
Syed and the Kiani, known for their stricter enforcement of purdah, were working 
outside the house without losing honour, gave women in general the chance of working 
using this observation as a ‘principle of precedent’. This precedent though, was based 
on the premise that women had the required qualifications. In many cases they did, 
thanks to the ‘trendsetting’ women from higher biraderis – according, of course to these 
women – such as in the case of Rehana, a Kiani schoolteacher: 
“In Matric I was focused on education, but my relatives had rishtas 
[marriage proposals] from both sides. My father decided who I should marry 
and I got engaged to a cousin who was also my class fellow. He left for the 
Gulf and after some time he refused to marry me. There was a lot of tension 
for eight years and then my brother sent me to Bagh where I did my BA. 
Then after everybody followed my brother’s idea and started sending their 
daughters to Bagh for further studies.” 
In the early eighties, Douglas and Wildavsky developed a “cultural theory of risk” 
(1982, in: Douglas, 1992: 46), where they stated that risk was socially constructed, i.e., 
the way people decided which risks to take and which to avoid depended on their social 
organisation and cultural values. Douglas and Wildavsky’s notions of risk perception 
are crucial in trying to unravel how societies react to risk – as Shaw (2000b) notes, risk 
perception and decision-making have to be understood in the cultural context where 
they are embedded. Yet, this theory “construes individuals as socially constrained” 
(Boholm, 1996: 70) and therefore lacks “active agency” (Paine, 2002: 67), as according 
to Douglas (1992: 78) “individuals transfer their decision-making to the institutions in 
which they live”. In the villages around Chinati, proponents of increasing women’s 
access to work outside the home made use of the earthquake to re-construct notions of 
risk intertwining it with the need for women’s emancipation. 
In their narratives of access to work, men and women used risk and insecurity as a 
discourse to push for more social and economic mobility,174 as well as to bridge the gap 
between social hierarchies. “The Syed family is more focused towards studying and they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 As did Kabeer’s (2000) respondents.	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give high priority to it, but after the earthquake things have changed. We have to send 
our daughters to study so they don’t worry about crises”, said Siddiqui, a Raja from 
Serabad. Yet, for women from higher biraderis, as well as for women from other 
biraderis, working as teachers outside the house was not an activity triggered by the 
earthquake. As seen previously, a large percentage of teachers before the earthquake 
were women. But in a way, the earthquake as an event was worded into a wake-up call. 
Many people used the term ‘awareness’ (agaahi) when explaining how the underlying 
post-earthquake insecurity made many families rethink the role of women as household 
earners. Mobeen, the JKLF member, thought of it as a radical rupture: “The earthquake 
changed our lives. People started watching more TV, more awareness, nobody used to 
educate their women, now people do because they realised that they have less securities 
in life. Women are expected to do jobs.” This wake-up call was not because women 
were previously denied an education, nor were they denied opportunities to become 
teachers. This wake-up call was for women to obtain an education that would allow 
them to go beyond teaching, to have careers needed in the region, such as doctors and 
social workers (samaji kaarkun). Particularly health-related careers were seen, after the 
earthquake, as essential to ‘becoming modern’. In my interactions with Mobeen he 
often complained that ‘occupied Kashmir’ (meaning IaK) had four medical colleges and 
PaK had none.175 Women too, complained about the lack of health care providers and 
facilities and remarked how health-related careers were acceptable for women but that 
there were no opportunities. Jameela, the Lahori-born housewife from Sarian said: 
“We need first aid service. We have to call nurses from far whenever we are 
sick. People here can’t even check blood pressure. We have to spend a lot of 
time travelling, it costs Rs. 1,200 to reach a doctor. My husband is only 
earning Rs. 4,000 month. My sister-in-law is educated, but she doesn’t know 
how to treat people. Life changed here after the earthquake. Now we are 
aware that women have to be self-sufficient.” 
Competing for what traditionally was seen as a male activity in a region where (male) 
unemployment and underemployment was high, aspiring to have a career (particularly a 
kaar-related career) meant having to prove that women would be better than men. A 
starting point was to acknowledge that women were better students than men. Despite 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 One year after my fieldwork, PaK witnessed the creation of its first medical colleges (one public and 
one private).	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everybody agreeing with this statement, there was a noticeable discrepancy between 
male and female narratives regarding the number of years women spent in school. 
Mohammad Riaz, a Gulf migrant, told me that “girls are better students than boys. They 
stay longer in school and many become teachers.” Jameela, on the other hand, 
complained that “here, when women are in 9th grade the talks start for marriage. This is 
something that is keeping women from progressing.”176 There was also a male/female 
discrepancy in how far from home women could go for schooling. Ali Naqvi told me 
that girls were more educated than boys and that “boys are sent to Rawalpindi and 
degenerate, while girls are more responsible and go for higher studies. Girls come back 
and teach or work for NGOs if families allow it.” The counter-narrative, of which 
Akram Bibi’s comment was representative, was that “girls are not educated beyond a 
certain time for there is a lot of travelling.” 
Although in some cases women did manage to migrate temporarily to urban centres in 
Pakistan for further studies,177 most women’s options were curtailed due to physical 
(im)mobility. Still, that did not prevent them from aspiring to have careers and trying to 
circumvent their physical immobility through distance learning,178 or by setting up 
special arrangements to enhance ‘secluded’ mobility. Bashir told me of one: “Schools in 
villages teach up to Matriculation. For college education boys and girls have to go to 
Bagh and Rawalakot. There is a [special] van that picks girls up in the morning and 
drops them back after college.” Yet, it was rare for women to challenge directly classic 
patriarchal values, as illustrated by women’s choices of careers other than teaching. 
Papanek (1982: 200) mentions that the assumptions of the purdah system were still 
persistent in the early 1980s in Pakistan when women tried to enter the modern sector of 
the economy as “most occupations either [grew] out of the demands of a purely female 
clientele or they [were] assimilated to traditional feminine role concepts”. The same can 
be said of this region, as the vast majority of younger schooled women aspired to 
become teachers or better still, doctors.179 With medicine and teaching as ‘honourable’ 
professions, women’s aspired role was still one of caring and rearing, an extension of 
their responsibility for social reproduction (Harris and Young, 1981). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 This observation might help explaining the change in Bagh district’s student enrolment: until grade 
eight there are more girls than boys enrolled in public schools, but from grade nine onwards the numbers 
switch (P&D AJK, 2009).	  
177 There were a few women who were studying in Islamabad and living with relatives.	  
178 Many women were enrolled in the Allama Iqbal Open University.	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Even though a common narrative about the earthquake as an event that increased 
women’s mobility developed in Chinati bazaar, its interpretation varied, depending on 
people’s understanding and practices of women’s seclusion and exclusion. These 
different interpretations gave way to different strategies. At one end of the spectrum, 
opponents of women’s work outside the home developed a discourse linking post-
earthquake mobility to a loosening of the region’s morality, tried to reinforce physical 
segregation in public spaces, and actively protested to ban actors and things that the 
earthquake brought which challenged the ‘moral values’ of their society. All of this was 
done in an attempt to curtail women’s mobility. At the other end of the spectrum, 
proponents of increasing women’s access to work outside the home created a counter 
discourse based on risk and status. These opposing forces made use of the same event – 
the earthquake – to both narrow and widen the area for women’s contestation of access 
to ‘work’ (kaam) and, indirectly, ‘action’ (kaar). 
 
Conclusion 
It is inevitable that a major event such as the earthquake should have an impact on the 
lives of women in a different way than it affects the lives of men. According to the 
narratives and discourses developed by the men of Chinati bazaar, the greatest change 
of all that had come about in the lives of women (according to the accounts of men) was 
in the arena of women’s mobility and in their access to work outside the home. Their 
stories revealed, however, that this change had affected not just the women but also the 
men, in that it raised large questions about their society and their value systems. Some 
thought that their social system was endangered by these changes and that the very 
fabric of their society had been torn apart, while others believed that this change 
indicated that they were now well on their way to becoming ‘modern’. 
In this chapter I contextualised these male discourses on women’s work, mobility and 
morality within local notions of work and labour, and conceptualised them using 
Arendt’s theory of human activity. I argued that in this region most of women’s 
activities were considered ‘labour’, only sometimes were they ‘work’, and very seldom 
were they considered ‘action’, and that there was a gendered struggle not only for 
‘work’ (kaam), but also for ‘action’ (kaar). The earthquake as an event appeared to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 There were, of course, exceptions. Aneela, a young daughter of a jeep driver often said – when passing 
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widen this pre-existing area of struggle and, according to the storytellers of Chinati 
bazaar, was used by both men and women to renegotiate the relations between genders. 
As in previous chapters, and in keeping with my main argument, I found that, even 
within this arena, changes that were attributed to the ‘earthquake event’ and the 
‘assistance event’ – which brought with it a multitude of development agencies – 
actually pre-dated the earthquake. This was evident in the men’s stories of active life in 
the villages around Chinati bazaar before the earthquake. However, recent events 
allowed people to develop their arguments and to develop different strategies that made 
use of the earthquake to narrow and widen (respectively) the area for women’s 
contestation of access to ‘work’ and, indirectly, ‘action’. It also seems that the 
earthquake provided the opportunity to strengthen an on-going underlying struggle by 
women for access to and control of public space. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
by her father’s car – that when she would grow up she would like to be a driver and speak English.	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Chapter Seven 
Out with the Old, In with the New: The Demise of Agriculture around 
Chinati Bazaar 
 
Introduction 
“Progress came after 1974; before [that] we were agriculturalists.” Ali 
Naqvi, elderly Syed. 
 
As I started my fieldwork in Chinati bazaar and its surrounding villages one of the first 
things that struck me in the stories I heard was the apparent diminishing importance of 
farming as an occupation. This was surprising, largely because agriculture, be it 
subsistence, had always played a major role in people’s lives in this region. The decline 
of agriculture was not linked to a single factor or event. Instead, a series of factors were 
responsible for this, some of which had their origins in events that occurred more than 
four decades ago with the beginning of mass migration to the Gulf, while others were as 
recent as the 2005 earthquake. Yet, like the arenas of change that I discussed in the 
previous chapters, the earthquake played a key role in the demise of agriculture 
according to the storytellers of Chinati bazaar. Most stories of changes in farming 
patterns started with a reference to the ‘earthquake event’, and villagers would then go 
on to explain why they had stopped farming in its aftermath. They pointed out that the 
earthquake had caused many chasmas (streams) to either change their course or simply 
run dry, thereby making agriculture nearly impossible due to the lack of water. 
In this chapter I examine these narratives in detail and look at the shifting trends in 
people’s way of thinking about agriculture in PaK, and at how farming practices 
changed in the villages surrounding Chinati bazaar after 2005. However, as in previous 
chapters, I also pay attention to and analyse the underlying sub-texts of these narratives, 
and listen attentively to their stories of everyday life in the region before the earthquake. 
These help me unveil, once again, the larger theme behind the disengagement with 
agriculture, namely the shift from a traditional self-sufficiency to a modern global 
interdependence. This, I argue, reflects a more continuous process of change that pre-
dates the earthquake, but was highlighted in its aftermath. 
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The Demise of Agriculture 
The assumption that farmers in this region had been dependent on watercourses to water 
their crops makes us believe that some form of irrigation was used in the fields, when, 
in fact, only 0.22% of farms, a minute percentage, used any method of artificial 
irrigation (GoAJK, 2000). Bagh District, like most of PaK was part of what Frederick 
Drew (1875) calls ‘the middle mountains’, situated in the Southwest of the Pir Panjal 
range which, similarly to northern Punjab, is known for its rainfed farming system, 
locally described as barani (rainfed).180 This means that rarely was water used for 
irrigation, as crops survived due to rainwater, making them dependent on potentially 
erratic rainfall. This dependency made farming a risky occupation, seldom profitable, 
and therefore the association of barani areas to subsistence agriculture. 
This region usually witnesses two rainy periods throughout the year, which translate 
into two rainfed cropping seasons: a winter season, where crops (known as rabi) are 
sown in early winter and harvested in late winter or early summer; and a summer 
season, with crops (known as kharif) sowed in early summer and harvested in late 
summer or early winter. Summer is the most important cropping season, with 84% of 
the total cropped area in Bagh District used for kharif crops, compared to only 15% 
used for rabi crops, with the remaining 1% being occupied by orchards (GoAJK, 2000). 
The most important kharif and rabi crops in this region are maize and wheat, 
respectively (see Table 11). 
Table 11 – Share of different crops within cropped area in Bagh District (percentage) 
 Maize (grain) Wheat Rice Fodders Vegetables Others 
Cropped area 78 15 1 4 – 1 
Kharif 94 – 1 5 – – 
Rabi – 95 – 2 1 2 
Source: GoAJK, 2000. 
At a first glance it appeared that most people used the earthquake and its impact on 
water availability as a way of thinking about the demise of agriculture. When probed 
deeper though, I noticed that water shortage was a crucial element in people’s lives 
beyond agrarian production: changes in watercourses had disrupted daily life. 
According to the 1998 Census (PCO, 1998), only 34.6% of PaK’s rural population had 
access to piped water, while more than 65% used to fetch water from communal sources 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 From the Persian baran (rain), literally meaning “land watered by rain”.	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before the earthquake. After the earthquake, about 1,641 water supply schemes were 
damaged throughout the region, drastically increasing the number of rural households 
dependent on communal sources. As some villages had more access to water than 
others, the ones with limited access devised mechanisms to share the limited availability 
of water through rationing. In Sarian the village committee decided that each house 
would get access to half an hour of water every 24 hours. This water was to be used 
only for cooking and drinking, with rainwater collected from the (new) tin roofs used 
for washing and laundry. For some houses hosting sometimes several households (and 
therefore numerous families) even this water was not enough for day-to-day life. 
As throughout Pakistan “inter-annual rainfall values varied significantly, often leading 
to successive patterns of floods and drought” (GFDRR, 2011: 3). People had witnessed 
an alteration in weather conditions in recent years, although not necessarily decreasing 
the overall average precipitation figures. Still, precipitation patterns had changed, with 
rainfall becoming more erratic (both in summers and winters) and the region 
experiencing warmer summers and colder, drier winters. In the winter of 2009/10 the 
lack of precipitation and potential future drought was such that in January the then 
Prime Minister of PaK asked people to offer Namaz-e-Istasqa (prayer for rain), which 
was done in most cities and villages of PaK, including Chinati. Expressing a narrative 
of environmental change, villagers in Chinati associated the change in weather patterns 
to ‘climate change’ and ‘global warming’, concepts debated in the public arena of the 
bazaar. For instance, the Copenhagen Climate Conference of 2009, which was 
happening during my fieldwork, was actively discussed in the bazaar. Some justified 
this narrative by stating that due to the industrial revolution and the subsequent increase 
in pollution levels, rainfall was now more unpredictable and temperatures were getting 
higher. The unpredictability of rain had, then, a direct impact on agriculture in these 
barani areas. It is important at this point to clear our head from images of arid or semi-
arid hills, receiving little or no rain, making it impossible for farmers to grow crops. 
One should not equate barani/rainfed with lack of water. In fact, most areas within PaK 
are actually considered the wettest in Pakistan (Hussain et al, 2009), with high levels of 
precipitation during both winters and summers, a humid sub-tropical climate averaging 
above 1,600 mm of annual precipitation, more than enough to grow most crops. The 
problematic of farming being barani in this region was not the quantity of rainfall, but 
its erraticism. It seemed then that the issue with water was not so much one of lack of 
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water, but more of water harvesting. While there were some NGOs involved in post-
earthquake reconstruction of water tanks and dissemination of water harvesting 
techniques, its targeting was relatively small. 
Despite being the more prominent factor in people’s narratives of the demise of 
agriculture, water availability was not the only one. Another reason that most villagers 
mentioned was the diminishing size of landholdings, this being directly linked to land 
fragmentation (see Table 12). Due to high population growth and associated 
overpopulation, and the following of local Shari'ah inheritance laws, the size of farming 
plots had, in many places, reached a stage where agriculture was simply not profitable 
and was no longer sufficient to feed a family. According to Conway (2011:2) “farms of 
less than 1 hectare [2.47 acres] and with few resources are usually unable to produce a 
surplus for sale and cannot provide enough work or substance for the family.” Taking 
into consideration that the average household size in Bagh District was 7.4, this meant 
in fact that a plot which was initially small – the overall average plot size in Bagh 
District diminished from 2.7 acres in 1972 to 1.9 acres in 2000 (GoAJK, 1975; GoAJK, 
2000) – became further divided into smaller plots, making it unsustainable to grow 
crops, especially staple foods such as maize, wheat or rice. For instance, in Sarian 
Hameed’s grandfather owned 21 kanals of land; his father inherited seven out of which 
he inherited two (respectively, 2.625, 0.875, and 0.25 acres). Within these two kanals, 
Hameed still had to find space to make a house. The fact that Hameed (and many 
others) used kanal as a unit of measurement for agricultural land was evidence enough 
of how small plots were in this area. Kanal is used in Pakistan as a unit of land 
measurement for urban and not rural plots; in rural Punjab, the lowest unit of 
measurement is the keela, which is equivalent to one acre. The kanal is 1/8 of an acre, 
1/20 of a hectare. 
Table 12 – Number of Farms in Bagh District 
1972 2000 Size of farm 
(acres) Number % Number % 
Under 1.0 4,229 17 15,444 34 
1.0 – 2.5 9,979 40 17,339 38 
2.5 – 5.0 7,223 29 9,264 21 
5.0 – 7.5 2,174 9 2,071 5 
7.5 – 12.5 1,052 4 851 2 
12.5 – 25.0 125 1 180 * 
25.0 – 40.0 10 * 20 * 
Above 40.0 9 *  * 
TOTAL 24,801 100 45,169 100 
Source: GoAJK, 1975; 2000. 
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A third factor was linked to the terrain, i.e., hilly, making it hard to work the land. The 
land itself, i.e. the soil, was agriculturally very good. Almas and Saeed’s (2000) study 
of the fertility status of agricultural land in PaK showed that this region was mostly 
composed of loamy soils, with adequate organic matter, ideal range of pH level, and 
available content of phosphorus and potassium – some of the best agricultural soils in 
South Asia. Due to the size and relief of agricultural plots, most of the work had to be 
done manually, as there was limited scope for mechanisation. According to the latest 
agricultural survey (GoAJK, 2000) in Bagh District only 7% of farms used tractors and 
11% used both tractors and draught animals, with the remaining 82% making use of 
only draught animals. Plots needed to be first levelled, which meant the need for 
terracing. The vast majority of terraces in the villages surrounding Chinati were built 
more than 50 years ago. Most villagers said that they did upkeep their terraces, which 
took one to four men from a few hours to about five days annually. While usually men 
stated they kept them to prevent land loss and landslides (through water seepage), 
women mentioned that terraces were worth keeping to provide a platform to grow 
fodder for animals, showing men’s responsibility for keeping the land and women’s for 
keeping livestock. Terracing was one of the hardest agricultural chores that I witnessed, 
as it involved manually building (or rebuilding) a wall with small boulders in a steep 
hill and then compacting the land. When terraces became old they started to crumble 
and boulders from the wall fell downhill. This meant that they had to be carried up the 
hill, through narrow and steep goat paths or even from where there were no paths at all. 
Terracing also needed to be done when building a house; in fact it was obligatory in the 
new building codes to access government compensation. Terracing, therefore, involved 
hard labour and most families depended on strong, healthy males to upkeep them. 
Unfortunately, many of these strong healthy males were either absent – being migrants 
– or, the younger ones, simply had started to decline doing a task that they consider 
below their potential, as after so many years of schooling they aspired to ‘work’ and not 
‘labour’. 
This brings me to two other factors which not only played an important role in 
relegating farming to a less-preferred occupation within society, but became over time 
the main reasons for the diminishing importance of agriculture in people’s lives: 
migration and education. What initially started as an economic strategy to complement 
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barani agriculture,181 soon became one of the main economic activities and one of the 
most sought after. Once a migrant became stable in his job in the Gulf, not only was his 
salary enough to send remittances back home, but it was sometimes also enough for 
other members of the household not to work. Migration, and particularly Gulf 
migration, had divested the region of manpower as well as it had divested the will of 
men to be manpower in their own land. A complementary factor interlinked with 
migration was the increase of education levels in PaK. Since the 1970s literacy figures 
in most of PaK were substantially above the rest of Pakistan (Figure 9). Like migration, 
education was not a novelty although its increase had, to a large extent, replicated the 
increase in migration patterns. Migration (and remittances) had a direct impact on 
education. Education was seen by many as a form of investment, social mobility and 
status, by ensuring the next generations would be more educated and therefore become 
more than farmers. The increase in education levels was not only quantitative, it was 
qualitative too: while most of the young adult population was illiterate around Partition, 
the 1950s and 1960s saw an increase in primary education enrolment, the 1970s and 
1980s an increase in secondary education, and more recently, from the late 1990s 
onwards, higher education. As Ali Naqvi told me, “a generation ago, when parents 
were illiterate, they only wanted their children to get some shahoor [consciousness]. 
Now parents prepare their children to become doctors, engineers, CSP [Civil Service of 
Pakistan] officers, etc.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Often more by need than choice.	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Figure 9 – Literacy Rate in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Pakistan (percentage) 
 
Source: AEPAM, 2006; 2010; P&D AJK, 1980; 1990; 2009; PCO, 1998. 
On the back of this education boom, the earthquake made quite an impact; more than 
half of deaths and injuries were of schoolchildren, as they were inside school buildings 
during that Saturday morning.182 But while as an event the earthquake had a negative 
impact on education, in the aftermath of the earthquake – albeit slow – the region saw 
an increase in school institutions,183 both public and private, as well as an increased 
demand for better education. Indirectly, the earthquake had a role to play in the 
aspirations of the younger generations, with more and more people deciding that 
education and a job outside the village was the way forward, a way of avoiding risks, 
such as the risky business of barani agriculture. Yet, job opportunities within the region 
were still were limited and government interventions had not kept up with the rising 
levels of education. Junaid, a bus driver whom I met at the bazaar’s adda, complained 
that “they [government] don’t give us any opportunities for employment, and the 
education level here is above Pakistan. Whoever wants to make it, has to go to Pakistan 
or abroad.” State, donor and NGO post-earthquake livelihood programmes focused 
mostly on agricultural projects and some vocational training (often sewing for women 
and masonry for men) together with microcredit projects.184 The problem was that, like 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 This can be seen in Figure 9, where the literacy rate curve ‘slowed down’ from 2005 to 2008.	  
183 Including the creation of the first medical colleges (one public and one private) in PaK.	  
184 Along with targeted cash grants to poorer families.	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Mirpur since the 1980s, the market-based economy had reached an over-capacity and 
Bagh District had “an excess of entrepreneurs as compared with opportunities to make 
money” (Ballard, 1983: 127). Despite the motto of ‘Building Back Better’, development 
agencies ‘built back the same’. As Bashir lamented in one of our final conversations, 
“it’s so difficult to find jobs these days; so we mostly send our children abroad, just like 
before the earthquake.” 
All these factors contributed over time to a shift in the way people thought about 
agriculture in PaK, visible in a dualistic narrative of farming as something traditional 
and not modern, a type of ‘labour’ and not ‘work’, and an activity increasingly done by 
the women of the house and not the men. It was also connected to the notion that, 
despite food self-sufficiency still being considered honourable, one could attain greater 
honour and status by producing185 abroad and consuming at home. 
 
From Tradition to Modernity 
Figure 10 – “Chemical fertiliser makes the land barren”, Lok Sanjh Foundation 
 
Sitting under the shade of a kahu tree on the perch of his house, after a day’s work at the 
Bagh court, advocate Ali Naqvi and I were sipping a cup of tea and discussing changes 
in PaK. Looking down the valley, through the dark green of the forested areas, the 
bright green of pastures, and the light green of the maize fields,186 populated by the 
blue, orange, red and silver newly built roofs, Ali Naqvi started his description of what 
had changed over time by saying “progress came after 1974; before [that] we were 
agriculturalists.” The event he was referring to was the beginning of the mass 
migration to the Gulf, which dramatically changed the working patterns of this area. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 In the sense of capital accumulation.	  
186 Itself an indication of nitrogen deficiency.	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Able-bodied men, in numbers much higher than ever before, left the fields to go abroad, 
to serve initially in the armies and eventually in the houses, hotels and restaurants of 
other rulers. In the past they had been mercenaries, builders, and caterers to the British 
in the subcontinent, now they did the same in the Arabian Peninsula. There were some 
differences between then and now (more precisely, before Partition and post 1970s): 
then, there were few migrating (most of the soldiers in the British Raj from this region 
were from the other side of the valley, the Rawalakot side), and remittances were rare – 
their pay was so little that few managed to save enough to send back home. Then, they 
were close enough to return to their lands when it was time to sow and harvest. Azfar 
Khan, a retired cook from Sarian said that “farming here was seasonal, depending on 
rains. We made sure we left everything when the rains came and started ploughing. We 
made sure to utilise the land to the maximum.” Now, almost every house had someone 
abroad187 and access to remittances was virtually ubiquitous. Now, only those who 
stayed worked on the land – and not all of those who stayed did that. 
With reference to Ali Naqvi’s comment, what struck me was the clear differentiation, in 
fact opposition, of progress to agriculture. In other words, for him, like for many others 
in this region, farming in PaK was something linked to the past and, therefore, not 
progressive. He used the word ‘agriculturalist’, not as a technical term for an expert on 
agriculture, but in the way it was used under the British Raj for agricultural castes, to 
describe people whose livelihoods depended on agriculture. He was not the only one not 
to classify his forefathers as farmers (kissan) and himself as landowner (zamindar). In 
PaK, approximately 86% of rural households owned land (P&D AJK, 2008), in stark 
contrast to 37% in Pakistan (GoAJK, 2000). Considering oneself a zamindar went 
beyond the simple fact of owning land, a key resource throughout the sub-continent. It 
puts one within what many authors identify as a higher class since the time of Mughal 
rule (Ahmad, 1977; Habib, 1999). Especially in Pakistani Punjab, the neighbouring 
province with which many Poonchis had most linkages with, the title of zamindar was 
strongly correlated to political and socio-economic power. As everywhere else in South 
Asia, more than working the land what mattered most was owning the land. 
In this region, farming was seen not only as an ‘old’ occupation, but also as an outdated 
one. Farming tools were outdated if we compared them to the tools used in more 
modern professions. While “agriculturalists” used hoes, sickles and ploughs, teachers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 ‘Abroad’ including Pakistan.	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and shopkeepers used ‘modern tools’, such as books and mobile phones. Even farming 
calendars were old. The calendar used for farming practices, commonly known as the 
‘local calendar’, by which farming activities were planned and implemented, was the 
Nanakshahi calendar, i.e., the Sikh calendar (see Table 13). This was related to the fact 
that in this region most landlords pre-Partition were Sikh and as such their vernacular 
was the one used for farming activities – which has lasted until today. 
Table 13 – Farming Calendar 
Local Calendar Nanakshahi Calendar Gregorian Calendar Pahari Days Punjabi Days 
December – January Pôh 30 Pôh 30 
January – February Maagh 29 Maagh 30 
February – March Phaagan 30 Phagun 30/31 
March – April Chait 30 Chait 31 
April – May Besaakh 31 Vaisakh 31 
May – June Jaith 32 Jaith 31 
June – July Haar 31 Haarh 31 
July – August Saawan 32 Saawan 31 
August – September Bhadon 31 Bhadon 30 
September – October Asooj 30 Assu 30 
October – November Katak 30 Katak 30 
November – December Maghar 30 Maghar 30 
 
While people in many parts of Pakistan have modernised their agriculture, particularly 
since the event of the Green Revolution in the late 1960s, most landowners in PaK have 
not. In contrast to the use of new technologies and new tools on the other side of the 
Jhelum river188, most landowners in PaK still farm as their forefathers did. Not only do 
they use limited amounts of inorganic fertiliser and no pesticides (see Table 14), but 
they also use draught animals when preparing the fields for sowing instead of tractors. 
Consequently ploughing was severely affected by the 2005 earthquake, as many 
animals died. It left many landowners with one or no livestock, when they needed two 
to pull a plough. The end result was that many fields were left unploughed, mostly those 
that tractors could not reach, i.e., the steeper ones further from roads. As mechanisation 
increased in large parts of Pakistan (especially in the neighbouring Punjab), in PaK 
agriculture still mostly involved manual labour. One still must bear in mind that there 
were other reasons for the limited use of tractors (and other forms of mechanisation), 
namely relief and the small size of landholdings. Yet, just across in northern Punjab, 
where agriculture is similarly rainfed, done in small landholdings in hilly terrain, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 Pakistan.	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where a large number of men migrate to the Gulf or enlist in the army, people still 
modernised farming. 
Table 14 – Farms Reporting Use of Inorganic Fertilisers and Pesticides (percentage) 
Fertiliser Plant Protection Year Bagh District PaK Pakistan Bagh District PaK Pakistan 
1972 11 18 52 0 0 22 
2000 25 37 75 0.04 0.24 27 
Source: GoAJK, 1975; 2000. 
In this region though, the continuous lack of investment in agriculture combined with 
the diminishing size of landholdings meant that farming became over time considerably 
unprofitable, to the extent that even unskilled migrant labourers abroad earned wages 
higher than the income generated by their families in traditional agriculture. Rather than 
off-farm employment complementing families’ incomes, as it was the case until the 
1970s, from this period onwards the bulk of family income was generated by off-farm 
employment, as much as 70% according to one estimate (Fida, 1991, in: FAO, 2003). 
Since then, most households in this region started considering farming neither as 
subsistence nor as fulltime, but as a complementing activity. Similar to Ferguson’s 
(1999: 84) urban workers’ conceptions of town and country using local versions of 
“modernist metanarratives of social science”, here too the myth of modernisation 
theory linked smallholder subsistence agriculture to notions of ‘developing’, 
‘traditional’, ‘rural’, and ‘poor’. Curiously, while PaK had the smallest landholdings 
compared to other Pakistani territories, its poverty levels were much lower.189 Taking 
into consideration that the vast majority of the population of PaK lived in rural areas, as 
seen by an 88:12 rural/urban ratio (Bagh District had a 94:6 ratio), compared to 
Pakistan’s 67:33 (PCO, 1998), rural poverty levels in PaK were half or less than any 
other Pakistani territory before the earthquake (Table 15). 
Table 15 – Poverty Incidence (percentage) 
 Urban Rural 
Pakistan-administered Kashmir 14.5 15.6 
Balochistan 28.4 24.6 
Khyber Pukhtunkhwa 31.2 44.3 
Punjab 26.5 32.4 
Sindh 19.0 29.2 
Gilgit-Baltistan 22.6 36.5 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas 22.6 44.5 
Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, 2001 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 No doubt due to non-farm work and remittances.	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When probed deeper, these notions of farming as the antithesis of being modern 
appeared even more in the younger generations’ discourse. Young people often 
substantiated their avoidance of being involved in agrarian production with the fact that 
agriculture gave little or no profits, that it was something that required lengthy 
investment in terms of time and physical labour, as opposed to a job with regular 
monthly returns. Having been brought up after the 1970s’ migration boom, younger 
generations were more educated than previous generations and thus had higher 
aspirations. For them, farming was ‘here’, at home, and not farming was ‘there’, outside 
the house, preferably abroad. They equated working on the land with no access to the 
Gulf (or Pakistan’s urban centres), no remittances, and stagnation. They saw farmers as 
kissan, not zamindar and they yearned to be in the tertiary sector, not the primary. They 
felt that their education was the passport to modern, not traditional, work. They wanted 
to be teachers, doctors, engineers, civil servants, migrants, and traders, not farmers. For 
them farming was not a business; sometimes it was not even ‘work’, it was ‘labour’. 
 
From Work to Labour 
As seen in the previous chapter, over time there was a paradigm shift in how people in 
this region viewed agricultural work. While older generations talked about farming as 
work (kaam), younger ones that had migrated or had higher levels of education saw 
farming as labour (mazdoori). Some did not even consider agriculture to be a 
profession, seeing it as restricted to the house and as a subsistence activity as a result of 
the smallness of landholdings. It was especially the youth as a group who challenged 
the concept of farming as work. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the placing of 
‘work’ and ‘labour’ (in an Arendtian sense) is susceptible to historical transformations. 
Access to Gulf migration and increase in levels of education opened up new areas of 
struggle and renegotiation for the classification, promotion and demotion of different 
human activities. Particularly in the case of labour and work, jobs were not permanently 
confined to one or another activity. Agriculture, which used to be mainly classified as 
work, had been ‘demoted’ by many to labour over time, due to access to new livelihood 
opportunities, the unprofitability of the occupation, and the shift in actors – from 
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owning males to females and hired labour. For many agriculture was labour: a never-
ending pursuit yielding nothing permanent and characterised by non-freedom.190 
They prescribed agrarian production therefore to labouring groups, i.e., mazdoors, the 
ones who migrated to PaK in search of labour (mostly from KP), lower-ranked 
biraderis who always had worked the land for higher-ranked biraderis (regardless of 
owning themselves land), poorer people who did not get access to migration, and, to a 
certain extent, women. This shift was witnessed by Ballard (1983: 127) in Mirpur where 
returned migrants “seek to avoid any kind of contact with agriculture, regarding it as 
far below their dignity.” Although the case in Chinati was not as extreme as Mirpur 
still, as Manshaat said191 “agriculture is below our status.” It is worth remembering that 
the two words for agricultural work, kaam and mazdoori, also entailed ownership: the 
former used when someone worked in his own land and the latter when someone 
worked in someone else’s land. Farming itself entailed the notion of private ownership, 
as seen by the words used for it here – kheti bari (from khet – field and bar – fence). 
Although I say that farming shifted from being seen as work to being seen as labour, 
this does not mean that farming changed from being kaam to being mazdoori for 
everybody. For instance, people who owned no land but worked on others’ referred to 
agricultural work as mazdoori, while some members of the Raja biraderi, who owned 
land and worked on others’ referred to it as kaam. The rationale was that they worked 
(kaam) in their own fields and farming was their major occupation, which they extended 
to other fields. 
A good example of the shifting nature of the perception of agricultural work in the 
region could be seen during the month of Asooj. When farming was the main 
occupation in PaK, Asooj was the busiest time of the year. “If someone dies in Asooj, 
put him in a trunk and bury him later” was a popular saying in this area. As it coincided 
with maize harvesting, some older people said that Asooj was the name for both maize 
harvesting as well as grass cutting, and associated it with the autumn harvest. However, 
others believed that there was no relation per se, that these two events just happened to 
coexist time-wise, and Asooj was only the name for the practice of communal grass 
cutting. Regardless of being linked to maize harvesting or not, Asooj had always had a 
feel of a harvesting festival (some informants even compared it to Basant in Punjab). In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 Many of my informants talked about being ‘stuck to the land’.	  
191 See section two of Chapter Six.	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the old days, every family would invite people from their village and even other 
surrounding villages to cut the grass on the family’s parcel of land. This seemed to be a 
romanticised view of Asooj, as we cannot ignore that there were at the time strong 
power hierarchies and commensality embedded in the language of biraderi. The 
wealthier ones would offer a simple lunch and an elaborate dinner and everybody, men 
and women, children and old, would cut the grass together. Once they would finish, 
they would move on to the next family landholding, eventually cutting the grass in 
every family plot. This grass was then used both to feed livestock and smallstock over 
the winter, and to thatch roofs. 
Today, and especially after the earthquake, Asooj was done by others, mostly Pukhtoons 
who moved to the region searching for work during post-earthquake reconstruction. 
Yet, the earthquake was not the decisive factor in these new labour arrangements during 
Asooj. As more and more males started migrating to urban centres and abroad since the 
1970s, there was a dearth of manpower within many families during this month. This 
created a class-like cleavage between families with access to labour and access to 
capital (through remittances) with which they could hire such labour. Usually a family 
with a diminished work force was a family whose manpower had migrated and who, 
therefore, had access to capital to hire labour from families with more manpower 
because its men had not migrated. Generally family members would still cut the grass of 
their own plots aided by relatives from within the village, but the assistance across 
biraderis was less, as some members now had the capital to hire labour. The earthquake 
brought with it a new group of labourers – the Pukhtoons – who effectively stopped 
even the need for inter-family assistance, especially in less poor families. It also 
reinforced the notion that Asooj was not ‘work’, it was ‘labour’ and as such labourers 
did it. 
Asooj and many other farming activities – from ploughing to harvesting – were often 
marked by undertones of caste and class differentiations. Some higher-ranked biraderis, 
such as the Syeds and Kianis, mentioned customary agreements between their biraderis 
and lower-ranked ones, where the former traditionally employed the latter as labour 
force to work their lands, as farming – one Syed informant said – was not their 
occupation. In many instances remittances from Gulf migration enabled many families 
– including from lower-ranked biraderis – to move up the social scale, to a position 
where they could now physically disengage from farming by hiring labour to work their 
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lands. Many informants often mentioned that only poor people were farmers (kissan), 
unlike those who migrated or were able to acquire jobs in the formal economy. The 
increase of cheaper labour available post-earthquake – with the arrival of Pakhtoon 
mazdoors – not only affected at times customary agreements, with higher-ranked 
biraderis now preferring to hire these to the detriment of lower-ranked biraderis, but it 
also allowed more families to start hiring labour to farm their lands. Still, many 
households depended on their khandan to either help them farm their lands or to employ 
them to farm their extended families’ land, especially during ploughing and harvesting. 
So, on the one hand, because their healthy males moved abroad (to Pakistani urban 
centres or to the Gulf), many families lost manpower. On the other hand, as in other 
migratory societies (Gardner, 1995), they gained capital to hire manpower to substitute 
their labour loss, fittingly improving their stakes (and status) at being identified as 
landowners and not landworkers or farmers. A relation developed between work and 
location, with people’s activities abroad being associated with ‘work’, and those at 
home with ‘labour’.192 When migrants returned and decided to work, most often they 
would get involved in trade by opening a shop in the nearest bazaar or by starting a 
distributing company. In other words, returned migrants engaged in the tertiary sector. 
As for the younger generation, their aspirations were higher. They tried their best to 
acquire as much education as possible in order to access jobs in the tertiary sector, 
preferably abroad or in the urban centres. These shifts did not, however, mean that 
everybody stopped farming in the region, although there was a decrease of production 
in most crops (Table 16). There were many families who, either because they could not 
access jobs outside farming or because their landholdings were large enough to make 
agriculture profitable, were still engaged in agrarian production. Finally, what many 
families did was to bring farming into the house, through their women. 
Table 16 – Farms Reporting Crops in Bagh District (percentage) 
Year Maize Wheat Rice Oilseeds Fodder Vegetables 
1972 99 50 36 25 1 1 
2000 92 25 31 * 6 1 
Source: GoAJK, 1975; 2000. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 In fact, according to the work they do and the ownership of the means of production, they work or 
labour at home and work or labour abroad (they own their land and therefore work the land, and often are 
hired to work abroad and therefore are labourers).	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From Men to Women 
Figure 11 – “The production and protection of local seeds has been the traditional duty of female 
farmers”, Lok Sanjh Foundation 
 
The importance of women in agrarian production was to a certain extent like beauty – it 
lay in the eyes of the beholder. When talking to most men, the majority disregarded and 
devalued women’s role, summarily relegating them to the sphere of the house, as 
involved in ‘kitchen gardens’.193 When talking to women, they not only brought forth 
the significance they attributed to these kitchen gardens, but also their role within many 
other agricultural activities – and how their importance changed over time. When men 
started migrating in significant numbers, the demographics of the region started tilting 
towards women, more specifically the young, healthy population. This migration 
created a decline of the male labour force in the region, which meant a decline in 
farming. The increase in cash income from migration further marginalised farming and, 
with women becoming the main actors in the region’s agrarian production, further 
marginalised the value of women’s work. The negative impact of migration and 
remittances on agricultural production, more an exception than a rule worldwide, was 
not unique to this part of PaK, as Ballard’s (1983) study of Mirpur shows, nor confined 
to PaK alone. For instance, in Palestine Moors (1995: 29) also noticed that women’s 
labour was less valued due to “the greater centrality of male wage labour and cash 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Not in the French sense of potager, but more like a vegetable patch.	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income for the livelihood of the households and the marginalisation of agriculture, 
largely directed towards subsistence and defined as women’s work.” 
The impact of male migration in shifting the gendered nature of agrarian production 
towards a greater female role was recorded in a FAO study before the earthquake (2003: 
3), which states that this migration “resulted in crop farming and livestock raising and 
management becoming increasingly women's domain.” In this consultation, FAO 
reports a senior officer within the region’s Department of Agriculture stating that in 
about 90% of households livestock rearing was solely a woman’s job. The same study 
acknowledges women playing a more significant role in previously male-dominated 
activities – such as harvesting, cleaning and storage of major crops, namely wheat, 
maize, and fodder – as well as the importance of the vegetable gardens as a source of 
nutrients and even income for many families, with women being in charge of these in 
85% of households. Yet, as farming was mostly seen as the production of staple crops – 
namely cereals – with the key activities being ploughing, sowing and harvesting, in the 
villages surrounding Chinati bazaar most men and women stated that farming was a 
man’s job and that women’s role in agrarian production was limited to kitchen gardens. 
Within the decline of agriculture in this region many people at the bazaar mentioned not 
only a decline in produce of the main crops, namely cereals and rice, but also in variety, 
i.e., type of crops. This picture was more complex than it seemed, as according to the 
various agricultural censuses the area under cultivation for maize, wheat and rice across 
the region as a whole did not change with the onset of mass migration – but it 
drastically decreased for minor cereals, such as pearl millet and sorghum – and the 
number of farms involved decreased. One explanation was related to the fact that even 
with major crops men were not involved in all stages of production, being mostly 
involved with ploughing the fields, sowing (together with women), harvesting and 
sometimes processing. Women (and sometimes children) were then responsible for 
‘rearing’ the crops, what they called palna.194 This meant that men were only needed 
during two moments: ploughing and harvesting. As not all men migrated to the Gulf,195 
non-migrants and men who had migrated to urban areas of Pakistan who could manage 
to come for these two times of the year often covered for this missing manpower. 
Weeding, pest management and all daily agricultural activities were done, as always, by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 Palna was also used when rearing a child or a domestic animal.	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the women. Men were mostly involved with the beginning and the end of farming, i.e., 
the main visible moments of a crop entering and leaving the land (ploughing, sowing, 
harvesting), as well as in activities linking the land to the outside world (buying the 
seeds, taking the harvested grain to the mill, taking the flour to the market). Women’s 
role could pass by ignored, as their actions were ingrained in ‘everyday farming’. Men 
were also busy with energetic food (cereals and rice), as opposed to women who grew 
nutritious food (vegetables, protein, and vitamins). There was a similar pattern with 
livestock rearing, that is, men were involved in buying and selling (or killing) animals, 
but women (and sometimes children) were in charge of rearing. The role of men as 
providers (not only as breadwinners, but as suppliers) and women as rearers was one 
that suited existing social norms, where women’s mobility was limited to the house.196 
Another change that migration brought about was an increase in women’s decision-
making within the house. As I mentioned in the previous chapters, as the male heads of 
many households migrated, they often left their wives in charge of the household, and 
as such in charge of the economy.197 Women felt an increase in decision-making power 
over some matters, including several that they already managed, for example, what to 
feed to whom (household members and guests) and what to grow. But migration 
brought not only an increase in decision-making power, but also an increased budget 
through remittances. Women could now decide if it was worth investing in dairy (a cow 
or a buffalo), chicken, in certain seeds, or on education. Again, this is a simplified 
version, as many households lived together and women’s decision-making abilities 
within families were determined by their relative power vis-à-vis other household 
members, especially their husbands and in-laws. Still, not only did women gain more 
power in deciding what to grow, but also in what not to grow. With remittances, women 
started making food choices based on taste and functionality, a luxury that they did not 
have before migration. For instance, women started mixing vegetables at the table, that 
is, consuming both local and market vegetables as local varieties were often considered 
sour. They started consuming more wheat flour when making rotis, rather than maize 
flour, as flour rotis were easier and faster to make and were better digested than maize 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 Despite the significance of the Gulf migration and the vast number of migrants, one must not forget 
that these were a large minority within the population.	  
196 The house in this context being more than just the physical structure, i.e. the home, with one’s fields 
being considered part of it.	  
197 Literally, ‘household management’.	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rotis.198 And post-earthquake they started eating sliced bread for breakfast, especially 
when they had guests. 
With the earthquake, as mentioned before, agriculture came to a halt, at least in the first 
months after it. One of the biggest impacts of the earthquake was the death of many 
animals and the loss of draught power and milk. In the following years, some of the 
NGOs working in the area tried to ‘reinvent’ agriculture by especially targeting female 
farmers (see Figure 11) and their main farming activities, namely animal rearing and 
kitchen gardens. Two NGOs in particular ‘helped’ people improve their agricultural 
practices and gain access to inputs in some of these villages, NRSP and Lok Sanjh. 
They provided information on accessing free or cheap seeds and fertilisers (with Lok 
Sanjh promoting a more organic and less conventional agriculture – see Figure 10), 
trained female farmers on more efficient farming methods for vegetable production, and 
subsidised or provided credit for the purchase of animals (chicken, goats and cows). As 
Rehana, a Kiani from Hothala said, “Until 10 years ago everybody used to grow maize 
and vegetables, but the new generation stopped [farming]. Now after the earthquake the 
NGOs started encouraging them to return to subsistence farming.” The combination of 
smaller agricultural plots, male migration and access to remittances, availability of 
market food (namely wheat), and the post-earthquake assistance helped bring 
agriculture into the sphere of the house, making farming more of a household chore. 
Recently, creeping inflation intensified the importance of homegrown food as a way of 
reducing costs in most households throughout PaK, irrespective of wealth. Several 
development agencies – particularly those involved in agricultural projects – used this 
food insecurity to advocate a discourse of self-sufficiency as a ‘good’ livelihood 
approach (see Figure 12), not only to make sure households were not food deficient but 
to incorporate notions of a healthier diet and a more frugal life, a ‘simple life’. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 For the past decade or so, the importance of maize shifted in most households from being a human 
staple to animal feed.	  
	   224	  
Figure 12 – “Self-sufficiency in food production at the household level is an important need of the time”, 
Lok Sanjh Foundation 
 
From Production to Consumption 
“The Gulf changed our food pattern. In the old days food [consisted of] 
milk, yoghurt and butter, plus herbs with rock salt and green chillies: 
chutney, lassi, curry, makkan roti. When we grew wheat it was for cattle 
feed – not harvested, just cut. Meat was desi chicken; [it took] 5 years to 
grow, hard to cook. We didn’t boil milk, just let it curd. Dessert, considered 
a delicacy, was a sweet pancake [made with] butter, milk, egg, and sugar. 
To entertain guests you’d give them pancake. Guests would pop in, and 
after gup-chup and chai someone would send a kid running after a chicken. 
Very few people used to drink tea – if you did, you’d often do it without 
milk. From the 1970s onwards eating patterns changed – masalas, desi 
ghee, industrial chicken, Milk Pak, Wheatabix, wheat roti. Now a lot of 
people don’t exercise, and have heart and blood pressure infirmities.” 
Sardar Zulfiqar, retired artist from Rawalakot. 
Despite being in close contact with Punjab for hundreds of years and having migrated to 
many of the main urban cities of the British Raj, working not only as soldiers but also as 
servants and cooks, people in this region did not eat Pakistani/Punjabi food until the 
mid 1970s. From then onwards, however, remittances brought people a new purchasing 
power which quickly created demand for new foods throughout the region. A member 
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of the Raja biraderi told me how he brought this new food to PaK. In the early 1970s he 
used to work as a cook in Karachi and later on as a caterer in Kuwait. One day a 
migrant with “a bit more money to spend” asked him if he could cook and cater for his 
daughter’s wedding. He decided to make biryani and other desi dishes; people liked it 
so much that they asked for the recipes. Since then, he said, everybody started eating 
Pakistani food. Although slightly exaggerated, this anecdote contained the ‘secret 
ingredient’ which did not exist in the previous centuries of contact with Punjab – due to 
the Gulf migration there was now a sizeable number of households that could afford the 
spices, wheat and sugary desserts that were once considered a luxury for the very rich. 
Since then, many new ingredients, foods, and recipes arrived in PaK. From the masalas 
that increased the spiciness of local cuisine, to the wheat flour that made rotis fast to 
prepare and easy to digest, the ready-mix custard packets which were now the main 
dessert dish, the biryanis served in every wedding, the sliced bread for breakfast that 
appeared post-earthquake, PaK cuisine has been radically changed. Saadia, a 
schoolteacher at one of the private schools at the bazaar, commented that “when my 
brother migrated, we were able to go more often to town. In town there are hotels and 
we like food there.” Yet, not everybody liked this food invasion; I often heard negative 
comments from the older generation about this synthetic, plastic, fast food – as opposed 
to the organic, healthy local food. Many of these comments were also linked to the 
concept of taste, with migrants saying tastes had become more refined, while older 
people – particularly from higher status groups – questioning the quality, both nutritious 
and taste, of the new cuisine.199 The clash of tastes was also, to a large extent, a struggle 
for social mobility (see Bourdieu, 2000). Food was not the only thing that was 
consumed differently since the migration boom. Energy also started to be consumed – 
in bottles. As the Forestry Department started a reforestation campaign in the 1980s, 
roads started being built and villages electrified. People started using less firewood 
particularly since the 1990s, with gas cylinders becoming relatively cheap. Recently, 
though, with increasing inflation many people reverted to burning wood for cooking 
again.200 
Apart from food and energy, many more things started to be utilised. Some of the first 
were electronic goods, often directly from the Gulf – the ubiquitous refrigerator, which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 As they did with the aesthetics of the coloured roofs.	  
200 In fact gas cylinders could be used as an indicator of wealth in this region.	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in many houses was not connected to the electricity supply, nor was it used as a 
refrigerator,201 the satellite dishes, the cassette players, the electronic alarm clocks, and 
the gold wristwatch, a mobile symbol of the Gulf migrant. These objects were more 
than just objects; they were symbols of status. They were not only valued for their use, 
but sometimes more for what they represented. Recently, after the earthquake, people 
started using tables and chairs to eat at. These items were not new, but often were only 
used when guests were around. Otherwise people usually just ate sitting on the floor 
around the stove in the kitchen. While this still happened throughout the vast majority 
of houses in this area for breakfast, many people started using furniture usually reserved 
for guests for themselves. And, as seen in chapter five, also after the earthquake the 
well-to-do households started building new roofs. Finally, for a long time people had 
been investing in education, not just quantity-wise, but quality-wise too. Of late, within 
this educational investment there was special preference for private schooling, which 
taught ‘good’ English and with extra-curricular activities. Ultimately, if someone in 
PaK did not want to produce food, there were not many more options of employment, 
except, of course, consumption-based jobs. 
 
From Kashmiri to Pakistani Dependency 
“People here used to work in agriculture. We used to grow maize, 
homemade chicken; maize and vegetables were even exported to Pakistan. 
Now it’s the other way around, everything is linked to Punjab, there’s 
nothing here – people don’t work here, there’s no opportunity.” Ali, bank 
manager at the bazaar. 
Pakistan-administered Kashmir and particularly what used to be the state of Poonch 
always had stronger links to Punjab than to the Kashmir Valley. Before Partition it 
would take people one day to reach Rawalpindi by foot, as compared to four days to 
reach Srinagar. Most of the migration during the British Raj was mainly towards 
Punjab.202 The languages spoken in this region, Pahari and Poonchi, are more closely 
related to Punjabi than Kashmiri. The Poonch Revolt, which sparked the first Indo-
Pakistani conflict and the division of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, started in this 
area and was considerably assisted by people from the other side of the Jhelum river in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 Often padlocked, in a way showing that it is an important object, worth protecting.	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Pakistan. When this part of the old State of Jammu and Kashmir came to be 
administered by Pakistan, the people of PaK relinquished their ability to independently 
dictate foreign policy, create their own law, or print their own currency. In other words, 
they became dependent on Pakistan.203 While in the first decades post-Partition people 
in this region continued to be self-sufficient, this self-sufficiency was largely based on 
attaining basic needs while having limited wants. The older generations often 
mentioned how generally poverty would cut across biraderis and that the definition of 
poverty changed over time and the bar was raised higher, so that some people who were 
now considered poor would have not been so five decades ago. 
With the migration boom to the Gulf countries there was primarily a shift in cereal 
consumption, when people started consuming less maize flour and more wheat flour. As 
PaK did not have the most suitable conditions to produce wheat at this scale it had to 
come from outside PaK, more precisely from the breadbasket of Pakistan, Punjab. As 
people’s incomes rose, their appetite for more elaborate foods also increased, many of 
which were rice-based, which again had to be imported from Pakistan. Following the 
energy-rich food imports came the nutrient-rich imports, namely vegetables and 
legumes and – reflecting a worldwide trend, whereby when incomes increase, sugar and 
fat consumption increases – sugar and desi ghee. With the increase in infrastructure, 
namely roads and electricity, the availability of these products became omnipresent and 
relatively affordable. As farming started to diminish soon many of these products 
became not only a want, but also a need. This need was not entirely generated by 
Pakistanis or Punjabis,204 as many of the traders were in fact from this region. 
The different Pakistani governments also played a role in this dependency. Like in 
Mirpur, where the stagnation of its economy had “been systematically under-developed 
as a consequence of policy decisions taken by governments located elsewhere, to whom 
the interests of the local population have been of little importance” (Ballard, 1983: 
128), this region’s economy was also not of importance for Pakistani policy-makers. If 
before 1947 this region was ‘underdeveloped’ because of being on the periphery of the 
State of Jammu and Kashmir, since then it has become a periphery of the Pakistani 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 Including recruitment to the Indian Army, as they were considered ‘Punjabi Mussulmans’.	  
203 Regardless of willingness to do so.	  
204 As often many disgruntled locals complained.	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state, which, apart from a few token endowments, never actively invested in the 
region.205 
As the levels of education rose, people started looking for better-suited employment, 
that is, employment that fulfilled their aspirations. As PaK had a very limited number of 
‘good jobs’ available, the options then were migration, either abroad to the Gulf or to 
the urban centres of Pakistan. In addition to migration for work, there was educational 
migration, given the limited number of higher education institutions in PaK. The 
younger generation started migrating to the main academic centres of Pakistan, aspiring 
to get ‘better education’ that would enable them to get a ‘better job’. Summing up, 
while Pakistan-administered Kashmir was politically dependent on Pakistan, over time 
it also became food dependent. This dependency was not exclusively created by 
Pakistan,206 but also by a society that, for the various reasons discussed earlier, shifted 
its focus from a traditional, hard-labouring subsistence livelihood to a ‘progressive’, 
service-dependent and market-based livelihood on its path to becoming ‘modern’. 
 
From Vita Activa to Vita Contemplativa 
Figure 13 – “There is no shame in household-level farming – Agriculture is a profession as well as a 
form of worship”, Lok Sanjh Foundation 
 
Throughout this region, agriculture was still associated with notions of pride and 
honour. This honour stemmed mostly from the ownership of means of production (land) 
and from being a zamindar. As a member of a lower-ranking biraderi put it, “if you can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 The same can be said of the whole of Pakistan.	  
206 But to which nonetheless heavily contributed by stifling its economy.	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produce [food] on your own, it means you have land”. This idea of being a producer 
was linked to being able to work one’s land, as compared to other people who laboured 
on someone else’s lands. Some people also believed that farming was a sacred 
profession because it had ancestral value; this value again being linked to the ownership 
of ancestral land, or mukami ghar (home of living). This was a strong reason why 
selling land was frowned upon, and considered acceptable only as a last resort, or when 
someone migrated and permanently settled somewhere else. In the latter case, such 
people stopped being considered hamsaya (neighbour). At the same time, being a 
farmer in this region also connoted a lack of mobility, which in turn was associated with 
not having migrated and not having enough education to have a salaried job. 
At a second level, farming was seen as a healthy option not only in terms of physical 
work, but because ‘healthy food’ was being produced. This food was healthy because it 
was organically produced, without artificial fertilisers and other chemicals, which again 
brought in the non-modernised view of agriculture in this region. There was a certain 
romanticism in this analysis, where the old way of farming was still seen as a ‘good’ 
way to produce food. This applied not only to food but to the entire way of living, with 
people preferring to walk rather than drive, a lifestyle that the older informants called 
the ‘good simple life’. Many older generations felt that this ‘simple life’ – connected 
with notions of frugality and living a modest life – was being lost because of new food 
habits, new types of jobs, migration and its negative impact,207 and too much education. 
One of the maulvi’s regular messages during the Jummah prayer sermons at the mosque 
in Chinati bazaar was for people to keep food habits, as well as lifestyles, simple. 
According to most of my informants, idleness was frowned upon in Islam. Work, they 
said, was seen not only as a right but also as a duty and an obligation, professing a kind 
of Weberian “Protestant work ethic”, which had been rediscovered in reformist Islam 
(Esposito, 1998: 80). This narrative though, was present across informants irrespective 
of religious sect, the basic tenet being that people must earn a living in an honourable 
way. For many people in this region agriculture was considered a form of worship – like 
in the Lok Sanjh Foundation message (Figure 13) – because it was a way of earning a 
livelihood working with one’s hands (hath ki kamai), just like, as Kashif explained to 
me, “all our prophets worked with their hands to earn their livelihoods”. They saw a 
clear relation between being idle and leaving the land idle. This was actually used as an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 The “fat wives and spoiled children” complex (see Chapter Five).	  
	   230	  
explanation for why many migrant households who had given up on farming would still 
hire someone to at least grow fodder in their fields to feed the animals. And it was this 
avoidance of land idleness that some NGOs used as a rationale for encouraging people 
to re-engage with agriculture in the region. The idleness of the returned migrant was a 
contested issue. Many informants – not Gulf migrants themselves – often mentioned 
how returned migrants from the Gulf would be seen “sitting on a rock” (being idle), and 
that they only worked abroad and did nothing once back home. While many returned 
migrants wanted to ‘act’ and became involved in the political and social life of the 
region, others felt that they had ‘done enough’ for the household, family, and biraderi 
and it was now time to dedicate oneself to more spiritual and intellectual activities. 
Many would devote their time to reading – mostly the Quran – and contemplating life. 
Aiming to experience the eternal (Arendt, 1958) they had shifted their activities from 
vita activa to vita contemplativa. 
 
Conclusion 
The storytellers of Chinati bazaar viewed the earthquake as a point of rupture between a 
bucolic, self-sufficient and communal past, and a modern, globally interdependent, and 
yet individualistic, future. According to the narratives and stories of the bazaar, the 
earthquake had resulted in the demise of agriculture. However, when these narratives 
are combined with people’s stories of active, everyday life and agricultural practices in 
these villages before the earthquake, a series of factors begin to emerge that have little 
to do with the earthquake itself, and that have actually been playing out slowly over a 
much longer period of time. The main amongst these is migration to the Gulf and other 
urban centres, and this is closely accompanied by associated factors such as an increase 
in education, increased access to capital for consumption, greater wealth differences and 
shifting gender roles. 
Despite people’s tendency to attribute the demise of agriculture to the impact of the 
earthquake, these other factors are able to provide more complete explanations for the 
shifts that occurred in both farming practices and in the ways people think about 
agriculture. These included a shift from traditional livelihoods to more modern and 
global occupations; from agriculture as ‘work’ to agriculture as ‘labour’; from farming 
being a male domain to it becoming a female activity; from being largely producers to 
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being primarily consumers; from self-sufficiency to food dependence; and finally, from 
living a ‘vita activa’ to living a ‘vita contemplativa’ in the case of returned migrants. 
These shifts meant that the way people conceptualised and engaged with agrarian 
production as an activity changed over time: it became the antithesis of being modern, 
reduced in importance to a type of labour, associated with household chores and, 
therefore, physically tied to the house, in contrast to the mobility of being a global 
migrant. Through these shifts agriculture had, indeed, been dying a slow death since the 
1970s. When the earthquake struck on 8th October 2005, these slow, blurred changes 
were suddenly brought into sharp focus and made more visible. 
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Chapter Eight 
The Continuity of Change in Chinati Bazaar: A Conclusion 
 
There is little the world knows about Pakistan-administered Kashmir (PaK), both in 
terms of the region and its people. This lack of knowledge was particularly evident in 
the aftermath of the 2005 earthquake that affected the lives of millions. It was during 
this period that I, as part of a research team trying to assess the impact of the 
earthquake, realised that this dearth of knowledge would have a serious negative impact 
on any ‘developmental’ project planned for this region. I returned to PaK three years 
after the earthquake with the aim of learning about it. The previous work I undertook in 
the region and the literature that I engaged with on disasters and vulnerability stimulated 
my initial research questions, veering them towards issues of social protection, 
resilience and remittances. However, once I had selected my field site, Chinati bazaar, 
and started to get to know its people, I was confronted with stories, myths, rumours and 
narratives about the earthquake and the changes that it had brought in its aftermath. I 
had come looking for affected populations and I found instead storytellers who – like 
Bashir – insisted on “telling me everything I needed to know”. 
There were two types of narratives that I heard in Chinati bazaar. The first talked almost 
exclusively of the earthquake and the vast changes it had brought with it. These stories 
saw the earthquake as a moment of rupture from which almost any type of change – 
both positive and negative – could be dated. The second referred to everyday life before 
the earthquake, and through these stories I was able to connect post-earthquake 
narratives of change to longer and older processes of change that pre-dated the 
earthquake but had become interwoven in the narratives of the earthquake. These 
‘other’ stories were largely about the impact of migration and globalisation that by most 
accounts had started in the 1970s. Some storytellers – like Ali Naqvi and Sardar 
Zulfiqar – told me older pre-Partition stories that dated the processes of migration and 
globalization from before the partition of India and Pakistan. Some, often younger, 
storytellers – like Imtiaz and Raza – told me stories about the future, of ‘becoming 
modern’, enmeshing the earthquake with the continuing processes of migration and 
globalisation. And then there were storytellers – like Omar and Kashif – who reminded 
me how, in all these stories, there were relations of connection and disconnection, 
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elements of exclusion and inclusion. Once I was back in the UK, I knew that I needed to 
tell these stories as stories; so like them, I too became a storyteller confabulating stories 
of continuous change in the lives of storytellers living around a rural bazaar in PaK. 
This thesis reads as a series of stories about change, about continuity, and about a group 
of people making sense of how certain critical events transformed their lives. These 
stories are also about how they decided to engage with these events and, through 
storytelling, reinvent a collective memory of the past and the future, because “narrative 
is action” and “action proceeds via narrative” (Osella and Osella, 2006: 582). As I 
stated in my introductory chapter, and argued through the other chapters, the earthquake 
was a point of rupture in the confabulated stories told by the storytellers of the bazaar, 
from which their collective memory dated its movement towards becoming modern and 
global. At the same time, the events surrounding the earthquake also served to highlight 
and emphasise more continuous processes of change that had been occurring over a 
longer period of time. For these reasons the work of Das and Jackson inspired me to 
look inside their stories, to see not only what they were telling me but also how they 
were choosing to frame these stories: which critical events were they talking about, how 
were they transformed into action, and how within their storytelling was “a vital human 
strategy for sustaining a sense of agency in the face of disempowering circumstances” 
(Jackson, 2006: 15). The work of Tsing and Ferguson was equally important in enabling 
me to see how the confabulated narratives on ‘becoming modern’ at the bazaar were not 
the product of a rupture caused by global forces acting on local places. The bazaar was, 
and had always been, a place that was both ‘global’ and ‘local’. 
Throughout this thesis I reflect on how people talk about certain processes. I follow, to a 
certain extent, Radcliffe-Brown’s philosophy of process, and of social life as a 
continuous process. According to him (1952, in: Ingold, 2008: 77) “the concrete reality 
with which the social anthropologist is concerned (…) is not any sort of entity but a 
process, the process of social life.” In a seminar held at the University of Chicago in the 
spring of 1937 he called for a Heraclitan view of the world as flux to support his 
processual view of reality (Radcliffe-Brown, 1957). By emphasising continuity through 
change Radcliffe-Brown’s understanding of social reality was comprehensively 
historical (Stanner, 1968, in: Ingold, 2008: 77). I follow a similar strategy in this thesis. 
I argue that despite the dramatic rupture of the earthquake in the lives of the storytellers 
of Chinati bazaar, the stories they told could be historicised within continuous processes 
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of social change, some of which pre-dated the earthquake by a few decades, while 
others had lasted a good part of the last century. I discuss how these processes of change 
were visible not only in their stories but also in the dynamics of social hierarchy, in the 
houses they built, in intra-family relations, in the mobility of women, and in their 
livelihood strategies. As Marx famously pointed out, men make their own history but do 
not do so under the conditions of their choosing. The earthquake was certainly a 
circumstance that no one chose, but it became one through which the storytellers of 
Chinati bazaar created their own history, as well as their future. 
 
The Bazaar as a Stage 
Crucial as it might have been to the making of their history – and despite often being 
signalled as the point of rupture between past and present – the earthquake was not the 
only factor of change in the region. One has to acknowledge other larger changes in 
which people from this region actively participated, particularly the more recent ones, 
such as migration and globalisation. General narratives of modernisation – often used as 
synonyms for globalisation and neoliberalism – still existed at the popular level, partly 
because many of the broad economic changes and ideological and political practices of 
governance characteristic of neoliberalism had been present in this region long before 
the earthquake. However, I am not inferring here that globalisation and neoliberalism 
should be seen as abstract external forces with unambiguous causal efficacy, which 
proceed to create a homogenous, convergent and levelled playing field, but as processes 
that they are (Kearney, 1995; Kingfisher and Maskovsky, 2008; Peck and Tickell, 
2002). And, as I previously mentioned, if we position ourselves to see social life as a 
continuity of change, social life as process, then we can see how these processes played 
out and were problematised in the bazaar, a place that was both ‘global’ and ‘local’. 
We can observe this problematisation in the way people at the bazaar described their 
collective past, or to be more precise, the way they tried to redefine themselves through 
their right to define a collective past. The rupture of the earthquake was used to break 
away from the past, by reinventing not only a new future but also a new past. In their 
collective memory, the creation of this new past allowed them to redefine themselves as 
modern and global, as well as different – from Pakistan and the other Kashmir. Yet, the 
global newness linked to globalisation creates distorted stereotypes of the past (Tsing, 
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2000). If we take a linear approach to development – like people who believe in 
modernisation projects do – before being modern and global one has to be traditional 
and local. Therefore, we need to reinvent and simplify the past. If the present society is 
egalitarian, in the past it had to be hierarchical; if its family structure is nuclear, in the 
past it had to be joint; if its women are empowered and physically mobile, in the past 
they were secluded and kept away from the public sphere; if it is dependent on global 
networks for labour markets and food consumption, in the past it was self-sufficient. 
We can observe how migration was seen at the bazaar as the key to engage with a 
modernisation project, aptly fitting the neoliberal principle of self-help (de Haas, 2010). 
The bazaar was filled with stories of how migrants ‘made it’ on their own, of how 
important family, kin and caste were key to their success, not only in capital creation 
but also on distribution and welfare. While acknowledging that this project created 
losers and winners through (local) policies of domination and discrimination, the 
mythical equalities and opportunities of circulation and exchange, of capital penetration 
(Tsing, 2000), were often used to condone such policies. Still, not all storytellers agreed 
with this project and some voices did exist against it, although at times subdued or too 
far from the bazaar to be heard. These were often the voices of the ones that did not reap 
the bounties of migration and remittances, the ones that felt they had less power now, 
and the ones that still felt unable to act (in an Arendtian sense) in society. 
We can also observe how in this modernisation project the key actor was the modern 
mobile individual. In their stories of ‘becoming modern’ there are at times undertones 
of neoliberal concepts of freedom and individuality, where the individual is free to 
participate in markets – and markets themselves free to act unhindered by the state 
(Kingfisher and Maskovsky, 2008). This freedom and individuality appears in their 
stories of the ‘new’ nuclear families, where the (male) migrant tries to break away from 
commitments to the extended family and portray himself as an individual first and a 
member of the community second. It also appears in their stories of love-cum-arranged 
marriages, where the youth – both boys and girls – seem to be (and allowed to be) more 
vocal on whom to marry and parents saying that they now place more importance on the 
characteristics of the individual rather than his/her family. And it appears in the 
professed and hotly debated changing position of women in society, with the notion of 
women as empowered individuals. 
Despite the apparent primacy of the individual, the community also had an important 
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role to play in this modernisation project. In the neoliberal process, as part of an 
entrepreneurial model, communities are co-opted and appropriated to replace the state 
in the responsibility for welfare and distribution (Elyachar, 2003; Kingfisher and 
Maskovsky, 2008; Peck and Tickell, 2002). This was visible at two levels: first, in how 
‘community’ was often redefined by decreasing the importance of biraderi and 
replacing it by (neutral) networks of mutual interest; second, in the way communities 
and other non-state actors, particularly NGOs, were to replace the state. Many saw the 
state as outdated, inefficient, ineffective, and corrupt, particularly in its efforts of post-
earthquake reconstruction and rehabilitation. Instead, NGOs and communities were 
often portrayed as the obvious future replacement for development to happen. Still, 
especially in the case of NGOs, there were many voices of discontent about how these 
agencies acted in the region – as there were voices reverberating de Haas’ (2010) point 
on how the state has a crucial role to play in shaping favourable conditions for 
development to occur. 
 
Lighting up the Bazaar’s Stage 
Until the electrification of these villages in the 1980s, people used to celebrate Shab-e-
Qadr208 (Night of Power) by lighting a muthah (a bundle of light) in front of their 
houses. The muthah was made by bunching together resinous pine sticks in which each 
stick represented a family member and the whole bunch represented the house. It was 
then put on a long pole in front of the house and lit at night, dotting the hills with light. 
My approach in this thesis to studying discourses of change is not unlike these muthahs. 
Following Tsing’s (2000: 347) suggestion that we “break down the units of culture and 
political economy through which we make sense of events and social processes...[to 
find] relatively coherent bundles of ideas and practices as realized in particular times 
and places” I present a series of stories about change bunched together in muthahs of 
ideas and practices as they were understood at a particular time and place. In one 
muthah discussed in Chapter Two I show that even though this area had historically 
always been part of a global project, even before Partition, its continuous peripheral 
status made people feel that they were never allowed to fully benefit from this project. 
In another muthah, presented in Chapter Three, I examine how the discourses of post-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 The night when the Quran was revealed to Muhammad.	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earthquake change were used to make sense of events, suffering and trauma, as well as 
to make political arguments not only about the past but also about the future. In the 
subsequent muthahs analysed in the following chapters, I investigate how people 
negotiated between moralities of equality and the realities of hierarchy (Chapter Four), 
how they debated a series of myths surrounding the house (Chapter Five), how men at 
the bazaar talked about women’s lives after the earthquake (Chapter Six), and how they 
explained the demise of agriculture in the region (Chapter Seven). Put together, all these 
muthahs bring to life a story of change and its continuity, for present within all these 
bundled stories were the two leitmotifs indicated in my first story of Chapter One: that 
the earthquake was a point of rupture in the confabulated stories at the bazaar from 
which the collective memory of its people dates its movement towards becoming 
modern and global; while simultaneously their narratives about events surrounding the 
earthquake also serve to highlight and emphasise more continuous processes of change 
that have been occurring over a longer period of time. 
Running as a common thread through these chapters are also the oft-repeated themes of 
modernisation, globalisation, and exclusion. According to the storytellers, before the 
earthquake migrants had had to leave home and go abroad in order to access change, but 
after the earthquake change had come to them, to Pakistan-administered Kashmir in 
general and to Chinati bazaar in particular. Their stories show that even though many 
people in PaK considered themselves global before the earthquake, the seclusion of 
their region had kept them from being modern. The earthquake gave them and the 
region an opportunity to become – or aspire to become – both global and modern. Their 
stories also show us the importance of connection and disconnection (Ferguson, 1999), 
as the elements of exclusion that permeated their global project were also often 
replicated in the post-earthquake assistance that flooded this region. In their 
confabulated collective memory of life before and after the earthquake the larger 
components of ‘being global’ and ‘becoming modern’ at times hide this exclusion. 
Therefore, I had to remain conscious of looking for the untold, censored or suppressed 
stories that were hidden within the bazaar’s narratives (Jackson, 2006). 
By retelling and analysing the stories of Chinati bazaar, I hope to have contributed to an 
increased knowledge and understanding of this region. At the most basic level, I have 
provided an ethnography of a region that is severely understudied and, that will 
hopefully serve as a foundation for further studies. At another level, this thesis is a 
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description of a ‘project’ that adds to Tsing’s (2000: 347) proposed collection of 
projects. The muthahs of ideas and practices as realised in particular times and places 
allow us to understand the “institutional proliferation of particular globalisation 
projects” in a globally informed investigation of global and local processes that avoid 
the pitfalls in which we fell many years ago with modernisation theory. And at yet 
another level this thesis contributes to the literature on disasters, especially on matters 
relating to the complexity of the interaction between disaster assistance and migration 
patterns. We know that migrant flows are contingent upon and stimulated through 
political and economic channels (Tsing, 2000; Gardner, 2012); and we know that 
migrant flows are often essential in the rehabilitation of disaster-affected populations. 
The stories of the bazaar add to this knowledge by highlighting that often post-disaster 
assistance flows are also stimulated through and contingent upon these same political 
and economic channels. This means that groups and individuals who do not benefit 
from migration connections might be further excluded during post-disaster assistance. 
Finally, by adopting a Heraclitan view of the continuity of change, this thesis 
contributes to a better understanding of how disasters such as the 2005 earthquake affect 
individuals differently within the same affected population, and how such events are 
then used differently by these populations and individuals to make sense of their 
collective past and future. In other words, I argue that we should see disasters as 
manifestations of continuously changing social systems. 
 
Other Actors, Other Stages 
In this thesis I look at a particular place and a particular time and I narrate a series of 
stories, myths, and rumours about several events that occurred in this place during this 
time. In Chapter One I used the allegory of the lihaaf and the razai to talk about how 
these confabulated stories of the earthquake, modernisation and globalisation were 
woven together by the storytellers of Chinati bazaar, and how these covered and 
explained their lives. But these lihaafs of stories are patchworked and embroidered, and 
there are still many patches that are either missing altogether within these stories, or that 
have not yet been embellished enough. I identify three of these missing patches here. 
Most glaringly, the voices of women are missing in this study. As a foreign male 
researcher in a conservative society, I had no direct access to the stories of the women 
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that lived in the six villages around Chinati bazaar. What I know of them comes from 
the stories of their men. These men told me that the biggest impact on women’s lives 
after the earthquake came from their increased physical mobility and their greater 
access to jobs. However, I do not know whether this is also what the women consider 
the greatest post-earthquake change in their lives. Further research that focuses on the 
lives of women and that goes beyond the bazaar into people’s houses – from the public 
into the private, from men’s world into women’s world – is, therefore, needed. 
In this study I conducted research in only one of many different regions of PaK that 
have different histories but were equally affected by the earthquake. It would be 
interesting to find out which of the stories discussed in this thesis are also being 
confabulated in other areas of PaK. What types of discourses of change did people 
develop in the urban bazaars of Bagh and Muzaffarabad; in other rural areas equally 
affected by the earthquake but with a much smaller migrant population; in the areas that 
were not affected by the earthquake but had equally large numbers of migrants; and 
finally, how are these stories being created and recreated, told and retold by migrant 
Kashmiri populations abroad in the Gulf or in the urban centres of Pakistan. 
The increase of terror attacks throughout Pakistan has also now reached PaK. An 
unfortunate consequence of the escalation and spread of terror attacks is that this region 
has started to become more secluded again. I noticed this trend close to the end of my 
fieldwork, when suddenly I started to get stopped and questioned by different members 
of the security apparatus not only each time I entered and left PaK, but also while 
moving within the region.209 Now that most international agencies have packed up and 
left PaK, headed to other stages and other disasters, and the ‘open door policy’ is now 
almost shut, it is once again becoming harder to conduct fieldwork in PaK. Despite the 
fact that the world now knows that there is ‘another Kashmir’, we still know very little 
about it. Far more research on the region is required, focused this time on these more 
recent changes that are now occurring because of terrorism and greater regional 
insecurity. The stories presented in this thesis can hopefully become the basis on which 
this future research can be built. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  209 Eventually I had to get myself a No Objection Certificate despite having a Pakistan Origin Card.	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Annex – List of Informants 
 
Gulf Migrants 
Ahmed (Mughal) waiter in Dubai, from Bagla 
Ammar (Mughal) retired head barman in Dubai, from Khorian 
Babar (Mughal) waiter in Dubai, from Thial 
Bashir (Mughal) returned Gulf migrant now shopkeeper, from Sarian 
Khalid (Mughal) returned Gulf migrant now trainer at vocational centre, from Khorian 
Mohammad Sheikh (Sheikh) returned Gulf migrant now trader, from Khorian 
Manshaat (Mughal) migrant in Dubai, from Basantkot 
Mushtaq (Mughal) Gulf agent, from Sarian 
Parvez (Mughal) returned Gulf migrant now shopkeeper, from Khorian 
Sheikh Ashraf (Sheikh) Gulf agent and businessman, from Sarian 
Siddiqui (Raja) migrant in Iraq, from Serabad 
Syed Ali Shah (Syed) Gulf agent and businessman, from Serabad living in Islamabad 
Yasin (Raja) returned Gulf migrant, from Searbad 
Zeeshan (Syed) businessman in Bagh city, from Moori Gali 
Zulfiqar (Mughal) returned Gulf migrant now a porter at the bazaar, from Thial 
 
Pakistan Migrants 
Aasim (Mughal) electrician in Karachi, from Sarian 
Abid (Syed) contractor, from Serabad 
Ali Azfar (Syed) ex-serviceman, from Khorian 
Ashfaq (Mughal) nurse in Karachi, from Thial 
Azfar Khan (Mughal) retired army cook in Pindi, from Sarian 
Fahad (Mughal) trader in Pakistan, from Sarian 
Faraz (Mughal) waiter in Lahore, from Khorian 
Imtiaz (Mughal) retired waiter in Lahore now shopkeeper, from Sarian 
Kashif (Mughal) retired driver in Karachi now shopkeeper, from Thial 
Mehmood (Khwaja) waiter in Lahore, from Basantkot 
Mohammad Azfar (Raja) ex-serviceman, from Bagla 
Omar (Mughal) retired mason in Karachi now newspaper seller, from Thial 
Sardar Zulfiqar (Sudhan) retired artist in Karachi, from Rawalakot 
Syed Ali Naqvi (Syed) advocate in Bagh city (previously in Lahore), from Serabad 
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Non-Migrants 
Abbas (Mughal) owner of the adda, from Sarian 
Abdullah (Mughal) unemployed, from Thial 
Abida (Mughal) female teacher at READ, from Khorian 
Amjad (Mughal) retired trader, from Sarian 
Aslam (Mughal) treasurer of the Khorian Social Welfare Association, from Khorian 
Ayub (Mughal) principal of READ, from Sarian 
Fatima (Syed) housewife, from Serabad 
Hameed (Mughal) mason, from Sarian 
Hamida (Mughal) housewife, from Bagla 
Jameela Bibi (Raja) housewife, from Serabad 
Khalil (Kiani) metre-reader for WAPDA, from Hothala 
Maulana Abdul (Mughal) maulvi at the bazaar, from Sarian 
Mehfooz (Mughal) shopkeeper, from Bagla 
Mira (Mughal) secondary school pupil, from Sarian 
Miryam (Mughal) secondary school pupil, from Sarian 
Mobeen (Mughal) district secretary and member of JKLF, from Thial 
Parveen (Mughal) housewife, from Sarian 
Qasim (Kiani) political agent, from Hothala 
Razia (Mughal) female schoolteacher at Al-Noor, from Bagla 
Rehana (Kiani) female schoolteacher at READ, from Hothala 
Saadia (Mughal) female schoolteacher at READ, from Sarian 
Safina (Mughal) housewife, from Sarian 
Sajida (Mughal) housewife, from Khorian 
Syed Ali Raza (Syed) schoolteacher, from Bagla 
Syed Hasnain (Syed) schoolteacher, from Serabad 
Syed Jaffer Saab (Syed) public school principal, from Serabad 
Tariq (Raja) unemployed, from Serabad 
Wasiq (Nai) mason and barber, from Moori Gali 
Yasir (Mughal) shopkeeper, from Bagla 
Zainab (Syed) female schoolteacher, from Serabad 
Zubaida (Mughal) housewife, from Thial 
 
In-Migrants 
Adam (Pukhtoon) labourer, from Lower Dir 
Ali (Narma) bank manager, from Bagh city 
Gulzar (Pukhtoon) contractor, from Upper Dir 
Jameela (Pukhtoon) housewife, from Lahore 
Khan Saab (Pukhtoon) labourer, from Mardan 
